Permanence discounting for land-based carbon sequestration

One major concern regarding land-based carbon sequestration involves the issue of permanence. Sequestration may not last forever and may either be released in the future or require expenditures to maintain the practices that keep it sequestered. In this paper, we investigate the differential value of offsets in the face of impermanent characteristics by forming a price discount that equalizes the effective price per ton between a “perfect offset” and one possessing some with impermanent characteristics. We find this discount to be a function of the future needs to replace offsets (in the face of lease expiration quantity or volatilization upon activities such as timber harvest) and the magnitude of any needed maintenance costs. We investigate the magnitude of the discounts under alternative agricultural tillage and forest management cases. In those studies, we find that permanence discounts in the range of 50% are not uncommon. This means that in the market place an impermanent sequestration offset may only receive payments amounting to 50% of the market carbon price. Furthermore, we find that in the face of escalating carbon prices that offsets may prove to be worthless.     

Offsetting Versus Mitigation Activities to Reduce $$\hbox {CO}_{2}$$ Emissions: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis for the U.S. and Germany

This paper studies the voluntary provision of public goods that is partially driven by a desire to offset for individual polluting activities. We first extend existing theory and show that offsets allow a reduction in effective environmental pollution levels while not necessarily extending the consumption of a polluting good. We further discuss the impact of an increased environmental preference on purchases of offsets and mitigation activities. Several theoretical results are then econometrically tested using a novel dataset on activities to reduce \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions for the case of vehicle purchases in the U.S. and Germany. We show that environmental preference triggers the stated use of \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) offsetting and mitigation channels in both countries. However, we find strong country differences for the stated purchase of \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) offsets. While such activities are mainly triggered by a high general awareness of the climate change problem in the U.S., the perception that road travel is responsible for \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions to a large extent is more important for driver’s license holders in Germany.     

Recreation demand estimation and valuation in spatially connected systems

Recreation demand models frequently are used to explain outdoor recreation behavior and to estimate willingness to pay for changes in environmental quality at recreation sites. Among the most commonly used recreation demand models are site choice models based on the multinomial logit framework, which account for the spatial relationships between each recreator's home and multiple alternative destinations thereby capturing the substitution possibilities among recreation sites. However, standard applications of this framework typically do not account for the possibility of spatial connections among the sites via movements of the target species, such as fish in connected water bodies in recreational angling applications or terrestrial species in hunting or wildlife viewing applications. In this paper we examine aspects of environmental valuation and natural resource dynamics that generally are addressed separately. Specifically, we show that in such spatially connected systems, a “reduced form” application of the standard site choice modeling approach, using proxy measures of environmental quality rather than direct measures of species abundances, can produce biased estimates of willingness to pay for environmental improvements. Furthermore, we show that under some conditions poorly targeted environmental improvements in spatially connected systems can lead to welfare decreases. In such systems a structural model of recreator site choices and species sorting behavior and population dynamics may be required to fully account for the spatial linkages among sites and the feedback effects between recreators and the target species.     

Anthropology and Institutional Economics

Defense and commercial trade offsets (also known as countertrade or industrial participation) are valued in the tens of billions of dollars each year andoften accompany the export of advanced technological goods. An offset is any type of non-monetary compensation that a procuring government requires an exporting firm to provide as a condition of the sale and generally commits the exporting firm to spend a certain percentage of the value of the sale in the procuring country. This paper examines 1) how procuring governments use offsets to achieve their goals, and 2) the economic and national security implications of offsets.     

Do increases in energy efficiency improve environmental quality and sustainability?

Governments world-wide increasingly see energy efficiency as an important aspect of sustainability. However, there is a debate in the literature as to whether the impact of improved energy efficiency on reducing energy use might be partially, or more than wholly, offset through “rebound” and “backfire” effects. This paper clarifies the theoretical conditions under which such effects would occur and explores their likely significance using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Scottish economy. We find that for Scotland a general improvement in energy efficiency in the production sectors of the economy initially produces rebound effects that eventually grow into backfire. Energy use ultimately increases in response to an efficiency gain and the ratio of GDP to CO₂ emissions falls. The economic factors underpinning rebound effects are straightforward: energy efficiency improvements result in an effective cut in energy prices, which produces output, substitution, competitiveness and income effects that stimulate energy demands. However, the presence of strong rebound or even backfire does not mean that efficiency-enhancing policies are irrelevant: rather it suggests that such policies operating alone are insufficient to generate environmental improvements. The implication is that a co-ordinated portfolio of energy policies is required.     

Electoral competition with environmental policy as a second best transfer

This paper explains why some governments fail to adopt policies that are sufficiently strong, while others adopt policies that are too stringent. Constructing a political economy model in which voters face uncertainty due to the types of politicians and the risk of environmental damage, we show that there is an equilibrium in which a politician uses a weaker environmental policy rather than efficient direct transfers for redistribution. We also show that there is an equilibrium in which a stricter environmental policy can be implemented by a politician who has no incentive to make transfers. Then, we discuss which equilibrium should be more plausible. We conclude that the latter equilibrium in which a too stringent environmental policy emerges can dominate the former unless the citizen’s estimate of environmental risk is sufficiently low.     

The dynamics of environmental innovations: three stylised trajectories of clean technology

In this article, we explore the dynamics of environmental innovations developed by firms to comply with environmental regulations. Our analysis is based on a micro-simulation model of industrial dynamics. The question arises: how do firms competing in the same industry deal with environmental issues without altering their productive efficiency or the performance of the product? We focus on clean technology which seeks to combine environmental and productive dimensions by way of innovation offsets. Our simulations show that an innovative strategy based on a good balance between environmental and productive dimensions takes more time to develop and needs to address a ‘competence destroying effect’. Finally, we study favourable conditions for the development of this type of clean technology and draw some policy implications.     

Multinational taxation and international emissions trading

Many studies have shown that the activities of multinational corporations are quite sensitive to differences in income tax rates across countries. In this paper I explore the interaction between multinational taxation and abatement activities under an international emissions permit trading scheme. Four types of plans are considered: (1) a single domestic permit system with international offsets; (2) separate national permit systems without trade; (3) separate national permit systems with limited offsets; and (4) an international permit trading system. For each plan, I model the incentives for the multinational firm to choose abatement activities at home and abroad and to transfer emissions credits between parent and subsidiary. Limits on trading across countries restrict efficiency gains from abatement, as is well known. But if available offset opportunities are limited to actual abatement activities, those activities are also more susceptible to distortions from incentives to shift taxable income. Transfer-pricing rules can limit but not always eliminate these distortions. In a system of unlimited international trading, abatement is efficiently allocated across countries, but tax shifting can still be achieved through intra-firm transfer pricing. From the basis of efficiency for both environmental and tax policies, the best design is an international permit trading system with transparent, enforceable transfer-pricing rules.     

Using structural restrictions to achieve theoretical consistency in benefit transfers

Analysts often extrapolate estimates of the value of environmental improvements reported in prior studies to evaluate new policy proposals, a practice sometimes referred to as “benefit transfer.” Benefit transfer functions are frequently specified based on statistical considerations alone. However, such a purely statistical approach can lead to willingness-to-pay functions that fail to satisfy some aspects of theoretical consistency that may be especially important for policy evaluations. In this paper, we examine several previous meta-analyses of nonmarket valuation studies in light of the adding-up condition, which is one important aspect of theoretical validity. We then use meta-regression to estimate a new willingness-to-pay function for surface water quality improvements intended to be used for benefit transfers. We estimate the meta-regression model using summary results from 51 previously published stated preference studies. An important feature of our approach is that we develop the meta-regression estimating equation to ensure that the resulting benefit transfer function will necessarily comply with the adding-up condition. This is achieved by first specifying a marginal willingness-to-pay function and then deriving an expression for total willingness-to-pay. This leads to a non-linear estimating equation, so we estimate the parameters of the model using non-linear least squares. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of our approach relative to other structural approaches, and we compare our empirical results to a more traditional nonstructural meta-regression model. Finally, we examine the quantitative importance of imposing the adding-up condition in our case study by performing some illustrative calculations of willingness-to-pay for hypothetical water quality improvements using both structural and non-structural models.     

The environmental Porter hypothesis: theory,evidence, and a model of timing of adoption

The Porter hypothesis postulates that the costs of compliance with environmental standards may be offset by adoption of innovations they trigger. We model this hypothesis using a game of timing of technology adoption. We will show that times of adoption will be earlier if the non-adoption tax is higher. The environmental tax will turn the preemption game with low profits into a game with credible precommitment generating higher profits (pro-Porter). If there is a precommitment game without environmental taxes, the introduction of a tax will lead to lower profits (anti-Porter). An evaluation of the empirical literature indicates that the Porter hypothesis will hold even for profit-maximizing firms under multiple market imperfections such as imperfect competition, X-inefficiency, and agency costs. These are more likely to be present in sectors with large firms. In many case studies that we have evaluated, though, we detected an element of explicit or implicit subsidies for environmentally friendly behaviour, which is in line with Pigovian policies.     

MARKETS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL

The environmental problem is no different from any other economic problem. The basic problem is scarcity. Wants are unlimited while resources are limited. Once we recognize our inability to satisfy all of our ecological wants, how do we decide which wants we will satisfy? Most efforts to address environmental concerns have used political institutions to answer this question and to devise policy responses. Environmental concerns have been addressed in the same manner that socialist nations sought to address broader economic concerns. This paper argues that such policies cannot succeed in the environmental realm any better than they did in the broader economic realm. Whether the political approach chosen relies on command-and-control or “market-based” mechanisms (eco-taxes or eco-quotas) matters little in resolving government's inability to prioritize. The dispersed nature and enormity of information needed to prioritize risks and the inability of government to create the rich system of incentives necessary to mobilize human ingenuity renders effective government controls infeasible. This paper argues for greater attention to environmental problems but concludes that we can better address environmental quality by integrating ecological resources into the economy via ecological privatization. This property rights approach to environmental policy—“free market environmentalism”—may entice more economists to address the important environmental questions and devise more appropriate solutions.     

Optimizing Environmental Product Life Cycles

In this paper, we propose a methodology, based on materials accounting and operational research techniques, to assess different industry configurations according to their life cycle environmental impacts. Rather than evaluating a specific technology, our methodology searches for the feasible configuration with the minimum impact. This approach allows us to address some basic policy-relevant questions regarding technology choice, investment priorities, industrial structures, and international trade patterns. We demonstrate the methodology in the context of the European pulp and paper industry. We are able to show that current environmental policy's focus on maximizing recycling is optimal now, but that modest improvements in primary pulping technology may shift the optimal industry configuration away from recycling toward more primary pulping with incineration. We show that this will have significant implications for the amount and type of environmental damage, for the location of different stages in the production chain, and for trade between European member states. We caution policy makers that their single-minded focus on recycling may foreclose investment in technologies that could prove environmentally superior. Finally, we hint that member state governments may be fashioning their environmental policy positions at least in part on some of the trade and industrial implications we find.     

Economic downturns,inequality, and democratic improvements

This paper explores the extent to which discrete improvements in the democratic quality of political institutions can be explained by income inequality. Empirical tests of this relationship have generally yielded null results, though typically test an unconditional relationship. Guided by a theoretical nuance of the “new economic view” of democratization and using an instrumental variable strategy, we re-examine the relationship conditional on the state of the macroeconomy. We demonstrate that the more unequal are societies, the higher the probability of experiencing democratic improvements following economic downturns. Following growth periods, higher income inequality has a slight negative or null effect on the likelihood of democratic improvement. The conditional result provides a simple explanation for why previous literature has found largely null results concerning inequality and democratization and offers additional evidence in support of the new economic view.     

Reciprocity and voting

In this paper we present a two-period model where a left-wing and a right-wing political party are solely interested in the policies they pursue. We assume that voters display reciprocal behavior. By contrast, political parties are not motivated by reciprocity. We show that reciprocity may have dramatic consequences for models of voting behavior. The incentive to be kind to the median voter may ensure that a position closer to the median voter's position is adopted even if political parties are not directly interested in being elected and cannot commit to a political stance during an election campaign. Moreover, reciprocity increases incumbency advantages.     

企业环境信息供求分析

鉴于我国环境问题日益突出的现实,企业层次环境信息的重要性日益突出.本文从需求与供给的角度分析了企业环境信息披露行为.在需求角度,投资者、政府,社会公众等是企业环境利益的重要相关者;在供给角度,企业管理层可能在披露成本及行为合法化、竞争策略影响等因素之间进行权衡.由此需要增加环境利益相关者的影响力,从而提升企业的环境信息披露水平.     

The Role of Mobility in Offsetting Inequality: A Nonparametric Exploration of the CPS

This paper explores how annual earnings mobility offsets annual earnings inequality, using matched CPS data. Mobility in the economy is estimated using nonparametric quantile regression, for which we adapt state–of–the–art smoothing techniques. Mobility is measured through the churning process (changes in earnings given initial earnings) in order to identify different mobility patterns for different earnings groups. For instance, upward mobility in high earners is far weaker than its converse, downward mobility for low earners. We assess the (positive or negative) contribution to offsetting of each pattern in mobility. Innovations in our approach also allow us to identify trends and minute changes in mobility, and to pinpoint which changes in mobility have offset the increases in inequality observed over the decades.     

Reciprocity and voting

In this paper we present a two-period model where a left-wing and a right-wing political party are solely interested in the policies they pursue. We assume that voters display reciprocal behavior. By contrast, political parties are not motivated by reciprocity. We show that reciprocity may have dramatic consequences for models of voting behavior. The incentive to be kind to the median voter may ensure that a position closer to the median voter's position is adopted even if political parties are not directly interested in being elected and cannot commit to a political stance during an election campaign. Moreover, reciprocity increases incumbency advantages.     

Interest Groups, Trade Liberalization, and Environmental Standards

In considering a country that imposes a minimum standard on an imported polluting good, which generates negative consumption externalities, we construct a common-agency model, in which a domestic environmental group and a foreign industrial lobby can influence the formation of the minimum standard by providing political contributions to the government. This paper investigates the effects of trade liberalization on the political equilibrium environmental standard, the pattern of trade, environmental disutility, and social welfare. We find that trade liberalization tightens the minimum standard, decreases imports of the polluting good, and reduces environmental disutilities. The importing country’s social welfare, however, does not necessarily increase with trade liberalization. The weaker the environmental group’s lobbying efficiency, or the stronger the foreign firm’s lobbying efficiency, the more likely it is that trade liberalization will enhance the importing country’s welfare.     

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop an infinite horizon political economy model where neither democratic nor autocratic politicians can commit to policies that are not ex post optimal. We show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint, politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do. This encourages such entrepreneurs to support them politically. Though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency, it may be politically rational because it influences the probability of political survival. In consequence, even when information is complete, politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future. We show that, maybe somewhat surprisingly, dictators who are less likely to lose power, are more likely to use the soft budget constraint as a strategy to gain political support.     

Is polarization bad?

The adverse effects of political and social polarization on government policies are empirically well documented, yet some democracies seem to cope well or even benefit from diversity. In this paper we develop a theoretical model to show how elections in polarized societies contribute to improve quality of government. We consider both polarization among citizens and political actors (political polarization), where the second is endogenously determined by parties competing to win the support of the majority of voters. We find that more heterogeneous societies are more likely to be politically polarized, but that the divergence of positions in the political arena helps the electorate control government corruption by raising electoral stakes. Our results, which are consistent with the findings of a substantial empirical literature, suggest that, when funneled into political competition, polarization may help improving quality of government and policies.