Provision versus Appropriation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Social Dilemmas

Social dilemmas characterize decision environments in which individuals' exclusive pursuit of their own material self‐interest can produce inefficient allocations. Social dilemmas are most commonly studied in provision games, such as public goods games and trust games, in which the social dilemma can be manifested in foregone opportunities to create surplus. Appropriation games are sometimes used to study social dilemmas that can be manifested in destruction of surplus, as is typical in common‐pool resource extraction games. A central question is whether social dilemmas are more serious for inhibiting creation of surplus or in promoting its destruction. This question is addressed in this study with an experiment involving three pairs of payoff‐equivalent provision and appropriation games. Some game pairs are symmetric, whereas others involve asymmetric power relationships. We find that play of symmetric provision and appropriation games produces comparable efficiency. In contrast, power asymmetry leads to significantly lower efficiency in an appropriation game than in a payoff‐equivalent provision game. This outcome can be rationalized by reciprocal preference theory but not by models of unconditional social preferences.     

Uniformly bounded sufficient sets and quasi‐extreme social welfare functions

The set of alternatives is infinite. If the social welfare function is transitive‐valued and minimal sufficient sets are uniformly bounded, then there are arbitrarily large finite subsets of the feasible set, and a rich sub‐domain of profiles, within which a reduction in the scope of someone's dictatorial power must be accompanied by an equal increase in the fraction of the pairs that are socially ordered without consulting anyone's preferences.     

Inequality‐averse well‐being measurement

We construct individual well‐being measures that respect individual preferences and depend on the bundles of goods consumed by the individual. Building on previous work in which general families of well‐being measures are identified, we introduce basic transfer principles that apply either to bundles or directly to indifference sets, and we characterize specific well‐being measures that involve either the ray utility or the money‐metric utility.     

The Effect of Subtracting a Constant from all Payoffs in a Hawk‐Dove Game: Experimental Evidence of Loss Aversion in Strategic Behavior

Economists and psychologists have documented patterns of individual decision‐making behavior (e.g., loss aversion) whereby losses and gains are treated differently. However, there has been little evidence of such patterns in multiplayer games. I report results showing the strongest evidence I know of that this phenomenon is present in games. Experimental subjects play two hawk‐dove games that are identical up to a constant; in one, all payoffs are positive, while in the other, payoffs are negative if and only if both players choose “hawk.” Under both fixed pairs and random matching, differences between the games are substantial, significant, and consistent with loss aversion.     

Selecting public goods institutions: Who likes to punish and reward?

We study the link between individual attitudes toward uncertainty on the one hand, and preferences over, as well as behavior within, various public goods institutions on the other hand. We incentive‐compatibly elicit preferences over voluntary contribution mechanisms with and without reward and punishment options and then randomly assign subjects to play in one of the four institutions. We find that payoffs are significantly greater when punishment is allowed but that only a small minority of participants prefers such an environment. Somewhat surprisingly, preferences over institutions are generally independent of individual characteristics. Conversely, individual characteristics, including institutional preferences, are significantly predictive of behavior in the public goods game. For instance, risk‐averse individuals preemptively punish more often. This suggests that when studying sanctions and rewards, it is important to consider individual attitudes toward risk and uncertainty—although they may not affect the original selection into institutions.     

Incorporating fairness in generalized games of matching pennies

We examine individual behavior in generalized games of matching pennies. We have three main findings. First, individuals cooperate in these games; that is, they systematically select strategies that lead both players to obtain higher expected payoffs than in a Nash equilibrium. Second, existing models that assume altruistic preferences do not explain the cooperative behavior in these games. Third, among the main models in the extant literature, the only one that predicts the observed behavior is the quantal response equilibrium.     

Uncertainty in foreign policy making: A Bayesian game analysis of Korea

Bayesian games are used to analyze situations where at least one player is uncertain about the other's preferences. For the past decade or so, the Bayesian models have been rigorously applied to various aspects of international relations involving uncertainty. These models have contributed to our understanding of international relations by uncovering complicated strategic interactions through deductive reasoning and by generating many empirically testable hypotheses. Apart from these efforts for general theory developments, however, scholars rarely applied Bayesian models to analyze real‐world international events, although many of them involve situations where one or more players are uncertain about the other's preferences. Some of these events are interesting and important in their own right, given their potential impact on regional security and the amount of attention paid by scholars and politicians alike. Therefore, these cases warrant independent studies utilizing Bayesian models. In this paper, we have developed two Bayesian models for the changing relationships North Korea has with South Korea and the United States. We also discuss another interesting aspect of North‐South Korea‐United States relations where North Korea is simultaneously playing similar, but separate, games with South Korea and the United States.     

Are You Risk Averse over Other People's Money?

Decisions with uncertain outcomes are often made by one party in settings where another party bears the consequences. Whenever an individual is delegated to make decisions that affect others, such as in the typical corporate structure, does the individual make decisions that reflect the risk preferences of the party bearing the consequences? We examine this question in two simple settings, lottery choices and sealed‐bid auctions, using controlled laboratory experiments. We find that when an individual makes a decision for an anonymous stranger, there is a tendency to exhibit less risk aversion. This reduction in risk aversion is relative to his or her own preferences, and it is also relative to his or her belief about the preferences of others. This result has significant implications for the design of contracts between principals and agents.     

WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR WATER SERVICE IMPROVEMENTS IN MIDDLE‐INCOME URBAN HOUSEHOLDS IN SOUTH AFRICA: A STATED CHOICE ANALYSIS

Water provision is not only an economic issue in South Africa, but also of social and political significance. One of the important reasons for increasing the brief of local government is so that services can be provided taking into account heterogeneous community preferences. However, measuring such preferences for water, which has some public good characteristics, is a challenge. This study elicits household willingness to pay for improvements in water attributes in Grahamstown West in the Eastern Cape, using conjoint analysis. Results show a fairly high McFadden R² and that Bacteria Count, Discolouration, Interruptions to supply and Price are statistically significant determinants of choice. The paper also suggests ways in which the model could be adapted for use in lower income and education households.     

‘Eating the bread out of their mouth’: Antwerp's export trade and generalized institutions, 1544–5

This article studies the distribution of exports from mid‐sixteenth‐century Antwerp at the individual and group level (grouped by merchant origin). Recently, scholars have argued that sixteenth‐century Antwerp, and in its wake a series of other cities, hosted an open‐access market as a result of an evolution towards open‐access institutions. However, the direct effect of this institutional change on merchant enterprise is hard to measure. Relying on detailed tax records, preferences at the individual merchant level for particular destinations and commodities are documented, to evaluate whether exporters had equal chances in Antwerp's export market. A few exporters had large export shares next to a multitude of smaller merchants. The exports of these smaller merchants to distant destinations and their participation in the export of important products demonstrate a fairly level commercial playing field with regard to their larger‐scale colleagues. Foreign traders had access to trade in Low Countries products, while local merchants were active in the export of major transit products. The activities of the latter group are particularly important; contrary to previous literature, Low Countries traders did not differ in their preference for home‐grown products.     

社会认同、偏好和经济行为——基于行为和实验经济学研究成果的讨论

社会认同理论的引入为实验经济学相关研究开拓了一个新的分支。通过假设个体间相互关联,社会认同因素直接作用于个体的偏好,进而改变经济决策,是对传统经济学理论的突破。总体来说,社会认同对偏好的塑造体现在两个方面：首先,社会认同会提升个体对内群的社会偏好,导致内群偏见,并使个体做出更加有利于内群的行为;其次,社会认同会改变个体对内群规则的偏好,进而导致不同维度的群体分类在经济决策上的差异。     

超越经济人的社会偏好理论:一个基于实验经济学的综述

实验经济学对传统经济人假设的系统反驳促使社会偏好理论应运而生.社会偏好理论的各个模型试图在维持理性假设下,通过将基于心理学和社会学的诸如公平、互利等与“自利”假设有着明显涵义辨识度的一些人类社会性情感因素纳入到效用函数中来进而修正经济人假设,并以博弈论为基本的分析工具力图构建新的博弈均衡来解释实验经济学所揭示的一系列悖论.本文围绕社会偏好在已有文献的基础上对其产生的背景、模型、测度、外溢以及检验等问题作了一个详细而系统的梳理     

The Stability of Social Preferences in a Low‐Income Neighborhood

We investigate whether social preferences are stable across contexts using a field population of low‐income Americans. We develop and demonstrate a simplified, visually‐based experimental methodology appropriate for this population. We show that choices in a laboratory public goods game predict giving in real donation experiments, as well as self‐reported donations and volunteering outside the lab. At the same time, choices vary systematically by individual characteristics and decision context. Thus, our results provide evidence both for an underlying stable social preference and for the role of context in influencing the expression of that preference.     

Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near‐Term Earnings over Long‐Run Value?*

This paper examines whether institutional investors exhibit preferences for near‐term earnings over long‐run value and whether such preferences have implications for firms' stock prices. First, I find that the level of ownership by institutions with short investment horizons (e.g., “transient” institutions) and by institutions held to stringent fiduciary standards (e.g., banks) is positively (negatively) associated with the amount of firm value in expected nearterm (long‐term) earnings. This evidence raises the question of whether such institutions myopically price firms, overweighting short‐term earnings potential and underweighting long‐term earnings potential. Evidence of such myopic pricing would establish a link through which institutional investors could pressure managers into a short‐term focus. The results provide no evidence that high levels of ownership by banks translate into myopic mispricing. However, high levels of transient ownership are associated with an over‐ (under‐) weighting of near‐term (long‐term) expected earnings, and a trading strategy based on this finding generates significant abnormal returns. This finding supports the concerns that many corporate managers have about the adverse effects of an ownership base dominated by short‐term‐focused institutional investors.     

Mixed strategy equilibria in repeated games with one-period memory

Infinitely repeated games is the pre-dominant paradigm within which economists study long-term strategic interaction. The standard framework allows players to condition their strategies on all past actions; that is, assumes that they have unbounded memory. That is clearly a convenient simplification that is at odds with reality. In this paper we restrict attention to one-period memory and characterize all totally mixed equilibria. In particular, we focus on strongly mixed equilibria. We provide conditions that are necessary and sufficient for a game to have such an equilibrium. We further demonstrate the exact set of payoffs that can be generated by such equilibria.     

A model of ideological transmission with endogenous parental preferences

Under what conditions can a given trait, such as religion or language, be preserved in the long run? To answer this question I develop a dynamic framework of ideological transmission in families in which parents are biased towards children’s traits and socioeconomic activities are modeled in the shape of a trust‐matching process. I model how children are educated to a specific ideological trait that later in life will influence the well‐being of the family. Compared to the existing literature, my model yields two new results. First, paternalistic preferences in children’s education at time t are a necessary but not a sufficient condition to ensure the preservation of heterogeneity in the long‐run distribution of traits. Second, my model is able to reproduce historical events in which a reversal of parents’ evaluation of traits has been observed. Assuming myopic agents does not change the qualitative results of the model.     

Trademarks and British dominance in consumer goods, 1876–1914

Late Victorian Britain was very important in the development of British dominance in light consumer goods industries, such as fermented liquors and spirits; detergents and perfumery; bicycles and other carriages; paper, stationery, and bookbinding; and games of all kinds and sports goods. Firms developed technology‐based innovations and marketing‐based innovations, creating abnormal peaks of trademark registrations in certain industries. This article investigates those peaks and shows that factors usually pointed out as explaining British economic decline in heavy industries did not impact on the development of light consumer goods industries, and on the contrary encouraged their fast growth during this period. Trademark registrations are shown to provide new insights into the debate on British relative decline, when combined with other industry and firm‐level data.     

Does parental migration impede the development of the cooperative preferences in their left-behind children? Evidence from a large-scale field experiment in China

In human capital theory, noncognitive abilities play an essential role in individual and societal success. Parents' migration for work purposes may inhibit the development of children's noncognitive abilities, but its influence on children's cooperation preferences remains unclear. Using three one-shot public goods games, we examine the impacts of parental migration on the development of children's cooperation preferences and whether introducing punishment mechanisms could partly exacerbate or offset the effects. We conducted a large-scale field experiment with more than 1600 rural students aged 6–16. Our main findings are as follows. First, the cooperation level of non-left-behind children increases significantly with age, while being left behind may affect this stable development track. Specifically, we find that paternal migration significantly decreases children's cooperation levels, while maternal or both parents' migration does not. Second, punishment mechanisms can significantly promote children's cooperation levels and offset the negative effect of paternal migration. Exogenous punishments work across ages, while endogenous punishments work only among middle school students. However, as the extent to which children were left-behind deepens, the offsetting effects of the punishment mechanisms gradually weaken.     

Incentive Contracts,Market Risk,and Cost of Capital

Should incentive contracts expose the agent to market‐wide shocks? Counterintuitively, I show that market risk cannot be filtered out from the compensation and managed independently by the agent. Under plausible risk preferences, the principal should offer a contract in which performance pay increases following a favorable market shock. In the aggregate, however, the effect of market risk on individual contracts diversifies away and the agency problem does not directly affect the cost of capital. The analysis suggests caution in interpreting changes in cost of capital in terms of the stewardship role of accounting information.     

Suzumura‐consistent relations: An overview

This paper provides a brief introduction to the use and usefulness of Suzumura consistency, a coherence requirement for binary relations that weakens transitivity. The property was introduced by Suzumura in the context of collective choice but, as demonstrated in some recent contributions, its applicability reaches beyond the boundaries of social‐choice theory. In addition to a summary of its mathematical underpinnings, some recent applications in individual and collective decision‐making are provided. Several examples are employed to illustrate the property and how it distinguishes itself from alternative weakenings of transitivity such as quasi‐transitivity or acyclicity.