RETIREMENT WEALTH AND LIFETIME EARNINGS*

This article argues that a satisfactory theory of wealth inequality should account not only for the marginal distribution of wealth, but also for the joint distribution of wealth and earnings. The article describes the joint distribution of retirement wealth and lifetime earnings in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. It then evaluates the ability of a stochastic life‐cycle model to account for key features of this distribution. The life‐cycle model fails to account for three key features of the data. (1) The correlation between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth is too high. (2) The wealth gaps between earnings rich and earnings poor households are too large. (3) Wealth inequality among households with similar lifetime earnings is too small. Models in which households differ in rates of return or time preferences account much better for the joint distribution of retirement wealth and lifetime earnings.     

Wealth inequality,governance and economic growth

Links between economic growth and inequality are of growing interest for researchers and policy makers. Previous studies of this relationship have focused mainly on inequalities in income rather than in wealth. Yet from many perspectives wealth inequality is arguably more important. Using a new panel data set from Credit Suisse for 45 sample countries over the period 2000–2012, this study investigates the effects of wealth inequality on economic growth. Empirical results from system GMM estimation suggest that the wealth inequality is negatively associated with cross-country economic growth. This result is robust to alternative estimators and measures of wealth inequality, as well as the econometric specification. Further empirical investigation reveals that impact of wealth inequality on growth is mitigated by better governance.     

The Relationship between Income,Wealth and Age in Australia

This article analyses the relationship between income, wealth, wealth‐adjusted income and age in Australia using a 2009–10 cross‐sectional data set. The main findings are: (i) wealth and wealth‐adjusted income generally rise with age, while income is constant across the life cycle; (ii) both income inequality and wealth inequality rise until mid‐life and fall thereafter, while wealth‐adjusted income inequality depends on the method of calculation used, one showing a fall in later life and another showing no fall; and (iii) after income, wealth and wealth‐adjusted income inequalities are adjusted for age, underlying inequality is lower in all three cases.     

Redistributive taxation,wealth distribution,and economic growth

This paper examines the relationship between wealth distribution and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with heterogeneous households and redistributive taxation. In this paper, we incorporate an endogenous determination of redistributive policy into the model, focusing on the relation between pre- and post-tax inequality. Endogenous redistributive policy affects wealth distribution and economic growth. Therefore, the relation between post-tax inequality and economic growth is different from that between pre-tax inequality and economic growth. Results show that there exists a negative correlation between pre-tax inequality and economic growth, whereas there exists an inverted-U relationship between post-tax inequality and economic growth in a voting equilibrium.     

Wealth inequality, preference heterogeneity and macroeconomic volatility in two-sector economies

We explore the link between wealth inequality, preference heterogeneity and macroeconomic volatility in a two-sector neoclassical growth model. First we prove that, if agents have homogeneous preferences, when the absolute risk tolerance is a strictly convex (concave) function, sufficiently high (low) levels of wealth inequality may lead to endogenous fluctuations in the neighborhood of the steady state. Second, we consider the effects of preference heterogeneity when agents are homogeneous with respect to their wealth. We show that when the utility function belongs to the HARA class, sufficiently high levels of preference heterogeneity may lead to endogenous fluctuations in the neighborhood of the steady state if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is greater than one.     

Macroeconomic determinants of wealth inequality dynamics

The evolution of wealth inequality over the long run depends on income growth, inflation, and interest rates. In this paper, we examine, in a dynamic setting, the effect of these three macroeconomic variables on wealth inequality in the United States over the periods 1929–2009 and 1962–2009. The results show that these macroeconomic factors explain a significant amount of the changes in wealth inequality. The results indicate that increases in inflation and income growth contribute positively to net wealth shares of adults in the bottom 50% and middle 40% of the wealth distribution, leading to decreases in overall wealth inequality. Interestingly, the results show increases in interest rates contribute to lower wealth inequality in the U.S. although this result does not hold across all the inequality measures.     

Wealth Concentration over the Path of Development: Sweden, 1873–2006*

We study wealth concentration in Sweden over 130 years, from the beginning of industrialization until the present day. Our series are based on new evidence from estate and wealth tax data, foreign and domestic family firm‐wealth, and pension wealth estimates. We find that Swedish wealth concentration was high in the agrarian state, and changed little during early industrialization. From World War I until about 1950, the richest percentile lost ground to high‐income earners in the rest of the top‐wealth decile. This equalization continued postwar; the entire top decile lost‐out relative to the rest of the population. Around 1980, wealth compression stopped and inequality increased. We approximate the effects of international flows and find that the recent increase in wealth inequality is probably larger than what official estimates suggest.     

Wealth inequality and dynamic stability

We explore the link between wealth inequality and stability in a two-sector neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous agents. We show that when the inverse of absolute risk aversion (or risk tolerance) is a strictly convex function, wealth inequality is a factor that favors instability. In the opposite case, inequality favors stability. Our characterization also shows that whenever absolute risk tolerance is linear, as when preferences exhibit hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA), wealth heterogeneity is neutral.     

Stochastic dominance and thick-tailed wealth distributions

Right-skewed and thick-tailed wealth distributions have been documented as an empirical regularity across space and time. A key mechanism for explaining these distributional features is proportional random growth. We investigate the comparative statics of a well-defined class of random growth models when allowing for stochastically ordered shifts in the wealth return process. An order-contingent monotone comparative statics property is identified, according to which pure increases in risk (e.g. higher volatility of capital returns) foster top wealth concentration whereas first-order stochastically dominated shifts in the return process (induced by e.g. proportional capital income taxation) rather lower inequality at the upper end of the distribution. Our analysis points to the potentially ambiguous effects on top wealth inequality of introducing or modifying capital income tax treatments in the presence of stochastic returns.     

Evolution of wealth inequality in China

Household wealth is a key indicator that reflects national economic competiveness and individual income levels. The distribution of wealth is central for evaluating social justice in a country. This article uses a data set composed of the 2002 China Household Income Project and the 2010 Chinese Family Panel Survey to analyze the level of wealth and wealth inequality in China during 2002 and 2010. The analysis decomposes the evolution of wealth inequality during that period in terms of the structure and composition of wealth. The findings show that there was a large increase in the quantity of wealth and wealth inequality between 2002 and 2010. The level of wealth in 2010 was four times that of 2002, and housing assets were the greatest component of overall wealth in 2010. Wealth inequality also rose dramatically after 2002, with the Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth increasing from 0.538 in 2002 to 0.739 in 2010. The rapidly escalating price of housing has been the main contributor to increasing wealth inequality in recent years.     

How does wealth distribution affect firm's incentive to innovate better quality goods?

The paper contributes to the literature relating to inequality and economic growth, in particular, we investigate the effects of wealth distribution on the kind of growth driven by innovation, i.e. Schumpeterian growth. Since two types of individuals are assumed, the poor and the rich, Gini-coefficient is treated in two variables, namely the relative wealth of the poor and the population share of the poor, each having a different effect on economic performance. Particularly in the separating equilibrium, an improvement in the relative wealth of the poor impedes economic growth, but a decline in the population share of the poor enhances economic growth. Furthermore, the current paper combines the Schumpeterian quality improvement model and the neoclassic production function. Thus, the impact of wealth inequality on economic growth is through the supply of human capital as well as the demand for better quality goods. Our results suggest that empirical research on the base of Gini-coefficient cannot generate a general relationship between wealth inequality and economic growth.     

Wealth Dynamics and the Endogenous Design of Firm Organization

The purpose of this paper is to explore a dynamic interaction between wealth distribution and firm organization design using a model of growth in altruism in which a consideration of moral hazard on the part of agents with risk-averse preferences prevents complete insurance and generates inequality. I show (i) that there exists an ergodic invariant distribution of wealth to which the stochastic process of lineage wealth converges globally, and (ii) that the firm form with direct evaluation of the agent's effort is more likely to be chosen as wealth is distributed more equally.     

Thomas Piketty's Historical Macroeconomics: A Critical Analysis

There has been a great deal of interest in the data on income and wealth inequality collected by Thomas Piketty. This paper does not question that data; rather, it questions the framework of Piketty's analysis, both theoretically and empirically—namely the alleged upward tendency of the ratio of wealth to national income and the rise of wealth inequality. First, in the mechanism put forward, wealth can only grow as a result of savings, thus ruling out any form of price effect (as in urban land). Second, Piketty’s second law defines an asymptotical trajectory, in which variables grow in parallel, something incompatible with the rise of the ratio between two variables. In addition, Piketty’s model does not match data for the USA. The historical profile of the ratio of wealth/national income is actually the inverted image of the productivity of capital (the ratio of output/firms’ fixed capital). Doubts are also expressed concerning the dramatic fall of the ratio of wealth/national income in Europe around World War I.     

The Gender Wealth Gap in Europe: Application of Machine Learning to Predict Individual-level Wealth

This article provides comparative estimates of the gender wealth gaps for 22 European countries, employing data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey. The data on wealth are collected at the household level, while individual-level data are needed for the estimates of gender wealth gaps. We propose a novel approach using machine learning and model averaging methods to predict individual-level wealth data for multi-person households. Our results suggest that random forest performs best as the predicting tool for this exercise, outperforming elastic net and Bayesian model averaging. The estimated gender wealth gaps tend to be in favor of men, especially at the top of the wealth distribution. Men have 24 percent more wealth than women on average. We also find that a high home ownership rate is associated with a smaller country-level gender wealth gap. Our estimates suggest that the individual-level wealth inequality is on average 3 pp higher than the household-level wealth inequality in multi-member households.     

Redistributive Tax and Growth in a Model with Discrete Occupational Choice

An optimal redistributive tax-subsidy formula is derived for a growth model where income inequality is endogenously driven by an adult's choice of occupation between work and management. Investment in human capital is the engine of growth. The world's stock of exploitable knowledge as well as the economy's average human capital determine the potential rate of return from investment in human capital in an economy. How much available knowledge would be exploited in the economy depends on the proportion of innovators in our model. A redistributive tax reform impacts growth as well as income inequality via its influence over the occupational choice. The optimal redistributive tax rate is path-dependent in the sense that it depends on the initial wealth distribution. The normative implication of the model is that the optimal capital income tax rate could very well be positive if the initial wealth inequality exceeds a threshold. The optimal capital income tax rate depends inversely on the initial wealth inequality.     

Wealth distribution and output fluctuations

We explore the link between wealth inequality and output fluctuations in a general two-sector neoclassical growth model with endogenous labor and heterogeneous agents. When agents have homogeneous CRRA preferences and individual wealth is Pareto distributed, a sufficiently large rise in the Gini index typically leads to an increase in endogenous fluctuations of output. For general economies, we show that under plausible conditions on the fundamentals, wealth inequality is still a destabilizing factor.     

ESTIMATES OF HOUSEHOLD WEALTH INEQUALITY IN THE U.S., 1962–1983

The study has two major objectives. The first is to determine time trends in household wealth inequality in the U.S. over the 1962–83 period. Four concepts of wealth are analyzed: (i) total household wealth, defined as total household assets less liabilities; (ii) fungible wealth, defined as total household wealth less consumer durables and household inventories; (iii) financial wealth, defined as fungible wealth less equity in owner-occupied housing; and (iv) capital wealth, defined as financial wealth less currency, checking accounts, and time deposits. Relying on a variety of data sources, I find that wealth inequality remained relatively constant from about 1962 to 1973, fell sharply from about 1973 to about 1979, and then rose sharply between 1979 and 1983. Concentration in 1983 was greater than that in 1962 for financial and capital wealth but of similar magnitude for total and fungible wealth. The second, methodological in nature, is to analyze the effect on measured inequality of the alignment of raw survey data to national balance sheet totals. I find that the alignment process can significantly affect point estimates of household wealth distribution but does not generally affect the direction of inequality trends.     

Perceptions of inequality

Individual perceptions of (income or wealth) inequality have strong effects on their decisions as economic agents or voters. It is therefore important to know more about the relation between perceived and measured inequality. We present a novel formal framework that is based on the assumption that people typically do not observe the entire income (wealth) distribution and that their guesses about the extent of inequality are based on “self-centered” reference groups. This framework predicts that perceptions of inequality will change along positions in the income distribution and that for a specific position various dimensions of inequality perception are related to each other. First, low (high) income individuals overestimate (underestimate) their own position. Second, subjective estimates of average earnings increase with the own income position. Third, high or low income people have different perceptions about the skewness and the “shape” of the income distribution (e.g. pyramid or diamond). Fourth, the subjective perception of inequality is lower for high-income individuals. Survey data from 40 countries provide strong support for the framework.     

Inequality: The original economic sin of capitalism? An Evaluation of Thomas Piketty's "Capital in the twenty-first century"

This is a review article of Thomas Piketty's book “Capital in the twenty-first century”. Piketty promotes the old theme that, under capitalism, the rich tend to become richer and the poor become poorer, at least in relative terms. We consider whether the data really shows that wealth and income are becoming more concentrated; the role of income transfers (Piketty's data is for pre-tax and pre-transfer income) and other influences on inequality such as real estate prices; the implications of social and economic mobility; the role of the state in fostering inequality; and the determination of socially acceptable inequality. We conclude that Piketty has not succeeded in showing that the inequality r > g (the rate of return is greater than the rate of growth) is the principal determinant of inequality. Piketty offers neither an accompanying theory of social justice nor a theoretical framework to support his case. In particular, lacking is a revealed appreciation of the effects of high marginal tax rates on growth and efficiency.     

TRENDS IN HOUSEHOLD WEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES, 1962–83 AND 1983–89

Using the 1983 and 1989 Surveys of Consumer Finances, I find evidence of sharply increasing house-hold wealth inequality over this period. Whereas mean wealth increased by 23 percent in real terms, median wealth grew by only 8 percent. The share of the top one-half percentile rose by five percentage points, while the wealth of the bottom two quintiles showed an absolute decline. The Gini coefficient increased from 0.80 to 0.84. Almost all the growth in real wealth accrued to the top 20 percent of wealthholders. In contrast, the degree of wealth inequality was almost identical in 1983 as in 1962, and real wealth growth was more evenly distributed across the wealth distribution. There is also evidence that the sharp increase in wealth inequality from 1983 to 1989 was due to a correspondingly sharp rise in income inequality, the increase of stock prices relative to housing prices, and relatively slow inflation.