Tax Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Potential versus Performance

Bilateral tax treaties are an important method of international tax cooperation. I survey the existing literature on these agreements, highlighting the differences between the standard view that treaties increase foreign direct investment and the empirical evidence that finds little support for this. I also discuss the key differences in treaty formation between developed countries relative to that between developed and developing nations.     

Federalism, weak institutions and the competition for foreign direct investment

This paper shows that vertical fiscal inefficiencies impede federally organized countries in successfully attracting foreign direct investment. Such countries, particularly if characterized by weak institutions, are disadvantaged in the process of bidding for firms and in their ability to commit to a low overall tax burden. The interaction of these problems deteriorates their competitive position vis-à-vis unitary states in the competition for foreign direct investment. These theoretical considerations are in line with recent empirical evidence that suggests that the number of government layers of host countries has significant and sizeable negative effects on the amount of foreign direct investment inflows.      

Determinants of Regional Investment Decisions in China: An Econometric Model of Tax Incentive Policy

This paper examines whether concessionary tax rates and tax incentives can attract foreign direct investment (FDI) into certain designated areas in China. Since China opened its doors to foreign investors in 1979, tax benefits have been used extensively to attract FDI into different areas. In 1991, a new tax law was introduced which superseded two previous income tax laws. This new law provides additional tax benefits which improve the investment environment for foreign investors. This study investigates the effect of China's tax rates and tax incentive policy on FDI and on the locational choices of foreign firms. Our empirical results indicate that tax rates and incentives are important determinants of regional investment decisions in China, after controlling for potential confounding variables covering infrastructure, unemployment rate, wage rate and agglomeration economics. Specifically, areas offering lower tax rates and increased tax incentives are found to attract greater amounts of FDI. The impetus of the tax effect on FDI is more apparent in the post-1991 period due to changes in the tax laws. Our results also suggest that infrastructure variables are important determinants of regional investment decisions.     

The effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting investment: panel data evidence from the CFA Franc zone

In this paper we investigate to what extent tax incentives are effective in attracting investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. We test the neo-classical investment theory prediction that tax incentives, by lowering the user cost of capital, raise investment. Next to tax incentives, we also estimate the impact on investment of other investment climate variables that are under direct control of the government, such as the transparency and complexity of the tax system, and the legal protection of foreign investors. In developing countries these variables might be as important as or even more important than the tax variables themselves.     

Investment impact of tax loss treatment—empirical insights from a panel of multinationals

We analyze the impact of tax loss treatment on multinational investment. Basically, two effects of tax loss treatment can be expected. First, firms make their investment decisions considering potential future losses. Then, the various types of conceivable loss offset provisions affect investment decisions. Secondly, existing loss carryforwards resulting from losses in the past affect the tax rate elasticity of current investment decisions. Our empirical analysis is based on data of German multinationals. We pay particular attention to industries having a high probability to make losses. Our regression results suggest that a short carryforward time limit lowers investment in particular for firms with a high loss probability. We only find mixed evidence that group loss offsetting provisions foster investment. Concerning the effects of existing losses carried forward, we find a reduced tax rate elasticity of investment for companies shielded by loss carryforwards.     

"两税"并轨对我国引进外国直接投资的影响

由于目前我国来自香港、台湾地区的直接投资以及一些国际避税地的外国直接投资占绝大多数,已将近总额的60%,因此,提高外资企业所得税率很可能会导致大量外资流向周边低税国家,从而对我国引进外资的总量产生较大影响。所以我们对税收优惠的调整在时间上和优惠方式的取舍上,都应有一个平稳的过渡,使我国对外开放和引进外资的政策保持延续性。     

税率锚定效应与企业投资决策

已有文献证实了高管过度自信等非理性因素对企业投资决策的影响,但尚未有文献研究锚定心理在投资决策中的作用。税收政策连续性不足会使得企业实际税率充满不确定性,高管在预测未来实际税率时很可能会非理性地锚定当期的高税率,进而产生税率锚定行为。本文研究这种非理性的税率锚定行为对企业投资决策的影响,结果发现:企业投资决策中存在显著的税率锚定行为,对高税率的锚定显著降低了企业未来的投资支出,且内在锚效应(纵向对比)强于外在锚效应(横向对比)。进一步地,我们发现经验更丰富的高管有助于缓解投资中的税率锚定效应,但更大的税率波动性加剧了这种效应,最终降低了公司业绩和价值。本文研究表明,控制投资中的税率锚定行为,有利于提高投资效率和企业价值,同时也表明保持宏观税收政策连续性有利于促进企业健康可持续发展。     

Capital structure and international debt shifting

This paper presents a model of a multinational firm's optimal debt policy that incorporates international taxation factors. The model yields the prediction that a multinational firm's indebtedness in a country depends on a weighted average of national tax rates and differences between national and foreign tax rates. These differences matter as multinationals have an incentive to shift debt to high-tax countries. The predictions of the model are tested using a novel firm-level dataset for European multinationals and their subsidiaries, combined with newly collected data on the international tax treatment of dividend and interest streams. Our empirical results show that a foreign subsidiary's capital structure reflects local corporate tax rates as well as tax rate differences vis-à-vis the parent firm and other foreign subsidiaries, although the overall economic effect of taxes on leverage appears to be small. Ignoring the international debt shifting arising from differences in national tax rates would understate the impact of national taxes on debt policies by about 25%.     

Taxing multinationals in a world with portfolio flows and R&D: Is capital export neutrality obsolete?

This paper examines recent claims that capital export neutrality no longer serves as an effective principle for the taxation of income from foreign direct investment, due to the large and growing role played by portfolio capital in financing investment and to the recognition that R&D is an important determinant of international trade and investment. In our evaluation of these claims, we find capital export neutrality appears robust. Because both domestic and foreign activities may be financed with portfolio capital, and they both produce goods that compete in the world economy, there is no compelling reason to grant a lower tax to foreign income alone. Regarding the promotion of R&D or the entry of new competitors, cutting the tax on foreign income may be no more effective than cutting the tax on domestic income. A second focus of the paper is to calculate what the residual U.S. tax rate on active foreign income actually is. Based on 1990 data this rate is negative if foreign income is defined appropriately.     

Anti profit-shifting rules and foreign direct investment

This paper explores the effects of unilateral tax provisions aimed at restricting multinationals’ tax planning on foreign direct investment (FDI). Using a unique dataset which allows us to observe the worldwide activities of a large panel of multinational firms, we test how limitations of interest tax deductibility, so-called thin-capitalization rules, and regulations of transfer pricing by the host country affect investment and employment of foreign subsidiaries. The results indicate that introducing a typical thin-capitalization rule or making it more tight exerts significant adverse effects on FDI and employment in high-tax countries. Moreover, in countries that impose thin-capitalization rules, the tax-rate sensitivity of FDI is increased. Regulations of transfer pricing, however, are not found to exert significant effects on FDI or employment.     

ODI与我国企业所得税激励政策

税收激励是促进我国对外直接投资发展的重要税收政策手段。但是我国的现行对外直接投资企业所得税激励政策存在诸多问题,如政策导向性弱、避免国际重复征税的措施不健全等。在借鉴国外激励对外直接投资的税收政策基础上,我们提出明确ODI税收政策的区域和产业导向,进一步完善消除国际双重征税的措施等建议,以优化我国对外直接投资企业所得税激励政策。     

Auditing internal transfer prices in multinationals under monopolistic competition

This paper derives an appropriate standard price that can be used by the tax authorities of a country for auditing transfer prices in multinational firms (MNFs) for the purpose of social welfare maximization of the country. We assume that the corporate tax rate in the host country, where MNFs undertake foreign direct investment to locate their manufacturing divisions, is lower than that in the home country. Our conclusion is that the tax authorities of the home country should not always force MNFs to hold down the transfer price through a too strict audit standard if it aims to maximize social welfare of the country in the long-run equilibrium. This result implies that tax authorities face a trade-off between consumer welfare and tax revenue when determining the standard price used for auditing. One notable implication is that the tax authorities should raise the upper-limit price allowed for internal transfers as the elasticity of substitution between brands for consumers decreases.     

To Invest or not to Invest: A real options approach to FDIs and tax competition

Foreign investment decisions of firms are often characterized by investment irreversibility, uncertainty, and the ability to choose the optimal timing of foreign investments. We embed these characteristics into a real option theory framework to analyze international competition among countries to attract mobile investments when firms, after the investment is sunk, can shift profit to low tax countries by transfer pricing. We find that an increase in the uncertainty of profit income reduces the equilibrium tax rates, whilst lower investment costs or larger profits, counteracts the negative fiscal externality of tax competition leading to higher equilibrium tax rates. JEL Code H25     

Are U.S. Multinational Corporations Becoming More Aggressive Income Shifters?

This paper examines income shifting of U.S. multinational companies over the past two decades. Domestic and foreign policy makers are increasingly concerned with the effect of income shifting on dwindling tax revenues, however, extant research on income shifting by U.S. multinational enterprises is mixed. We address the disconnect between the academic literature and the policy maker's perceptions by examining the extent of multijurisdictional income shifting by U.S. multinational companies. We directly address conflicting results in extant literature and show that using either multiperiod proxies or instrumental variables overcomes weaknesses of annual proxies in this setting. Our tests show that U.S. companies have become more active at shifting income out of the United States as the regulatory costs of shifting have changed. Holding tax rate differences between U.S. and foreign jurisdictions constant, our empirical estimates suggest that our sample of 380 corporations with low average foreign tax rates collectively shifts approximately $10 billion of additional income out of the United States annually during 2005–2009 relative to 1998–2002 due to varying regulatory costs of shifting.     

Why hasn’t tax competition triggered a race to the bottom? Some quantitative lessons from the EU

The integration of European financial markets in the early 1980s created an environment of near-perfect capital mobility across countries that had harmonized indirect taxes but maintained large differences in factor taxes. The years that followed witnessed several rounds of competition in capital taxes with puzzling results. Instead of the dreaded “race to the bottom” in capital taxes, the UK lowered its capital tax to a rate closer to those of France, Germany and Italy, while capital taxes changed slightly in these countries. The UK increased its labor tax marginally, but the other countries increased theirs sharply. This paper shows that these results are consistent with the quantitative predictions of a dynamic, Neoclassical general equilibrium model of tax competition that incorporates the key international externalities of tax policy operating via relative prices, wealth distribution and fiscal solvency. Tax competition is modeled as a one-shot game over time-invariant capital taxes with dynamic payoffs relative to a status quo calibrated to European data. The calibration is preceded by an empirical analysis that shows that the relationship linking taxes to labor supply and the investment rate in the model are in line with empirical evidence and that domestic taxes seem to respond to foreign taxes. The solutions of the games show that when countries compete over capital taxes adjusting labor taxes to maintain fiscal solvency, there is no race to the bottom and the Nash equilibrium is close to observed taxes. In contrast, if consumption taxes adjust to maintain fiscal solvency, competition over capital taxes triggers a “race to the bottom,” but this outcome entails large welfare gains. Surprisingly, the gains from coordination are small in all of these experiments.     

Exemption vs. Credit Method in International Double Taxation Treaties

This paper examines the choice of international double taxation relief methods by two small countries that mutually exchange foreign direct investment. At the first stage, each country chooses between the exemption and the credit method (as prescribed by the OECD model treaty) and at the second stage, each country sets nationally optimal non-discriminatory capital tax rates. It is shown that in the subgame perfect equilibrium both countries choose the exemption method. Mutual application of the exemption method is also shown to yield the highest welfare for each country. While the tax export effect generally induces both countries to choose inefficiently high tax rates, this effect is weakest when both countries exempt foreign earned profits from domestic taxation.     

Taking the Long Way Home: U.S. Tax Evasion and Offshore Investments in U.S. Equity and Debt Markets

We empirically investigate one form of illegal investor‐level tax evasion and its effect on foreign portfolio investment. In particular, we examine a form of round‐tripping tax evasion in which U.S. individuals hide funds in entities located in offshore tax havens and then invest those funds in U.S. securities markets. Employing Becker's ( 1968 ) economic theory of crime, we identify the tax evasion component by examining how foreign portfolio investment varies with changes in the incentives to evade and the risks of detection. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical evidence of investor‐level tax evasion affecting cross‐border equity and debt investment.     

Determinants of tax revenue in OECD countries over the period 2001–2011

By using static and dynamic panel data techniques, this paper analyses the impact of economic, structural, institutional and social factors on tax revenue, across 34 countries from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, over the period 2001–2011. The results show that gross domestic product per capita, the industrial sector, and civil liberties have positive impact on the dependent variable, while the agricultural sector and the share of foreign direct investment in gross fixed capital formation have negative impact. The lagged value of the dependent variable enters positively in the equation and its effect is larger in high income countries. We also encounter tax effort and tax gap and find that they are stable over time but diverse across countries regardless the level of development of the economies.     

Globalization of Chinese firms,location choice,and socio-cultural milieu

For a number of years, the bulk of Chinese outward foreign direct investment was found in countries with lower technological development and minimal management capabilities. Recent research and preliminary data have shown a swift shift in outward foreign direct investment allocation by Chinese multinational enterprises to OECD countries. We argue that the main reasons for this shift are: location strategy, firm-specific resources, new government policy, and socio-cultural milieu. This paper examines the factors which influence Chinese manufacturers' decisions to invest in OECD countries. We integrate the resource-based view, institutional view, and economic view to explain the propensity of Chinese manufacturing firm investment. We contribute to Chinese investment decision and foreign direct investment location theory by incorporating these three views.