自有品牌对连锁商业品牌战略的影响分析

零售商实施品牌战略是制造商和零售商之间垂直竞争加剧的产物,也是应对零售商之间水平竞争的需要.零售商品牌战略包括企业品牌和商品及服务品牌两个层次.作为零售商商品品牌的重要内容,自有品牌通过企业品牌和制造商品牌两个路径对零售企业的品牌战略产生影响.为保证品牌战略的有效实施,零售企业必须处理好业态选择、品类管理、品牌策略的管理等.     

跨渠道零售整合策略研究

随着网络技术及电子商务的迅速发展,结合了实体门店、电子商务和移动商务的跨渠道零售方式已经成为全球零售业发展趋势。跨渠道零售能够为零售商带来新的市场机会、提高顾客忠诚度、进而创造竞争优势。跨渠道零售可以分为营销手段、网络分销、新业务、数据整合等四种运营模式,零售商可以从订单响应、商品结构、渠道利益分享等方面实施渠道整合策略。     

店内营销实施中存在的问题及对策研究

企业产品竞争日趋激烈,企业和零售商都意识到实施店内营销之必要。本文在分析目前店内营销实施过程中存在问题的基础上,就商品陈列、POP广告、优惠促销、导购人员培训、体验消费五个方面给出相关的策略建议。     

零售商应对策略消费者的商品定价问题分析

本文首先对国内外学者提出的应对策略消费者的策略进行了总结,基于博弈论深入分析策略消费者的行为,进而提出了应对策略型消费者的基于商品分类的零售商动态定价策略,并通过行为实验探究了该定价策略相对于传统定价策略对策略消费者消费行为选择的影响,定量测度了该策略实施初始年零售商收益的变化情况。     

零售商创建自有品牌的发展策略

创建自有品牌是我国零售商未来发展的一个重要趋势,我国零售商实施自有品牌的不仅具有可行性,而且创建和发展自有品牌成为零售商维持竞争优势的必然选择,零售业自有品牌战略是零售企业应对市场激烈竞争的有效手段,它的产生有着深刻的背景,但实施这一战略,零售企业须注意谨慎选择商品种类与合作厂商、充分利用最新技术手段、正确定位等问题,文章对我国大型零售商实施自有品牌的营销策略进行了深入分析。     

零售商培养自有品牌的营销策略

在我国,零售商经营自有品牌商品已成为近年来引人关注的一种商业现象。但大多数零售商缺乏科学的品牌规划,特别是对自有品牌营销策略的特殊性缺乏认识。为此,本文对零售商自有品牌的营销策略作了分析,指出零售商在经营自有品牌时,如何在时机、商品、品牌、价格、促销等方面作出正确选择。     

家乐福自有品牌策略对我国零售企业的启示

开发自有品牌商品是零售企业充分发挥品牌效应,取得竞争优势的重要途径。我国零售企业自有品牌的发展刚刚起步,零售商和消费者对自有品牌的认识层次不深,零售企业在开发自有品牌方面的操作技术也有待提高。本文借鉴了家乐福自有品牌的成功策略,提出了适合我国零售企业的自有品牌发展策略。     

论我国零售商开发农村市场的PB商品策略

香港屈臣氏的成功告诉我们,准确的市场定位是零售商PB商品策略成功的关键。我国农村市场具有广阔的发展前景,但又有其不同于大城市的消费特点,如今在国家一系列惠农政策引导下,农村市场已经成为各个零售商必争之地,本文提出PB商品策略是零售商开发农村市场的有效策略,并指出在农村市场的连锁运营是PB商品策略的必备条件。     

浅析零售商自有品牌建设的必要条件

本文在自有品牌的概念基础上,分析了零售商开发自有品牌的策略,并集中论述了大型零售商实施自有品牌战略所必要的条件:有足够大的市场空间;有可靠的生产基地;有一定的规模;有良好的商誉;有高效的管理团队和合适的自有品牌商品。     

零售商采购商品的经济分析

<正>商品采购是零售商经营活动的起点,也是商品流转活动的首要环节,采购工作的好坏直接关系着零售商是否拥有可靠稳定的货源,关系着后续商品经营活动的正常开展。在运营中谁能抓住商品采购这一环节,谁就等于找到了控制商品流通的源头,拥有较其他零售商更突出的竞争优势。因此,对商品采购的各项内容进行经济分析,强化采购管理,降低采购成本,不仅直接影响零售商的利润,还影响着零售商的一切经营活动。     

Pass-through timing

Trade promotions are the most important promotional tool available to a manufacturer. However trade promotions can achieve their objective of increasing short-term sales only if the retailer passes through these promotions. Empirical research has documented that there is a wide variation in retail pass-through across products. However little is known about the variations in pass-through over time. This is particularly important for products with distinct seasonal patterns. We argue that extant methods of measuring pass-through are inadequate for seasonal products. We therefore introduce a measurement approach and illustrate it using two product categories. We find interesting differences in pass-through for loss-leader products versus regular products during high demand and regular demand periods. We find that retailers use a deep and narrow pass-through strategy (high pass-through on loss-leader products, but small pass-through on regular products) during periods of regular demand and broad and shallow pass-through strategy (smaller, but similar pass-through on both loss-leader and regular products) during periods of high demand. Loss leader products continue to obtain higher pass-through in high demand periods, if the category's high demand period is also a high demand period for other product categories as well.

Small-independent retailers vs. organized retailers: An empirical study in Indonesian economics of service industries

This paper explores the influence of strategic planning and functional-business strategy in helping small-independent retailers/traditional retailers to survive amidst the competition with organized retailers. Based on cross-sectional survey research, this study illustrates the influence of strategic planning and functional-business strategy to retailer–supplier relationship, consumer loyalty program, and retailer performance. In order to clarify the relationships among these constructs, a structural equation model (SEM) is employed to examine the model fit and the five hypotheses. The results show that strategic planning is critical for small independent retailers due to its influence on the retailer–supplier relationship and consumer loyalty program. Besides, consumer loyalty program is also influenced by functional-business strategy. The retailer–supplier relationship and consumer loyalty program exhibits a positive influence on the small-independent retailer performance. The research supports the existence of a more complex that the consumer loyalty program fully mediates the relationships between strategic planning and functional-business strategy on retail performance. Moreover, the retailer–supplier relationship fully mediates the relationship between strategic planning and small retailer performance. These findings constitute a new contribution to the literature on small retailer research streams through the development of cross category relationships such as strategy, buyer behavior, and structure categories. Besides, this study can enhance the strategic management as well as the performance of small-independent retailers to achieve sustainable competitive advantage.     

信息共享下双渠道制造商与零售商协调研究

随着internet的应用越来越广泛,许多制造商不仅使用传统的销售商渠道销售产品,而且通过网上直销的方式进行产品销售,双渠道增加了渠道之间的竞争。零售商为了在渠道竞争中获得优势,可以通过花费一定的成本增加零售产品价值。通过建立博弈模型分析强势制造商在对零售商信息完全、信息不完全情况下的定价策略,分析得出制造商获得零售商信息的价值,以及零售商愿意向制造商分享成本信息时的临界收益,旨在提出参考建议。     

Defensive strategy against a private label: Building brand premium for retailer cooperation

We build a game-theoretic model of price competition between a national brand manufacturer and a retailer that also sells its private label. In particular, we examine a national brand's strategy of building brand premium in the context of channel coordination. The importance of national brand's brand equity has been well-documented in many empirical and behavioral studies. We reinforce the argument that building brand premium should be the first line of defense for a national brand instead of aggressively cutting wholesale price. Not only does the national brand manufacturer benefit from it, but also the retailer who sells both the national brand and its own private label has less incentive to promote the latter. Therefore, it can induce retailer cooperation, which is essential for a successful strategy in a distribution channel.     

Shopping in the omnichannel supply chain under price competition and product return

In recent years, omnichannel retailing has created value for prospective consumers. The rise of omnichannel retailing has changed consumers' buying habits, and manufacturers are facing stiff competition from retailers. To reduce this competition effect, manufacturers and retailers often work together to reduce showroom display costs. Despite this practice, there is little understanding of how omnichannel retailing impacts supply chain (SC) profit under competitive conditions. We investigate the test-in-store-and-buy-online (TSBO) retailing strategy and its impact on SC profit and price competition between manufacturers. The retailer sells products of both manufacturers through its website but displays products of only one manufacturer in the showroom, which bears the displaying cost. The retailer adopts a return policy for the other manufacturer. Stackelberg game was used to examine how members of the chain interact, and Nash equilibrium was used to find optimal strategies for players under decentralized and integrated channels. The results show that the TSBO strategy in retailing benefits all supply chain players under the integrated channel. A further interesting finding is that omnichannel SC profits are highest when retailers adopt a return policy. When two manufacturers compete and adopt different sales models, the manufacturer who uses the TSBO retail model reaps the most profit. Several other managerial insights are drawn from sensitivity analyses.     

零售商自有品牌开发路径探索

零售业自有品牌战略是零售企业应对市场激烈竞争的有效手段,它给零售业和工商企业之间的利益关系带来了深刻的影响。创建自有品牌是我国零售商未来发展的一个重要趋势。本文指出了我国零售商创建自有品牌所面临的制约条件,并针对各制约条件提出了相应对策。     

Managing Relationships With Customers And Suppliers: Law, Economics And Strategy

Vertical relationships – contracts or ownership and control, enable firms to exercise extensive control and influence over a supplier or retailer. Such vertical links can increase firms'competitiveness in a whole range of ways. Some of these – reducing costs through integrating processes or ensuring effective product retailing also serve the consumer interest. Others, preventing retailers from offering competing products, for example, don't; and this explains the suspicion with which such links are often viewed by the competition authorities. The consequence is that strategy for vertical relationships must encompass commercial, economic and legal dimensions. It is a key element in corporate strategy in many industries.     

Consumer heterogeneity and online vs. offline retail spatial competition

This paper develops a game-theoretic spatial model featuring consumer heterogeneity in online vs. offline retailers’ spatial competition. We find that consumers’ browse-and-switch behavior intensifies the competition because both offline and online retailers’ price and profit decline when the behavior occurs, but it is not necessarily a threat to offline retailers especially when the product relates more closely to experience. We consider six equilibrium scenarios for different combinations of consumer behaviors when considering a hybrid retailer. The analysis taking consumer heterogeneity into consideration shows that the hybrid retailer operating both online and offline is not always the winner. Particularly, the business opportunity for the offline retailer lies in consumers’ willingness to pay in store, and whether the retailer launches an online store depends on the type of products and services provided.     

The Role of Retail Competition,Demographics and Account Retail Strategy as Drivers of Promotional Sensitivity

We study the determinants of sensitivity to the promotional activities of temporary price reductions, displays, and feature advertisements. Both the theoretical and empirical literatures on price promotions suggest that retailer competition and the demographic composition of the shopping population should be linked to response to temporary price cuts. However, datasets that span different market areas have not been used to study the role of retail competition in determining price sensitivity. Moreover, little is known about the determinants of display and feature response. Very little attention has been focused on retailer strategic decisions such as price format (EDLP vs. Hi-Lo) or size of stores. We assemble a unique dataset with all U.S. markets and all major retail grocery chains represented in order to investigate the role of retail competition, account retail strategy, and demographics in determining promotional response. Previous work has not simultaneously modeled response to price, display, and feature promotions, which we do in a Bayesian Hierarchical model. We also allow for retailers in the same market to have correlated sales response equations through a variance component specification. Our results indicate that retail strategic variables such as price format are the most important determinants of promotional response, followed by demographic variables. Surprisingly, we find that variables measuring the extent of retail competition are not important in explaining promotional response.     

An evolutionary game theoretic model for analyzing retailers’ behavior when introducing economy and premium private labels

The significant growth of Private Labels (PLs) has led to a growing competition between National Brand (NB) manufacturers, on the one hand, and retailers, on the other; while manufacturers strive to achieve enhanced customer loyalty through such measures as innovation and advertising, retailers focus their efforts on offering high-quality products. This paper considers for the first time a supply chain consisting of one NB manufacturer and a population of retailers under two scenarios. In the first, each retailer sells NB and chooses either to introduce an Economy Private Label (EPL) or not. In the second scenario, each retailer chooses either to introduce a Premium Private Label (PPL) or not. To solve the problem, an evolutionary game is introduced and the retailers’ behavior is analyzed. Using two numerical examples, parametric analysis and managerial insights are also provided. It is found that the entire population chooses the strategy of introducing a private label (EPL or PPL) and that this strategy yields greater profits for both the manufacturer and the retailers than other strategy profiles might do. In addition, it is shown that both the retailers and the manufacturer gain more profits by introducing a PPL rather than an EPL.