THE PURCHASING POWER PARITY THEORY AND RICARDO'S THEORY OF VALUE

In this paper the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) theory and itscriticisms are analysed. The majority of studies show that inmost cases, the PPP indicator is not a good predictor for nominalexchange rate changes, nor a good indicator of relative competitivenessbetween countries. Instead, orthodox and non-orthodox economistsuse relative labour costs to represent real exchange rates.This has interesting implications for the currently acceptedprice determination theory. In turn, this also allows us touse a Ricardian model as developed by Pasinetti to calculatethe ratio of real, vertically integrated unit labour costs betweencountries as a real exchange rate determination theory and asa sectoral relative competitiveness indicator as well.     

AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL POWER DISPERSION: THE CASE OF TURKEY

This study examines the effects of fragmented governments and fiscal authorities on budget deficits in Turkey along with political business cycle effects. For econometric analysis we will use annual data from the period 1960 to 2009. This article sheds light on various dispersion indices and their use in the field of political power and fiscal performance. The results show that the power dispersion indices of governments and fiscal institutions significantly explain the increases in the ratio of budget deficit to gross national product. The article draws attention to the unification and better coordination of fiscal authorities in Turkey. The analysis has important policy implications for Turkey and other developing countries from the viewpoint of fragmented political and administrative dispersion of power and poor budget performances. (JEL P16, H72, C22, C43)     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND ANALYSIS OF THEIR SOCIAL VALUE*

ABSTRACT: This article applies political economy theory to public‐private partnerships (PPPs). First, we propose that social welfare is the appropriate normative evaluation criterion to evaluate the social value of PPPs. Second, we specify the goals of PPP participants, including private‐sector partners and governments. Third, we review the observed outcomes of PPPs and analyze them from both a political economy perspective and a social welfare perspective. Fourth, based on a comparison of the actual outcomes of PPPs to normatively desirable social welfare outcomes, we propose some ‘rules for governments’ concerning the design of government PPP institutions and the management of PPPs. We argue that if governments were to adopt these rules there would be fewer PPPs in total, they would be more like traditional government contracts and there would be a greater likelihood of improved social welfare. However, political economy theory also explains why implementation of any reform will be difficult.     

政治关联、并购战略选择与企业价值*

本文以2010年发生并购的上市公司为初始样本,实证检验了企业政治关联对并购当年（2010年）和并购后连续五年（2011—2015年）企业价值的影响,并进一步分析这种影响在并购企业采用不同并购战略选择时是否存在显著差异。本文研究发现,并购企业中央政治关联和地方政治关联均对并购后企业短期价值和长期价值具有显著的正向影响。进一步研究发现,从总体上看,在一定条件下,跨地并购战略在企业中央政治关联与企业价值（短期/长期）间有正向的部分中介效应,即中央政治关联企业通过跨地并购战略的实施进一步增强了对企业价值的提升作用;企业地方政治关联可以显著地促进多元化并购战略的实施,而实施多元化并购战略进一步增强了对企业价值（短期/长期）的抑制作用,即多元化并购战略在企业地方政治关联对企业价值的影响机制中发挥部分中介效应,并且对直接正效应具有抑制作用。     

REVEALED POLITICAL POWER

When is a polity biased? Consider an “outsider” who observes policy data but observes neither citizens’ preferences nor the underlying distribution of political power. He views political power as if it were derived from wealth‐weighted voting, where the weights determine the wealth bias. Positive weights favor the rich whereas negative ones favor the poor. We show that any policy data is rationalized by any wealth‐weighted system. However, policy and polling observations together imply explicit bounds on the set of rationalizing biases. Accumulated data narrows this band. The inferential model is consistent with models of political competition for campaign contributions.     

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PEEL'S REPEAL OF THE CORN LAWS

The repeal of the Corn Laws in Britain in 1846 has been much debated as to whether interest groups or ideology contributed most to this policy reform. This paper examines a conventional view that Sir Robert Peel, in proposing repeal, converted from protection to free trade under the influence of the ideas of political economy. It is shown that economic ideas had a crucial influence on Peel, but that he remained skeptical of political economy as a doctrine.     

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE EFFICIENCY OF COMPENSATION FOR TAKINGS

To assess compensation for regulation-induced "takings," the authors model political support for regulation as a function of externalities, landowner wealth, and tax burdens. When competing social interests have equal influence on political outcomes, compensation should not be paid. However, when environmentalists and property owners have unequal influence, the model yields several counterintuitive implications. For example, disenfranchised environmentalists should support takings compensation, since it reduces landowner opposition to regulation. The authors also show how compensation rules can limit the deadweight social costs of income transfers, while recognizing their effects on regulator and landowner behavior. (JEL K11 , D72 , L51 )     

边境区位价值的梯度结构与梯次开发——以中国与东盟国家接壤的边境地带为例

在经济全球化、区域经济一体化日益加强的背景下,边境区位价值的研究与实践具有重要的时代意义与应用前景。文章阐释了边境区位价值的理论内涵,通过主成分分析法构建了边境区位价值的综合评价模型,对边境区位价值的梯度结构进行了论证与测度,并提出对边境区位价值采取梯次开发的模式。最后以中国与东盟国家接壤的边境地带为例进行了实证研究。     

ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IMMIGRATION AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION*

In this article, we analyze an economy in which agents vote over immigration policy and redistributive tax policy. We show that natives' preferences over immigration are influenced by the prospect that immigrants will be voting over future tax policy. We also show that changes in the degree of international capital mobility, the distribution of initial capital among natives, the wealth or poverty of the immigrant pool, and the future voting rights and entitlements of immigrants can have dramatic effects on equilibrium immigration and tax policies. Finally, we provide some empirical support for the model's predictions.     

THE FED AND THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE

This study asks whether the Federal Reserve has actively made monetary policy so as to aid the president's reelection. Using Shiller's smoothness "prior" to estimate the shape of cycles, the study finds a political business cycle in unemployment and a preelection increase in growth of the money supply. But the timing of these two cycles is inconsistent. Furthermore, little evidence exists of a cycle in the instruments of monetary policy. Thus, the Fed is not actively creating a political business cycle. Apparently, movements in real money that are not caused—but are not offset—by the Fed are an important cause of the political business cycle.
Elections influence Fed behavior. Monetary tightness occurs early in a presidential term, before reelection incentives become critical. This is due to the Fed's political weakness. Thus, the Fed's independence only partly insulates it from electoral pressures.     

THE FED AND THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE

This study asks whether the Federal Reserve has actively made monetary policy so as to aid the president's reelection. Using Shiller's smoothness "prior" to estimate the shape of cycles, the study finds a political business cycle in unemployment and a preelection increase in growth of the money supply. But the timing of these two cycles is inconsistent. Furthermore, little evidence exists of a cycle in the instruments of monetary policy. Thus, the Fed is not actively creating a political business cycle. Apparently, movements in real money that are not caused—but are not offset—by the Fed are an important cause of the political business cycle.
Elections influence Fed behavior. Monetary tightness occurs early in a presidential term, before reelection incentives become critical. This is due to the Fed's political weakness. Thus, the Fed's independence only partly insulates it from electoral pressures.     

SALMON STOCK VARIABILITY AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE PACIFIC SALMON TREATY

Since the mid-1970s, changes in the marine environment along the west coast of North America and in the Northeastern Pacific appear to have greatly enhanced the productivity of Alaskan salmon runs while contributing to declining runs of some salmon spawning in Washington, Oregon, and California. These inverse fluctuations in northern and southern salmon stocks may have aggravated a recent break-down in cooperation between the United States and Canada in setting harvest allocations under the Pacific Salmon Treaty. This paper examines the establishment of fishing regimes by the Pacific Salmon Commission. A game theoretic model is used to analyze the possible contribution of stock variability to the current conflict. Shifts in the parties' incentives to manage the fishery cooperatively, together with significant transaction costs, explain much of the recent difficulty in negotiating mutually acceptable fishing regimes. The paper concludes by addressing the question of whether the regime-setting process can be made more resilient to such stresses.     

民营企业的崛起与劳动价值论的深化

江泽民同志指出:我们应结合新的实际,深化对社会主义社会劳动和劳动价值理论的研究和认识。这不仅为深化对劳动和劳动价值理论的研究和认识,阐明了重要性和必要性,而且为对深化研究和认识指明了方向。历史证明:在不同的社会形态中,不同的经济体制下,准确界定劳动的性质,恰当估量劳动在价值创造中的作用,是马克思主义政治经济学的一个基本问题,是清醒认识社会经济关系和正确处理分配关系的理论基础。笔者试从民营企业的视角,谈一些粗浅认识。民企业主对马克思劳动价值论的直觉感悟众多民营企业创始人是由多方人士构成的新群体、新阶层。他们…     

THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY: ITS EXPLANATORY POWER FOR LDCs*

This paper reviews the new political economy and its relevance to explaining policymaking in the developing countries.     

FORGETFULNESS AND THE POLITICAL CYCLE*

This paper examines a mechanism that underlies both the political business cycle and the cycle in non-economic policies executed by politicians. We show that if rational voters suffer from forgetfulness (a noise in the memory). then government expenditure on the production of public good increases as elections approach. Hence, the model describes a cycle that is observed in the government expenditures of democratic societies. Unlike previous models, this model does not require that the government have information superiority over rational voters with respect to its competency. According to this model, incumbents transfer resources from the beginning of their terms of service and use them near the end of their terms. We also find that the less concave the production function, the wider the cycle.     

THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF PREVENTING RESPIRATORY AND CARDIOVASCULAR HOSPITALIZATIONS

This article provides estimates of the economic benefits of reducing respiratory and cardiovascular hospitalizations based on cost of illness and willingness to pay. The willingness-to-pay estimates indicate that individuals value prevention of a five-day hospitalization event at an average of approximately $2,400. Average total costs of illness per hospitalization are $22,000–39,000. A comprehensive cost-of-illness estimate that includes value of time losses for the hospitalization and at-home recovery periods provides a close approximation of total costs borne by third parties plus individual willingness to pay. Both exceed previous cost-of-illness estimates by about 10–25%. (JEL D61, I18, Q25 )