M&As performance in the European financial industry

This paper looks at the performance record of M&As that took place in the European Union financial industry in the period 1998–2002. First, the paper reports evidence on shareholder returns from the merger. Merger announcements implied positive excess returns to the shareholders of the target company around the date of the announcement, with a slight positive excess-return on the 3-months period prior to announcement. Returns to shareholders of the acquiring firms were essentially zero around announcement. One year after the announcement, excess returns were not significantly different from zero for both targets and acquirers. The paper also provides evidence on changes in the operating performance for the subsample of merges involving banks. M&As usually involved targets with lower operating performance than the average in their sector. The transaction resulted in significant improvements in the target banks performance beginning on average 2 years after the transaction was completed. Return on equity of the target companies increased by an average of 7%, and these firms also experience efficiency improvements.     

Asymmetric Trading Costs Prior to Earnings Announcements: Implications for Price Discovery and Returns

We show that the cost of trading on negative news, relative to positive news, increases before earnings announcements. Our evidence suggests that this asymmetry is due to financial intermediaries reducing their exposure to announcement risks by providing liquidity asymmetrically. This asymmetry creates a predictable upward bias in prices that increases preannouncement, and subsequently reverses, confounding short‐window announcement returns as measures of earnings news and risk premia. These findings provide an alternative explanation for asymmetric return reactions to firms' earnings news, and help explain puzzling prior evidence that announcement risk premia precede the actual announcements. Our study informs methods for research centering on earnings announcements and offers a possible explanation for patterns in returns around anticipated periods of heightened inventory risks, including alternative firm‐level, industry‐level, and macroeconomic information events.     

The complementary relationship between financial and non-financial information in the biotechnology industry and the degree of investor sophistication

We examine whether financial and non-financial variables, separately and in tandem, are value relevant in explaining market returns, equity values and the degree of investment by sophisticated investors for a sample of drug development companies. Patent counts, number of collaborations and probability-adjusted portfolios of drugs under development are the non-financial information metrics used in this study. Earnings are the main financial information variable. We show that news about these non-financial measures is significantly associated with abnormal returns. We also find that earnings are value relevant in explaining cumulative abnormal returns and equity prices around earnings announcement dates despite the fact that R&D expenditures are large and usually expensed as incurred. We further show that non-financial information is value relevant in explaining annual returns, equity prices and degree of investment by (long-horizon) sophisticated investors. Moreover, non-financial variables are value relevant after controlling for financial variables suggesting that the two types of variables are complements.     

Earnings Preannouncement Strategies

We examine the disclosure strategies managers follow when theyd preannounce quarterly earnings shortly before formal earnings announcements. We document that managers with bad news release essentially all of their news at the preannouncement date, while managers with good news only release about half of their news. Controlling for the combined news released at the preannouncement and earnings announcement dates, firms with negative earnings announcement surprises have significantly lower excess returns for the period from just before the preannouncement to just after the earnings announcement. This finding is consistent with the observed disclosure strategies whereby managers attempt to avoid negative earnings announcement surprises, and suggests that how information is presented can affect the market's reaction to that information.     

Does the market overweight imprecise information? Evidence from customer earnings announcements

We examine how supplier-firm shareholders respond to the earnings announcements of their major customers to test the moderated confidence hypothesis, which predicts overreaction to imprecise signals. In our setting, the moderated confidence hypothesis predicts that supplier shareholders will overreact to customer earnings news because that news contains imprecise information about the suppliers’ future cash flows. We find evidence that supplier earnings announcement abnormal returns are negatively correlated with supplier abnormal returns at the earlier customers’ earnings announcements, consistent with supplier overreaction. We also find evidence that the overreaction declines with the strength of the economic ties between the supplier and the customer.     

Aggregate Market Reaction to Earnings Announcements

This analysis identifies a distinct immediate announcement period negative relation between earnings announcement surprises and aggregate market returns. Such a relation implies that market participants use earnings information in forming expectations about expected aggregate discount rates and, specifically, that good earnings news is associated with a positive shock to required returns. Consistent with this interpretation we find that Treasury bond rates and implied future inflation expectations respond directly to earnings news. We also find some evidence that the negative relation between earnings news and market return persists beyond the immediate announcement period, suggesting that market participants do not immediately fully impound these future market return implications of aggregate earnings news.     

Investor and (Value Line) Analyst Underreaction to Information about Future Earnings: The Corrective Role of Non-Earnings-Surprise Information

Prior research suggests that financial analysts' earnings forecasts and stock prices underreact to earnings news. This paper provides evidence that analysts and investors correct this underreaction in response to the next earnings announcement and to other (non-earnings-surprise) information available between earnings announcements. Our evidence also suggests that analysts and investors underreact to information reflected in analysts' earnings forecast revisions and that non-earnings-surprise information helps correct this underreaction as well. Controlling for corrective non-earnings-surprise information significantly increases estimates of the degree to which analysts' forecasting behavior can explain drifts in returns following both earnings announcements and analysts' earnings forecast revisions.     

Anticipated Earnings Announcements and the Customer–Supplier Anomaly

I test whether the anticipation of earnings news stimulates acquisition of customer information and mitigates returns to the customer–supplier anomaly documented by Cohen and Frazzini (“Economic Links and Predictable Returns.” The Journal of Finance 63 (2008): 1977–2011). I find that attention to a firm's publicly disclosed customers increases shortly before the firm announces earnings, and that customer stock returns predict supplier stock returns shortly before, but not after, the supplier's earnings announcement. I further find some evidence that these predictable returns are increasing in the level of customer information acquisition. These results are unique to anticipated disclosure events and suggest that anticipation of supplier earnings announcements resolves investor limited attention to customer information and accelerates price discovery of customer news.     

Earnings Forecasts and the Information Contained in Spinoff Announcements

This study examines spinoff announcements in conjunction with financial analysts’ forecasts of earnings. The analysis shows that spinoff announcement abnormal returns are significantly related to the firm's information environment as proxieci by financial analysts’ earnings prediction errors. The findings also indicate that analysts significantly increase their short-term earnings forecasts in response to spinoffs, but do not significantly revise their long-term earnings forecasts. However, the earnings revisions are not significantly different across prediction error groups, which confirms that spinoff-related abnormal returns cannot be attributed solely to expected performance gains.     

Earnings Announcements and Systematic Risk

Firms scheduled to report earnings earn an annualized abnormal return of 9.9%. We propose a risk‐based explanation for this phenomenon, whereby investors use announcements to revise their expectations for nonannouncing firms, but can only do so imperfectly. Consequently, the covariance between firm‐specific and market cash flow news spikes around announcements, making announcers especially risky. Consistent with our hypothesis, announcer returns forecast aggregate earnings. The announcement premium is persistent across stocks, and early (late) announcers earn higher (lower) returns. Nonannouncers' response to announcements is consistent with our model, both over time and across firms. Finally, exposure to announcement risk is priced.     

Corporate goodness and profit warnings

Is a firm that is known for positively engaging stakeholders expected to voluntarily disclose bad financial news? If it makes the announcement, does its corporate goodness help to mitigate the stock price reaction? We examine these issues using a sample of profit warnings, and a sample of firms with negative earnings surprises that did not warn. Firms that have positive corporate social responsibility ratings are more likely to provide earnings warnings than other firms. When they do provide a profit warning, the event negative abnormal returns are of significantly smaller magnitude than the returns of other firms providing warnings. This effect does not occur for social firms that decide not to warn. They suffer the same negative stock price impact on the earnings announcement day as other firms.     

Risk,Mispricing, and Value Investing

We evaluate the stock return performance of a modified version of the book-to-market strategy and its implications for market efficiency. If the previously documented superior stock return of the book-to-market strategy represents mispricing, its performance should be improved by excluding fairly valued firms with extreme book-to-market ratios. To attain this, we classify stocks as value or glamour on book-to-market ratios and accounting accruals jointly. This joint classification is likely to exclude stocks with extreme book-to-market ratios due to mismeasured accounting book values reflecting limitations underlying the accounting system. Using both 12-month buy-and-hold returns and earnings announcement returns, our results show that this joint classification generates substantially higher portfolio returns in the post-portfolio-formation year than the book-to-market classification alone with no evidence of increased risk. In addition, this superior stock return performance is more pronounced among firms held primarily by small (unsophisticated) investors and followed less closely by market participants (stock price <$10). Finally, and most importantly, financial analysts are overly optimistic (pessimistic) about earnings of glamour (value) stock, and for a subset of firms identified as overvalued by our strategy, the earnings announcement raw return, as well as abnormal return, is negative. These last results are particularly important because it is hard to envision a model consistent with rational investors holding risky stocks with predictable negative raw returns for a long period of time rather than holding fT-bills and with financial analysts systematically overestimating the earnings of these stocks while underestimating earnings of stocks that outperform the stock market.     

The timing of information arrival and overnight returns

This paper examines the information assimilation of overnight returns after positive or negative news arriving during RHT (regular-hours-trading) or AHT (after-hour-trading). We first show that overnight returns are informative of earnings news arriving either during RHT or AHT, and the effects are strongest on the first day after the announcement. Our results then suggest that positive (negative) overnight returns after good (bad) earnings news arrival increase (decrease) CARs, with more pronounced effects for news released AHT. We further show that the market takes the timing of news release into account and reacts negatively to those released during AHT, causing significant under-performance in the subsequent CAR. Lastly, our finding of market underreaction to good news and overreaction to bad news when it is released during AHT suggest that it may be more appropriate for managers to release all news during RHT when market participants are at their trading desks.     

Earnings Forecast Revisions and Security Returns: Canadian Evidence

The impact that revisions of financial analysts' forecasts of earnings have on Canadian security returns during the 1979-1988 period is tested using an event study methodology. A post-revision announcement drift in security prices is documented; the Canadian capital market displays a marked delay in reacting to positive revisions in earnings forecasts. Contingent on revision size, positive and significant excess returns are apparent for up to seven months following their release. The returns, before transaction costs, are not marginal; over a 12-month holding period, excess returns are 18.2%. The results for negative and non-revisions in earnings forecasts suggest that the market reacts quite efficiently to the information implicit in these events. An explanation for the asymmetrical results for the positive and negative revision portfolios is offered. These findings are robust to five control procedures used to test the sensitivity of the reported results to changes in the methodology. A number of explanations for this result are proposed including overlapping excess returns and beta shifts; none reconciles the anomalous results.     

Asymmetric response to earnings news across different sentiment states: The role of cognitive dissonance

Using the Chinese stock market data, we test the hypothesis that cognitive dissonance influences the stock market response to earnings news. Supporting this notion, we find that investors disregard earnings news that contradicts their sentiment due to cognitive dissonance, thereby causing a muted announcement date price reaction to such news. Further analysis shows that higher retail concentration and greater valuation uncertainty of the underlying firm exacerbate this cognitive dissonance and hence amplify its impact, but less credible financial report does not. Finally, we find that cognitive dissonance is temporary for bad news under optimism, but is quite persistent for good news under pessimism. Overall, our findings offer a behavioral bias explanation to understand why investors underuse accounting information.     

Underreaction to Dividend Reductions and Omissions?

Using a sample of 2,337 cash dividend reduction or omission announcements over the 1927 to 1999 period, this study reports significant negative post‐announcement long‐term abnormal returns, which last 1 year only. However, this long‐term abnormal performance is driven by the post‐earnings‐announcement drift. After controlling for the earnings performance and the skewness of buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns, there is no compelling evidence of a post‐dividend‐reduction or post‐dividend‐omission price drift.     

Effects of Preannouncements on Analyst and Stock Price Reactions to Earnings News

This study examines the effects of earnings preannouncements on financial analyst and stock price reactions to earnings news. Prior experimental research documents that when the signs of a preannouncement surprise and subsequent earnings announcement surprise are consistent (i.e., both either positive or negative), analysts make larger magnitude revisions to their future period earnings forecasts in response to the total earnings news conveyed in the preannouncement and earnings announcement than when the surprise signs are inconsistent. This study extends this research by examining a sample of actual preannouncements from 1993–1997 to determine whether the effects documented in laboratory settings manifest at the aggregate market level in stock prices and consensus analyst forecast revisions. Results indicate that after controlling for the sign of earnings news, sign of earnings, and sign of the earnings announcement surprise, stock prices and analyst forecast revisions respond more strongly when a preannouncement and subsequent earnings announcement elicit the same surprise signs than when the surprise signs are inconsistent. Further analysis indicates that the consistency of the signs of a preannouncement surprise and earnings announcement surprise is not associated with future earnings, suggesting that the magnified reaction of investors and analysts to consistent surprise signs is not a rational reaction to associations observed in market settings.     

Informed Trading in Corporate Bonds Prior to Earnings Announcements

This paper examines the information content of corporate bond trading prior to earnings announcements using data from both NAIC and TRACE. We find that the direction of pre‐announcement bond trading is closely related to earnings surprises. This link is most evident prior to negative news and in high‐yield bonds. Further, abnormal bond trading during the pre‐announcement period can help predict both earnings surprises and post‐announcement bond returns. Such predictive ability of bond trading largely originates from institutional‐sized trades and is concentrated in the issuer's most actively traded bond. Finally, even after accounting for transactions costs, informed bond trading can generate significant net profits, especially prior to the release of bad news.     

Earnings Announcements,Differences of Opinion and Management Guidance

Berkman, Dimitrov, Jain, Koch, and Tice (2009) document a negative relationship between differences of opinion and earnings announcement returns, and this relationship is more pronounced when short‐sale constraints are likely to be high. These findings are interpreted as support for the theory in Miller (1977) that binding short sale constraints cause pessimists to be underrepresented in price formation. We conjecture that accounting information (i.e., earnings news) is likely to play a role in this returns pattern. After controlling for the level of earnings news, we find that the relationship between differences of opinion and stock returns is either eliminated or opposite from what is predicted by Miller's theory. Further, we present evidence that suggests the confounding effect of earnings news can be explained by (pessimistic) management earnings guidance. Our findings offer an alternative explanation for why low differences of opinion stocks earn greater abnormal returns around earnings announcements.     

Are corporate managers savvy about their stock price? Evidence from insider trading after earnings announcements

We find that insiders trade as if they exploit market underreaction to earnings news, buying (selling) after good (bad) earnings announcements when the price reaction to the announcement is low (high). We also find that insider trades attributable to public information about earnings and the price reaction generate abnormal returns. By demonstrating that managers spot market underreaction to earnings news, our results imply that managers are savvy about their company’s stock price.