Do remittances improve political institutions? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa

Do remittances represent a significant positive determinant of democratic institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa? In this paper, we estimate the effect that remittances have on democratic institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1975–2014. Using a 5-year non-overlapping panel sample and controlling for country and time fixed effects, we find that remittances are positively associated with democratic institutions. Our baseline system-GMM estimates indicate that a one standard deviation increase in remittance flows improves democratic institutions by around 0.32 standard deviations. Furthermore, we find that remittances improve democratic institutions by increasing schooling and reducing poverty.     

Effects of financial liberalization on financial market development and economic performance of the SSA region: An empirical assessment

This study investigates the role of financial liberalization in promoting financial deepening and economic growth in Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA). We apply the more efficient system GMM estimator in dynamic panel data that combines first difference and original level specification to deal with the problems of weak instruments. Our dataset covers 21 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over the period of 1981–2009.Additionally, the paper sought to examine both the direct and indirect impacts of financial liberalization policies on economic growth and financial deepening using a much more comprehensive and recent financial liberalization dataset. The econometric results suggest that, on average, financial liberalization is negatively associated with income growth in SSA region. Our findings provide support for the skeptical empirical view of financial liberalization in emerging markets, which show that liberalization, by itself, might be associated with lower economic growth through leading to destabilization, stimulating domestic capital flight and increasing the risk of financial fragility. However, the research finds that financial liberalization does indeed impact positively on financial deepening and resource mobilization in SSA region, after controlling for key macroeconomic factors such as institutional quality, fiscal imbalances and inflation. In fact the study reports a stronger reforms effect for countries that have stronger legal institutions, protection of property rights and higher human capital. Policy-wise, the study finds that institutional and human capital factors are important in explaining growth and financial development; therefore, it is necessary for SSA governments to promote a stronger and more transparent institutional development as we move forward.     

Governance during Social Transformations: Challenges for Africa

The governance advice that is offered to Africa usually identifies a list of ‘good governance’ goals like stable property rights, a rule of law, low corruption and government accountability as preconditions for development. These goals are difficult to implement not only because they are expensive public goods but in addition their enforcement is typically at variance with powerful interests in the political settlements of developing countries. The historical evidence and much institutional theory suggests that during their social transformations successful developing countries had a different set of ‘developmental’ or ‘growth-enhancing’ governance capabilities that enabled their states to support critical property rights transformations and assist firms in acquiring and learning to use new technology. The institutions and policies they used differed because their political and institutional starting points were different. There are therefore no blueprints for Africa or anywhere else, but certainly the good governance menu is unrealistic. Rather African countries have to experiment and develop institutional and policy solutions that work in their context and which are appropriate for transforming property rights and accelerating technology adoption.     

Institutions matter,but which ones?

The purpose of this paper is to go beyond the narrow focus of the current institutional economics literature in development on the institutions protecting individual property rights, and to look at the economic effects of some other aspects of institutional quality on the development process (like democratic participation rights and institutions to address coordination failures). Another purpose is to suggest an alternative instrumental variable in quantifying the effects of property rights institutions. Finally, we speculate how, on account of distributive conflicts, institutions that have an adverse effect on economic performance often tend to persist for long periods of time in many poor countries.     

Endogenous strength of intellectual property rights: Implications for economic development and growth

The key institution that determines sustained growth in R&D-based growth models is the strength of intellectual property rights, which are usually assumed to be exogenous. In this paper we endogenize the strength of the intellectual property rights and show how private incentives to protect these rights affect economic development and growth. Our model explains endogenous differences in intellectual property rights across countries as private incentives to invest in property rights generate multiple equilibria. We show that the resulting institutional threshold offers an explanation for why the effect of a transfer of institutions from one country to another depends on the quality of the institutions that were imported.     

Property rights,entrepreneurship and coordination

The notion of plan coordination enjoys a central place in the analysis of institutions and competitive market processes. The conventional wisdom is that institutions and policies vary in the extent to which they promote competition and how quickly and completely they bring individuals’ plans into closer coordination with one another. Kirzner has provided the most fully elaborated statement on the use of coordination as a positive analytical device for explaining market dynamics and as a normative criterion for evaluating economic policies. We identify the core propositions in his analysis that elucidate how economic coordination depends upon that most fundamental of market institutions – the system of private property rights. We also probe into Kirzner's claims about inherent limitations in our ability to compare the coordinative potential of alternative property rights systems. We unpack the consequences of these core propositions using the economic theory of property rights. We also examine Kirzner's assertion that dynamic competition – including Schumpeterian innovation – is necessarily coordinative in its market effects. We find that his argument rests on the implicit assumption that property rights remain constant during the process of market adjustment. We provide a case study of the advent of commercial aviation as a potential counterexample to his claims.     

Microfinance institutions’ transparency in Sub-Saharan Africa

This study analyses the impact of the ownership structure and macro-level factors on Microfinance institutions’ (MFIs) transparency in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Using cross-sectional data from 223 MFIs in 11 countries, we find that MFI transparency in SSA is low and highly variable. Our results indicate that larger MFIs and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are associated with greater transparency. Greater transparency of NGOs is consistent with the need to sustain and attract donor funding. Country-level resources, such as the level of financial sector development, also impact MFI transparency.     

Property Rights,Governance, and Economic Development

In this review article we give an intuitive account of why good institutions in general, and secure property rights in particular, matter for economic growth and development. We also discuss implications for good governance, defined as the efficient provision of property rights and other aspects of governance. Finally, we briefly touch on political institutions that might be conducive to good governance and thus economic development.     

Does the quality of institutions enhance savings? The case of Sub-Saharan Africa

Over the last three decades, there has been increasing disparity in savings across regions and income groupings globally. In this paper, we investigate whether the quality of institutions explains the saving disparities in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Utilizing comprehensive panel data and spanning the period 1980–2015, we estimate a savings model using the two-step instrumental variable generalized method of moment (2SIV-GMM) estimator. Our results show that the impact of institutions on savings behaviour differs across regions and income groupings, and in SSA, in aggregate. We find that the level and growth of per capita income and terms of trade enhance savings whereas government consumption expenditure, financial sector development and the elderly dependency rate are savings impeding. The findings are robust to alternative model specification and highlight the importance of institutions in influencing savings behaviour in SSA.     

Institutions and Values: A Methodological Inquiry

Economics entails a study of institutions regardless of the school of thought, and it is inherently an analysis of institutional transformation with a vision toward creating positive social change through economic arrangements. However, the conceptions of institutions, identity of individuals, human nature as it pertains to economics, identification of the economic sphere, its concerns, and studying its evolution, all vary substantively across schools of thought. We examine the following issues: (i) the differences in the ontological identity of the individual between heterodox approaches, new institutional economics (NIE), and the neoclassical school; (ii) the central point of divergence between original institutional economics (OIE) and NIE, despite both schools being committed to the project of an “institutionally” centered approach to economics; and (iii) the absence of a cohesive project to explore foundational theoretical congruencies among those heterodox approaches that have a shared vision, values, and a common ontological identity of socially embedded people.     

Explaining the effect of financial development on the quality of property rights

Empirical evidence suggests that financial development can catalyze property rights reforms. This paper offers a theory of financial markets to explain these facts defining the relationship. The explanation is based on a simple trade‐off between the costs and the benefits of securing property. Securing the right to property at a cost allows agents to post collateral against loans. However, the benefits of collateral vary according to the existing credit market conditions, which we take into account in the tradeoff between the costs and the benefits of securing property rights along the path of financial development to explain the conditions under which financial development can create incentives for better property rights institutions.     

The Coevolution of Finance and Property Rights: Evidence from Transition Economies

The transition from communism to capitalism was necessarily accompanied by a sudden and abrupt increase in the financialization of society. This increase occurred in an environment that, even now, still has little experience with or expertise in financialization. Given that financialization occurred simultaneously with the growth and evolution of other political and economic institutions, the question arises: What was the effect on these other nascent institutions like property rights? This article empirically analyzes the relationship between financialization and property rights in transition countries. Using a unique monthly database of twenty transition countries over a period from 1989 to 2012, this article finds that the influence of financialization depends on which definition of “financialization” is used. In particular, increases in basic financial intermediation improved property rights. However, higher-order “financialization,” proxied here by the size of capital markets and the wages in the financial sector, appeared to have a negative impact on the development of broad-based property rights in transition.     

When should market-supporting institutions be established?

Market-supporting institutions play an essential role in successfulmarket economies, yet much remains unanswered about when inthe course of economic development those institutions shouldbe established. This article develops a model that shows howprivate sector growth can depend on the time at which a countryestablishes institutions belonging to a specific category: thosethat have the potential not only to enhance efficiency, butto threaten private property rights by facilitating income redistribution(e.g., agencies to enforce regulations and tax laws). If a countryhas no difficulty committing to secure property rights, it isefficient to establish potentially efficiency-enhancing institutionsas soon as possible. In the presence of commitment problems,however, eventually desirable institutions (even those essentialfor economic growth) can derail growth if established prematurely.Restricting voting rights may have positive or negative effectson growth, and there exist potential complementarities betweendemocracy and efficiency-enhancing institutions.     

建筑业农民工人力资本产权结构研究

建筑业由于其项目管理要求,就其工作性质而言具有很强的工作范围不确定性、工作内容一次性、工作地域分割性等特点,决定建筑业农民工人力资本在资本取得、价值实现、基本权益保障等方面都具有一定的特殊性.在文献梳理基础上,本文借鉴人力资本产权理论提出建筑业农民工人力资本产权权能结构包括所有权、收益权和发展权三种权利束.在此基础上,研究三类权利束的特征:在所有权方面表现为投资主体的非系统性、在交易过程中弱抵押性和制度失衡引起的基于所有权的基本权利受损;在收益权方面表现为先天弱势资本导致的产权主体交易能力低下、折价交易以及交易的被动性;在发展权方面表现为人力资本定价的滞后、人力资本价值折损高风险以及人力资本价值提升的曲折.     

Property Rights, Renewable Resources and Economic Development

This paper analyzes the role of endogenous property rights in the development of an open resource-based economy. I incorporate renewable resources and endogenous decisions on property rights into a convex growth model with the formal and informal sectors. I find that along the transition path to steady state, property rights enforcement is not constant but improves with time as well as involves intermediate property rights specification (between open access and perfect property rights). International trade and labor market are driving these endogenous changes. Property rights improve with favorable terms of trade when the economy exports resource services and stronger property rights help maintain the resource stock by deterring illegal harvest. This pushes labor away from the informal harvest sector toward greater participation in the formal sector of the economy. In turn, more labor participation in the formal sector along with capital formation increase the country’s output and consumption. Overall, with an open economy and well-functioning institutions, renewable resources have a positive impact on economic growth.     

Emerging from the Hobbesian jungle: Might takes and makes rights

The conflict over scarce resources in the Hobbesian jungle may be avoided if rules of obligation delineating property rights develop along with institutions of governance. One possibility is a “duress contract” as the strongest individual threatens others who agree to enslavement. Thus, “might takes rights.” Alternatively, individuals with similar capacities for violence may enter a “consent contract” establishing rules of obligation and then voluntarily participating in governance. They will not agree to a rights assignment that produces less wealth than they expect through violence, however, so “might makes rights.” A might-takes-and-makes-rights analysis is outlined to explain the continuum of legal institutions and property rights allocations that can evolve between these two extremes of duress and consent. Increasingly finely delineated private property rights tend to evolve under institutions produced by consent contracts, while common pool problems tend to arise near the duress contract end of the spectrum. This paper draws from a larger project on “The Evolution of Law” which has been supported by the Earhart Foundation. Discussions with and comments by Randy Holcombe, Kevin Reffit, and two anonymous referees led to significant improvements in the development and presentation of the arguments, as did discussant comments on a related paper made by Douglas Ginsburg and participants in the Friedrich August von Hayek Symposium on “Competition Among Institutions” in Freiburg, Germany, June 1–4, 1994, sponsored by the International Institute at George Mason University and the Walter Eucken Institute, Freiburg.     

Institutions,governance and incentives in common property regimes for African rangelands

The general distinctions between open access, state property, common property and private property are now well established in the academic literature. When applied to African rangelands, however, common property admits a wide variety of resource management regimes. To formulate effective policies it is necessary to understand the structure and operations of particular regimes. In this paper we discuss three examples of common property regimes, two from the southern African nation of Lesotho and one from the west African nation of Senegal, to illustrate some of the key characteristics of common property regimes. In particular, it is important to understand the structure of governance, the types of institutions that govern behavior, and the compatibility between governance, institutions and individual incentives. A common property regime can only be effective if its institutions are compatible with the structure of governance. The extent of its effectiveness also depends upon the incentives and expectations of individuals expected to enforce the rules of the institutions or comply with their terms. At present, most African governments lack the organizational capacity and political will necessary to implement state property regimes, official regulations on resource use, or individual property rights for rangelands resources. In many cases it is more appropriate for governments to define and enforce group rights to particular resources, then help to establish conditions in which internal group dynamics yield efficient resource management outcomes.     

我国国防知识产权质押融资模式与政策研究

国防知识产权作为国防科技工业创新发展的基础,是落实军民融合国家战略的重要保障。国防知识产权质押融资能够有效拓宽军工企业融资渠道,解决国防知识产权成果转化过程中大量资金需求与单一融资渠道的矛盾,提高国防知识产权转化运用效率。基于军民融合战略,从我国知识产权质押融资现状着手,剖析国防知识产权质押融资在目前体制下的制约因素,通过对国外军民融合发展过程中知识产权质押融资制度建设的研究,构建我国国防知识产权质押融资模式总体框架,阐述所涉及各机构、部门的职责,并提出相应政策建议,以期释放我国国防知识产权利用潜能,促进军民融合深度发展。     

A model of the origins of basic property rights

This paper studies the origins of one of the most basic of property rights, namely, the right of an individual or an organization to the fruits of its labour. My objective is to address the questions of why, when and how this property right can emerge and be made secure. I develop a model of the strategic interaction between two players in the state-of-nature, which is an environment characterized by the absence of any laws and institutions (including property rights and the state). My analysis explores, in particular, the roles of the players' fighting and productive skills on the emergence and security (or otherwise) of this property right.