Insider ownership and dividend signals: Additional evidence from the banking industry

This study investigates the relationship between the concentration of insider ownership and the share-price response to dividend-policy changes implemented by bank holding companies (BHCs). Using a cross-industry sample, previous research (Born 1988) found that there are differences in the magnitude of the share-price response to dividend initiations which may be explained by the concentration of insider ownership of the sampled firms. We hypothesize that the concentration of insider ownership does not play a role in differences in share price for BHCs due to the presence of regulatory monitors. The results of this study support our hypothesis.     

Firm performance and the political economy of corporate governance: survey evidence for Bulgaria,Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia

Using survey data for 220 traditional manufacturing firms over 7 years of transition and 4 Central Eastern Europe (CEE) countries, we find firms that produced for the EU market under planning consistently outperform those that produced for the CMEA market. Within the previously CMEA market, the best firms were selected to outside privatisation and outperformed insider/state owned firms. Outside privatisation was resisted in EU oriented firms and ownership was found to have no effect on performance. Path dependent demand shocks and political constraints on the sequencing of state firms to private ownership determine the relationship between firm performance and ownership structure during transition.     

Friend or foe? Employee ownership and CEO dismissal

This paper examines 2 research questions. First, does the level of employee stock ownership impact the likelihood of dismissing poorly performing chief executive officers (CEOs)? Second, does the level of employee stock ownership affect the likelihood of appointing an outsider or an insider after the dismissal of an incumbent CEO? We suggest that employee stock ownership reinforces the firm performance—CEO dismissal link because employee shareholders' welfare consisting of fixed claims (wages, bonuses, etc.), residual claims (dividends, increase in stock value, etc.), and human capital (generic and idiosyncratic) are highly linked to their firm performance. Moreover, under conditions of poor performance, employee shareholders are likely to favor an outsider CEO because he or she is more likely to initiate and implement drastic changes to the strategy of the firm, and therefore, he or she is more likely to improve firm performance. Drawing on a longitudinal sample of French firms, we find that employee stock ownership strengthens the negative relationship between firm performance and CEO dismissal likelihood. We find also that the higher employee ownership, the more likely that the underperforming CEO is replaced by an outsider. In contrast, employee ownership has no moderating impact on the likelihood of insider CEO appointment.     

Corporate governance and firm efficiency: evidence from China's publicly listed firms

This paper applies a two‐stage, double bootstrapping data envelope analysis approach to investigate whether and to what extent various distinctive corporate governance practices affect productive efficiency in a sample of 461 publicly listed manufacturing firms in China between 1999 and 2002. We find that firm efficiency is negatively related to state ownership while positively related to public and employee share ownership. In addition, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm efficiency is U‐shaped, indicating the presence of tunneling activities by the largest shareholder. Among three types of controlling shareholder, state exerts the most negative impact on firm efficiency, followed by state‐owned legal entities. These results provide strong evidence that political interferences have reduced firm efficiency. It shows that the proportion of outside directors and the number of board meetings are positively associated with firm efficiency, suggesting that board of directors can be an effective internal governance mechanism. Furthermore, provincial market development, a proxy for the strength of external governance mechanism, is positively related to firm efficiency. Overall, our findings illustrate that restructuring state‐owned enterprises via improvements in corporate governance has enhanced firm efficiency, but partial privatization without transfer of ownership and control from the state to the public remains a major source of inefficiency in corporate China. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ownership Concentration,Institutional Development and Firm Performance in Central and Eastern Europe

This paper analyzes the relationship of ownership concentration and firm performance in the context of different institutional environments in 28 Central and Eastern European transition economies. We focus on private, non‐listed firms that have been largely neglected by the extant literature. Using the BEEPS data for the period from 2002 to 2009 we find an inverted u‐shaped relation of ownership concentration and firm performance for those firms that operate in non‐EU‐member countries as well as those firms that are situated in less developed institutional systems. We interpret these findings as evidence for a classic agency problem in the lower part of the ownership concentration distribution that is dominated by a ‘private benefits of control’ problem with rising ownership concentration. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Employee ownership and firm performance: a meta‐analysis

Employee ownership has been an area of significant practitioner and academic interest for the past four decades. Yet, empirical results on the relationship between employee ownership and firm performance remain mixed. To aggregate findings and provide potential direction for future theoretical development, we conducted a meta‐analysis of 102 samples representing 56,984 firms. Employee ownership has a small, but positive and statistically significant relation to firm performance ( = 0.04). The effect is generally positive for studies with different sampling designs (samples assessing change in performance pre‐employee–post‐employee ownership adoption or samples on firms with employee ownership), different performance operationalisation (efficiency or growth) and firm type (publicly held or privately held). Suggesting benefits of employee ownership in a variety of contexts, we found no differences in effects on performance in publicly held versus privately held firms, stock or stock option‐based ownership plans or differences in effects across different firm sizes (i.e. number of employees). We do find that the effect of employee ownership on performance has increased in studies over time and that studies with samples from outside the USA report stronger effects than those within. We also find little to no evidence of publication bias.     

The Effects of a Separation of Ownership from Control on UK Listed Firms: An Empirical Analysis

There has been a wide‐ranging debate concerning the effects of the separation of management and ownership of large firms. Given recent issues concerning corporate remuneration, this debate is as relevant and possibly more so today as it has ever been. Theoretically, as the ownership of a firm becomes more diverse, the management of the firm will have more discretion and opportunity to act in accordance with their own interests at the expense of those of the shareholders. This paper considers the effect of a separation of ownership from control on 406 UK listed firms. Simultaneous equations are used to test for a relationship between the percentage of shares owned by significant outsiders and insiders and the performance of the firm. A number of authors have suggested that there may be a significant relationship between these variables. The analysis conducted in this study supports the view that there is a relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ownership structure, corporate governance and productive efficiency in China

This paper investigates whether and to what extent ownership structure and corporate governance affect productive efficiency in a sample of 744 publicly listed manufacturing firms in China between 1999 and 2006. The paper finds that firm efficiency, as estimated using stochastic frontier analysis and data envelopment analysis, is negatively related to state ownership while positively related to public and employee share ownership. In addition, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm efficiency is U-shaped, indicating that the largest shareholder may engage in tunneling activities. As the identity of the largest shareholder changes from government, government-controlled legal entity to other types of legal entity, firm efficiency significantly improves. These results provide strong evidence that political interferences have reduced firm efficiency. Moreover, firms with more independent board are more efficient, supporting the argument that board of directors can be an effective internal governance mechanism. Furthermore, provincial market development, a proxy for the strength of external governance mechanism, is positively related to firm efficiency. Overall, the findings illustrate that restructuring state-owned enterprises via improvements in corporate governance has enhanced firm efficiency, but partial privatization without transfer of ownership and control from the state to the public remains a major source of inefficiency in corporate China.     

The Relationship between Slack Resources and the Performance of Entrepreneurial Firms: The Role of Venture Capital and Angel Investors

In this study, we seek to further delineate factors that condition the relationship between slack resources and firm performance. To do so, we develop and test a model that establishes the role of venture capital (VC) and angel investors as powerful external stakeholders who positively moderate the slack–performance relationship. In addition, we provide more insight into this relationship by examining differences between these two types of private investors and by examining the role of their ownership stakes. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 1215 private firms, including VC‐backed firms, angel‐backed firms, and similar firms without such investors. We find that the presence of VC investors positively moderates the relationship between both financial and human slack resources and firm performance, while angel investors only positively moderate the effect of human resource slack. Further, VC investors are only marginally better at helping entrepreneurs to extract value from human resource slack than angel investors and they are no better when it comes to financial slack. Finally, we find that the impact of financial and human resource slack on firm performance is more positive in VC‐backed firms when investors hold high ownership stakes, an effect which is significantly stronger than when angel investors hold high ownership stakes.     

Large shareholders and firm value: Are high-tech firms different?

This paper explores the relationship between ownership structure and firm value in firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. The results of the estimations, taking into account simultaneity and reverse causality, show that the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value differs across firms belonging to the sector of innovative technologies and more ‘mature’ firms. The results give support to the hypothesis that ‘mature’ firms with higher ownership concentration are likely to perform better than firms with more dispersed ownership. In contrast, in high-tech companies, with large share of knowledge related activities, higher ownership concentration is associated with lower firm value. This effect is robust to various alternative specifications.     

Director Ownership and Voluntary Segment Disclosure: Hong Kong Evidence

Weakness of corporate governance and lack of transparency are often considered causes of or contributors to the Asian Financial Crisis. Publicly listed companies in Hong Kong, like other Asian firms, have concentrated director ownership. The study uses voluntary segment disclosure above the benchmark minimum as a proxy for transparency and examines its relationship to the ownership structure and composition of corporate boards in Hong Kong. We find that: (1) high (concentrated) board ownership explains the extent of low voluntary segment disclosure and this negative relationship is stronger when firm performance is very poor; (2) the contribution of non‐executive directors to enhance voluntary segment disclosure is effective for firms with low director ownership but not for concentrated‐ownership firms. These results have implications for policy makers and regulators in the Asia‐Pacific region striving to improve governance and transparency.     

Employee motivation,external orientation and the technical efficiency of foreign‐financed firms in China: a stochastic frontier analysis

By using a stochastic frontier model, we have identified several firm‐specific attributes as determinants of technical efficiency in foreign‐financed manufacturing firms in southern China. The empirical results suggest a strong association between efficiency and employee motivation, which includes the use of bonus incentives and flexibility in employment policy. In terms of the external orientation behavior of firms, the findings do not support the export/efficiency relationship. Sample firms with a high degree of export‐orientedness were less efficient, possibly due to the high transaction costs in China of exportation. As for the effects of expatriate input on production, our empirical evidence revealed that firms with a relatively high expatriate ratio performed less efficiently than others did. These two findings may have significant implications for the marketing strategies and management (including the localization) of human resources of foreign‐financed firms in China. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An investigation of causality between insider transactions and stock returns

Prior research shows that corporate insiders engage in profitable transactions by trading securities of their own firms. The main purpose of this study is to examine whether insider transactions and stock returns have causality relationships at the firm level for a sample of 2,521 firms during the period 1988 to 1998. We find a large impact of stock returns on subsequent insider transactions at both the aggregate and firm levels. The impact appears to be negative which suggests that insiders buy after stock price decreases and sell after stock price increases. Our findings on the predictive content of insider transactions for subsequent stock returns are primarily consistent with prior literature. We observe a positive but weak relationship between insider transactions and future stock returns.     

Employee ownership heterogeneity and firm performance in China

Employee ownership (EO) has gained increasingly significant attention from both business practitioners and policy makers in China. Through the examination of the implementation of EO by China's listed firms from 1992 to 2017 with a total of 3,396 firms and 36,559 firm‐year observations, we explored the relationship between EO implementation and firm performance. In general, we found that over time, EO firms outperform non‐EO firms in China, and the influence of EO is only different in nuanced aspects in different time periods according to the change of policies. The data from the most recent period, that is, 2014–2017, indicate that EO adopters have higher performance than matched non‐EO firms both before and after adoption, but the relative performance does not increase after adoption. We further examined the interactive effect between EO and executive stock ownership (ESO) schemes and found that the adoption of ESO weakens the positive relationship between EO and firm performance. Regarding different types of EO, we found lower performance in companies with high return rights but no control rights, and we found better performance when high return rights are combined with control rights. We suggested policy and managerial implications on the basis of the findings.     

Option introduction and insider trading in the NASDAQ/NMS equity market

This paper investigates and supports the hypothesis that insiders have an incentive to shift their informed trading activities when options initially are listed for a firm. Firm size is found to be related to the level of insider trading activity. There is a significant decrease in insider equity-market volume for the smallest third of firms, a significant increase in insider-equity market volume for the middle third of firms, and a significant decrease in insider equity-market volume for the largest third of firms. This supports the hypothesis of a difference in the degree of impact on equity volume upon option introduction based upon firm size. This research provides additional evidence of informed trading activities when option introduction, insider trading, and firm size are considered simultaneously.     

Are firms with state ownership greener? An institutional complexity view

This study investigates the role of state ownership in green innovation from the institutional complexity viewpoint. We posit that state ownership can be characterised by two seemingly competing logics: institutional logic, which emphasises that firms with state ownership can acquire resources to promote innovation; and efficiency logic, which states that firms with state ownership have low resource utilisation effectiveness. On the basis of the integration of both views, we suggest a U‐shaped curvilinear relationship between state ownership and green innovation. Data from Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2015 confirm our hypothesis. Moreover, we also find two macro‐level contingencies that moderate this relationship: regional innovation readiness and industrial competition. The U‐shaped relationship between state ownership and green innovation is more pronounced when regional innovation readiness and industrial competition are higher. This study advances previous research on environmental innovation by arguing that state ownership is characterised by institutional complexity rather than being a monolithic construct.     

Patterns of corporate governance and technical efficiency in Italian manufacturing

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relationship between the corporate governance system and technical efficiency in Italian manufacturing. We use a non‐parametric frontier technique (DEA) to derive technical efficiency measures for a sample of Italian firms taken from nine manufacturing industries. These measures are then related to the characteristics of the corporate governance system. Two of these characteristics turn out to have a positive impact on technical efficiency: the percentage of the company shares owned by the largest shareholder and the fact that a firm belongs to a pyramidal group. Interestingly, a trade‐off emerges between these influences, in the sense that one is stronger in industries where the other is weaker. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Privatisation,corporate control and employment growth: Evidence from a panel of large Polish firms, 1996–2002

Using data on Polish firms this paper examines the relationship between corporate control structures, sales growth and the determinants of employment change. Privatised and de novo firms are the main drivers of employment growth; in the case of de novo firms, it is foreign ownership which underpins the result. Being privatised has a positive impact on employment but this is concentrated within a range of 3–6 years after privatisation. There are no systematic differences in employment response to negative sales growth across the ownership categories. Employment in state firms is less responsive to positive sales growth. From these results we infer that the behaviour of state firms is affected by both insider rent sharing and binding budget constraints.     

Entrepreneurial human capital,equity concentration and firm performance: Evidence from companies listed on China's Growth Enterprise Market

In this work, a sample of firms listed on China's Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) is employed to investigate the impact of human capital and equity concentration on firm performance. It shows that entrepreneurs' education level, industry experience and technical professional background have a positive impact on firm performance. Moreover, the higher the equity concentration, the better a firm's performance. Entrepreneurs with rich industry experience and a technical professional background tend to collect and condense equity, thereby increasing equity concentration. These findings reveal the relationship between entrepreneurial human capital and ownership concentration and enrich research on firm performance.     

Insider Trading, Earnings Management and Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence Based on Hong Kong Firms

We document positive association between earnings management and insider selling after the fiscal year‐end for Hong Kong firms. This positive association is especially evident before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Our findings suggest that Hong Kong executives manage reported earnings to maximize their private benefits from insider selling. Additionally, we find that a higher proportion of independent directors (INED) on corporate boards moderate the positive association between insider selling and earnings management. Stricter monitoring of earnings management by INED is especially evident when no member of the family with majority ownership is present on corporate boards as a director. This suggests that the presence of family members with majority ownership on corporate boards significantly reduces INED's monitoring effectiveness. Our findings suggest that strict regulations are needed to control insider trading, and independence of corporate boards is important for monitoring of earnings management associated with insider trading. Furthermore, appointment of family members with majority shareholdings should be avoided to enhance independence and to monitor effectiveness of corporate boards.