Transparency,Liquidity, and Valuation: International Evidence on When Transparency Matters Most

We examine the relation between firm‐level transparency, stock market liquidity, and valuation across countries, focusing on whether the relation varies with a firm's characteristics and economic environment. We document lower transaction costs and greater liquidity (as measured by lower bid‐ask spreads and fewer zero‐return days) for firms with greater transparency (as measured by less evidence of earnings management, better accounting standards, higher quality auditors, more analyst following, and more accurate analyst forecasts). The relation between transparency and liquidity is more pronounced in periods of high volatility, when investor protection, disclosure requirements, and media penetration are poor, and when ownership is more concentrated, suggesting that firm‐level transparency matters more when overall investor uncertainty is greater. Increased liquidity is associated with lower implied cost of capital and with higher valuation as measured by Tobin's Q. Finally, a mediation analysis suggests that liquidity is a significant channel through which transparency affects firm valuation and equity cost of capital.     

Can Island Provide Liquidity and Price Discovery in the Dark?

On September 23, 2002, facing a regulatory mandate issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission, Island teminated the position of the Nasdaq 100 Index Tracking Stock (QQQ) on its book. While the market volume remained almost the same, Island's market share in the QQQ fell significantly. However, Island still dominates other trading centers in the price discovery process and volatility spillovers. The spreads on most trading centers became narrower after Island removed its quotes from the public view. The overall results suggest that the decrease in market transparency does not compromise market liquidity. Informed traders who provide price discovery in the QQQ are willing to sacrifice potential price improvements for the fast speed and reliable execution that Island offers, and are able to trade in the absence of displayed quotes.     

Presidential Address: Issuers, Underwriter Syndicates, and Aftermarket Transparency

I model strategic interaction among issuers, underwriters, retail investors, and institutional investors when the secondary market has limited price transparency. Search costs for retail investors lead to price dispersion in the secondary market, while the price for institutional investors is infinitely elastic. Because retail distribution capacity is assumed to be limited for each underwriter‐dealer, Bertrand competition breaks down in the primary market and new issues are underpriced in equilibrium. Syndicates emerge in which underwriters bid symmetrically, with quantities allocated internally to efficiently utilize retail distribution capacity.     

Transparency,Value Creation,and Financial Crises

This article reports the findings of the authors' recent study of the impact of the level of corporate transparency on shareholder value creation during periods of financial crisis. Their sample consists of the companies comprising Spain's IBEX 35 stock index during the ten‐year period 2000–2010. The study uses three different measures of earnings management (EM) as inverse indicators of the quality of disclosure and carries out fixed effects regressions that adjust for firm and industry characteristics, two periods of financial crises, and the passage of time. The main findings of the study are that (1) companies with lower disclosure quality have generated less value for their shareholders over long time periods and that (2) the shareholders of companies that were more aggressive in managing their earnings experienced greater wealth destruction during the two financial crises of the last decade. Given the still unfolding impact of the recent global financial crisis, as reflected in the current debt crisis in Western European countries, the authors' study reinforces the importance of the current debate over the benefits and costs of increasing the regulation of financial markets, especially in the areas of transparency and disclosure requirements.     

Risk Aversion, Transparency, and Market Performance

Using a model of market making with inventories based on Biais (1993), we find that investors obtain more favorable execution prices, and they hence invest more, when markets are fragmented. In our model, risk-averse dealers use less aggressive price strategies in more transparent markets (centralized) because quote dissemination alleviates uncertainty about the prices quoted by other dealers and, hence, reduces the need to compete aggressively for order flow. Further, we show that the move toward greater transparency (centralization) may have detrimental effects on liquidity and welfare.     

Auditor Fees, Market Microstructure, and Firm Transparency

Abstract:  Auditors, as corporate insiders, have access to private information regarding the firm's financial and business opacity that is unavailable to outside investors. We test whether auditors price their knowledge of firm opacity in their audit fees by examining two competing hypotheses. The first states that higher audit fees may reflect the greater risk that the auditor faces in auditing an opaque firm. Under this hypothesis, market based measures of opacity will be positively correlated with higher fees. The second hypothesis states that firms buy reputational capital from their auditor by paying high fees in an attempt to improve the market's perception of the firm's transparency. In this case, higher audit fees are negatively correlated with market based measures of opacity. Our results are consistent with the first hypothesis, that auditors price opacity risk into their fees.     

Dark trends: Psychology,science fiction,and the ominous consensus

Many science fiction authors predict that the world will continue moving towards an environment characterised by a combination of high population density and advanced technology. Psychologists and writers of fiction both appear to be in general agreement that such an environment will result in an information overload, intolerable time pressures, overwork for a minority with a lack of meaningful work for the majority, and the loss of privacy and autonomy. Futurists should note the agreement between artistic vision and scientific research—that human civilisation appears to be moving towards conditions that are unpleasant and deleterious.     

Transparency and market quality: Evidence from SuperMontage

In this study, we examine the effect of pre-trade transparency on market quality using data before and after the introduction of SuperMontage. Our results show that both bid–ask spreads and return volatility declined significantly after the implementation of SuperMontage. In addition, SuperMontage led to significant improvements in the SEC Rule 605 execution quality measures (e.g., faster executions and higher fill rates). Overall, our results indicate that SuperMontage improved market and execution quality on NASDAQ through greater pre-trade transparency and the integrated, more efficient quotation and trading system.     

杰米·戴蒙续写传奇

当雷曼兄弟、贝尔斯登、花旗等金融机构被国际金融危机“折磨”得苦不堪言时,摩根大通却成为这场金融风暴中美国唯一坚挺的大型金融机构：2009年全年摩根大通实现净利润117亿美元,即使在2008年最困难的一年该机构还有56亿美元的净利润,截至去年第四季度摩根大通已经连续第22季盈利。然而,     

政府公共治理、财政透明与企业投资效率

近期的研究支持了转型经济条件下政府与企业之间的密切联系,但却少有研究关注政府公共治理效力对微观企业的影响。基于此,本文以地方政府财政透明度为对象,将政府公共治理因素纳入到企业行为的分析中,观察其对企业投资效率的影响。本文发现,与央企和民企相比,地方政府财政透明度的增加更有助于提高地方国有企业的投资效率;地方政府财政透明度的增加对地方国有企业的过度投资具有更强的抑制作用。本文的研究提供了政府公共治理影响企业价值的经验证据,丰富了转型经济条件下政府——企业的行为分析框架。并且本文对推进财政信息公开、加强社会主义民主制度和责任型政府建设,亦具有积极的实践指导价值。     

Information Transparency and Coordination Failure: Theory and Experiment

We examine the effect of higher order beliefs on the ability of decentralized decision makers to coordinate and take advantage of improvements in information transparency that can increase welfare. Theories that address this question have not been empirically explored. We study coordination in a laboratory experiment with privately informed decision makers. Economic outcomes in the setting depend both on agents' rational beliefs regarding economic fundamentals and on their rational beliefs regarding the beliefs of other agents. Increasing information transparency mitigates uncertainty about economic fundamentals but may increase strategic uncertainty, precipitating multiple equilibria and less efficient group outcomes. We provide evidence that sometimes the equilibrium attained by creditors is inferior from a welfare perspective to other available equilibria. Risk dominance appears to determine equilibrium selection in our setting.     

Enhancing Bank Transparency: A Re-assessment

Transparency regulation aims at reducing financial fragility by strengthening market discipline. There are, however, two elementary properties of banking that may render such regulation inefficient at best and detrimental at worst. First, an extensive financial safety net may eliminate the disciplinary effect of transparency regulation. Second, achieving transparency is costly for banks, as it dilutes their charter values, and hence also reduces their private costs of risk-taking. We consider both the direct costs of complying with disclosure requirements and the indirect transparency costs stemming from imperfect property rights governing information and particularly infer the conditions under which transparency regulation cannot reduce financial fragility.