When Galbraith Frightened Conservatives: Power in Economics,Economists’ Power,and Scientificity

In this article, I first expound John Kenneth Galbraith’s general theory of power. Galbraith always took into account phenomena of power in economics, and shed light on the power of economists in particular. I then show how the reaction of conservatives to the broadcasting of the Age of Uncertainty highlights the relevance of Galbraith’s theory. Letters exchanged by conservative Lords in an effort to fight against Galbraith’s ideas paradoxically illustrate his theory. This leads to questions about the status of economists, popularizers, and experts. Finally, I argue that convictions have a crucial role in scientific production, and that Robert Solow’s distinction between the “serious scholars” and the proselyte economist is irrelevant because of its incapacity to understand how economists produce knowledge.     

The “Treasury View”: An (un-)expected return?

Abstract

By examining the rhetorical use of an old piece of economic theory by some contemporary economists, this paper intends to report on “how today's economists conduct a public policy debate”. This paper is neither a scholarly history of the interwar debate nor a sophisticated critique of current economic policy. It is an attempt to link the policy and theoretical arguments of two similar debates separated by nearly 80 years. The second part of the paper demonstrates that the (un-)expected return of the Treasury View is a case study illustrating two very different modelling strategies.     

On Misunderstanding Government: an Analysis of the Art of Policy Advice

In the traditional economics literature government is treated as an agent exogenous to the economy. When economists confront situations where individuals cannot sign binding contracts, they invoke government as the “third party” that can enforce the contracts; after studying the macroeconomic problems of a country, economists frequently go on to tell what government should do to improve the outcome. It is argued in this paper that this is an erroneous view of government and is the reason why the advice of economists and other social scientists have had so little impact on government behavior. The difficulties of advising an endogenous government are highlighted by developing a new game, the Cheater's Roulette. It demonstrates that even when the adviser and the politician have very similar objectives, there may be no straightforward way to transmit the knowledge of the adviser to the politician. Having analysed the subject of advising government, the paper goes on to discuss, more speculatively, some general issues concerning the modeling of an endogenous government.     

From Judicial Sovereignty to Collective Democracy: The Development of J.R. Commons’ Perspective on Progressive Institutional Change

Abstract:

This article clarifies the significance of “collective democracy” in the works of John R. Commons by comparing it with “judicial sovereignty” in terms of its contribution to “progress.” We can thus answer two issues that Paul D. Bush does not clearly address: (i) what setup for policy formation contributes to progress and (ii) what is the role of economists within a collective democracy? Based on the comparison, the answer to the first question is collective democracy, and regarding the second question, the roles of economists as both economists and “institutional” economists are extrapolated.     

Tooke's approach to explaining prices

This paper examines the method of analysis and theoretical approach Thomas Tooke (1774–1858) employed in his empirical study of English prices. It is shown that Tooke adopted the “long period method” formulated by Adam Smith to analyse a capitalist society. It is shown that like most nineteenth-century classical economists, Tooke adopted a modified version of Adam Smith's “adding-up” approach to normal prices and distribution which incoporated Ricardo's theory of rent. The paper shows that based on this approach, Tooke explained short-run fluctuations in prices be reference to factors that disrupted the adjustment of supply to the “effectual” demand for commodities.     

Epistemology and the tasks of feminist economics

This paper examines the implications of current epistemological debates for the work of feminist economists. Feminist economists must acknowledge (in accordance with recent developments in the study of science) that (a) inquirers can never be certain whether claims about the world are true; (b) scientific inquiry is permeated with “internal” and “external” values; and (c) beliefs are affected by inquirers' social locations. But feminists should not, it argues, embrace the “relativist” stance of some postmodern thinkers, or reject the ideal of “truth,” or argue that beliefs are strictly determined by inquirers' identities and interests. It seeks to outline an epistemological “middle ground” for feminist economics, between the extremes of exaggerated claims of certainty and a disempowering relativism.     

Guy Routh's Heterodox Critique of Economic Methodology

Guy Routh was an outstandingly incisive and severe critic of mainstream economic theory's abstraction, class bias, and empirical irrelevance. Routh's The Origin of Economic Ideas (1975 1989), with such chapter titles as “The Preposterous Origins” and “From Propaganda to Dogma”, was described by Robert Heilbroner as “irreverent, original, controversial, and delightful” while J. K. Galbraith expressed his “utmost enjoyment” and “utmost approval” of the book. Routh's trenchant critique of mainstream theorizing and his vision of an empirically-grounded alternative have been largely forgotten since his death in 1993, but deserve the attention of heterodox and especially of institutionalist and social economists.     

Unequal Chances: Family Background and Economic Success

Abstract

This essay is a comment on“The Citation Impact of Feminist Economics”by Frances Woolley, which appeared in Feminist Economics, Vol. 11, No. 3, November 2005.

This contribution comments on Frances Woolley's recent Feminist Economics article, “The Citation Impact of Feminist Economics.” It points to two avenues through which Woolley's article could have better illuminated the extent of Feminist Economics' scholarly relationship with the communities of both heterodox and mainstream economists: first, she omits several important heterodox economic journals in her study, and second, she could have offered a more critical evaluation of mainstream journals and economists relative to Feminist Economics and feminist economists. This paper uses citation data drawn from ten heterodox and ten mainstream journals to identify and build on these gaps.     

Marx's critique of “eternal” political economy: how Mill is alien to Marx's attacks

Marx deplored political economy's claims to establish “eternal” – or “natural” – laws. This paper seeks to defend John Stuart Mill from his critique. It argues that, contrary to what Marx alleged, these two economists have a great deal more in common on this topic than is frequently realised. Both on the theoretical level and on the political one, Mill's views about the relativity of capitalism seem very close to Marx's. This paper also suggests that Marx may have ignored Mill's insistence on the relativity of economic theories because it may have challenged his own “scientific socialism”.     

Liberal Jansenists and interest-bearing loans in eighteenth-century France: a reappraisal

Abstract

This article is an attempt to prove that although the liberal Jansenists – Jansenism being the most powerful Christian protest movement of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – were not the first and the only ones to address the prohibition of interest-bearing loans, their writings on the issue shifted and fuelled the debate during the French Enlightenment, especially among the Encyclopédistes and the economists. By refuting the very logic of “extrinsic titles” of the Scholastics and their extension later on by the Jesuits, the liberals Jansenists redefined “interest” as the price to be paid for the use of money.     

Effect of Graduate-Program Rank on Success in the Job Market

Economic educators often profess the goal of teaching our students to “think like economists.” Since Siegfried and colleagues (1991) coined this phrase, its meaning has been interpreted as a focus on analytical concepts and methods of economics as opposed to the broader goal of preparing students for independent, critical thought in the complex world beyond college. Colander and McGoldrick (2009b) argued that students are more likely to achieve both of these objectives when the learning process includes open-ended questions that encourage them to move beyond algorithmic application of textbook principles. In this article, the authors operationalize this “big think” approach through an instructional module on differential tuition pricing, the development of which was enhanced by careful attention to contemporary learning theory.     

The market as a social space: On the meaningful extraeconomic conversations that can occur in markets

Prominent economic sociologist Richard Swedberg has argued that economists have failed to develop a theory of the market that recognizes it as a “social phenomenon in its own right.” While this may be true of mainstream economics, the Austrian school’s theory of the market is much richer than the standard view. For Austrians, the market has always been a central concern. And Austrians have always argued that the market is a social structure where both exchange and competition occurs. Still, Austrians give little more than scant attention to the noneconomic sociality that occurs in markets. The market, however, is both a conversation and an arena where meaningful conversations can occur. This paper is an effort to focus attention on the market as a social space where social activity (beyond competition and exchange) takes place and where noneconomic relationships and economic relationships develop.     

PERSPECTIVE ON PRODUCTIVITY RESEARCH*

Radical changes, up and down, have taken place in the estimates of growth in total factor productivity in the U.S. made by different economists, or by the same economists at different times. If such estimates provide “some sort of measure of our ignorance,” as Abramovitz once put it, we seemed to be a lot less ignorant in 1927 (when Cobb and Douglas published their famous paper), or in 1967 (when Jorgenson and Griliches published theirs), than we were in the years between (when Schmookler, Abramovitz, Kendrick, and Denison completed their studies), or than we are today (when we have, or will soon have, revised estimates by Denison and by Kendrick, and new estimates by Christensen and Jorgenson). Viewed in this perspective, many questions may be raised about the significance of the current estimates that something like a third or more of the rate of increase in U.S. national output is “due” to increase in productivity, as well as about the concepts, data, and methods that underlie the estimates. A list of particular subjects worth considering for research is given and each is briefly discussed.     

Why Has CAI Not Been More Successful In Economic Education: A Note

The authors question the somewhat negative judgment about computers reached by Siegfried and Fels in their article, “Teaching College Economics: A Survey” (Journal of Economic Literature, September 1979). They observe that there are a host of research questions in need of answers before economists reject the generally positive picture across many other disciplines of the efficacy of computer-related instruction.     

Social Economics and Evolutionary Institutionalism Today

This paper discusses theoretical and methodological elements that constitute social economics. It also considers those elements for evolutionary (Veblenian) institutional economics. It investigates how these “heterodoxies” may further converge. Such convergence would probably not trigger a complete unification, but lead to a broadly defined common research program and a strategy for joint “heterodox” survival, in face of the ranking game of the neoclassical “mainstream” and of the dominant powers supporting it as the discipline providing ideological legitimization. A common denominator of “heterodoxies” in terms of real-world orientation, direct interdependency and interaction of agents (social decision situations), appropriate complexity, and the treatment of values is drafted. Theoretical concepts discussed include complex and open systems, individual agency, institutions, embeddedness, networks, social reform, and process orientation. Formal methodological developments considered are complex modeling, game theory, or computer simulations. We arrive at a more formal common basis, which we term socio-economics. We also consider the relations of evolution and institutions, the institutional dichotomy, and the theory of institutional change. The monism of the “market” of the “mainstream” turns out to dissolve into the institutional diversity of real-world network forms, which helps explaining real-world forms of markets, hierarchies, or spatial clusters. Focuses of “heterodox” convergence will have to be the related “microfoundations” and “macrofoundations” projects, integrating an interdisciplinary “naturalistic” approach to genetic-cultural co-evolution of cooperation, and social reform. While modern socio-economics makes “heterodoxies” leading in economic research, their future still appears open between ideological cleansing and extinction through the mainstream, and proactive paradigmatic pluralism.     

Religion and the sociological critique of political economy: Altruism and gift

Abstract

This article shows that there is a strong connection between the religious component of French sociology and the critique of political economy. In the first section, I consider how selfish behaviour, or egoism, became treated as a major threat endangering the creation of industrial society by those concerned about the diffusion of political economy. I then summarise the methodological critique set forth in the Cours, before connecting this critique to the economic content of the Système and the concept of altruism. In the following section, Spencer's view of altruism is contrasted to that held by Comte, and then I consider the reaction of French political economists, defending the moral value bought about by their science. In the final section, I explain how the Comtean approach was re-enacted by Durkheim and then by Mauss, at the head of the “sociology of religion” section of L'Année sociologique, the Durkheimian journal, to give birth to the theory of gift-giving behaviour that Mauss used to critique political economy in the 1920s.     

Calculation in kind and marketless socialism: On Otto Neurath's utopian economics

Abstract

Otto Neurath is notorious amongst economists for his plans for a socialist economy with calculation in kind in place of a market. This paper considers the common criticism of “utopianism” from an immanent point of view. To do so, it will first be established in what Neurath recognized a negative sense of utopianism that was opposed to his own self-confessed “scientific utopianism”. Then it will be considered in what respect, if any, Neurath's stance in the socialist calculation debate can be shown to be objectionably utopian in this sense by the counter-arguments put forward by Ludwig von Mises.     

Social Provisioning as a Starting Point for Feminist Economics

The past decade has seen a proliferation of writing by feminist economists. Feminist economists are not identified with one particular economic paradigm, yet some common methodological points seem to be emerging. I propose making these starting points more explicit so that they can be examined, critiqued, and built upon. I use the term “social provisioning” to describe this emerging methodology. Its five main components are: incorporation of caring and unpaid labor as fundamental economic activities; use of well-being as a measure of economic success; analysis of economic, political, and social processes and power relations; inclusion of ethical goals and values as an intrinsic part of the analysis; and interrogation of differences by class, race-ethnicity, and other factors. The paper then provides brief illustrations of the use of this methodology in analyses of US welfare reform, gender and development, and feminist ecological economics.     

Estimating the effects of forward guidance in rational expectations models

Simulations of forward guidance in rational expectations models should be assessed using the “modest policy interventions” framework introduced by Eric Leeper and Tao Zha. That is, the estimated effects of a policy intervention should be considered reliable only if that intervention is unlikely to trigger a revision in private sector beliefs about the way that monetary policy will be conducted. I show how to constrain simulations of forward guidance to ensure that they are regarded as modest policy interventions and illustrate the technique using a medium-scale DSGE model estimated on US data. I find that many experiments that generate the large responses of macroeconomic variables deemed implausible by many economists – the so-called “forward guidance puzzle” – are not modest policy interventions. Those experiments should therefore be treated with caution, since they may prompt agents to believe that there has been a change in the monetary policy regime that is not accounted for within the model. More reliable results can be obtained by constraining the experiment to be a modest policy intervention. In the cases I study, the quantitative effects on macroeconomic variables are more plausible when this constraint is imposed.     

Scientific misconduct and research ethics in economics: an introduction

Abstract

Since the screening of Inside Job in movie theatres around the world in 2010, research integrity in economics has been questioned by scholars and public intellectuals. Prestigious economists and policy makers are accused of conflicts of interest while prominent economists are charged with plagiarism and self-plagiarism. Some of these economists replied to accusations about themselves while many others have preferred not to respond at all. These days, economists hear the following question more often than before: “what is wrong with economics?”