What are we learning from the life satisfaction literature?

The recent availability of cross-sectional and longitudinal survey data on life satisfaction in a large number of countries gives us the opportunity to verify empirically (and not just to assume) what matters for individuals and what economists and policymakers should take into account when trying to promote personal and societal well-being. We now have ample evidence, generally robust to different cultural backgrounds, on the effects of some important happiness drivers (income, health, unemployment, marital status, etc.) which can be considered “quasi-stylized facts” of happiness. If economic policies, for many obvious reasons, cannot maximize self-declared life satisfaction as such, we are nonetheless learning a lot from these findings. In particular, results on the relevance of relational goods, on the inflation/unemployment trade-off in terms of welfare and, more in general, on the measurement of the shadow value of non-market goods obtained with life satisfaction estimates are conveying relevant information about individual preferences and what is behind utility functions. Such findings suggest that the anthropological reductionism characterizing most economic models can be misleading and that target indicators of economic policies have to be refocused if we want to minimize the distance between economic development and human progress.     

You can’t always get what you want: gender differences in job satisfaction of university graduates

Previous literature stressed on the gender differences in job satisfaction and the factors influencing the job satisfaction of men and women. Two rationales are usually provided for the finding that women tend to be relatively more satisfied with their jobs than men although disadvantaged in labour markets: first, women may have relatively lower expectations of career and income, and second, they may attach relatively less importance to extrinsic rewards than men. In order to analyse whether substantial gender differences exist already at the beginning of the career, we employ information of over 20 000 graduates collected through a large-scale survey of German university graduates who recently entered the labour market. We find that the job satisfaction of female graduates is on average slightly lower than the job satisfaction of male graduates, but our results do not point to substantial gender differences. In our sample of highly qualified individuals, men and women are very similar in what they want from their jobs and also in their perceptions of what they get. While our results point to substantial similarity of men and women in the early career stage, gender differences may emerge at later stages of the career life cycle.     

Intergenerational preference differences and optimal national saving

This paper investigates the problem facing national planners who realize that their successors may employ different social welfare criteria for determining economic policies than they do. In such a situation, we show that the present planners may want to leave future generations a smaller capital stock than they would if they thought the stock would be managed in a way consistent with their own preferences. On the other hand, we also identify cases in which the opposite is true. We obtain the results by studying an optimal aggregate growth model the utility function of which changes randomly from one generation to the next. We analyze the model using a system of functional equations in place of the conventional Bellman equation from dynamic programming theory.     

Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition

We explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models. When a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity, information choices exhibit complementarity as well: if an agent wants to do what others do, they want to know what others know. This makes heterogeneous beliefs difficult to sustain and may generate multiple equilibria. In models with substitutability, agents prefer to differentiate their information choices. We use these theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent price-setting models and to propose modelling techniques that ensure equilibrium uniqueness.     

Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework for Bounded Rationality

I propose modelling boundedly rational agents as agents who are not logically omniscient—that is, who do not know all logical or mathematical implications of what they know. I show how a subjective state space can be derived as part of a subjective expected utility representation of the agent's preferences. The representation exists under very weak conditions. The representation uses the familiar language of probability, utility, and states of the world in the hope that this makes this model of bounded rationality easier to use in applications.     

Temptation-Driven Preferences

"My own behaviour baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe." Saint Paul
What behaviour can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent faces temptation but is otherwise a "standard rational agent"? In earlier work, Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) use a set betweenness axiom to restrict the set of preferences considered by Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) to those explainable via temptation. We argue that set betweenness rules out plausible and interesting forms of temptation including some which may be important in applications. We propose a pair of alternative axioms called DFC, desire for commitment , and AIC, approximate improvements are chosen . DFC characterizes temptation as situations in which given any set of alternatives, the agent prefers committing herself to some particular item from the set rather than leaving herself the flexibility of choosing later. AIC is based on the idea that if adding an option to a menu improves the menu, it is because that option is chosen under some circumstances. From this interpretation, the axiom concludes that if an improvement is worse (as a commitment) than some commitment from the menu, then the best commitment from the improved menu is strictly preferred to facing that menu. We show that these axioms characterize a natural generalization of the Gul–Pesendorfer representation.     

The impact of information signals on market prices when agents have non-linear trading rules

Several methods have been developed for filtering seasonal influences and extreme returns in financial and economic time series. The theoretical support for these approaches is rather questionable since it focuses on the effects of shocks on prices and not on their sources. Removing such effects modifies the true generating system of market dynamics because of the non-proportional character of non-linearity. Thus, taking into account that the underlying process of economic time series is highly non-linear we cannot be certain a priori what the impact of new information will be on the dynamic structure of a system. The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate using the methodology of simulations the eventual distortions in time series data arising from the arrival of news when agents follow non-linear trading strategies. We argue that if news can really modify the dynamical behaviour of a system, then the methodology of filtering exogenous distortions needs to be re-examined.     

NOTES ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THEIR STATISTICS

Statistics for developing countries often are misunderstood and misinterpreted because the published data do not distinguish between the economically modern and the traditional sectors. The purpose of economic development is to move a nation from the traditional, or largely non-monetary, subsistence agriculture type of life, to the modern or money oriented and technologically developed type. Statistics of national accounts, the economically active (the working force), and other topics often fail to be useful for economic development purposes because they are presented for the totality of the country and do not show the modern-traditional sectors separately.
In addition, data are often misinterpreted and used incorrectly because the development economists do not understand the nature of the data—how they were collected and what they really signify. This point is illustrated with the economically active statistics. Finally, a plea is made for more statistics and information about families.     

Crime,punishment, and prejudice

We examine the link between the penalties used to punish convicted criminals and judicial prejudice against defendants. In our model, agents choose to commit crimes if their privately observed utility from doing so is high enough. A crime generates noisy evidence, and defendants are convicted when the realized amount of evidence is sufficiently strong to establish the probability of guilt beyond a fixed threshold. We show that if convicted offenders are incarcerated, poorer individuals face a strong prior prejudice in trials and are therefore convicted with less evidence than richer individuals. At the same time, they commit crimes more frequently. Penalties such as monetary fines can eliminate this bias, but may also reverse it. We fully characterize the penalty schedule that guarantees an unbiased equilbrium. We extend the model such that agents also differ in characteristics such as race or gender. We show biased outcomes (targeted at subgroups of the population) may still exist, even if all members of the population are ex-ante alike in their economic characteristics.     

THE ECONOMICS AND THE NONECONOMICS OF THE WORLD WAR INDUSTRY

The world war industry is defined as the part of human income-earning activity devoted to producing, maintaining, and sometimes utilizing means of destruction. Most of the industry consists of what is purchased with national states' military budgets, which are spent by unilateral national defense organizations. These organizations are basically noneconomical, in the sense that they do not have a balance sheet, do not show a "bottom line" or net worth, and therefore there is no way to estimate their profitability. They have economic aspects in terms of decisions that balance marginal benefits against marginal costs. The benefits, however, are mainly psychological in the minds of the decision makers. Wars of conquest, especially those resulting in empires, have not paid off very well for the conquering power. Military defeat often leads to cultural and economic development. Nuclear weapons and long-range missiles have made national defense essentially obsolete and the greatest enemy of national security. Military leaders may respond to this development as they recognize their traditional culture of courage, heroism, and fighting has been replaced by child roasting and perhaps universal destruction. There seem to be few economies of scale in the national state, and perhaps we should look forward to a world of 500 national states in stable peace with a very limited, functional world government.     

A pure hedonic theory of utility and status: Unhappy but efficient invidious comparisons

We examine status preferences where agents compare their own utility relative to the utilities of others. As long as status utility comparisons are not too intense, they do not affect either the competitive equilibrium or the set of efficient allocations. However, status utility comparison may substantially reduce average utility and dramatically increase utility inequality. Equating utility with happiness operationalizes the theory and provides an explanation of why invidious comparisons can generate so much unhappiness without much inefficiency. Our theory has very different welfare implications from other status theories, even when reduced form representations appear observationally equivalent.     

Psychological costs of currency transition: evidence from the euro adoption

This paper assesses the perceived individual psychological costs of adhering to the Euro. We use the difference-in-differences approach (DD), comparing individual levels of satisfaction with the economy in Slovakia immediately before and after the introduction of the Euro, with similar individuals in neighboring Czech Republic, which did not adopt the Euro. Both countries were economically and politically integrated for decades, and display similar macroeconomic behavior before and after the currency change in Slovakia. What we assess is not the actual, economic, costs stemming from the Euro adoption, but the change in utility as perceived by the individuals. There is evidence of substantial psychological costs associated with currency transition, especially for the old, the unemployed, the poorly educated and households with children. Our results are robust to the use of alternative control groups and to estimation procedures using the DD matching approach. The significant perceived costs uncovered in this paper suggest policy-makers should not ignore them when considering a sweeping economic change such as the adoption of a new currency.     

Crusoe,Friday and the Raced Market Frame of Orthodox Economics Textbooks

ABSTRACT

‘Crusoe’ and ‘Friday’ signifiers necessarily evoke a world of racialised hierarchies. Economics textbooks are perhaps the sole remaining medium to simply wish away their resulting relations of power. These are the teaching aids that inspire students analytically to think of markets as pristine economic institutions and persuade them politically that they should want to will such institutions into being. Yet they all-too-often rely on the pedagogical device of the so-called Robinson Crusoe Economy, where the main characters from Defoe’s most famous novel are required to instinctively recognise their equality within voluntary contracting agreements so that each can act as the neoclassical homo economicus. In other words, economists’ Crusoe and Friday figures must behave antithetically to what has historically been implied by the ‘Crusoe’ and ‘Friday’ signifiers. But how can this be so, given how commonplace it was when Defoe’s characters were first introduced into economic theory in the 1850s to justify white settler colonialism on the grounds that ‘savage’ societies lacked the capacity to be self-governing? The raced market frame that emerged in practice from this assumption continues to be reproduced uncritically today by Crusoe’s and Friday’s presence in the textbook explanation of the most basic model of market exchange.     

Optimal Individual Decisions with a Psycho-materialistic Utility Function

This paper proposes a theoretical model aimed at interpreting the outcome of some games. It is often observed that players do not play the Nash equilibrium, when their utility is modelled on their payoff only. However, other models which include psychological variables fail to describe the behaviours observed. Here I propose a utility function which encompasses both monetary and psychological payoffs in such a way that the predictions fit the actual decisions of the players observed in experiments.     

Who do we tip and why? An empirical investigation

An important question about social norms is whether they are created to increase welfare. This is addressed by examining the characteristics of tipped and non-tipped occupations. Tipping prevalence is negatively correlated with worker's income and consumer's monitoring ability and positively with consumer's income and closeness between the worker and the consumer. The results refute a common belief that tipping exists to improve economic efficiency by lowering monitoring costs. Tipping, however, is more prevalent when consumers feel empathy and compassion for workers and want to show gratitude for good service, suggesting that tipping might increase welfare if welfare includes psychological utility.     

建设什么样的优秀团队

1994年,管理学家斯蒂芬P罗宾斯首次提出了＂团队＂的概念。在随后的10余年里,关于＂团队合作＂的理念风靡全球,团队似乎随处可见,而人们也早已泛滥地使用这个词汇了。可如果深究：什么样的团队才能够使工作做得最出色、什么样的团队管理才能够真正提高团队的效率时,那就不是一件容易的事情了。因此,试从建设什么样的优秀团队方面和大家探讨一下优秀团队的建设。     

On the existence of rational expectations equilibrium

We prove a theorem on the existence of rational expectations general economic equilibrium when agents condition on prices as well as on private information, and maximize the expectation of a state-dependent utility function. The key to the result is a new idealization of what it means for a set of empirical distributions to support agents' expectations. This idealization depends on the notion that agents compare their expectations with continuous versions of the random empirical distributions that are generated by the workings of the economy. The existence theorem covers all strictly concave utility functions, arbitrary distributions of the state variable, and situations in which the dimension of the state variable is large relative to the number of commodities.     

The impact of socio-economic background on satisfaction: evidence for policy-makers

Consumer satisfaction with utility services has received increased attention from firms, consumer associations, regulators and governments since the 1990s. Evidence is mounting that consumers in specific socio-economic groups express lower satisfaction levels than their peers, at least, in some utility markets. Seeing this as part of their remit to protect consumer welfare, governments and international organizations are exploring possible demand-side policy responses with the intention of ameliorating lower satisfaction levels of these groups of consumers. However, more information on the precise relationships between satisfaction and consumers’ socio-economic background is required if policy is to be proportional and effective. This paper provides new empirical knowledge on this topic by contrasting consumers’ stated and revealed preferences for five utility services (electricity, gas, fixed and cellular telephony and Internet) across twelve European countries. We find strong evidence that consumers’ socio-economic characteristics matter: consumers with lower levels of education, the elderly and those not employed exhibit particular expenditure patterns on, and lower satisfaction levels with, some utility services. However, this relationship is uneven and depends on the socio-economic category and service in question. We conclude by highlighting five findings which may be of use to policy-makers when considering whether demand-side regulatory policies are required     

Monetary policy and efficiency in over‐the‐counter financial trade

We develop a monetary model that incorporates over‐the‐counter (OTC) asset trade. After agents have made their money holding decisions, they receive an idiosyncratic shock that affects their valuation for consumption and, hence, for the unique liquid asset, namely money. Subsequently, agents can choose whether they want to enter the OTC market in order to sell assets and thus boost their liquidity or to buy assets and thus provide liquidity to other agents. In our model, inflation affects not only the money holding decisions of agents, as is standard in monetary theory, but also the entry decision of these agents in the financial market. We use our framework to study the effect of inflation on welfare, asset prices and OTC trade volume. In contrast to most monetary models, which predict a negative relationship between inflation and welfare, we find that inflation can be welfare improving within a certain range, because it mitigates a search externality that agents impose on one another when they make their OTC market entry decision. Also, an increase in the holding cost of money will lead to a decrease in asset prices, a regularity that is well documented in the data and often considered anomalous.