Modeling internal commitment mechanisms and self-control: A neuroeconomics approach to consumption–saving decisions

We provide a new model of consumption–saving decisions which explicitly allows for internal commitment mechanisms and self-control. Agents have the ability to invoke either automatic processes that are susceptible to the temptation of ‘over-consuming,’ or alternative control processes which require internal commitment but are immune to such temptations. Standard models in behavioral economics ignore such internal commitment mechanisms. We justify our model by showing that much of its construction is consistent with dynamic choice and cognitive control as they are understood in cognitive neuroscience.The dynamic consumption–saving behavior of an agent in the model is characterized by a simple consumption–saving goal and a cut-off rule for invoking control processes to inhibit automatic processes and implement the goal. We discuss empirical tests of our model with available individual consumption data and we suggest critical tests with brain-imaging and experimental data.     

Human capital accumulation and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor: How large is the bias?

I consider two different skill accumulation technologies, learning by doing and Ben-Porath type training. The effect of human capital accumulation in the form of learning by doing is to increase the labor supply elasticity estimate by a factor of 2.1 relative to the estimate that ignores human capital accumulation. The results are similar for the Ben-Porath type training technology, although the estimate of the bias is somewhat higher.     

Effect of Graduate-Program Rank on Success in the Job Market

Economic educators often profess the goal of teaching our students to “think like economists.” Since Siegfried and colleagues (1991) coined this phrase, its meaning has been interpreted as a focus on analytical concepts and methods of economics as opposed to the broader goal of preparing students for independent, critical thought in the complex world beyond college. Colander and McGoldrick (2009b) argued that students are more likely to achieve both of these objectives when the learning process includes open-ended questions that encourage them to move beyond algorithmic application of textbook principles. In this article, the authors operationalize this “big think” approach through an instructional module on differential tuition pricing, the development of which was enhanced by careful attention to contemporary learning theory.     

The target projection dynamic

We study the target projection dynamic, a model of learning in normal form games. The dynamic is given a microeconomic foundation in terms of myopic optimization under control costs due to a certain status-quo bias. We establish a number of desirable properties of the dynamic: existence, uniqueness and continuity of solution trajectories, Nash stationarity, positive correlation with payoffs, and innovation. Sufficient conditions are provided under which strictly dominated strategies are wiped out. Finally, some stability results are provided for special classes of games.     

Corruption in a model of vertical linkage between formal and informal credit sources and credit subsidy policy

The present note develops a model of vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets highlighting the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing dominant moneylender, the bank official and the new moneylenders move sequentially. The existing moneylender acts as a Stackelberg leader and unilaterally decides on the informal interest rate. We show that there may arise a case where an increase in the supply of formal credit results in an increase in the informal interest rate under reasonable parametric restrictions. This shows that apart from (i) asymmetric information on the part of informal sector lenders (Bose, 1998), (ii) an increase in the probability of default of all informal sector lenders (Hoff and Stiglitz 1997), and the (iii) possibility of informal lenders to collude (Floro and Ray 1997), the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit might be another factor responsible for the policy of vertical linkage to break down.     

Error cascades in observational learning: An experiment on the Chinos game

The paper reports an experimental study based on a variant of the popular Chinos game, which is used as a simple but paradigmatic instance of observational learning. There are three players, arranged in sequence,each of which wins a fixed price if she manages to guess the total number of coins lying in everybody?s hands. Our evidence shows that, despite the remarkable frequency of equilibrium outcomes, deviations from optimal play are also significant. And when such deviations occur, we find that, for any given player position, the probability of a mistake is increasing in the probability of a mistake of her predecessors. This is what we call an error cascade, which we measure by evaluating the (heterogeneous) Quantal Response Equilibrium which better suits our data. We also check the robustness of our findings when we allow for belief heterogeneity by applying Kübler and Weizsäcker?s (2004) cognitive frame of limited depth of reasoning.     

The econometric critique of computable general equilibrium modeling: the role of functional forms

Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are among the most influential tools in applied economics. However, some serious questions have been raised about the empirical validity of these models. The core of the critique is that the parameter selection criteria are unsound and the use of first-order (CES class) functional forms imposes influential restrictions on the model's structure. A formal summary of the case against standard CGE modeling is presented, as is an alternative econometric-based modeling strategy which answers the critique. We then present a comparative CGE modeling experiment designed to assess the role of function forms. It is found that choice of functional forms affects not only industry-specific results, but aggregate results as well, even for small policy shocks.     

Pre-sale information

In markets as diverse as that for specialized industrial equipment or that for retail financial services, sellers or intermediaries may earn profits both from the sale of products and from the provision of pre-sale consultation services. We study how a seller optimally chooses the costly quality of pre-sale information, next to the price of information and the product price, and obtain clear-cut predictions on when information is over- and when it is underprovided, even though we find that information quality does not satisfy a standard single-crossing property. Buyers who are a priori more optimistic about their valuation end up paying a higher margin for information but a lower margin for the product when they subsequently exercise their option to purchase at a pre-specified price.     

English auctions with resale: An experimental study

I design and test a simple English auction and two English auctions with resale, but with different informational backgrounds. All three treatments theoretically have the same equilibrium. I find, however, that the possibility of resale alters behavior significantly. In the two treatments with resale, subjects deviated from both the Nash prediction and the common results about bidding behavior in English auctions. Subjects tend to overbid, when they are certain they can reap the whole surplus in the resale market. I employ different models like QRE and levels of reasoning and conclude that overbidding can be explained as a rational response to the noisy environment in markets with human participants, that is, as rational decision making when anticipating others to make errors. When the outcome of the resale market is not certain, there is significant signaling behavior and auction prices tend to be lower than the Nash prediction.     

Misery loves company: Social regret and social interaction effects in choices under risk and uncertainty

Extensive field evidence shows individuals? decisions in settings involving uncertainty depend on their peers? decisions. One hypothesized cause of peer group effects is social interaction effects: an individual?s utility from an action is enhanced by others taking the same action. We employ a series of controlled laboratory experiments to study the causes of peer effects in choice under uncertainty. We find strong peer group effects in the laboratory. Our design allows us to rule out social learning, social norms, group affiliation, and complementarities as possible causes for the observed peer group effects, leaving social interaction effects as the likely cause. We use a combination of theory and empirical analysis to show that preferences including “social regret” are more consistent with the data than preferences including a taste for conformity. We observe spillover effects, as observing another?s choice of one risky gamble makes all risky gambles more likely to be chosen.     

A model of fashions and status

This paper presents a model of fashion cycles based on the idea that individuals purchase fashion goods because their displayed status increases with the personal status of other consumers who buy the same good. Fashion cycles occur in the model because demand now is a rising function of future prices: if future prices are high, only rich consumers will buy it in the future and the good will have a higher status value in the future and will be more desirable now, even though demand now is a decreasing function of current price. The time inconsistency problem is solved by repeated cycles which allows for reputation building. The crucial assumption made is that there is perfect information about the price path of all firms and the average status of the purchasers of each product. This limits possible profits in fashion markets in competition as imitation of price paths is then possible.     

Cyclical wage movements in emerging markets compared to developed economies: The role of interest rates

This paper documents that, at the aggregate level, (i) real wages are positively correlated with output and, on average, lag output by about one quarter in emerging markets, while there are no systematic patterns in developed economies, and (ii) real wage volatility (relative to output volatility) is about twice as high in emerging markets compared with developed economies. We then present a small open economy model with productivity shocks and countercyclical interest rates. The model incorporates a working capital requirement and the Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) preference that allows for flexible parameterization of the strength of income effects on labor supply. The model can account for the high volatility of wage and consumption relative to output and countercyclical trade balances that characterize emerging-market economies. During economic downturns, rising interest rates in emerging markets induce relatively large income effects on labor supply, so households would not reduce their labor input as much even though wages drop significantly.     

Comment on “Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents” [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210–217]

We amend an error in [S. Parreiras, Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents, J. Econ. Theory 123 (2005) 210–217]. Consequently, it is in general not possible to reinterpret a mechanism design model that violates the spanning condition of Crémer and McLean [J. Crémer, R. McLean, Full extraction of the surplus in bayesian, dominant strategy auctions, Econometrica 56 (1988) 1247–1258] as one in which agents hold private information about the informativeness of their signals about other agents? types. Instead, such an interpretation is warranted only when the weights used to span an agent?s set of beliefs stand in a singular relation with the prior type distribution that is known as an alternative characterization of Blackwell dominance.     

The real puzzle of blackmail: An informational approach

The “puzzle” of blackmail is that threats to reveal private information that would be harmful to someone in exchange for money are illegal, but revelation is not. The resolution is that concealment of information about product quality impedes the efficient operation of markets, whereas revelation promotes it. The real puzzle is why possessors are not naturally inclined to sell to uninformed parties, who value the information more than would-be blackmail victims. The answer has to do with the public good qualities of information, which create an appropriability problem in transactions with uninformed parties. The paper also discusses incentives to acquire compromising information.     

The trade-offs from pattern bargaining with uncertain production costs

Pattern bargaining is a negotiating strategy that is often employed by industry-wide unions in oligopolistic industries to set wages. The conventional wisdom is that pattern bargaining “takes labor out of competition” and therefore softens bargaining between the union and firms, resulting in higher industry wide wages. However, this does not explain why firms agree to pattern bargaining. We introduce a model in which the agents face uncertainty about the relative product-market positions of the firms and compare the trade-offs involved in adopting different bargaining mechanisms. We show that with sufficient heterogeneity in non-labor costs, there are situations in which both the union and the firms prefer pattern bargaining. We also show that in such situations, the adoption of pattern bargaining harms consumers. This provides an explanation as to how pattern bargaining can arise in equilibrium and why there is often strong political opposition to it.     

领导—员工目标导向匹配对员工越轨创新行为与创新绩效的影响

基于493份领导—员工配对问卷，采用多项式回归与响应面分析技术，探讨领导—员工4种目标导向匹配模式对员工越轨创新行为以及创新绩效的影响机制。研究结果表明，与领导—员工目标导向差异性匹配相比，领导—员工目标导向一致性匹配对员工越轨创新行为的影响更显著；在领导—员工目标导向一致性匹配情形下，与领导绩效目标导向—员工绩效目标导向匹配相比，领导学习目标导向—员工学习目标导向匹配对员工越轨创新行为与创新绩效的影响更显著；在领导—员工目标导向差异性匹配情形下，与领导学习目标导向—员工绩效目标导向匹配相比，领导绩效目标导向—员工学习目标导向匹配对员工越轨创新行为与创新绩效的影响更显著；越轨创新在领导—员工目标导向匹配与员工创新绩效之间发挥中介作用。     

Endogenous market power

In this paper we develop a framework to study markets with heterogeneous atomic traders. The competitive model is augmented as we provide traders with correct beliefs about their price impacts to define equilibrium with endogenously determined market power and show that such equilibrium exists in economies with smooth utility and cost functions and is generically determinate. Traders? price impacts depend positively on the convexity of preferences or cost functions of the trading partners and are subject to mutual reinforcement. Compared to the competitive model, the volume of trade is reduced, and hence is Pareto inefficient. The price effects of non-competitive trading depend on the convexity of marginal utility or cost function.     

Evidence of a modest price decline in US broadband services

In this paper, we construct a consumer price index for broadband services in the United States using over 1500 service contracts offered by DSL and cable providers from 2004 through 2009. This exercise frames a range of open questions about measuring price changes in a manner that informs policy discussions about US broadband services. We employ approaches used commonly for constructing a consumer price index by using a mix of matched-model methods and hedonic price index estimations to adjust for qualitative improvements. We find a quality-adjusted price decline, but the evidence points towards a modest decline at most. Our estimates of the price decline range from 3% to 10% in quality-adjusted terms for the 5-years period, which is faster than the BLS estimates for the last 3 years. In contrast to other innovative industries that experience rapid price declines, such as computers or integrated circuits, the modest price decline for broadband services raises many questions.     

Aggregate information cascades

We introduce a new model of aggregate information cascades where only one of two possible actions is observable to others. Agents make a binary decision in sequence. The order is random and agents are not aware of their own position in the sequence. When called upon, they are only informed about the total number of others who have chosen the observable action before them. This informational structure arises naturally in many applications. Our most important result is that only one type of cascade arises in equilibrium, the aggregate cascade on the observable action. A cascade on the unobservable action never arises.