事务所转制效果存在差异吗？——原因与后果

借助理论模型将会计师事务所转制对审计质量及审计收费的影响纳入一个整合的分析框架,推导出影响转制效果的关键因素：除审计师法律责任的增加程度以外,客户经营风险以及转制前审计质量水平也同样影响审计质量及审计收费的提高。基于2007—2015年中国A股上市公司数据,在控制了客户经营风险之后进行实证研究,结果表明审计质量及审计收费的提升确实在初始审计质量较低的中小型事务所样本中更加显著。进一步研究发现,在事务所转制的过程中及完成后,更多的审计客户从中小型事务所转换为前十大事务所,且这种客户流动趋势在异常审计收费较高的样本中更加显著。     

Legal Liability,Government Intervention,and Auditor Behavior: Evidence from Structural Reform of Audit Firms in China

This paper investigates how legal liability influences audit quality and audit fees, particularly in the presence of government intervention. Since 2010, all Chinese audit firms were required to transform from a structure of limited liability company (LLC) to limited liability partnership (LLP), which removes the cap on the liability exposure of negligent auditors. By adopting this natural experiment, we document the following findings: first, after audit firms reorganize as LLPs, auditors are more likely to (1) issue modified audit opinions and going-concern opinions, (2) constrain clients’ earnings management, and (3) charge a premium in audit fees, which suggest that exerting unlimited legal liability on negligent auditors improves both audit quality and audit fees. Second, the effect of the LLP adoption is more pronounced when auditors are from local audit firms, and clients are controlled by local governments. Further analyses suggest that the stock prices of clients positively react to the reform event, which indicates that LLP adoption improves the overall value of audits. In summary, our empirical findings are consistent with the argument that legal liability is able to effectively shape auditor behavior in emerging markets where the other institutional mechanisms are relatively weaker and government intervention is heavy.     

The Empirical Research on Auditor Independence and Mandatory Auditor Rotation

Using, the method of correlation coefficient, this paper discusses the empirical relationship between audit tenure and audit opinion in annual reports in China A-share market and period of mandatory rotation of auditor. The research finds that the negative correlation between auditor tenure and non-standard unqualified audit opinion is statistically significant, and auditor tenure might impair his/her independence. To enhance auditor independence and improve audit quality, it is necessary to rotate mandatory auditor. The results also fred that consecutive auditing years should not exceed 5 years when the existing auditor has been the auditor of listed company, and mandatory rotation of auditor adapts to the rotation of CPA firms in charge of a client.     

会计师事务所内部治理机制研究——基于立信会计师事务所的治理实践

加强会计师事务所内部治理机制建设是提高会计信息质量和注册会计师审计质量的重要保证,是促进资本市场健康稳定发展、维护社会公众利益的重要举措,是实施会计行业国际化发展战略的重要基础工程。本文全面阐述了立信会计师事务所转制为特殊普通合伙后的内部治理实践,以期为完善我国会计师事务所的内部治理机制提供经验借鉴和政策建议。     

审计师轮换类别与审计结果——基于“关系”的视角

审计师强制轮换制度能够从制度上对审计师独立性给予一定程度的保证,而社会关系的存在会对审计师的独立性产生影响,但同时也能够增加前后任审计师工作交接的效率。以2007—2019年签字审计师轮换为样本研究发现,同一事务所内签字审计师的变更会使得后任审计师出具清洁审计意见的可能性提升,后任审计师审计当年发生财务重述的可能性较低,且可操纵性应计利润较低。但是,后任审计师获取的审计费用并没有显著降低。与不同事务所之间的签字审计师轮换相比,同一事务所审计师轮换情况下,由于更易进行信息共享与沟通,后任审计师的审计质量更高,且与前任审计师审计质量相比,后任审计师审计质量有所提升。     

客户关系变动提高了审计费用吗？

在全球供应链不断发展的形势下，稳定的供应链关系愈发重要。从审计师风险应对视角探讨客户关系变动是否以及如何影响审计费用。实证结果表明，客户关系变动显著增加了审计费用。机制检验发现，客户关系变动使审计师加大审计投入并感知到更高的审计风险，进而收取更高的审计费用。进一步探究客户关系变动的原因及其对审计费用的影响后发现，客户自身面临财务困境时引发客户关系变动，提高了审计费用;但当企业经济政策不确定性较高时却降低了客户关系变动，从而降低审计费用。基于事务所层面和企业层面的异质性检验还发现，客户关系变动与审计费用的正向关系主要体现在高资质事务所、客户集中度较高和治理水平低的企业中。研究结论为探讨客户关系变动的经济后果提供了新的证据和视角，对当下中国如何进行供应链风险管理具有启示意义。     

低质量审计是审计师个人特质导致的特例吗？——基于“污点”签字注册会计师的研究

在签字注册会计师层面研究低质量审计的发生原因时发现:审计失败被发现前,与同所未受罚签字注册会计师相比,受到证监会处罚的签字注册会计师的审计质量持续较低;部分受罚签字注册会计师因事务所合并而被动进入质量控制较好的环境中,其审计质量较合并前有显著改善。这说明在相同质量控制体系下,低质量审计是由审计师个人特质导致的特例;而良好的质量控制有助于抑制"污点"签字注册会计师个人特质对审计质量的不利影响。     

审计师行业专长与审计质量关系研究——基于客户规模视角

目前,我国国内学术界对于基于不同客户规模的审计师行业专长与审计质量关系的研究还不多。以2002年至2009年中国舞弊上市公司为研究样本,通过多元回归分析发现:审计师行业专长可以显著提高审计质量;在大客户市场上,审计师行业专长对审计质量提高的作用受到很大的限制和削弱,这可能是由于审计师对大客户审计时难以保持应有的独立性所致。     

审计报告中的审计责任:演进与反思

审计报告中的审计责任经历了从"无"到"有"、从"具体"到"规范"和从"规范"到"强化"的过程.在审计报告中适当反映审计责任是注册会计师充分发挥审计鉴证职能与合理规避审计责任和审计风险两者之间艰难抉择的结果.现行审计报告中对注册会计师责任的界定只是注册会计师与报告使用人之间一种直接的沟通方式,并非是唯一的、最有效的沟通方式.     

审计任期与审计独立性——持续经营审计意见的经验研究

以注册会计师是否因财务方面存在可能导致公司持续经营能力问题的事项或情况对上市公司出具持续经营审计意见作为审计独立性的衡量指标,分别从签字注册会计师任期与会计师事务所任期两个角度具体考察了审计任期与审计独立性之间的关系。结果发现,无论是注册会计师任期,还是事务所任期,审计任期越长,审计独立性就越低。这为我国已实施的签字注册会计师强制轮换政策的合理性提供了经验支持。     

诉讼风险如何影响事务所低价揽客经济后果?——来自公司盈余管理的经验证据

近年来,会计师事务所低价揽客行为频发,其经济后果受到广泛关注。在此背景下,基于诉讼风险视角,实证检验事务所低价揽客行为对企业盈余管理的影响。研究发现,存在低价揽客行为的事务所审计的客户公司有着更高程度的盈余管理,但这种关系主要由非十大所的低价揽客行为所驱动;当诉讼风险增加时,事务所低价揽客与公司盈余管理之间的正向关系有所减弱,诉讼风险的这种调节作用主要存在于非十大所审计的企业以及进行正向盈余管理的企业中。这些结果表明,与大所相比,小所的低价揽客行为在加剧企业盈余管理方面产生的经济后果更为严重,而较高的诉讼风险可缓解这一行为带来的不良后果。因此,抑制企业盈余管理,应有针对性地规范小所的审计定价行为,加大其低价揽客行为的诉讼成本。     

What matters in disclosures of key audit matters: Evidence from Europe

New regulation in the European Union has introduced the mandatory disclosure of key audit matters (KAMs) to audit reports. The EU has identified KAMs as significant risks, significant transactions or events, or significant judgments by auditors. This paper aims to determine the factors that influence the number of KAMs that auditors disclose in the main European countries under the new regulation. We predict that the litigation risk, reputation loss, auditor–client relationship, precision of accounting standards, and the effect of regulators and supervisors’ activities affect the number of KAMs that auditors disclose. The sample consists of firms on the FTSE 100, CAC 40, or AEX 25 that have disclosed KAMs at the 2016 fiscal year‐end. In line with our hypotheses, the findings show that a higher number of business segments (complexity) and more precise accounting standards lead to the disclosure of a higher number of KAMs. Contrary to our expectations, the results indicate that a positive association exists between the audit fee and the number of KAMs disclosed. As audit fees can be related to higher client risk, this finding could indicate that litigation risk dominates any auditor–client dependence. Further, although auditors often view their audits of banks as complex, the findings show a negative association between banks and the number of disclosed KAMs. This evidence may be related to the fact that financial institutions are in a highly regulated and supervised industry that reduces the need to disclose the KAMs.     

审计职业声誉损害、独立性与市场反应

独立审计是降低信息不对称程度和缓解委托代理成本的有效机制,其作用的发挥取决于审计质量,而职业声誉是市场衡量审计质量的便捷标准,注册会计师职业声誉的损害是否会削弱社会公众对审计质量的评价,进而影响市场对公司价值的判断?文章以2002年3月中国注册会计师协会发布的未通过年检的五家会计师事务所作为切入点,研究声誉受损对其主审上市公司累计异常回报率的影响,结果发现异常回报率显著为负,而且这种负面反应的程度与上市公司的委托代理成本相关,但与独立性不存在显著关系。     

签字注册会计师重新上任会影响审计质量吗? ——来自强制轮换签字注册会计师公司的经验证据

以2003—2017年沪深两市A股上市公司中发生签字注册会计师强制轮换的公司为研究样本,研究签字注册会计师强制轮换后重新上任对审计质量的影响以及事务所规模对此影响的调节作用,并考察这种调节作用在财务状况不同的上市公司间的差异。研究结果表明：签字注册会计师强制轮换后重新上任会降低审计质量;大规模会计师事务所能有效削弱签字注册会计师重新上任对审计质量的降低效应;相比财务状况较好的公司,事务所规模在财务状况较差公司中的调节作用更加显著。研究结论可以为完善签字注册会计师轮换制度以及加强对注册会计师行业的监管提供经验支持和价值参考。     

Ownership concentration,modified audit opinion,and auditor switch: New evidence and method

This study investigates: 1) how does the ownership structure of listed firms influence the relation between their earnings management behavior and auditor opinion; 2) how does the ownership structure influence the relation between the auditor opinion and auditor switch. We find that the level of listed firms’ earnings management is positively associated with the propensity of being issued modified audit opinions (MAOs) by auditors when their ownership structure is highly concentrated. However, the issuance of MAOs is not associated with the auditor switch under such condition. On the contrary, a high level of earnings management is not associated with the propensity of being issued MAOs when firms’ ownership structure is less concentrated. Further, the issuance of MAOs may increase the likelihood of auditor switch. The empirical findings suggest that auditors may cater for the preferences of the real controller of listed firms when issuing audit opinions. Moreover, the “auditor opinion shopping” behavior by listed firms is also affected by listed firms’ ownership structure.     

客户资源控制权与审计师轮换的治理效应

审计师轮换是构建注册会计师审计秩序化格局以防范会计欺诈的重要监管手段。我国资本市场以行政权力和关系网络为主导的治理模式影响了会计师事务所的产权结构安排和资源配置模式,出现了客户资源控制权个人化的现象,致使我国监管政策的微观运行基础与欧美国家存在重大差异,同时也阻碍了会计师事务所的内部治理,从而说明我国审计市场存在审计师轮换的客观需求基础。为此,将审计师的私人人力资本转化为会计师事务所的组织资本是提高审计师轮换质量效应的重要路径。     

会计师事务所转制对审计质量的影响研究——来自上市公司的经验证据

通过分析2008—2012年A股上市公司相关数据,研究会计师事务所转制对于审计质量的影响,结果显示：特殊普通合伙制会计师事务所的审计质量高于有限责任制会计师事务所的审计质量;转制后会计师事务所的审计质量高于转制前会计师事务所的审计质量,但是转制对审计质量的提高有一定的不同步性。研究结论为转制政策的合理性提供了证据支撑,也为其他中小型会计师事务所改制提供了必要性方面的经验依据。     

强制更换会计师事务所对审计质量的影响——对企业更换中天勤等事务所的实证分析

中天勤、沈阳华伦等5家会计师事务所2001年未通过年检被取消执业资格,他们的原有客户不得不改聘其他会计师事务所.该事件为强制更换会计师事务所提供了研究背景.以非正常性应计利润(DA)来衡量审计质量发现,在强制更换会计师事务所以后,这些公司的非正常性应计利润不降反升.进一步分析的结果显示,在正DA组,后任会计师没有调低那些公司的非正常性应计利润;而在负DA组,这些公司的非正常性应计利润在更换会计师以后反而增加了.研究显示,在中国这样一个极度分散的审计市场中,强制更换会计师事务所并没有带来大家预期的效果.     

Sustainability reporting quality and post‐audit financial reporting quality: Empirical evidence from the UK

This study examines whether firms that appear to exhibit high sustainability reporting quality are less likely to engage in earnings management activities, thereby delivering financial information that is more transparent and reliable than that delivered by firms that do not produce high‐quality sustainability reports. I also investigate whether the association between sustainability reporting quality and post‐audit financial reporting quality is conditional on audit effort. Analysis of data drawn from FTSE 350 companies covering 2007 to 2018 indicates that firms that produce high‐quality sustainability reports are significantly and negatively associated with earnings management metrics. More importantly, this association is moderated by audit effort, measured by audit fees, suggesting that sustainability reporting quality reflects factors considered by auditors in their audit risk assessment practices. These results remain robust after several sensitivity analyses. I conclude that firms that devote more resources to producing high‐quality sustainability reports are likely to demonstrate an overall commitment to quality that alleviates auditors' concerns about the opportunistic use of sustainability reporting and reduces business risk, thereby reducing the effort auditors expend to verify financial reports.