中国资本市场“框架效应”现象的实证研究——基于中组部18号文的自然实验

基于2013年10月中组部发布18号文所产生的特殊情境,本文实证检验了18号文引发的官员独董辞职事件,对辞职原因的不同表述引起的市场反应。本文研究表明,同为18号文引发的官员独董辞职事件,对于将辞职原因披露为个人原因/工作原因的样本公司,市场出现了显著的负向反应;而对披露为依照18号文要求辞职的样本公司,市场则未有明显反应。市场对同一事件、不同披露的差异反应,表明投资者在决策过程中存在非理性的认知偏误,资本市场上存在框架效应现象。本文是国内首篇基于经验证据研究框架效应的实证文献,弥补了现有框架效应研究主要采用实验方法和问卷调查的不足,也为后续研究框架效应现象,提供了可资借鉴的分析思路和检验方法;同时,对于当下的中国资本市场,也具有重要的政策意义。     

盈余信息度量、市场反应与投资者框架依赖偏差分析

本文以2 0 0 0年9月到2 0 0 3年1 2月沪市A股3 3 8家上市公司为研究对象,应用实证研究方法,检验以四种不同度量方式表示同一盈余信息所产生的“盈余惯性现象”是否存在差异。结果表明:在三因素模型进行风险调整之前,基于四种盈余信息指标的盈余惯性现象都显著地存在。但经过三因素模型风险调整后,基于“意外盈余率”和“标准化意外盈余率”二个指标的盈余惯性现象消失了;基于“意外盈余”和“标准化意外盈余”二个指标的盈余惯性现象仍然存在,所以买入赢家组合、卖出输家组合仍可获得显著的超常收益。显然,这一研究结果并不支持风险定价学派的观点。笔者认为,根据Tversky和Kahneman( 1 981 )提出的“框架依赖偏差”(FramingDependenceBias)理论,四个盈余信息指标所产生的盈余惯性现象的差异表明我国投资者对盈余信息的反应依赖于信息度量的方式。     

An Experimental Analysis of Intertemporal Allocation Behavior

If the future is uncertain, optimal intertemporal decisions rely on anticipating one's own optimal future behavior as is typical in dynamic programming. Our aim is to detect experimentally stylized facts about intertemporal decision making in a rich stochastic environment. Compared to previous experimental studies our experimental design is more complex since the time horizon is uncertain and termination probabilities have to be updated. In particular the decision task is non-stationary as in real life which seriously complicates the task of diagnosing behavioral regularities. In this study we give some illustrative results and provide some general perspectives. Our main result is that subjects' reaction to information about termination probablilities are qualitatively correct.     

劳动力市场性别歧视行为分析

性别歧视是劳动力市场一种常见的行为,表现在两性就业、工资、职业安排、劳动保障和发展机会等方面程度不同的差别.然而,以经济学的逻辑,不同性别的报酬或职业差异本身并不能作为歧视的充分证明,因为,教育水平、年龄、工作经验和工时数量等很多因素都决定生产率的特征,甚至这种差异还可能来自两性对从事市场或家务劳动的不同选择.一个人在劳动力市场上的价值取决于影响其边际劳动生产率的所有供给和需求因素,如果与生产率无关的因素在劳动力市场上取得了正的或负的价值,才可能导致歧视.理性地认识性别歧视和对其原因进行剖析,有助于女性劳动者对提高自己禀赋资源以获得更高产生率的深刻理解.     

市场结构、环境税与福利效应分析

运用短期局部均衡分析方法研究完全竞争市场和垄断市场条件下环境税对社会福利的影响.结果显示:在完全竞争市场条件下,对企业征收环境税可以增进社会福利.而在垄断市场条件下,环境税的福利效应具有不确定性,这取决于垄断造成的扭曲程度.如果垄断造成的扭曲较小,环境税仍然可以提高社会福利.但无论是增进抑或降低社会福利,对垄断企业征收环境税都不可能实现最优化,因为环境税在矫正污染外部性的同时,垄断造成产量水平下降导致福利损失增加,所以只能追求一个次优的结果,次优环境税低于完全竞争条件下的标准环境税.     

我国股票市场羊群行为的实证分析

运用CSAD（横截面绝对收益率偏离度）指标对市场整体收益率进行回归的方法,对样本区间沪、深股市所有上市公司股票收盘价数据进行整体和分阶段的实证分析,发现在样本期间内,我国股票市场在整体上存在显著的羊群行为,并且羊群行为存在一个减少的趋势。从市场分组研究发现,在市场上涨情形下存在类似的羊群行为和类似的发展趋势,而在市场下跌情形下羊群行为呈现出不同的特征,存在一个由不显著到显著逐步递增的趋势。     

信息不对称、羊群行为与房地产市场中的居民破产

本文通过构建一个0-1决策博弈模型,分析了在信息不对称的情况下,房地产市场中羊群行为的形成机制、羊群行为如何导致房地产泡沫的生成、以及经济状况恶化时泡沫破裂后居民破产的可能性.结论显示,居民在房地产市场中的行为选择既受宏观经济基本面因素的影响,也受羊群行为的影响,而羊群行为的存在使得房地产市场产生价格泡沫,当房地产泡沫破裂时,居民破产的概率与信息不对称的程度和居民的预期相关.     

Disposition Effect and Diminishing Sensitivity: An Analysis Based on a Simulated Experimental Stock Market

The authors experimentally investigate the existence of the disposition effect and its relationship with diminishing sensitivity. Their approach includes 3 key characteristics: (i) an environment closely resembling actual stock markets, (ii) individual-specific reference prices, and (iii) a direct test of diminishing sensitivity as a correlate of the disposition effect. They find strong support for the existence of the disposition effect as an independent hypothesis. This is an improvement over previous studies, which tested this hypothesis only jointly with others. The authors' results also strongly point to diminishing sensitivity, of the type postulated by prospect theory, being positively associated with the disposition effect.     

金融市场中的从众行为与信息传播

目前,很多的理论和实证研究发现,从众现象是导致金融市场剧烈波动的重要原因之一。因此,认识从众行为的演变发展过程,分析产生从众现象的原因,并提出一些防范措施是非常有意义的工作。从众现象非常复杂,从信息传播的角度分析从众行为。     

非对称信息条件下信贷市场分析

随着市场机制的建立和金融体制改革的深入,企业与银行之间的借贷关系日益复杂,银行对企业的放贷面临新的挑战。企业为了获得贷款想方设法隐瞒自己信息,银行为了避免损失,极力加强监管力度。由于商业银行(放款者)与企业(贷款者)之间存在着信息不对称性,所以它直接影响银行的贷款风险决策。     

网络条件下企业技术创新合作行为分析:一个实验研究

运用实验方法,以网络条件下企业技术创新合作行为为实验背景,模拟了不同初始资源组合下企业的技术创新合作行为,探讨了企业在技术创新合作过程中的资源投入情况。研究结果表明,企业会根据自身及网络中其它企业的资源禀赋水平调整在合作过程中的投入程度,且初始资源水平的差异性会直接影响到网络条件下企业技术合作创新成功率。     

An Experimental Education Market with Positive Externalities

A graphical approach shows that in order for the tax revenue to increase, following a reduction in the marginal rate, the increase of aggregate supply must be greater the lower the price level elasticity of aggregate demand.     

期货市场监管层与投资者的信息博弈分析——兼论期货市场过度投机的动因

信息博弈是参与期货市场博弈的各个主体在包括信息产生、信息传播和信息利用在内的期货信息运行体系中,围绕信息的真实性、完整性、及时性和有效性进行的博弈.在过度投机的市场环境下,由于期货市场监管层与投资主体各自的风险偏好不同,它们对市场投机氛围的把握尺度也迥异,这就在期货市场监管层与投资主体之间产生了信息博弈.对期货市场监管层与投资主体之间信息博弈的分析表明,过度投机行为屡禁不止的根本原因并非仅源于投资主体的"逐利偏好",还源于投资主体因生存考验而表现出的对监管层的"主动示好",从而赢得监管层的"良心庇护".因此,只有协力打击过度投机行为,强化市场监管合作,才能保证期货市场持续、稳定、健康发展.     

隐性担保、市场博弈与创新需求的满足--一个关于中国股市的分析框架

中国股市独特的制度变迁路径和基础环境确立了政府的隐性担保人角色.这一角色引发及强化了投资者与政府、上市公司和国企与政府、证券公司与政府的一系列市场博弈.目前的许多市场消极现象都可由此得到说明.政府逐步解除隐性担保契约、摆脱尴尬角色定位的关键出路便是响应和满足市场的创新需求.     

流动性补偿、信息不对称与市场预期:央票发行对央票交易成本的影响分析

基于对经济正常波动时期与金融危机时期央票发行对央票交易成本的影响分析,结论表明央票交易成本中流动性成本显著高于信息不对称成本。在经济正常波动时期,央票发行顺应市场预期,央票发行并未引起流动性成本和信息不对称成本的显著变化;在金融危机时期,央票发行出乎市场预期,央票发行引起信息不对称成本显著增加,指令流自相关系数显著降低。而央票市场的信息不对称成本,主要来源于机构投资者对公开信息的解读不同。     

Coordination and Information in Critical Mass Games: An Experimental Study

We present experimental results on a repeated coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria in which a payoff from choosing an action is positive only if a critical mass of players choose that action. We design a baseline version of the game in which payoffs remain constant for values above the critical mass, and an increasing returns version in which payoffs keep increasing for values above the critical mass. We test the predictive power of security and payoff-dominance under different information treatments. Our results show that convergence to the payoff-dominant equilibrium is the modal limit outcome when players have full information about others' previous round choices, while this outcome never occurs in the remaining treatments. The paths of play in some groups reveal a tacit dynamic coordination by which groups converge to the efficient equilibrium in a step-like manner. Moreover, the frequency and speed of convergence to the payoff-dominant equilibrium are higher, ceteris paribus, when increasing returns are present. Finally, successful coordination seems to crucially depend on players' willingness to signal to others the choice of the action supporting the efficient equilibrium.     

The Administered Labor Market: An Institutional Analysis

The purpose of this article is to offer a Polanyian perspective on the issue of guaranteed income (GI). In analyzing the debate over the Speenhamland system, especially as Karl Polanyi ([1944] 2001) describes it in The Great Transformation, he offered an important criticism of a GI program that some contemporary Polanyian economists have been struggling to come to terms with in their writings. Instead of defending a GI policy by seeking to reject Polanyi’s analysis of the problem, I suggest that we should consider embracing Polanyi’s concern by proposing a comprehensive twin policy that would complement a basic income program with a Keynesian full employment commitment.     

Asymmetric Demand Information in Uniform and Discriminatory Call Auctions: An Experimental Analysis Motivated by Electricity Markets

We study experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty, motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. We study the effect of asymmetric demand-information in the two auction institutions. In our treatment condition some sellers have less information than in our baseline conditions. In both conditions transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, under asymmetric information discriminatory auctions are significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower prices and less volatility.