Cooperation and cultural transmission in a coordination game

The aim of this paper is to analyze if cooperation can be the product of cultural evolution in a two-stage coordination game, consisting of a production stage followed by a negotiation phase. We present an overlapping generations model with cultural transmission of preferences where the distribution of preferences in the population and the strategies are determined endogenously and simultaneously. There are several groups in the society; some of them play cooperatively and others do not. Socialization takes place inside the group, but there is a positive rate of migration among groups which parents anticipate. Our main result shows that all groups converge to the cooperative equilibrium.     

Head-enders as stationary bandits in asymmetric commons: Comparing irrigation experiments in the laboratory and the field

The emergence of large-scale irrigation systems has puzzled generations of social scientists, since they are particularly vulnerable to selfish rational actors who might exploit inherent asymmetries in the system (e.g. simply being the head-ender) or who might free ride on the provision of public infrastructure. As part of two related research projects that focus on how subtle social and environmental contextual variables affect the evolution and performance of institutional rules, several sets of experiments have been performed in laboratory settings at Arizona State University and in field settings in rural villages in Thailand and Colombia. In these experiments, participants make both a decision about how much to invest in public infrastructure and how much to extract from the resources generated by that public infrastructure. With both studies we find that head-enders act as stationary bandits. They do take unequal shares of the common-pool resource but if their share is very large relative to downstream participants' shares, the latter will revolt. Therefore for groups to be successful, head-enders must restrain themselves in their use of their privileged access to the common-pool resource. The comparative approach shows that this result is robust across different social and ecological contexts.     

The commons,common property,and environmental policy

The conceptual confusion among property, common property, open access resources, and the tragedy of the commons is identified and rectified. Property rights are defined and clarified. From that it is possible to understand the traditional confusion between open access resources and common property resources. It is urged that common property regimes be used in place of common property resources. This will emphasize that institutional arrangements are human creations and that natural resources can be managed as private property, as common property, or as state property. It is the property regime — an authority system — that indicates the rules of use of a variety of natural resources.     

合作研发的影响因素——来自中国企业的经验研究

本文重点检验了技术溢出、研发目标对合作研发的影响。研究发现：合作研发与输入溢出具有显著的正相关关系;就输出溢出而言,水平溢出会抑制企业问的合作（包括水平合作和垂直合作）,而垂直溢出却会促进企业间的垂直合作,且这种积极作用不会受到水平溢出的影响;研发目标对企业问合作研发模式选择也具有显著影响,当企业旨在提高研发成果的成功率和利用率时,更倾向于选择垂直合作;当企业进行重大技术开发或重大创新时,更倾向于选择水平合作。     

Tax schemes in a class of differential games

This paper evaluates tax schemes in a class of differential games. The results indicate that there are many tax schemes that support efficient resource usage, but each may fail to implement the targeted resource because of the multiplicity of equilibria. Since all of the equilibria are subgame perfect, it is difficult to predict which specific one arises. Care must then be taken in using a tax scheme as a remedy for the “tragedy of the commons.” The advantages of other policy instruments (including command-and-control regulation and a tradable permit system) are also discussed. I am indebted to Gerhard Sorger, Koji Shimomura, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. The detailed suggestions of one of the referees in particular have markedly improved the paper. Any remaining errors are mine. Partial financial support from MEXT KAKENHI(11730017, 18078004) is also gratefully acknowledged.     

企业竞合行为的演化博弈分析--以我国创意产业为例

近年来,创意产业不仅成为学界关注的热点,也成为政府和企业专注与投资的特点。企业之间竞合行为将直接决定其竞争力,进而影响我国创意产业竞争力与发展方向。本文基于文化创意产业集群内企业间的竞合行为,运用演化博弈的理论方法,建立了核心企业之间的横向对称博弈及核心企业与其相邻下游企业之间的纵向非对称博弈的数理模型,分析了其演变的动态过程。研究结果表明,该系统的演化方向与双方博弈的支付矩阵相关,博弈结果受到合作收益、初始合作成本、独立创新能力、合作成功率、以及双方初始状态等因素的影响,最后给出了相关建议,为整合我国文化产业集群提供了理论依据。     

论两主体情形下合作剩余的分配--以悬赏广告为例

本文讨论在两经济主体的合作能够产生剩余的情况下 ,这些剩余如何在他们之间进行分配。以往研究提出了分配问题的几个可能的解 ,并对解的存在性和唯一性进行了讨论。但他们的分析或是直接对解用不可验证的公理进行描述 ;或是对个体偏好强加一些不可验证的假设 ,然后得到存在性或唯一性的结论。作者发现 ,运用类似于博弈论中多个策略均衡点存在时“聚点”决定解的唯一性的分析方法 ,可以得到这样的结论 :实际中多个解都可能存在 ,不同问题的不同解是由社会习俗决定的 ;即便是同一个问题 ,由于社会习俗的不同 ,也可能有不同形式的解 ;并且解的大小及其变化与社会习俗互有影响。接下来 ,作者以悬赏广告为例 ,对悬赏广告中悬赏金的大小进行求解。我们发现用前面的结论可以比较好地解释所得到的结果。另一方面 ,得到的结果在一定程度上也可以验证前面的结论。     

Corporate Social Responsibility,Values, and Cooperation

Lately, some questions relating to Corporate social responsibility (CSR) have become relevant. The European Commission defines CSR as the enterprises’ contribution to sustainable development. In the field of cooperation, there are numerous examples of enterprises very closely engaged in sustainable development that apply very strict ethical codes to their regular operations. This work tries to think about: (1) the necessity of taking upon, again, the moral teachings of some fathers of economics as Adam Smith or Robert Owen, most of which were scorned since the triumph of utilitarianism and rationalism; (2) the slide of society through post-modern values; and (3) the role of cooperative principles and values in the new cultural environments.

Cooperation by way of support in a rent seeking contest for a public good

This paper analyzes the efforts made to influence a decision that can have two outcomes. First, the agents on the same side designate an agent to play the contest for them. The inactive agents can then decide to support this active agent, i.e. pay a percentage of his effort. It is optimal to designate either the agent with the lowest stake (who will receive support from everyone else) or the agent with the highest stake (who will not receive support) as the active agent. We find that the side with the higher aggregate stake may have the lower success probability.     

地球观测领域国际科技合作影响因素探析

本文通过解读当今世界国际科技合作在地球观测领域发展的新格局,分析新形势下地球观测领域国际科技合作的影响因素,探讨我国地球观测领域国际科技合作的对策。     

Environmental versus Human-Induced Scarcity in the Commons: Do They Trigger the Same Response?

We study appropriation strategies in common pool resources where extinction is a credible threat. Here we present an experimental study of the appropriation of common pool resources in a dynamic setting where resource availability depends on the initial environmental characteristics of the common resource and on human-induced resource depletion due to users’ appropriation patterns. Our results show that initial resource scarcity limits appropriation by inducing an initial caution among users that persists throughout of the game. Additionally, we find that subjects restrain their appropriation strategies when scarcity increases. However, this concern for resource scarcity is not enough to prevent resource depletion. Agents do not counteract the previous rounds’ appropriation strategies but follow the appropriation trend. High appropriation levels are followed by higher appropriation strategies, thus promoting the well known tragedy of the commons. Often concern for resource preservation is not great enough to limit appropriation.      

竞争、不确定性与企业间技术创新合作

新古典经济学认为企业间结网合作与利己短视的理性经济人假设不相一致。对此 ,目前经济理论已有所突破。较早的博弈论无名氏定理指出 ,只要有足够的耐心重复进行博弈就可能达到合作的效果。近来提出的网络形成理论则认为网络的形成及稳定完全依赖于结网的直接间接收益与成本的权衡。但是 ,它们都还不能反映企业所面临的不确定性和市场竞争环境对企业策略行为的影响 ,从而无法解释合作分享为什么会发生在硅谷那样竞争空前激烈、流动异常频繁的地方而在另一些得到政府扶持保护的地方却难现其踪。本文以硅谷为代表的自组织创新网络为研究原型 ,构造了一个基于企业复合实物期权创新合作行为的创新网络模型 ,从中得到了两点新的重要发现 :①与无名氏定理的要求相反 ,体现竞争压力和不确定性的急切感是企业间结网合作的必要条件 ;②能够实现最大增值的创新网络是不断更新的概率暂存网络。     

解析龙头企业与农户合作关系的绩效差异

文章用4个案例反映了现实中龙头企业与农户之间存在不同的合作关系以及不同的关系绩效。根据交易成本理论、资源基础观和关系观,从合作关系本身对这种差异进行了分析。合作关系是一种混合治理结构,不同的合作关系应采取不同的治理机制,而不同的治理机制具有不同的价值创造功能（包括降低交易成本）,所以不同的合作关系必然存在绩效上的差异。文章对4个案例的对比分析,很好地支持了这一观点。     

澜沧江─湄公河次区域国际合作和可持续发展

澜沧江─湄公河流域地区已成为国际关注、研究和投资的热点区域。以推进该地区可持续发展为目标，国际间开展了十多个各种合作。有不少合作内容和范围是重复的，但合作项目之间无内在关联，行动不统一不协调。这不仅在合作过程中产生紊乱，还对可持续发展产生负面影响，而这种状况尚未引起各流域国及国际社会的足够重视。本文对此进行了讨论，提出解决有关这类问题的一些思路和对策。     

环境保护的国际合作：以SARS为例

SARS危机反映了当前环境问题日渐国际化的趋势,其根源是资源紧缺和经济全球化之间的矛盾。面对这一问题,各国应通力合作、寻求对策,实现环境保护的国际合作。但环境责任在各国间的分配问题阻碍了国际环境合作的进展。本文指出,基于环境和国力的全球合作机制可合理分配各国的代际责任和代内责任,有利于促进环境保护的国际合作,是一种可行的环境保护国际合作模式。要实现这一目标,首先要各国在代际和代内责任的问题上达成共识,二是要增加国际机构、国际公约对合作各方的约束力。     

On the (in)effectiveness of rewards in sustaining cooperation

We study the effectiveness of costly rewards in mitigating excess extraction in a standard Common Pool Resource (CPR) game experiment. We implement two treatments. In the first, rewards are a pure transfer from one player to the other. In the second, the benefits of receiving a reward are higher than the cost of providing it. Referring to the latter as “net positive” rewards, we observe that these are used more frequently than transfer rewards, and that, unlike transfer rewards, they are effective in sustaining cooperation in the CPR game. JEL Classification C72, C92, D74     

浅议校企合作中的知识产权管理

进入知识经济时代,中国高校与企业合作开发利用知识产权成为一种趋势。但其中存在诸多问题和隐患,应该引起重视。对这些问题应着重从高校的知识产权管理入手解决,并提出一些看法和建议。高校肩负推动技术创新和将科技成果转化为现实生产力的双重任务,科技与经济相结合,高校与企业相结合,这是中国改革开放以来出现的新形势,也是顺应世界发展潮流的新趋势：所以高校与企业合作发展对双方而言是互惠互赢的。     

联产品协同生产的成本驱动实证研究

实证研究证明，联产品生产的协同作用也是产品成本的驱动因素。协同成本的动因在于联产品的组成变量。在联产品协同生产过程中，所采取的基于非线性成本函数的边际成本计算法，应该是数理依据严谨、实务应用可行的方法。     

组织间的合作关系:基于嵌入关系的视角

本文在分析市场交换关系与嵌入关系不同特征的基础上,研究了关系性嵌入和结构性嵌入对于组织间合作的影响。研究表明：关系性嵌入影响组织间专业性信息的传递、组织间的互利、事后支持以及组织间的适应;而结构性嵌入通常会产生经济的外部性,并通过多次博弈、重复嵌入等方式使组织获得通过市场交换所不具备的优势。但是,如果组织间的关系嵌入过度则会导致关系从一种资产转变成了一种负担,并产生锁定效应。