Product choice with economies of scope

This paper develops a model in which two competing firms on a bounded line each sell two products. Production costs for each firm are lower the closer are its two products. It is shown that there may be anywhere from zero to three possible equilibrium configurations. Equilibrium may entail market segmentation, market interlacing or an intermediate case. The paper contributes to two bodies of literature: (i) Industrial organization. When the line is interpreted as a one-dimensional characteristic space, the model provides an appealing explanation of economies of scope in multi-product firms. (ii) Firm location theory. The model relaxes the unrealistic assumption made in spatial models that each firm has a single outlet and obtains significantly different results.     

Non-jointness and scope economies in the multiproduct symmetric generalized McFadden cost function

The multiproduct symmetric generalized McFadden cost function is increasingly prominent in empirical production analysis. Researchers should be aware that the scope for imposing and testing non-jointness in this model is limited. In the general version of the model non-jointness requires the non-testable maintained hypothesis of similar (in a sense we define) single-output production technologies, a maintained hypothesis for which there is not normally any basis. The apparent imposition and testing of non-jointness must be qualified accordingly. The attempt to impose non-jointness and global separability simultaneously necessarily imposes constant returns to scale and the implication that outputs are identical up to a scalar multiple. In this special case the model therefore effectively describes merely the production of a single output, and in this sense is only trivially multiproduct.     

Economies of scope and economies of agglomeration

Agglomeration economies are economies external to the firm, and plant, but internal to a particular location. In this paper the notion of agglomeration economies is formally investigated. The implications of the concept for urban structure and industrial organization are then traced. Under specified considerations, weak economies of agglomeration, as defined in this paper, are shown to be necessary for the existence of an urban area.     

The cost of strikes in the Spanish mining sector: modelling an undesirable input with a distance function

In some contexts, firms have to deal with certain elements or factors that affect the production outcome but which are non-market in nature and therefore do not have a price. In this paper we propose a new use of a production economics tool, the input distance function, to empirically measure the effects of these factors. Although we suggest a general use of this methodology, it has been developed in the context of measuring the effects of labor disputes in a particular declining industry, that of Spanish coal mining. We have estimated an equation system comprising an input distance function and cost share equations to calculate the cost generated by strikes.

Deregulation and dairy production systems: a Bayesian distance function approach

Milk quota trading rules differ across EU member countries. In Denmark a biannual milk quota exchange was set up in 1997 to promote a more efficient reallocation of milk quotas as well as to reduce transaction costs related to the searching and matching of sellers and buyers. Using two comprehensive unbalanced panel data sets on organic and conventional milk farms this study attempts to disentangle the effects of the introduction of quota transferability on the production structure of those farms as well as the probability of market entry/exit. Bayesian estimation techniques are used to estimate an input oriented generalized Leontief distance function as well as a curvature constrained specification. The results suggest that the deregulation in the quota allocation mechanism led to an increased allocative efficiency of organic as well as conventional milk production as well as a relative shift of the PPF in favor of the production of organic milk.     

The relationship between private investors and small firms: an agency theory approach

Many small firms in Sweden are characterized by a lack of equity capital. For several years measures to increase the equity capital have been discussed. In this discussion the private investors' market has received virtually no attention. This study presents some preliminary results of the private investors in Sweden.

The research in small firms financing is characterized by a lack of theoretical framework. One basic assumption in the study is that agency theory can provide an essential framework to explain the interaction between the private investor and entrepreneur. Twenty-five hypotheses generated from agency theory are formulated and tested on 62 small unlisted firms in Sweden. Multiple regression analysis is used for the causal analyses.

The empirical results in the study show inter alia that the geographic distance and the private investor's knowledge about the portfolio firm's transformation process seem to be the most influential factors for determining the private investor's involvement in the portfolio firms. It is also interesting to notice that none of the variables, frequency of contacts and the private investor's operational work in the portfolio firm affect the performance of the firm. Contrary to conventional wisdom, private investors do not add value to their portfolio firms through their interaction with the entrepreneurs.

The theoretical conclusion is that agency theory does not provide any satisfactory framework to explain the private investor - entrepreneur relationship. Some of the basic assumptions in agency theory seem to be invalid. A model for the relationship between private investors and entrepreneurs is developed in which four interaction strategies are identified. The model gives implications on two levels: the portfolio level and the individual case level.     

Learnability of an equilibrium with private information

This paper investigates the learnability of an equilibrium with private information. Agents of each type have their own private information about an exogenous variable and conduct adaptive learning with a heterogeneously misspecified perceived laws of motion (PLM) that includes only this variable. The paper shows that the existence of private information has a nonnegative impact on the learnability of the equilibrium; that is, the condition for learnability is unaffected or relaxed by heterogeneity and/or misspecification in PLMs caused by private information. In a New Keynesian model with private information about fundamental shocks, the learnability of the equilibrium is ensured by the Taylor principle of monetary policy. The paper also confirms that these results hold true not only in the presence of private information, but also in a variety of informational structures.     

Revisiting the decomposition of cost efficiency for non-homothetic technologies: a directional distance function approach

In the early 1980’s Kopp and Diewert proposed a popular method to decompose cost efficiency into allocative and technical efficiency for parametric functional forms based on the radial approach initiated by Farrell. We show that, relying on recently proposed homogeneity and duality results, their approach is unnecessary for self-dual homothetic production functions, while it is inconsistent in the non-homothetic case. By stressing that for homothetic technologies the radial distance function can be correctly interpreted as a technical efficiency measure, since allocative efficiency is independent of the output level and radial input reductions leave it unchanged, we contend that for non-homothetic technologies this is not the case because optimal input demands depend on the output targeted by the firm, as does the inequality between marginal rates of substitution and market prices—allocative inefficiency. We demonstrate that a correct definition of technical efficiency corresponds to the directional distance function because its flexibility ensures that allocative efficiency is kept unchanged through movements in the input production possibility set when solving technical inefficiency, and therefore the associated cost reductions can be solely—and rightly—ascribed to technical-engineering-improvements. The new methodology allowing for a consistent decomposition of cost inefficiency is illustrated resorting to simple examples of non-homothetic production functions.     

Existence of an equilibrium for infinite horizon economies with and without complete information

This work proves the existence of an equilibrium for an infinite horizon economy where trade takes place sequentially over time. There exist two types of agents: the first correctly anticipates all future contingent endogenous variables with complete information as in Radner [Radner, R. (1972). Existence of equilibrium of plans, prices and price expectations in a sequence of markets. Econometrica, 289–303] and the second has exogenous expectations about the future environment as in Grandmont [Grandmont, J. M. (1977). Temporary general equilibrium theory. Econometrica, 535–572] and information based on the current and past aggregate variables including those which are private knowledge. Agents with exogenous expectations may have inconsistent optimal plans but have predictive beliefs in the context of Blackwell and Dubbins [Blackwell, D., Dubins, L. (1962). Merging of opinions with increasing information. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 882–886] with probability transition rules based on all observed variables. We provide examples of this framework applied to models of differential information and environments exhibiting results of market selection and convergence of an equilibrium. The existence result can be used to conclude that, by adding the continuity assumption on the probability transition rules, we obtain the existence of an equilibrium for some models of differential information and incomplete markets.     

Identifying bank outputs and inputs with a directional technology distance function

The bank efficiency literature lacks an agreed definition of bank outputs and inputs. This is problematic given the long-standing controversy concerning the status of deposits, but also because bank efficiency estimates are known to be affected by the inclusion of additional outputs such as non-traditional (fee-based) activities or risk measures. This paper proposes a data-driven identification of bank outputs and inputs using the directional technology distance function. While previous applications of this tool used symmetric expansion or contraction directions, we focus on a set of orthogonal directions, each corresponding to an assumption on the input/output status of an individual variable. These directions correspond to a set of different specifications, whose estimated coefficients can be used to determine the input or output status of all variables except the regressand. Our empirical analysis revealed a very consistent pattern across the alternative specifications estimated. There is strong evidence that customer deposits are an input, and that non-performing loans are an important undesirable output. Finally, the orthogonal expansions/contractions we consider avoid the simultaneity problem raised by the “convenient normalization” commonly used to impose linear homogeneity in stochastic frontier estimation.     

A mechanism design approach to an optimal contract under ex ante and ex post private information

This paper applies a mechanism design approach to the problem of an optimal contract when one party has both ex ante and ex post private information. With ex ante private information added to the costly state verification environment, the timing of the contract is important in achieving the first-best investment decision. It is shown that an optimal contract involves precommitment, a feature often observed in many bank loan contracts. An optimal contract thus obtained is interpreted as t he golden parachute, a device providing incentives to managers not to distort the running of a firm to fight takeover bids. In the process of characterizing an optimal contract, the revelation principle is re-examined. Received: 12 April 1996 / Accepted: 3 December 1997     

Existence of equilibria in economies with externalities and non-convexities in an infinite-dimensional commodity space

We prove an equilibrium existence theorem for economies with externalities, general types of non-convexities in the production sector, and infinitely many commodities. The consumption sets, the preferences of the consumers, and the production possibilities are represented by set-valued mappings to take into account the external effects. The firms set their prices according to general pricing rules which are supposed to have bounded losses and may depend upon the actions of the other economic agents. The commodity space is L_∞(M,M,μ), the space of all μ-essentially bounded M-measurable functions on M.As for our existence result, we consider the framework of Bewley (1972). However, there are four major problems in using this technique. To overcome two of these difficulties, we impose strong lower hemi-continuity assumptions upon the economies. The remaining problems are removed when the finite economies are large enough.Our model encompasses previous works on the existence of general equilibria when there are externalities and non-convexities but the commodity space is finite dimensional and those on general equilibria in non-convex economies with infinitely many commodities when no external effect is taken into account.     

Taxation in an economy with private provision of public goods

This paper analyses the effects of taxation and subsidies in an economy with private provision of a public good. It is shown that in a situation where all individuals contribute, taxation affects the equilibrium allocation if and only if at least one individual's voluntary contribution to the public good has an impact on the aggregate tax payments of the others. We then consider linear nonneutral tax-subsidy schemes and analyse efficiency and uniqueness of the resulting Nash equilibria. We show that an efficient Nash equilibrium, where all individuals contribute, will in general not be unique, and establish a non-uniformity property which a tax-subsidy scheme must fulfil in order to induce a unique interior equilibrium that is efficient. Throughout the paper it is assumed that individuals fully understand and take into account the government's budget constraint. Received: 3 November 1997 / Accepted: 23 March 1999     

承包型CM模式与跨流域调水工程建设管理

在分析跨流域长距离调水工程特点的基础上,提出对大型跨流域调水工程采用承包型CM模式并分析其应用优点和条件。     

Competition for private capital and central grants: the case of Japanese industrial parks

Local governments invest in public infrastructure to develop their regions. When they depend on intergovernmental grants for local development and have opportunities to lobby upper-level governments for such grants, horizontal intergovernmental competition in lobbying activity may emerge in addition to competition over public infrastructure. This paper empirically examines the existence of these interactions between Japanese localities, by using data on the value of industrial parks as infrastructure provisions and on personnel interchanges between the central and local governments as a measure of lobbying activity. Our results suggest that a Japanese local government’s choice of the size of industrial parks and its invitation to central officers to act as a director on loan are positive responses to the neighboring local government’s policy choices. As the value of the industrial parks in a district is affected by the neighboring districts’ lobby activities and their industrial park values, we can interpret these results as evidence of inter-regional competition in these two dimensions, rather than control by the central government in this unitary state.     

A goal programming-discriminant function approach to the estimation of an empirical production function based on DEA results

This paper describes a new frontier estimation procedure which relies on results obtained from Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The paper reviews some of the earlier works in this area and points out potential difficulties with them. It further suggests ways to validate such developments. A procedure is constructed on the basis of a Goal Programming (GP)-Discriminant Function model developed in stages during the 1980s. A numerical example is used to illustrate the proposed procedure. Then, an extensive simulation in which the GP-based procedure is compared to three regression-based techniques is presented. The simulation results clearly indicate the superiority of the proposed technique over the regression alternatives.     

Existence of marginal pricing equilibria in economies with externalities and non-convexities

We consider a general equilibrium model with externalities and non-convexities in production. The consumption sets, the preferences of the consumers and the production possibilities are represented by set-valued mappings to take into account possibility of external effects. There is no convexity assumption on the correspondences of production. We propose a definition of the marginal pricing rule, which generalizes the one used in the model without externality and, which satisfies a continuity assumption with respect to the external effect.We prove the existence of general equilibria under assumptions which allow us to encompass together the works on economies with externalities and convex conditional production sets, and those on marginal pricing equilibria in economies without externalities. We provide examples to illustrate the definition of the marginal pricing rule and to show the difference with the standard case.     

Small open economies and external shocks: an application of Bayesian global vector autoregression model

Quality & Quantity - This study assesses the impact of external shocks on select small open economies (SOEs) using the Bayesian variant of the global vector autoregression model with time...     

A study of proportionality and robustness in economies with a commonly owned technology

Abstract. Studying one-input one-output economies, we say that an allocation is proportional if the input-output ratio is identical among agents and if each agent maximizes her welfare given this ratio. We propose three equity axioms based on this definition, and we use them to compare the main solutions to this simple equity problem. We also combine efficiency, robustness axioms and our proportionality axioms to characterize two solutions. Received: 11 June 1997 / Accepted: 26 May 2000