Time and the Process of Security Price Adjustment

This paper delineates the link between the existence of information, the timing of trades, and the stochastic process of prices. We show that time affects prices, with the time between trades affecting spreads. Because the absence of trades is correlated with volume, our model predicts a testable relation between spreads and normal and unexpected volume, and demonstrates how volume affects the speed of price adjustment. Our model also demonstrates how the transaction price series will be a biased representation of the true price process, with the variance being both overstated and heteroskedastic.     

Macroeconomic Announcements and the Distribution of Price-Endings in the U.S. Treasury Market

We investigate how new information impacts quote clustering in the bond market. We find that clustering, along with quote activity, price volatility and bid-ask spreads, increases sharply in the minutes following releases of macroeconomic news. Each returns to near-normal levels within the hour. Effects are strongest for more liquid on-the-run notes and for the announcements typically associated with substantial information flow. The strong positive comovement of clustering, quote activity, price volatility, and bid-ask spreads supports the conclusion that innovations of these variables are endogenous to the arrival and incorporation of information into prices.     

Price adjustment to news with uncertain precision

We analyze how markets adjust to new information when the reliability of news is uncertain and has to be estimated itself. We propose a Bayesian learning model where market participants receive fundamental information along with noisy estimates of news’ precision. It is shown that the efficiency of a precision estimate drives the slope and the shape of price response functions to news. Increasing estimation errors induce stronger nonlinearities in price responses. Analyzing high-frequency reactions of Treasury bond futures prices to employment releases, we find strong empirical support for the model’s predictions and show that the consideration of precision uncertainty is statistically and economically important.     

去伪存真:油价趋势与股票市场——来自“一带一路”35国的经验证据

油价波动深刻影响全球经济,严重时会造成全球股市动荡,甚至引发系统性金融风险。然而油价中的信息噪音严重阻碍国际油价对股票市场的预测效果。本文提出的移动平均法可有效减弱信息噪音,研究表明,本文基于移动平均法构建的油价趋势因子对“一带一路”沿线国家股票市场具有良好的样本内和样本外可预测性。进一步研究发现,国际油价波动对产油国和非产油国股票市场的影响存在非对称性。本文为国际油价冲击股票市场提供了新的有力证据,同时本文研究成果提示了油价风险,对维持我国股票市场稳定,保持金融稳定具有一定意义。     

信贷扩张、资产价格上涨与调控政策选择

本文首先从理论上考察信贷与资产价格之间的关系,利用Allen和Gale的资产价格泡沫模型,并根据我国实际情况,通过放松假设条件说明信贷扩张是资产价格上涨的重要原因,资产供给、信贷政策、银行信贷管理能力会影响资产价格的上涨。通过对我国经济的实证研究发现,我国的信贷与资产价格之间存在相关关系,最后指出从资产供给、信贷政策、银行信贷管理等方面入手制定政策抑制资产价格的进一步上涨。     

Price Discovery and Dissemination of Private Information by Loan Syndicate Participants

We delineate key channels through which flows of confidential information to loan syndicate participants impact the dynamics of information arrival in prices. We isolate the timing of private information flows by estimating the speed of price discovery over quarterly earnings cycles in both secondary syndicated loan and equity markets. We identify borrowers disseminating private information to lenders relatively early in the cycle with firms exhibiting relatively early price discovery in the secondary loan market, documenting that price discovery is faster for loans subject to financial covenants, particularly earnings‐based covenants; for borrowers who experience covenant violations; for borrowers with high credit risk; and for loans syndicated by relationship‐based lenders or highly reputable lead arrangers. We then ask whether early access to private information in the loan market accelerates the speed of information arrival in stock prices. We document that the stock returns of firms identified with earlier private information dissemination to lenders indeed exhibit faster price discovery in the stock market, but only when institutional investors are involved in the firm's syndicated loans. Further, the positive relation between institutional lending and the speed of stock price discovery is more pronounced in relatively weak public disclosure environments. These results are consistent with institutional lenders systematically exploiting confidential syndicate information via trading in the equity market.     

Do market prices reveal the decision models of sophisticated investors?: Evidence from the laboratory

If security prices are fully revealing, then all public information should be reflected in prices, and unsophisticated traders may be able to learn how various types of information affect security valuation by observing prices. A series of laboratory asset markets was conducted to examine whether unsophisticated traders are able to learn to evaluate publicly released information by trading with and observing trades made by a sophisticated trader who knows the valuation implications of the information. We find that unsophisticated traders who participate in an asset market with a sophisticated trader show significant improvement in their ability to use public information on a subsequent price estimation task. Conversely, a control group consisting only of unsophisticated traders shows no improvement. We conclude that market prices convey the sophisticated trader’s private information in a manner that permits unsophisticated investors to learn the stock price implications of a public information release.     

Logit Price Dynamics

We model retail price stickiness as the result of costly, error‐prone decision making. Under our assumed cost function for the precision of choice, the timing of price adjustments and the prices firms set are both logit random variables. Errors in the prices firms set help explain micro facts related to the size of price changes, the behavior of adjustment hazards, and the variability of prices and costs. Errors in adjustment timing increase the real effects of monetary shocks, by reducing the “selection effect.” Allowing for both types of errors also helps explain how trend inflation affects price adjustment.     

Stock Market Efficiency and Economic Efficiency: Is There a Connection?

In a capitalist economy, prices serve to equilibrate supply and demand for goods and services, continually changing to reallocate resources to their most efficient uses. However, secondary stock market prices, often viewed as the most “informationally efficient” prices in the economy, have no direct role in the allocation of equity capital since managers have discretion in determining the level of investment. What is the link between stock price informational efficiency and economic efficiency? We present a model of the stock market in which: (i) managers have discretion in making investments and must be given the right incentives; and (ii) stock market traders may have important information that managers do not have about the value of prospective investment opportunities. In equilibrium, information in stock prices will guide investment decisions because managers will be compensated based on informative stock prices in the future. The stock market indirectly guides investment by transferring two kinds of information: information about investment opportunities and information about managers' past decisions. However, because this role is only indirect, the link between price efficiency and economic efficiency is tenuous. We show that stock price efficiency is not sufficient for economic efficiency by showing that the model may have another equilibrium in which prices are strong-form efficient, but investment decisions are suboptimal. We also suggest that stock market efficiency is not necessary for investment efficiency by considering a banking system that can serve as an alternative institution for the efficient allocation of investment resources.     

Microdata Evidence on the Empirical Importance of Selection Effects in Menu‐Cost Models

We use microdata on product prices linked to information on the producing firms that set them to study to what extent the timing of price changes reacts to changes in marginal cost. This self‐selection of price changes is a key feature in the canonical Menu‐Cost model a la Golosov and Lucas Jr. (2007), which may generate near monetary neutrality (Golosov and Lucas Jr. 2007, Karadi and Reiff 2016), but is absent in the Calvo (1983) model. We find that the microdata strongly favors the Calvo (1983) model. Thus, upstream in the supply chain, price setting is best characterized by a very low degree of self‐selection into price changes.     

News announcements and price discovery in foreign exchange spot and futures markets

This paper studies competition in price discovery between spot and futures rates for the EUR–USD and JPY–USD markets around scheduled macroeconomic announcements. Using both the information shares approach and the common factor component weight approach for futures prices from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), as well as deal prices from spot trading on the Electronic Broking Services (EBS), we gauge how foreign exchange spot and futures markets respond to news surprises. The results show that the spot rates provide more price discovery than do the CME futures rates overall; however, the contribution of the futures rates to price discovery increases in the time surrounding macroeconomic announcement releases.     

Information,noise, and asset prices: An experimental study

A series of laboratory asset markets is conducted to examine the effect of noisy information releases on security prices. The price reaction to a given information release has been hypothesized to be positively related to the degree of uncertainty just prior to the release and negatively related to the degree of noise in the information itself. A series of two-period markets is conducted with noisy information provided between periods. Prior uncertainty and noise are manipulated. Using a random effects regression procedure, strong support is found for both hypotheses.     

Forward and Futures Prices: Evidence from the Foreign Exchange Markets

Cornell and Reinganum (1981) , hereafter CR, report that price differentials for future contracts and forward contracts are statistically insignificant in foreign exchange markets. Based on this finding, CR conclude that marking-to-market is insignificant in the formulation of currency futures prices. This note identifies two potential concerns with the CR tests. One problem relates to the timing of delivery dates for “matched” contracts. A second problem relates to the time period for the CR study. We show that correcting for these problems does not affect the overall conclusions of the CR study; marking-to-market does not appear to have a significant effect on currency futures prices.     

Stock Prices and the Supply of Information

We develop a model in which the dependence of the brokerage commission rate on share price provides an incentive for brokers to produce research reports on firms with low share prices. Stock splits therefore affect the attention paid to a firm by investment analysts. Managers with favorable private information about their firms have an incentive to split their firm's shares in order to reveal the information to investors. We find empirical evidence that is consistent with the major new prediction of the model, that the number of analysts following a firm is inversely related to its share price.     

Taxes and the Pricing of Stock Index Futures

Stock index futures prices are generally below the level predicted by simple arbitrage models. This paper suggests that the discrepancy between the actual and predicted prices is caused by taxes. Capital gains and losses are not taxed until they are realized. As Constantinides demonstrates in a recent paper, this gives stockholders a valuable timing option. If the stock price drops, the investor can pass part of the loss on to the government by selling the stock. On the other hand, if the stock price rises, the investor can postpone the tax by not realizing the gain. Since this option is not available to stock index futures traders, the futures prices will be lower than standard no-tax models predict.     

Stock price decreases prior to executive stock option grants

This study examines abnormal stock price changes prior to executive stock option grants. Executives have the incentive and opportunity to manage the timing of their communications of inside information to the market during the period just prior to the date of their stock-option grant so as to reduce the exercise price of their options. Executives benefit from temporary stock price decreases before the grant date and by stock price increases after the grant date. Executive stock option grants create a unique opportunity for insiders to profit by manipulating the timing of information flowing to the market without engaging in insider trading. Using data on 783 stock-option grants to chief executive officers, we find a statistically significant abnormal decrease in stock prices during the 10-day period immediately preceding the grant date.     

Dual transfer pricing with internal and external trade

This paper examines a transfer pricing problem between two divisions of a decentralized firm. The selling division is privately informed about its own costs and produces a good that is sold both externally in an intermediate market and internally within the firm. Unlike most previous work, we focus on dual transfer pricing systems that allow the selling division to be credited for an amount that differs from the amount charged to the buying division. We identify conditions under which efficient decentralized trade and external price setting incentives can be provided with a properly chosen set of dual transfer prices that do not rely on direct communication. Instead, the optimal dual transfer prices will depend only on public information about the market price charged by the upstream division in the external market, which indirectly communicates information about production costs to the downstream division. For a variety of well-known demand functions, the optimal transfer prices will be linear functions of the market price. Our main results hold when the upstream division faces multiple internal buyers or faces a binding capacity constraint.     

Learning by lending

This paper studies bank learning through repeated interactions with borrowers from a new perspective. To understand learning by lending, we adapt a methodology from labor economics to analyze how loan contract terms evolve as banks acquire new information about borrowers. We construct “proxy” variables for this information using data from borrowers’ out-of-sample, future credit performance. Due to the timing of their construction, banks could not have used these variables directly to price loans. We nonetheless find that these proxies increasingly predict loan prices as relationships progress, even after controlling for possible omitted variable bias. Our methodology provides strong evidence that: (a) bank learning affects loan prices, and (b) relationship benefits are heterogeneous. In particular, higher quality borrowers face differentially lower spreads as their relationship with lenders develop – and banks learn about their quality – while lower quality borrowers see loan prices increase and their loan amounts fall. We further find suggestive evidence that banks incorporate CEO-specific information into loan prices.     

The effect of information releases on the pricing and timing of equity issues

With time-varying adverse selection in the market for new equityissues, firms will prefer to issue equity when the market ismost informed about the quality of the firm. This implies thatequity issues tend to follow credible information releases.In addition, if the asymmetric in information increases overtime between information releases, the price drop at the announcementof an equity issue should increase in the time since the lastinformation release. Using earning releases as a proxy for informativeevents, we find evidence supporting these propositions.     

Evidence that Analyst Following and Institutional Ownership Accelerate the Pricing of Future Earnings

This paper presents evidence that prices of firms followed by sell-side analysts and favored by institutional investors incorporate future earnings earlier than prices of other firms. We conduct two sets of empirical tests: the first examines coefficients from regressions of returns on lead, contemporaneous, and lag earnings changes; the second compares the timing of monthly abnormal returns from earnings-based zero-investment portfolios. In both sets of tests, the results for analysts and institutions are incremental to each other. In addition, neither the analyst price lead nor the institutional price lead is due to price leads increasing with firm size.