制度经济学三大流派的比较与评析

20世纪二三十年代之后,西方经济学在经济理论上陷入持久的危机。制度经济学派就是在批判传统的主流经济学——新古典主义的基础上发展起来的。制度经济学按其类型一般分为以凡勃仑、康芒斯为代表的早期制度经济学,以加尔布雷斯、缪尔达尔为代表的后制度经济学和以科斯、诺斯为代表的新制度经济学。它们分别代表了三种制度观和三种研究思路与方法,各有其合理性和局限性。目前,国内经济学界往往热衷于新制度经济学的研究与介绍,而对于另外两大制度学派的研究却甚为冷清。只知晓其中一种而忽视其他,很难说就掌握了制度理论的精髓。只有了解制度学派的全貌,并对它们进行比较和鉴别,才能更为深入地了解制度经济学学说,才有可能形成较为客观的认识与判断。     

价值现象学视野中的新制度经济学

新制度经济学突破了新古典经济学的范式,引入了交易费用分析范式。运用价值现象学的方法可以对新制度经济学的理论基础进行分析,新制度经济学由于忽视交易费用赖以存在的条件,所以在研究过程中经常会颠倒事物之间的因果关系,这与新制度经济学的社会心理基础有关。怨恨构造了现代社会的精神气质,新制度经济学与这种精神气质是一致的。新制度经济学对制度起源及变迁的关注都与怨恨所造成的价值假象密切相关。     

A Proposed Methodological Synthesis of Post-Keynesian and Institutional Economics

Post-Keynesian and institutionalist writers have commented on the theoretical and conceptual commonalities between the two schools. Some have suggested a theoretical synthesis based on these commonalities. In spite of these theoretical and conceptual commonalities each tradition has developed significantly different methods of analysis. Instead of theoretical or conceptual synthesis we seek here to present a methodological synthesis.

Institutionalist methods have yielded "plausible" explanations, but these have been too "vague and suggestive" to be consistently used for economic policy. Post-Keynesian methods have policy necessary "rigor," but the similarity to neoclassical methods has exposed post-Keynesian theories to unwarranted synthesis with incompatible traditions.

This essay presents a synthesis of post-Keynesian and institutionalist methodology, one of "plausible rigor," combining elements of "institutional dynamics" with a heuristic framework based on John Dewey's "instrumental logic," and proposes that the resulting approach overcomes weaknesses in the methods of analysis of both schools.     

Comparative Institutional Advantage and the Appropriate Development Model for Sub-Saharan Africa

The theory of comparative institutional advantage posits that certain types of firms locate production facilities in a particular location and avoid other locations due to unique institutional advantages and disadvantages. In sub-Saharan Africa, neoliberal policies, weak and corrupt states, and Transnational Corporations have created a particularly destructive variant of capitalism. African capitalism generates little in the way of economic growth, rewards mainly the TNC and the African elites, and undermines Africa’s economic future via activities that are utterly extractive in nature. African capitalism is facilitated directly by the WTO, the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and the World Bank, and the institutional structures of African economies. After outlining the problems with African capitalism as currently structured, the paper goes on to suggest an alternative to this model involving experimental, embedded, grass roots development efforts that build on domestic cultural institutions that would generate significantly more positive outcomes for the people of sub-Saharan Africa. By abandoning neoliberal policies, it might be possible to create a better economic model that would build on community-centered institutional strengths to benefit a greater proportion of the population.     

Comparative Institutional Advantage and the Appropriate Development Model for Sub-Saharan Africa

The theory of comparative institutional advantage posits that certain types of firms locate production facilities in a particular location and avoid other locations due to unique institutional advantages and disadvantages. In sub-Saharan Africa, neoliberal policies, weak and corrupt states, and Transnational Corporations have created a particularly destructive variant of capitalism. African capitalism generates little in the way of economic growth, rewards mainly the TNC and the African elites, and undermines Africa’s economic future via activities that are utterly extractive in nature. African capitalism is facilitated directly by the WTO, the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and the World Bank, and the institutional structures of African economies. After outlining the problems with African capitalism as currently structured, the paper goes on to suggest an alternative to this model involving experimental, embedded, grass roots development efforts that build on domestic cultural institutions that would generate significantly more positive outcomes for the people of sub-Saharan Africa. By abandoning neoliberal policies, it might be possible to create a better economic model that would build on community-centered institutional strengths to benefit a greater proportion of the population.

Towards a History of American Institutional Economics

This paper focuses on a number of issues that have arisen in my efforts to deal with the history of American institutional economics in the interwar period. The specific issues addressed here are (1) the choice of time frame; (2) the definition of institutionalism in terms of its commonly held ideas; (3) the treatment of the network of personal contacts that make up the institutional movement; (4) the treatment of certain institutional and cross-disciplinary connections and supports; and (5) the variety of reasons lying behind the relative decline in the position of institutional economics after World War II. Each of these issues is discussed in light of historical material and examples and with a view to detailing the specific challenges and possible solutions involved.     

Democracy,Development and Comparative Institutional Advantage in Africa

Development in Africa has been stalled for decades in a vicious cycle of poverty, underdevelopment, corruption, and conflict. In this paper, we argue that donors should focus on democracy and accountability as a first priority in development aid. We use the theory of comparative institutional advantage to identify the key institutions that are most likely to facilitate economic development in communities in the modern world. These institutions include an efficient non-corrupt government sector. Subsequently, we discuss how a lack of democracy and accountability inevitably undermines development efforts and investment, referring especially to the Ethiopian experience but also considering the experiences of other African dictatorships. Finally, we discuss how donors, by emphasizing democracy and accountability along with other policies that support democratic institutions, have a greater chance of effectively contributing to African economic development.     

金融生态中的法律制度探讨--一个新制度经济学的角度

在金融生态建设中,完善法律制度是改进金融生态的重中之重.本文运用新制度经济学的相关理论,阐释了中国金融生态环境法制缺陷的深层次原因是没有真正实现从"人治"、"权治"到"法治"的根本转变,以及非正式约束与市场经济还存在诸多的矛盾,金融生态环境建设的核心是法律制度建设.当前我国金融生态建设的首要问题应以完善金融产权为核心,以强化信用秩序为重点,改善金融主体法律制度.     

从制度经济学视角看人民币汇率改革

汇率改革是一种多目标的制度安排,各利益主体在利益上既存在着一致性,又存在着矛盾性.实施混合性制度变革,将有利于最大限度地减少全社会在利益上的损失和汇率改革阻力,也有利于制度均衡的产生和改革的最终实现.     

Institutional Approaches to Economic Development: The Current Status of the Debate

The recent publication of "Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History" (Chang 2011a) has stimulated a thought-provoking debate, and has brought forth a wide-ranging demonstration of the theoretical arsenal of the new institutional economics. The debate proves that, as of yet, no satisfactory theory of institutions has been articulated, nor is there an agreement on the relationship between institutional change and the politics of development. It also demonstrates the presence of two distinct lines of research: ideological and political, both of which rely on different theoretical legacies, and embody distinct economic worldviews. This scenario allows a summary of the argument in the most recent literature to be made on the relationship between institutions and development, as well as to relate the debate to the concept of development as a process of expansion of capacities.     

Institutional Economics as Theory of Policy Change: Impact of Past Policy Failures on Present Policy

Social scientists have developed several theories for understanding or evaluating policy change over time. Since all costs or benefits are not internalized owing to positive transaction costs, policymaking is always implemented under cost underestimation conditions and, therefore, is imperfect. I call this trait policy failure in this article. Furthermore, I show that a new framework combining the social costs approach and the legal/economic approach in institutional economics is suitable and can be applied to evaluating how past policy failures affect present policy, providing as an example the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan.     

Towards a non-Darwinian Theory of Institutional Change

The paper emphasizes two flaws in mainstream economics: the failure to understand actual human behavior in many real contexts and the failure to take account of transaction costs. By emphasizing the role of knowledge, institutions, transaction costs and path dependence, new institutional economics has provided a powerful answer to these shortcomings. Nevertheless, a number of questions remain open. In particular, path dependence is far from being a continuous process. Its dynamics and its irregularities are by and large unexplained. Hence, a strong need for a convincing evolutionary theory of environmental change. This article does not deny the validity of the Darwinian view applied to the theory of the firm and of competition in a free-market economy. The paper, however, maintains that the natural-selection process that characterizes the Darwinian approach is ill suited to describe economic evolutionary processes. It is shown that a combination of functional analysis and natural selection may indeed be a better solution, for it solves some of the puzzles raised by public choice theory without violating the fundamental tenets of the new institutional economics approach. Still, although this combined view may well explain why the institutional features are retained by the system, it does not clarify why they are introduced in the first place. A third possibility is put forward in the second part of the paper, where a new evolutionary theory is suggested. Within this framework, agents are assumed to behave according to their preferences within the existing rules of the game. At the same time, new ideas and sometimes new ideologies may influence their behavioral patterns. The combination between needs and ideologies generates environmental change, especially if so-called ideological entrepreneurs are able to transform latent and shared beliefs into an institutional project and enforce it.     

基于制度变迁条件下中国私营企业产权制度模式分析

制度变迁由于受到初级行动团体和次级行动团体的影响,其变迁模式在不同的发展阶段呈现出不同的表现特征。本文通过对改革开放30年来中国私营企业在不同发展阶段的制度变迁模式所做的实证研究,深刻分析了中国在进行经济体制转轨的不同时期影响私营企业产权制度变迁的主体因素,并通过对中央政府、地方政府、非政府组织和私营企业四大主体之间存在的相互博弈关系的研究,提出了未来一个时期内中国私营企业产权制度变迁的模式应该是一种由企业主导、非政府组织、地方政府作为润滑剂或者中介并与中央政府相互协调与相互制衡的“双回路制度变迁模式”。最后就如何优化该产权制度的变迁模式提出了政策建议。     

两种制度经济学范式中的意识形态理论:分歧与根源

作为制度经济学的两种范式,新制度经济学和马克思经济学的意识形态理论在意识形态的本质和功能、意识形态的根源与变迁、意识形态与制度变迁的关系等方面存在着明显的分歧.整体来看,马克思的分析框架迄今仍是最有说服力的.这些分歧的根源是方法论:新制度经济学的方法论是制度个体主义和建构理性主义,马克思的制度经济学的方法论是制度整体主义与制度个体主义的统一、演进理性主义与建构理性主义的统一.     

"三农"问题的制度经济学分析

从制度经济学的角度来看,制度歧视、扭曲、农村组织缺位及制度变迁的滞后、非均衡是导致"三农"问题的直接原因,而诺斯的"国家理论"则揭示了"三农"问题的更深层原因。     

新比较经济学的研究视角及其比较研究

20世纪90年代初期,随着苏联、东欧等社会主义国家相继崩溃,旧比较经济学没有可比较的对象,为新比较经济学创造了条件。本文主要对新旧比较经济学进行了比较研究。从比较对象上看,旧比较经济学主要针对不同经济制度进行比较;而新比较经济学侧重于相同经济制度在不同国家的效率差异。从研究方法上看,旧比较经济学主要是特征描述法,没有建立系统的理论;而新比较经济学采用主流经济学的分析方法,创立了自己的理论体系。最后,本文对新比较经济学与新制度经济学及公共选择理论进行了比较研究。     

Property and Economic Power as Issues in Institutional Economics

In the first part of this two-part paper, I presented an "irenic" reconciliation of the three apparently contradictory definitions of "institution" within original institutional economics (OIE), employing the methodology of critical institutionalism. The critical institutionalist reconciliation of these definitions conceptualizes institutions as an emergent process by which the internal and necessary relations of social structure as collective action, mediated through agency, results in the control, expansion, and liberation of the individual action of social actors in transactions. In short, an institution is the emergent process of social structure actualized in transactions (social action). Institutions, therefore, not only have a structural existence, but also an actual existence as they are the process of the emergence of the actual (in transactions) from the structural. Institutions are multi-level processes and cannot be reduced to structures, actions, behaviors, or patterns of behaviors. In this part, I demonstrate the significance of this reconciliation in two areas. The first is its ability to further differentiate the institutional definition of economics as "the science of social provisioning" from the mainstream definition of economics as "a relationship between ends and scarce means" by decomposing the institutional definition into its productive and distributive processes. The second is its usefulness in modeling the interaction of non-economic social institutions with economic institutions at varying levels of detail. I also introduce critical institutional analysis, and use as a method, for model-building and use it to build models of communal, feudal, and industrial capitalist economies.     

The Institutional Economics of Karl Polanyi

Economists tend to see the market as a default option for social order and a role for government only when markets fail. Developing a convincing analysis of the role of government in economic processes, however, needs to start by considering government failure in its own terms. Drawing on insights from institutional economics, law and economics and the philosophy of law, emphasizing the necessity of rules for the economy, this paper develops the concept of government failure. The paper identifies and develops four different types of government failure. Government can set rules for economic processes and actors that are (1) too specific, (2) too broad, (3) that are arbitrary, or (4) that conflict with other rules it has set out to address other, related issues (possibly primarily non-economic). Government failure is illustrated in the context of Intellectual Property Right (IPR) law as it relates to Anti-Trust law.     

Entrepreneurs and the Ordering of Institutional Reform: Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine Compared

We use survey data to examine new firms in Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. By measures of job growth, security of property, and market development, our countries fall into two groups: an advanced group including Poland, Romania and Slovakia, with Slovakia falling somewhat behind the other two; and a backward group of Russia and Ukraine. Macroeconomic stability is not sufficient for private-sector growth. A lack of bank finance does not seem to prevent private-sector growth. More inhibiting than inadequate finance are insecure property rights.     

Impact of improved water services in informal neighbourhoods in Ouagadougou

This article examines the impact of a project to improve water services in underserved neighbourhoods in Ouagadougou on household water access conditions. We used the propensity-score matching method to analyse data from a survey carried out in 2011, and found that the improvement project cut the cost of water neighbourhood-wide by 94 CFA francs per cubic meter, reduced the portion of this expense by 1% of the average household budget, and cut the daily time to collect water by 10–13 min. The results that we obtained through the propensity-score matching method differ from those obtained by simply comparing the averages of the neighbourhoods participating in the project to those that did not participate. This indicates that the propensity-score matching method of impact evaluation is valuable in supplying decision makers with nonbiased estimates of the link between ease of access to water and poverty reduction.