共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
《Journal of Banking & Finance》1996,20(2):351-375
This paper shows that leaving insolvent banks with large enough charter values open can be optimal and derives normative bank closure/reorganization policies based on the liquidation value of assets and the charter value. The charter value of a bank is broadly defined as the value that would be foregone due to a closure. Our simulations of risk taking show that an optimal forbearance for an insolvent bank with a large enough charter value alleviates the moral hazard problem. This is because increasing the risk raises the probability of losing the charter value, although it generates a moral hazard gain. 相似文献
2.
《Journal of Banking & Finance》2004,28(3):647-672
We contribute to the debate over the reform of the Basel Accord by developing risk-based capital requirements for mortgage loans held in portfolio by financial intermediaries. Our approach employs simulation of both economic variables that affect default incidence and conditional loss probability distributions. Results indicate that appropriate capital charges for credit risk vary substantially with loan characteristics and portfolio geographic diversification. Hence, rules that offer little risk differentiation, including the current Basel I regime and “standardized” approach proposed in Basel II result in significant divergence between regulatory and economic capital. These results highlight the incentive problems inherent in simplified methods of capital regulation. 相似文献
3.
We examine the role of private unlimited deposit insurance as a complement to federal deposit insurance for deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard during a crisis. We find that banks whose deposits are federally and privately fully insured obtain more deposits and expand lending, in contrast to banks whose deposits are only federally insured. We also document that privately insured banks remain prudent in the loan origination process during the subprime crisis. Our results offer novel insights into depositor and bank behavior in the presence of multiple deposit insurance schemes with differential design features. They also illustrate how private sector solutions incentivize prudent bank behavior to strengthen the financial safety net. 相似文献
4.
Eric R. Young 《Journal of Monetary Economics》2004,51(8):1683-1710
In this paper, I examine a model economy with production, search, and unemployment insurance. The introduction of capital into the economy of Wang and Williamson (J. Monetary Econom. 49(7)(2001)1337) generates the result that optimal replacement ratios are always zero. The result arises from the decline in aggregate activity caused by unemployment insurance: both capital and labor inputs to production fall when benefits rise. Unlike most of the literature, I compute explicitly the cost of the transition path; agents are made better off by switching to a steady state with no unemployment insurance, but the welfare gain is approximately cut in half. Only the very poor and unemployed suffer welfare losses along the transition path. I then briefly investigate the implications of negative replacement ratios. 相似文献
5.
《Journal of Banking & Finance》1986,10(2):189-201
A model of deposit insurance in which the bank closure rule can systematically deviate from the economic insolvency condition used in earlier models is developed. Simulation of that model for plausible parameter values suggests that the failure to close banks on a timely basis has a profound effect in increasing the insurer's liability. The implications of these results for capital regulation are discussed. 相似文献
6.
Market discipline and deposit insurance 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Cross-country evidence presented in this paper suggests that explicit deposit insurance reduces required deposit interest rates, while at the same time it lowers market discipline on bank risk taking. Internationally, deposit insurance schemes vary widely in their coverage, funding, and management. This reflects that there are widely differing views on how deposit insurance should optimally be structured. To inform this debate, we use a newly constructed data set of deposit insurance design features to examine how different design features affect deposit interest rates and market discipline. 相似文献
7.
This paper develops a risk-based capital pricing model for credit insurance portfolios held by a vulnerable insurer. The model accounts for business cycles using a two-state Markov switching model, and allows for dynamic leverage adjustment by the insured firms. The new proposed model, which incorporates risk-based capital practice, is better for both the insurer and the insured firms. Based on the risk-adjusted performance metric, we found that the insurer is better off insuring short- and medium-term loans in expansion and steady states, while it is better off backing both short- and long-term loans in recessions. Our results also emphasize that macroeconomic uncertainty significantly impairs the creditworthiness of the insurer and insured firms. 相似文献
8.
James R. Barth 《Journal of Financial Services Research》1989,2(3):231-259
The federal insurance funds were designed to cover all insured deposits but lacked a rule specifying how these deposits would be covered if a crisis occurred that swamped either insurance fund. The Congress apparently accepted the argument that strict enforcement and regulation could be used to reduce the probability of failure and thereby avoid large losses to the insurance fund. This flaw in the federal deposit insurance system has permitted insolvent institutions to remain open. The very poor performance of these institutions has skewed aggregate thrift performance in recent years, masking the performance of solvent institutions. A protracted debate has ensued centering on the cost of resolving troubled thrifts and whether healthy thrifts can pay these costs. This debate has drawn attention away from the potential value of the thrift charter.This article was originally presented at the conference, Perspectives on Banking Regulation, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, November 3–4, 1988. 相似文献
9.
A model is presented in which demand deposits backed by fractional currency reserves and public insurance can be beneficial. The model uses Samuelson's pure consumption-loans model. The case for demand deposits, reserves, and deposit insurance rests on costs of illiquidity and incomplete information. The effect of deposit insurance depends upon how, and at what cost, the government meets its insurer's obligation — something which is not specified in practice. It remains possible that demand deposits and deposit insurance are a distortion, and reserve requirements serve only to limit the size of this distortion. 相似文献
10.
《Journal of Financial Stability》2010,6(2):79-84
This study shows how the misconception of the option value of deposit insurance by Merton (1977) and its later misuse by Keeley and Furlong (1990), among others, have led some literature supporting the adoption of binding non-risk-based capital requirements to derive incorrect conclusions about their efficacy. This study further shows that what Merton defines as the option value of deposit insurance is actually a component of a bank's limited liability option under a third-party deposit guarantee. As such, it is already included in the value of the bank's equity capital, and the flawed definition makes the Keeley–Furlong model internally incoherent. 相似文献
11.
《Journal of Banking & Finance》1999,23(11):1691-1706
We propose a multiperiod deposit insurance pricing model that simultaneously incorporates the capital standard and the possibility of forbearance. The model employs the recently developed GARCH option pricing technique in determining the deposit insurance value. Our model offers two distinctive advantages. First, it explicitly considers the implications of the strict enforcement on capital standard as stipulated in FDIC Improvement Act of 1991. Second, the use of the GARCH model allows us to capture many robust features exhibited by financial asset returns. By the GARCH option pricing theory, the value of a contingent claim is a function of the asset risk premium. This unique feature is found to be prominent in determining the bank's deposit insurance value. We also examine the effects of capital forbearance and moral hazard behavior in this multiperiod deposit insurance setting. 相似文献
12.
Using a pricing formula for options on coupon bonds (Jamshidian [1989], El Karoui and Rochet [1990]) we are able to compute the actuarial pricing of deposit insurance for a commercial bank. Our formula takes into account the maturity structure of the bank's balance sheet, as well as market parameters such as the term structure of interest rates and the volatilities of zero coupon bonds. The relation with asset liability management methods is explored. 相似文献
13.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of capital and risk transfer instruments (CRTIs) on a financial group's risk situation. In this respect, we extend previous literature by accounting for the conglomerate discount on firm value, which is a reduction in shareholder value due to diversification within the group. In general, CRTIs between parent and subsidiaries have a substantial effect on the diversification of risks, economic capital requirements, and default risk, which we study in detail for different types of CRTIs, including intra-group retrocession and guarantees. One main finding is that diversification effects within the group are much lower when taking into account conglomerate discount effects. We believe this aspect to be an important issue in the ongoing discussion on group solvency regulation and enterprise risk management. 相似文献
14.
This paper examines blanket guarantee, deposit insurance and restructuring decisions with respect to a multinational bank (MNB) using Nash bargaining when the threat of a bank panic motivates countries to make decisions quickly. Failure of the bank would unevenly distribute externalities across countries, influencing the restructuring incentives. In equilibrium, the bank is either liquidated or one of the countries – or both – recapitalizes it. A partition of the recapitalization costs is sensitive to the country-specific benefits and costs from recapitalization, panic and liquidation. The home regulator benefits from the advantage that it is the only entity that can legally liquidate the MNB. Rational expectations regarding the bargaining result affect the incentives to declare a blanket guarantee. 相似文献
15.
《Journal of Banking & Finance》1986,10(2):203-218
This paper investigates the impact of variable-rate deposit insurance on the financial and real sectors of the economy and its role as an absorber of bankruptcy risk within these sectors. A variable-rate system raises the cost of funds to the real sector and increases probability of bankruptcy of the borrowing firms. When such bankruptcies occur, society experiences a dead weight loss. We argue that appropriate deposit insurance pricing must weigh the social costs connected with both financial firm failure and real-sector bankruptcy. 相似文献
16.
从验资准则看验资业务的新变化 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
2006年2月,财政部发布了《中国注册会计师审计准则第1602号——验资》(以下简称"新准则"),后又发布了准则指南(以下简称"新指南")。和《独 相似文献
17.
This article provides incentive compatible regulations that support fairly priced deposit insurance in a competitive banking industry. If informational asymmetry exists between the regulator and banks regarding loan quality, but the regulator can observe actual loan rates charged, then imposing a capital requirement schedule that leads market loan rates to decrease in loan quality is shown to be incentive compatible. Competition in the loan market induces banks to be indifferent to all loans that satisfy a minimum acceptable quality and reject all riskier loans. The regulator could reduce the banking industry's riskiness by imposing stricter capital requirements that increase this minimum quality. 相似文献
18.
We develop a model that captures, at the same time, the temporal dynamics of single-firm credit risk and the contagion across banks via a network of obligations and common assets. In particular, we enrich the continuous-time modelling approach of default by accounting explicitly for the procyclical loop between asset prices and leverage. Contagion can spread well before any default occurs, through the value of the obligations held by counterparties. Moreover, the extent of procyclicality effects depends explicitly on the structure of both the interbank network and the asset bank network. We analyse the model in a simplified scenario of a densely connected core of banks and we carry out a systematic investigation of how procyclicality emerges from the multiplicative interplay of market illiquidity and tightness of capital requirements. 相似文献
19.
On April 1, 2002, the Japanese government lifted a blanket guarantee of all deposits and began limiting the coverage of time deposits. This paper uses this deposit insurance reform as a natural experiment to investigate the relationship between deposit insurance coverage and market discipline. I find that the reform raised the sensitivity of interest rates on deposits, and that of deposit quantity to default risk. In addition, the interest rate differentials between partially insured large time deposits and fully insured ordinary deposits increased for risky banks. These results suggest that the deposit insurance reform enhanced market discipline in Japan. I also find, however, that too-big-to-fail (TBTF) policy became a more important determinant of interest rates and deposit allocation after the reform, thereby partially offsetting the positive effects of the deposit insurance reform on overall market discipline. 相似文献
20.
《Journal of Banking & Finance》1998,22(9):1139-1156
This paper presents a model of incentive compatible bank regulation under moral hazard and adverse selection. We derive a wide range of simple and conceptually implementable mechanisms that can solve each type of incentive problem separately and also achieve the first-best outcome – but only when regulatory instruments involve ex post pricing that is contingent on the bank's performance relative to the market. An important feature of these mechanisms is that they do not involve a subsidy to the bank. When the regulator faces both moral hazard and adverse selection simultaneously, we identify the conditions under which the same mechanism can achieve the first-best solution. 相似文献