Readings and translations of Karl Marx in Portugal (1852–1914)

This article presents an original and critical inventory of the most significant surveys, citations, discussions and translations made of Marx's works in Portugal up until the First World War.

The paper stresses the academic and political conditions under which Karl Marx's ideas were received in a European semiperipheral society and the specific interpretations that were made of those ideas.

It allows for the possibility of undertaking future studies comparing other national cases.     

A Proposed Methodological Synthesis of Post-Keynesian and Institutional Economics

Post-Keynesian and institutionalist writers have commented on the theoretical and conceptual commonalities between the two schools. Some have suggested a theoretical synthesis based on these commonalities. In spite of these theoretical and conceptual commonalities each tradition has developed significantly different methods of analysis. Instead of theoretical or conceptual synthesis we seek here to present a methodological synthesis.

Institutionalist methods have yielded "plausible" explanations, but these have been too "vague and suggestive" to be consistently used for economic policy. Post-Keynesian methods have policy necessary "rigor," but the similarity to neoclassical methods has exposed post-Keynesian theories to unwarranted synthesis with incompatible traditions.

This essay presents a synthesis of post-Keynesian and institutionalist methodology, one of "plausible rigor," combining elements of "institutional dynamics" with a heuristic framework based on John Dewey's "instrumental logic," and proposes that the resulting approach overcomes weaknesses in the methods of analysis of both schools.     

The Place of Uncertainty in Heterodox Economics Journals: A Bibliometric Study

Uncertainty is a common theme in heterodox economics. This article investigates how heterodox journals have been dealing with the concept of uncertainty. It relies on a bibliometric analysis to identify the concept of uncertainty in top heterodox journals and the genealogy of different heterodox meanings of uncertainty among those journals.     

Institutions and Development: The Interaction Between Trade Regime and Political System

This paper argues that an unequal distribution of political power, biased to landed elites and owners of natural resources, in combination with openness to trade is a major obstacle to development of natural resource- or land-abundant economies. We develop a two-sector general equilibrium model and show that in an oligarchic society public investments conducive to industrialization. schooling for example.are typically lower in an open than in a closed economy. Moreover, we find that, under openness to trade, development is faster in a democratic system. We also endogenize the trade regime and demonstrate that in a land-abundant economy the landed elite has an interest to support openness to trade. We present historical evidence for Southern economies in the Americas that is consistent with our theoretical results: Resistance of landed elites to mass education, comparative advantages in primary goods production in the 19th century globalization wave, and low primary school enrollment and literacy rates.     

Institutions,innovation and growth

This paper looks at the link between the quality of economic institutions and innovation, and innovation and growth. We construct a measure of the innovation content of individual manufacturing industries and show that countries with stronger economic institutions specialize in more innovation‐intensive industries. Our results also provide evidence that industries involving higher levels of innovation grow relatively faster in countries with better economic institutions. The results suggest that innovation is an important channel through which higher quality economic institutions contribute to better growth performance in the long run.     

Do Institutions Cause Growth?

We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that (a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, (b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and (c) subsequently improve their political institutions.     

Engines of Growth in China: The Limits of Informal Institutions

Abstract:

Since the 1978 reforms, China has experienced rapid economic and social development. GDP growth has been in the double digits on average yearly, creating the fastest sustained economic growth recorded by a major economy in history. Not only did this transform the economy and society at large, China reached important milestones in terms of reducing poverty and creating prosperity in a short period of time. This article uses the conceptual framework of new institutional economics to examine China’s economic growth and how growth has been achieved largely by ‘informal institutions’ that are grounded in culture, customs, and private interactions that emerge spontaneously. The trajectory by which these informal institutions left their imprint on China’s complex economic landscape and how they can constrain future economic growth are also of central importance. After examining decentralization and risk management practices, property rights, and the legal system, we emphasize the importance of creating formal institutions necessary for long-term growth, most importantly innovation. Preliminary evidence shows total factor productivity is tapering off which may reflect the constraints of China’s institutional environment. This ought to be reversed if China is to enjoy long-term sustained growth.     

Religious Identity,Informal Institutions,and the Nation-States of the Near East

This paper uses the Near East as a case study to describe how religious identity became a source of preference formation and a cause of social cleavage. It formulates the concepts of identity-sharing groups and resource-sharing groups to bridge between religious identity's social-psychological aspects and its socioeconomic effects. The paper then argues that social cleavages among religious identity-sharing groups generated informal institutions that are incompatible with the abstract formal institutions of the nation-states of Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. That incompatibility hobbles efforts of formal state institutions to promote economic development, and instead restrains economic growth by intensifying existing conflicts among groups. It suggests that a state that could promote economic development would be the one that recognizes and supports the informal, localized institutions and allows those of them with common features to evolve into abstract formal institutions.     

A Simple Model of Inefficient Institutions

This paper develops a simple model of economic and political institutions that lead to poor aggregate economic performance. In the model economy, groups with political power, the elite, choose policies to increase their income and to directly or indirectly transfer resources from the rest of society to themselves. The resulting equilibrium is generally inefficient because of three distinct mechanisms: (1) revenue extraction, (2) factor price manipulation and (3) political consolidation. In particular, the elite may pursue inefficient policies to extract revenue from other groups. They may do so to reduce the demand for factors coming from other groups in the economy, thus indirectly benefiting from changes in factor prices. Finally, they may try to impoverish other groups competing for political power. The elite's preferences over inefficient policies translate into inefficient economic institutions. The notable exception to this general picture emerges when long‐term investments are important, thus creating a commitment (holdup) problem, whereby equilibrium taxes and regulations are worse than the elite would like them to be from an ex ante point of view. In this case, economic institutions that provide additional security of property rights to other groups can be useful.     

交通信号灯与拍卖机制——对市场与制度关系的一个案例研究

肖特的交通博弈模型表明,当还不具备足够的技术条件有效降低交易成本的情况下,更为可行的制度可以成为价格机制的替代,然而其模型并不足以证明制度与市场价格机制的替代关系。现代技术条件使得十字路口价格机制的实现成为可能,因此也表明了制度与市场价格机制并非简单的替代关系。模型的发展演变反映了奥地利学派的自发市场秩序观更为具有解释力。     

Insider and Outsider Strategies of Influence: The BRICS’ Dualistic Approach Towards Informal Institutions

ABSTRACT

The challenge of ‘emerging’ countries in the 21st century has been conducted in a much more peaceful manner than in past eras when power transitions were most commonly accompanied by war. The hallmark of this peaceful transition has been the elevation of the G20, a forum in which established and emerging powers jointly deal with global economic issues and which – despite or precisely because of its informal character – has become the prime forum for global economic governance. Significantly, however, this new openness and flexibility of the international system and its increasing informalism have not only provided an avenue for emerging powers to be integrated into the inner circle of global economic governance, but have also allowed them to set up alternative institutions. By forming their own exclusive BRICS group in parallel to their membership in the G20, emerging powers have pursued a dualistic strategy that allows them to be simultaneously institutional ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. The article focuses on this seemingly ambiguous international behaviour and explains why the BRICS have opted for this dualistic approach. Far from being socialised into the established system, the oppositional psychology of the past has not disappeared completely.     

Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development

We estimate the respective contributions of institutions, geography, and trade in determining income levels around the world, using recently developed instrumental variables for institutions and trade. Our results indicate that the quality of institutions trumps everything else. Once institutions are controlled for, conventional measures of geography have at best weak direct effects on incomes, although they have a strong indirect effect by influencing the quality of institutions. Similarly, once institutions are controlled for, trade is almost always insignificant, and often enters the income equation with the wrong (i.e., negative) sign. We relate our results to recent literature, and where differences exist, trace their origins to choices on samples, specification, and instrumentation.     

Revolution,Reform, and Social Justice

The literature on mainstream economics usually takes the United States as the main geographical reference. However, the various criteria that define mainstream economics can be applied outside the United States. The ideas that have prestige and influence in a given country’s academia may not be the same ideas that constitute American mainstream economics. Brazil has been an example of pluralism. An institutional perspective helps explain why several people in Brazil conform with institutional rules of thought and of behavior that differ from those of the American mainstream, including the norm of pluralism, and how these rules influence many people.     

劳动力产权与基本经济制度

劳动力作为一项特殊资产,存在着特定的产权结构.劳动力产权有着五层次的结构.当劳动力主体不能完全拥有这五层次的产权时,即存在着对劳动力产权的强制分割,这种分割的具体差别也就构成了不同基本经济制度之间的本质区别.当劳动力主体完整地拥有这五层次的产权时,则意味着劳动力主体是"自由"的,而这正是自由市场经济制度的本质所在.     

The Incoherent Emperor: A Heterodox Critique of Neoclassical Microeconomic Theory

It is somewhat common for heterodox economists to come to the defense of neoclassical microeconomic theory. This is due to many reasons, but perhaps the commonest one is ignorance. It seems that most heterodox economists are not aware of the many critiques or that as a collective they completely undermine neoclassical theory. The objective of the article is to dispel ignorance by using the existing criticisms to delineate a systematic critique of the core components of neoclassical microeconomic theory: the supply and demand explanation of the price mechanism and its application to competitive markets. The critique starts by examining the choices, preferences, utility functions, and demand curves, followed by examining production, costs, factor input demand functions and partial equilibrium, and ending with perfect competition and the supply curve. In the conclusion, the implications of the results will be extended to the firm and imperfectly competitive markets, and then the question whether general equilibrium theory or game theory can save neoclassical microeconomic theory.     

The Austrian Theory of Institutions Applied to Science-Industry Relationships: The Relevance of Innovative Institutions

This contribution aims at using an Austrian approach of institutions to discuss specific institutional arrangements in the current working of science-industry relationships. By combining distinctive characteristics between Menger's and Hayek's research programs, we establish a typology of institutions that goes beyond the usual way to approach business institutions and allows us to identify transitory types of institutional arrangements called innovative institutions. We apply that Austrian approach of institutions and address its relevance to highlight some puzzling issues derived from empirical evidence. Then, innovative institutions reveal particularly suited to understand how public and private research work together in science-industry relationships.     

我国创业板市场交易制度设计——一种演化视角

创业板市场交易制度的设计要为市场实际的发展和演化留有空间。以集中竞价机制为基础,引入多元竞争性做市商、融合竞价做市商两种制度的混合型做市商制度,能够满足制度变迁的阶段性要求,是现实国情约束下创业板市场的最优交易制度选择。     

现代工作价值观研究述评

随着跨国公司的发展以及"走出去"战略的兴起,工作价值观方面的研究再度受到了学者们的关注。上个世纪六七十年代、九十年代分别兴起了两次关于工作价值观研究的高潮,现在研究者们的热情再度爆发。为在以后的研究中取得更大进步,本文就前两次高潮所产出的成果进行总结并对未来研究提出展望。     

诚信道德与事业单位法人管理

事业单位法人管理,是我国改革不断深化过程中出现的新问题。社会主义市场经济条件下的事业单位法人管理,诚信道德建设占有重要地位,可谓多项管理的基础、核心,是治本之策。事业单位法人在社会机构整体框架中,担负着特殊职责,要求事业单位法人正确处理“两种效益”的关系,坚持以社会效益优先的价值方针;正确处理整体利益与局部利益的关系,强化为公共利益提供优质服务的诚信意识;正确处理一时的效应与夯实基础的关系,更好地为经济社会协调发展服务。