Wage Determination of a Child Worker: A Theoretical Analysis

A theory of wage determination of a child worker is presented using the consumption efficiency hypothesis and the Nash bargaining technique. The employer and the guardian of the child play the bargaining game. The model shows some interesting results regarding the split of the wage between the consumption of the child and the income of the guardian.     

农民工的城市归属感与定居决策

本文利用2008年珠三角九城市农民工调查数据,对农民工城市定居决策的影响因素进行了实证分析。结果发现,农民工的城市归属感是其定居决策的关键影响因素。农民工的归属感与工资收入、家庭教育、居住条件等显著正相关,与打工时间、年龄、收入缺口、是否存在劳动者权益侵犯等显著负相关。而农民工是否购买保险、是否加入工会、是否接受职业培训等不会显著影响农民工的城市归属感及定居决策。这说明我国的医疗养老保险制度、工会制度、职业培训政策等并未切实保护农民工的利益,需要进行相应的改革。     

Unions and the share economy

This paper contrasts share bargaining and wage bargaining in the context of a “monopoly” model of union bargaining. In the example considered here, employment levels are identical under wage and share systems, but total compensation is higher under share bargaining than under wage bargaining, underscoring the importance of the broader ontext within which a share system is introduced.     

Sharing the Burden? Empirical Evidence on Corporate Tax Incidence

This study investigates the direct incidence of the corporate income tax (CIT) through wage bargaining, using an industry‐region level panel dataset on all corporations in Germany over the period 1998–2006. For the first time we account for employment effects which result from tax‐induced wage changes. Workers share in reductions of the CIT burden; yet, the net effect of wage bargaining on the corporate wage bill, after an exogenous €1 decrease in the CIT burden, is as little as 19–28 cents. This is about half of the effect obtained in prior literature focussing on wages alone.     

On the optimality of a minimum wage: New insights from optimal tax theory

We build a theoretical model to study whether a minimum wage can be welfare-improving if it is implemented in conjunction with an optimized nonlinear income tax. We consider this issue in a framework where search frictions on the labor market generate unemployment. Workers differ in productivity. The government does not observe workers' productivity but only their wages. Hence, the redistributive policy solves an adverse selection problem. We show that a minimum wage is optimal if the bargaining power of the workers is relatively low. However, if the government controls the bargaining power, then it is preferable to set a sufficiently high bargaining power.     

How large are wage differentials in Austria?

The OECD has repeatedly recommended that wage bargaining in Austria be decentralised to allow wage diferentials to widen. But the status quo itself is in question. While studies of aggregate industry data indicate a high degree of wage dispersion, research based on data from household surveys seems suggest that income inequality in Austria is as small as in the Scandinavian countries. This paper seeks to reconcile these opposing views. It shows that data from the household surveys underestimate the size of inter-industry wage differentials. An analysis of the structure of contractual wage rates supports the view that wage inequality is very pronounced in Austria and that a narrowing of the wage gap would lead both to an increase in productive efficiency and an increase in income equality.     

Optimal tax progressivity in unionised labour markets: What are the driving forces?

In labour markets with collective wage bargaining higher progressivity of the labour income tax creates a trade-off. On the one hand, wages are lowered and unemployment decreases, on the other hand, the individual labour supply decision is distorted at the hours-of-work margin. The optimal level of tax progressivity within this trade-off is determined using a numerical general equilibrium model with imperfect competition on the goods market, collective wage bargaining and a labour-supply module calibrated to empirically plausible elasticity values. The model is calibrated to macroeconomic and institutional parameters of both the OECD average and a number of individual OECD countries. In most cases the optimal degree of tax progressivity is below the actual level. A decomposition approach shows that the optimal level is increased by high unemployment and by the general tax level.     

Enterprise Bargaining,Union Structure and Wages*

Models of simultaneous bargaining games are used to analyze the wage outcomes associated with various systems of industrial relations, including bargaining by craft, enterprise, industry or the whole economy. Union structure is a key determinant with highest wage pressure occurring when unions are organized along craft lines at industry level Abandonment of centralized bargaining and the splintering of both union and employer organizations into craft and industry units may well lead both to higher aggregate wage pressure and to greater wage inequality.     

Lower Tax Progression, Longer Hours and Higher Wages

The impact of tax reforms that decrease income tax progression is analysed in an equilibrium search model with wage bargaining and endogenous individual working hours. Working hours are either bargained together with the hourly wage (case 1) or determined solely by workers after bargaining over the wage (case 2). In both cases reducing tax progression increases working hours of employed and, more interestingly, unambiguously increases wages and unemployment. Wages and unemployment rise more and working hours and production less in case 1 compared to case 2, probably making case 2 countries best suited for such tax reforms.
JEL Classification : H 24; J 22; J 41     

Wage Bargaining Versus Efficiency Wages: A Synthesis

We construct a model integrating the efficiency wage model of Shapiro–Stiglitz (1984) (SS), with an individual wage bargaining model in the Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides (DMP) tradition where firms and workers form pairwise matches. We show that when workers may threaten to shirk on the job and there is individual wage bargaining, the wage is always higher and employment lower than in either the SS model, or the (appropriately modified) DMP model. When firms determine workers' efforts unilaterally, efforts are set inefficiently low in the SS model. In the bargaining model, effort is higher, and is first best when the worker non–shirking constraint does not bind. The overall equilibrium allocation may then be more or less efficient than in the SS model, but is always less efficient than in a pure bargaining model with no moral hazard.     

On-the-job search and strategic bargaining

This paper studies wage bargaining in a simple economy in which both employed and unemployed workers search for better jobs. The axiomatic Nash bargaining solution and standard strategic bargaining solutions are inapplicable because the set of feasible payoffs is nonconvex. I instead develop a strategic model of wage bargaining between a single worker and firm that is applicable to such an environment. I show that if workers and firms are homogeneous, there are market equilibria with a continuous wage distribution in which identical firms bargain to different wages, each of which is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game. If firms are heterogeneous, I characterize market equilibria in which more productive firms pay higher wages. I compare the quantitative predictions of this model with Burdett and Mortensen's [1998. Wage differentials, employer size and unemployment. International Economic Review 39, 257-273.] wage posting model and argue that the bargaining model is theoretically more appealing along important dimensions.     

Optimal income taxation when couples have endogenous bargaining power

This study examines the optimal income taxation for a two-earner household, where the couple bargains over their private goods consumption and time allocation between work and leisure. In the model, bargaining power is determined endogenously by the income gap between the two earners. Conventional studies have shown that the higher income tax rate should be imposed on the individual with the smaller wage elasticity, typically the individual with the higher productivity. In contrast to conventional argument, this study shows that the optimal tax rate on the household member with the higher productivity is lower than that of the individual with the lower productivity if the required tax revenue is relatively small and the influence of the gender income gap on the power balance of the couple is moderate. This is because such a tax structure encourages the labor supply of the individual with the higher productivity to mitigate the decrease in the household’s consumption induced by income taxation.     

Hourly wage rate and taxable labor income responsiveness to changes in marginal tax rates

Recently, a voluminous literature estimating the taxable income elasticity has emerged as an important field in empirical public economics. However, to a large extent it is still unknown how the hourly wage rate, an important component of taxable income, reacts to changes in marginal tax rates. In this study we use a rich panel data set and a sequence of tax reforms that took place in Sweden during the 1980s to estimate the elasticity of the hourly wage rate as well as the taxable labor income elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate. We also estimate elasticities with respect to the non-labor income in a way that is novel in the literature. While carefully accounting for the endogeneity of marginal tax rates we find a statistically significant response in wage rates both among married men and women. The estimates of the hourly wage rate elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate fall in the range of 0.14–0.16 for males and 0.41–0.57 for females, whereas the corresponding taxable labor income elasticity estimates hover between 0.19–0.21 for males and 0.96–1.44 for women. Moreover, for men we find that the taxable labor income elasticity with respect to non-labor income is statistically significant; the point estimate being ? 0.07. This implies that the compensated taxable labor income elasticity is about 5 percentage points higher than the uncompensated one. In general, we consider the estimates for males to be more certain and robust than the estimates for females.     

Analysis of the 1980 Sydney Survey of Work Patterns of Married Women: Further Results*

Using cross-section data from the 1980 Sydney survey of the work patterns of married women, this paper contributes to the very scarce Australian stock of disaggregate econometric studies of the labour market activities of married women. Labour force participation, hours of work and wage functions (reservation wage as well as market wage) are estimated in a second-generation static labour supply framework. Unique features of the study include the availability of direct data on previous market experience, a formulation of the impact of children on the participation decision which permits testing for the presence of economies of scale in child-minding activities, estimation of the reservation wage function, and a data base which permits a clear distinction between earnings and other forms of income.     

Industry-Level Wage Bargaining: A Partial Rehabilitation—The German Experience

In order to reduce unemployment, it is often recommended that industry-level wage bargaining in Germany should be replaced by a more decentralized system. This paper provides a critical assessment of the current wage bargaining institutions and re-examines the case for a more decentralized system. Based on a theoretical model integrating Insider–Outsider aspects into the comparison, the uniformly superior employment performance of a decentralized wage bargaining system is questioned. We conclude that, rather than solely trying to decentralize wage bargaining, a promising policy option may be to improve the skills of the unemployed by efficient labour market policies and to foster institutional reforms such that wage bargaining takes account of the long-run employment consequences of wage setting.     

Progressive taxes and automatic stabilization in an open economy

In a simple model with a fixed exchange rate, more progressive taxes are likely to lead to a fall in the multiplier for autonomous expenditure. The effect on the multiplier for an autonomous wage shock may go either way, and increased progressivity may change the sign of this multiplier. The wage bargaining is modeled as a trade-off between employment and real disposable income. Depending on them weight attached to employment and the way expectations are formed, more progressivity may contribute to stabilize rather than destabilize this wage formation process. Indexation of taxes to imported inflation seems preferable to alternatives.     

A simultaneous discrete choice model of labor supply and wages for married women in Switzerland

A simultaneous model of female labor supply and wages is estimated. The labor supply model is formulated as a trichotomous discrete choice model in order to take into account the bimodal distribution of observed working hours. For women without observed wages the probability of choosing the observed work category is integrated over all values of the wage. The model is estimated using a sample of married women in Switzerland. The budget constraint is constructed by computing the disposable income for each hours point, taking into account the Swiss income tax system. The estimation results imply relatively modest wage elasticities of expected labor supply for working women. On the other hand the elasticity of the participation probability with respect to wages for nonworkers is twice as large. The magnitude of the income elasticities is comparable to other studies. The wage elasticities obtained with two alternative estimation procedures are considerably lower. These results show that wage elasticities crucially depend on how the problem of unobserved wages is solved.     

Life beyond the Washington Consensus: An Introduction to Pro-poor Macroeconomic Policies

Abstract

This paper develops a rationale for the recession-induced inflation hypothesis. Within a conflicting claims framework we present a model in which both price leaders and organized workers set their nominal prices on the basis of a desired profit rate and a real wage target respectively. We argue that an absolute cost advantage in concentrated industries (for instance in fixed costs) may provide oligopolistic leaders sufficient margin to raise prices and restore a desired level of profitability during a recession. The resultizng unstable income distribution will set off an inflationary spiral if the firm's advantage in selling its output imparts an upward bias to the flexibility of input prices (specifically wages). Taking into consideration different scenarios for workers' bargaining power we present a simple simulation experiment to analyze the inflation and real wage paths of the economy after a negative output shock. When we endogenize output, we show that for a high degree of the bargaining power, output is likely to converge to a higher steady-state value.     

跨越中等收入陷阱:国际经验与实现路径

通过对我国经济结构的分析,作者发现结构失衡是跨越中等收入陷阱的主要障碍,人口红利逐渐式微加剧了我国向高收入组跨越的难度。在调节结构失衡的过程中,应以收入分配改革为切入点,通过建立集体工资谈判制度、完善社会保障体制和财税政策来调节收入分配,将收入差距控制在合理范围内;同时,促进产业升级和技术创新,推动经济由技术内生化阶段向自主创新阶段转变,实现增长阶段的跨越。     

A DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL UNDER BILATERAL MONOPOLY*

The paper points out a crucial difference between the conventional disequilibrium macro model and partial equilibrium models of wage bargaining, In the former the real wage is constrained to be less than or equal to the marginal product, whereas in the latter the real wage is frequently constrained to be greater than or equal to the marginal product. The paper builds a disequilibrium model under bilateral monopoly, paying explicit attention to the labour market. The well-known union model of McDonald and Solow forms the basis of the labour market analysis. Just as the three regions of Keynesian Unemployment, Classical Unemployment and Repressed Inflation are configured in the conventional case, an equivalent exercise is undertaken but with the addition of a collectively negotiated wage. The particular wage agreement used is the Nash bargain. The framework is then used to account for the unusual events that occurred in the UK labour market 1979–81, particularly the unprecedented rise in unemployment with no diminution of the inflation rate. It suggests that there was a shift in bargaining advantage in favour of employers, which resulted in an increased share of profits in national income. This regime change exacerbated the unfavourable circumstances for labour, which existed at that time.