Profit‐Sharing and Wages: An Empirical Analysis Using French Data between 2000 and 2007

Economic theory presents different arguments about how profit‐sharing may affect wages. First, profit‐sharing may substitute for the base wage. Second, profit‐sharing can be interpreted as an ‘efficiency wage’ that adds to the base wage and increases total compensation. The existing empirical literature has not determined which of these arguments is valid. This article attempts to address this issue for France between 2000 and 2007. Based on a difference‐in‐differences selection model, we show that bonuses in firms adopting profit‐sharing are too small to conclude whether it substitutes for or complements the base wage. While base wage levels are generally higher among profit‐sharing firms, changes in the base wage over this period are lower among firms that have had profit‐sharing for a number of years.     

Just a Question of Selection? The Causal Effect of Profit Sharing on a Firm's Performance

Using German firm panel data, we analyze the productivity effects of profit sharing. Because selectivity should pose a severe problem in this context, we combine matching with a difference‐in‐differences approach. This method enables us to rule out potential bias. Our results suggest that selectivity does indeed matter. Firms with very special characteristics apply profit sharing. We find that these establishments are already more productive before they decide to implement profit sharing. Nevertheless, after accounting for selection, our results show that the introduction of profit sharing leads to a significantly higher productivity in these firms.     

Profit sharing and market structure

We study how agents decide between working for firms with profit sharing and firms in which pay is based on individual productivity. Profit sharing has the disadvantages of free riding and adverse selection. The benefit of profit sharing is that it makes easier for agents to signal their productivity. We show that in equilibrium skilled agents are more likely to belong to profit sharing organizations. The analysis provides a framework for understanding the market structure of industries like law, accounting and consulting services in which both profit-sharing partnerships and “eat-what-you-kill” firms co-exist and compete with each other.     

Employment Change after Takeovers: The Role of Executive Ownership

The article examines the impact of executive ownership and other ownership and governance factors on employment change after takeovers. Drawing on a dataset of 235 takeovers, the results show that there is a reduction in employment in just over 50 per cent of the sample. Higher levels of executive share ownership are associated with lower probabilities of employee layoffs post‐takeover, and there is a positive relationship between executive ownership and employment growth. The effect of executive options on employment change is generally insignificant, as are the effects of other features of ownership and governance. The evidence suggests that executives with higher levels of ownership tend to mount takeovers of better‐performing firms and to implement takeovers aimed at growth.     

Who Works for Whom and the UK Gender Pay Gap

This study reports novel facts about the UK gender pay gap. We use a representative, longitudinal and linked employer–employee dataset for 2002–2016. Men's average log hourly wage was 22 points higher than women's in this period. We find that 16 per cent of this raw pay gap is accounted for by estimated firm-specific wage effects. This is almost three times the amount explained by gender occupation differences. When we decompose a pre-adjusted measure of the pay gap, we find less than 1 percentage point or a 6 per cent share is accounted for by the gender allocation across high- and low-wage firms. In other words, only a small share of what is traditionally referred to as the ‘unexplained’ part of the pay gap is explained by the differences between men and women in whom they work for.     

Incorporating Prior Information into A GMM Objective For Mixed Logit Demand Systems

Random parameters demand system estimates can generate upward sloping demands and imply margins outside of the theoretical bounds for profit maximization. If such violations are numerous enough, they can confound merger simulation exercises. Using Lerner indices for multiproduct firms playing static Bertrand games, we find that up to 35 per cent of implied margins for beer are outside the bounds. We characterize downward sloping demand and the theoretical bounds for profit maximization as prior information and extend the GMM objective function, incorporating inequality moments for product‐level own‐elasticities and brand level or product level Lerner indices. Very few violations remain when an inequality constrained estimator is used.     

Capital investment and employment in the information sector

Estimation of the employment effects of changes in capital investment is a standard tool in public policy debates. Typically, such predictions are based on employment multipliers derived from Input–Output analysis. In this paper, we measure the employment effects of changes in capital investment in the U.S. information sector by econometrically estimating an “employment multiplier” from historical data. The estimated multiplier is 10 information sector jobs for each million dollars in expenditure, and perhaps 24 new jobs per million dollars invested across the entire economy. Employment multipliers derived from the Input–Output methodology average about 16 jobs per million, but the multiplier includes jobs outside the information sector. Including employment spillovers, our estimates suggest the multipliers from Input–Output models are plausible. We also note that information sector jobs have substantially higher median earnings than the private sector average, so the economic significance of changes in information sector employment are greater than might first appear. Our findings may be useful in debates over changes in industry regulation that could affect investment.     

Is Profit Sharing Productive? A Meta-Regression Analysis

In this article, we re-examine the relationship between group-based profit sharing and productivity. Our meta-regression analysis of 355 estimates from 56 studies controls for publication selection and misspecification biases and investigates the impact of firm-level unionisation. Profit sharing is positively related to productivity on average, with a stronger relationship where there is higher unionisation. The positive effect of profit sharing on productivity is larger in cooperative firms and in transition economies. Separate meta-analysis of interactions suggests that profit sharing works better in combination with capital investment and employee participation in decisions.     

Employment and Local Public Sector Unions

This study examines the longitudinal effects of unionization on employment levels in 13, 749 departments of city and county government with unchanged union status between 1977 and 1982. The resluts demonstrate that, holding constant 1977 employment per capita, 1982 employment pr capita is 3.1 per cent higher in departments with bargaining units, compared to nonunion department. Employment levels in departments with nonbargaining associations are equal to nonunion levels, but associations may increase employment relative to levels employers would choose because they also set compensation above nonunion levels. The political context of local public sector employment is probably responsible for these effects.     

Profit Sharing and Productivity: Further Evidence from the Chemicals Industry

Profit sharing potentially augments productivity by affecting motivational variables that promote group norms favoring effort. A factor augmentation model of production is developed to measure the impact of profit sharing on productivity using a test industry in U.S. manufacturing. The model is applied using alternative exogenous and endogenous specifications for the profit-sharing incentive variable. The results are consistent with those obtained in other recent studies and suggest that profit sharing results in improvements in productivity.     

The Choice of Payment Schemes: Australian Establishment Data

We use Australian establishment data to estimate the determinants of incentive schemes. Hypotheses are drawn from the new economics of personnel and the strategic choice literatures. Larger firms are more likely to use individual schemes such as piece rates. Firms where female workers predominate or those facing stiff product market competition are more likely to use both piece rates and profit sharing. We also isolate the effects of monitoring, job security, and industrial relations climate.     

Profit Sharing and Public Policy: Insights for the United States

Nations differ in their approach to profit sharing, with policies ranging from nonintervention to mandatory sharing. Mounting evidence that profit sharing has a positive impact on employment and productivity has spurred some American legislators and economists to propose additional tax incentives. While this option has been effective in increasing the number of plans, a more prudent response would be the creation of a national tripartite body to accelerate and enhance the quality of profit-sharing research.     

Unions and Investment in British Manufacturing Industry

This paper is concerned with the impact of unions on the investment rate in British industry. On the basis of an analysis of some 72 industries in the manufacturing sector, we find that, ceteris paribus, firms that recognize manual unions and have an average level of union density invest some 23 per cent less than firms that do not recognize unions. However, once we allow for union effects on wages and productivity, this overall effect is reduced to between 4 and 13 per cent, depending on the degree of competition in the product market.     

The Effect of Unions on Productivity Growth, Investment and Employment: A Report on some Recent Work

Using two British microeconomic data sets, this paper reports the following. (1) Union firms experienced faster productivity growth during 1980–4, but there was no difference in performance in 1975–9, or 1985–6. So unions do not necessarily reduce productivity growth. It is also unlikely that the above pattern can be explained by changes in union legislation. (2) Unionism appears to have no significant effect on in vestment, once one allows for the effects of differential productivity growth. (3) Wages in union and non-union firms are equally responsive to changes in the capital–labour ratio. (4) Contrary to what is often alleged, unionism per se does not reduce employment growth. Instead, the negative correlation observed in 1980–4 probably arises from a significant reform of working practices in unionized firms during 1980–4.     

PRICE DISPERSION IN THE SMALL AND IN THE LARGE: EVIDENCE FROM AN INTERNET PRICE COMPARISON SITE

This paper examines four million daily price observations for more than 1,000 consumer electronics products on the price comparison site http://Shopper.com . We find little support for the notion that prices on the Internet are converging to the 'law of one price.' In addition, observed levels of price dispersion vary systematically with the number of firms listing prices. The difference between the two lowest prices (the 'gap') averages 23 per cent when two firms list prices, and falls to 3.5 per cent in markets where 17 firms list prices. These empirical results are an implication of a general 'clearinghouse' model of equilibrium price dispersion.     

Franchisor–franchisee supply chain cooperation: Sharing of demand forecast information in high-tech industries

In order to maintain their competitive edges in the market, high-tech firms cannot simply rely on superior technology alone. In addition, due to rapid technological changes, market demands in the high-tech industries have become volatile and difficult to forecast. This study proposes an option (i.e. franchising) that high-tech firms can use in order to expand their markets and improve firm performance. We also utilize a Bayesian forecasting methodology in order to address information sharing between the franchisor and franchisee. Our study demonstrates how high-tech franchising firms can benefit from information sharing of demand forecasts when franchising in order to enhance franchise performance. We also show that a profit sharing mechanism that results in optimal profits for the franchisor and franchisee. The study fills the research gaps that currently exist in the franchising literature and provides important managerial implications for practitioners in B2B markets.     

Social Partnership Agreements in Britain: Labor Cooperation and Compliance

This article reviews evidence on the outcomes of British social partnership agreements using matched comparisons. It concludes that in industries marked by employment decline, partnership firms often have shed jobs at a faster rate than nonpartnership firms. However, in expanding sectors, partnership firms have created jobs at a faster rate than nonpartnership rivals. There is no discernible impact of partnership on either wage settlements or union density. It is argued that we need evidence on information sharing, trust, and power and suggested that partnership agreements are unlikely to contribute significantly to union revitalization.     

First Degree Price Discrimination Goes to School

Personalized pricing is widely discussed but seldom observed, making studies of its efficacy rare. Yet, first degree price discrimination is common in the pricing of higher education, and I use data on prices and the characteristics of students admitted to a professional graduate program at a public university to estimate a matriculation demand function. I then derive linear pricing functions that maximize revenue for a target number of students. By allowing these functions to depend on progressively richer sets of observables, I explore the effect of personalization of pricing on profit. Tailoring prices to a one‐dimensional measure of student quality would raise revenue by 2.2 per cent above the revenue with uniform pricing. Pricing based on both student quality and state residency raises revenue by 8.4 per cent, and further tailoring based on available observables raises prices 9.0 per cent above the maximum revenue under uniform pricing. Pricing that obeys current statutory tuition limits raises revenue less but still by just over half as much. I also infer the welfare weights that the pricing process implicitly attaches to student characteristics.     

Effects of Deregulation and Vertical Unbundling on the Performance of China's Electricity Generation Sector

The restructuring of the Chinese electricity sector in 2002 reshaped the market structure by vertically unbundling the dominant integrated firm and started the process of wholesale price liberalization. We estimate factor demands to study whether these reforms boosted productivity in the generation segment of the industry. Controlling explicitly for price‐heterogeneity across firms and unobservable productivity shocks, we find that the reforms are associated with reductions in labor and material use of 7 and 5 per cent, respectively. These effects only appear two years after the reforms and are robust to many specification checks. The absolute magnitudes of the estimated restructuring effects vary in intuitive ways by location, firm size or age, and for different definitions of restructured firms.     

Profit Sharing for Increased Training Investments

This article investigates whether paying a profit‐related wage stimulates training investments. The results point to increased worker effort and wage flexibility as two channels through which profit sharing enhances investments in training. While both effects are found for young workers, for older workers, profit sharing mainly affects training investments through greater worker effort. The results suggest that profit sharing can be especially useful for stimulating training among older workers, a growing group in the labour force with a relatively weak labour market position due to a lack of training.