Human extinction scenario frameworks

It is a natural human instinct to wonder about the future. Some have long speculated about the various events that could potentially lead to the extinction of the human race. While a dark subject, the point of exploring factors that could drastically impact the ability to sustain life on our planet has utility in preparing for events of this nature. It is in the spirit of learning how to change before catastrophe strikes that such wondering occurs.     

Beliefs about human extinction

This paper presents the results of a web-based survey about futures issues. Among many questions, respondents were asked whether they believe humans will become extinct. Forty-five percent of the almost 600 respondents believe that humans will become extinct. Many of those holding this believe felt that humans could become extinct within 500–1000 years. Others estimated extinction 5000 or more years into the future. A logistic regression model was estimated to explore the bases for this belief. It was found that people who describe themselves a secular are more likely to hold this belief than people who describe themselves as being Protestant. Older respondents and those who believe that humans have little control over their future also hold this belief. In addition, people who are more apt to think about the future and are better able to imagine potential futures tend to also believe that humans will become extinct.     

Futures literacy: A hybrid strategic scenario method

What stories do we tell about the future? This article develops a topology of storytelling about the future, which is used to develop a definition of ‘futures literacy’. It goes on to outline a hybrid strategic scenario method for acquiring the capacities of futures literacy.     

Obligations to future generations and acceptable risks of human extinction

This paper addresses the question, ‘what is the acceptable risk of human extinction?’ Three qualitative obligations to future generations - The Fairness Criterion, The Unfinished Business Criterion, and the Maintaining Options Criterion - are used to produce quantitative estimates of the acceptable risk. The resulting acceptable risks are all at or below 10⁻²⁰, a very stringent standard.     

An updated scenario typology

Scenario analysis has evolved notably in its 50-year history and today there is a large diversity in the scenarios that are developed. Establishing an overview of this diversity would be useful for the further development of scenario method. However, such an overview cannot be generated without the use of a shared understanding of the typical features of scenario development and of the relevant terminology. A broadly shared scenario typology can provide this common understanding but existing typologies do not capture the diversity of scenario types. To this end we propose an updated typology, the presentation of which is the focus of this paper. We also explain how the typology was tested for its robustness in a comparative analysis of recent scenario projects.     

Pricing options on scenario trees

We examine valuation procedures that can be applied to incorporate options in scenario-based portfolio optimization models. Stochastic programming models use discrete scenarios to represent the stochastic evolution of asset prices. At issue is the adoption of suitable procedures to price options on the basis of the postulated discrete distributions of asset prices so as to ensure internally consistent portfolio optimization models. We adapt and implement two methods to price European options in accordance with discrete distributions represented by scenario trees and assess their performance with numerical tests. We consider features of option prices that are observed in practice. We find that asymmetries and/or leptokurtic features in the distribution of the underlying materially affect option prices; we quantify the impact of higher moments (skewness and excess kurtosis) on option prices. We demonstrate through empirical tests using market prices of the S&P500 stock index and options on the index that the proposed procedures consistently approximate the observed prices of options under different market regimes, especially for deep out-of-the-money options.     

Improving decision-making with scenario planning

Decision makers struggle with four important contributors to decision failure, namely, 1) bounded rationality, 2) a tendency to consider only external variables, 3) the stickiness and friction of information and knowledge, and 4) mental models that include decision premises or policies. Whether independent or combined, these decision problems can form the ultimate in decision error—folly. The four problems in decision-making are reviewed in detail and scenario planning is posited as a tool for preventing the impact of each, ultimately with an aim of avoiding folly.     

Directions in scenario planning literature - A review of the past decades

This paper provides a systematized overview of patterns in the scenario planning literature published in the last decades. Recently, scenario planning has enjoyed a revival, apparent in the ‘boom’ in published research on the matter. Consequently, a major issue that needs to be addressed is how to organize the literature along precise lines. A number of reviews that describe the current status of the body of literature and knowledge on scenario planning have made attempts to respond to such requirements. These studies agree that systematizing the existing literature is a necessary step in developing the field. This paper aims to contribute to this purpose. The review of the academic literature here conducted is thought to be useful for both academics and practitioners. For researchers, this systematic overview will be constructive not only in providing an analysis of the directions of published research but also in setting up a research agenda for the future. For managers and practitioners, it provides a clear outline of firm-related articles and discusses their contribution from a managerial point of view. It also raises awareness with regard to future analytical methods, and in particular, to scenario planning and its potential contribution to the competitiveness of firms. The research was carried out under the research Project Enterprise of the Future of the University of Aveiro.     

World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race

This paper examines the foundation for two scenarios of the future depicting how human civilization might destroy itself and possibly bring about the extinction of the human race in the process. The scenarios are based upon the two human-generated “fires” deeply ingrained within industrial civilization: (1) the nuclear “fire” of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and their automated “launch on warning” alert systems and (2) the slow burning “fire” of global warming and runaway climate change. This paper also examines obstacles that are currently preventing the necessary first steps towards solving these problems.     

Perceived Environmental Uncertainty in scenario planning

Scenario planning is a strategy tool with growing popularity in both academia and practical situations. Current practices of scenario planning are largely based on existing literature which utilises scenario planning to develop strategies for the future, primarily considering the assessment of perceived macro-external environmental uncertainties. However there is a body of literature hitherto ignored by scenario planning researchers, which suggests that Perceived Environmental Uncertainty (PEU) influences the micro-external as well as the internal environment of the organisation. This paper reviews the most dominant theories on scenario planning process and PEU, developing three propositions for the practice of scenario planning process. Furthermore, it shows how these propositions can be integrated in the scenario planning process in order to improve the development of strategy.     

Changing organizational culture with scenario planning

This paper explores scenario planning as a tool to help change organizational culture. Changing the culture of the organization to adapt to changes in the environment is an important concern for most organizations—yet this change is often reactive. The authors present scenario planning as a proactive tool for developing alternative, possible cultures as an initial step toward effecting change. The following describes and clarifies the relationships between scenario planning and the cultural framework, along with research suggestions to determine the validity of this argument.     

Exploring client scenarios associated with scenario planning

All scenario planning projects have a ‘client’ and one of the most challenging tasks facing a scenario planner is the client's role or position in the way projects are conceptualized, delivered and received. The scenario planner has to establish and manage a ‘successful client relationship’—but what actually constitutes that for a scenario planning project?The client acts as the conduit between the scenario planner and the organization for which the scenario planning project is being undertaken.The ‘client as conduit’ implies several challenges for the scenario planner including:

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The client's awareness and understanding of scenario planning as a method for their organization to learn from the future [1].

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The client's level of commitment to learning from the future.

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The size and context of the scenario planning project.

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The position of the client within a network of people and/or resources required to run a scenario planning project.

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The client's involvement or position within the scenario building team created in the project.

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The benefits and risks accruing to the client through the execution of the scenario planning project.

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The client organization's capacity to act strategically; its power to perform.

This paper will explore, through storytelling, different pictures of client relationships associated with scenario planning. The stories are developed from a deep and extensive well of scenario practitioner and consulting experience over the last 15 years to explore and discuss these client issues, and how clients for scenario planning projects have evolved, and how they may enhance or restrict scenario planning projects in the future.     

Broadband development in the European Union to 2012—A virtuous circle scenario

Along with many national governments, the European Commission has pushed broadband to the fore of social and economic policies in recent years. It has aligned broadband developments with furthering information society and knowledge economy developments.This paper presents a positive scenario for broadband-related developments in the European Union area from 2009 to 2012. The scenario, the iNetWorked Society, is one of four developed in an extensive multi-country project funded by the European Commission under the 6th Framework Programme.Before examining the scenario, however, the paper places into a critical perspective the EU's legacy of broadband policy to date. It highlights the limitations of technology-centred policy frames and broadband strategies, which privilege supply-side infrastructure and neglect demand-side issues of applications, uses and users. Such policy frames have been associated with great variations in the level of broadband rollout, take-up and use across Member States.The paper then outlines the socio- and macro-economic conditions that need to be in place in Europe for the positive scenario of the iNetworked Society to be realised. The iNetWorked Society comprises a plausible, internally consistent scenario for developments in a number of broadband-related areas: broadband adoption, e-business, e-work, e-government and digital content. It is based on a virtuous circle of technological, economic and socio-political developments, including strong economic growth, high broadband penetration, and high social engagement with ICTs.     

The critical role of history in scenario thinking: Augmenting causal analysis within the intuitive logics scenario development methodology

The historian Eric Hobsbawm stated that ‘The safest empirical generalization about history is still that nobody heeds its obvious lessons much’. Whether at a macroeconomic level or within individual organisations there are numerous examples of this, such as the economic crash of 2008, the causes of which had many parallels with those that caused the great depression 80 years previously. On the other hand however, overly-relying on the past as a guide to the future has its own obvious dangers—not least that important future events may have no past precedent. As such, the present paper firstly provides a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of using the past as a guide to the future. It then examines the role of history in scenario work, arguing that history should receive greater emphasis as part of the scenario planning process. We suggest changes to the standard Intuitive Logics (IL) approach to scenario planning which would render learning from history a more central component of the scenario process, in contrast to its current peripheral role. Rather than diminishing scenario planning’s ability to facilitate a consideration of how the future may differ from the past, we show how a greater emphasis on history can enhance consideration of the causality of future change. An adapted IL that has more emphasis on historical analysis can augment scenario planning’s effectiveness as a tool for consideration of the future.     

Stress scenario generation for solvency and risk management

We derive worst-case scenarios in a life insurance model in the case where the interest rate and the various transition intensities are mutually dependent. Examples of this dependence are that (a) surrender intensities and interest rates are high at the same time, (b) mortality intensities of a policyholder as active and disabled, respectively, are low at the same time, and (c) mortality intensities of the policyholders in a portfolio are low at the same time. The set from which the worst-case scenario is taken reflects the dependence structure and allows us to relate the worst-case scenario-based reserve, qualitatively, to a Value-at-Risk-based calculation of solvency capital requirements. This brings out perspectives for our results in relation to qualifying the standard formula of Solvency II or using a scenario-based approach in internal models. Our results are powerful for various applications and the techniques are non-standard in control theory, exactly because our worst-case scenario is deterministic and not adapted to the stochastic development of the portfolio. The formalistic results are exemplified in a series of numerical studies.     

Causal mapping and scenario building with multiple organisations

Thinking and planning for the future is critical in a competitive business world. Scenarios are a common technique for investigating the future, but can be time consuming and challenging to develop, particularly when more than a single organisation is involved. An approach is presented here which shifts the focus of scenario building from the company level to the sector level, whereby a range of organisations engage collectively on a topic of mutual importance. A rapid technique was developed, with simple scenarios being constructed in 2-4 h. This process was implemented in 13 multi-organisational workshops with participants from the construction and building industries, sectors which are traditionally short-term and reactive in their outlook. The resulting feedback, observations and experiences are discussed, together with examples of how the resultant scenarios have been applied. An example of causal map reflection (exposing an individual's causal map to others) is also presented, described and critiqued. It was found that the process was successful in engaging participants in thinking about and discussing the future, appreciating the interconnectivities of the related issues, and understanding the collective implications of their potential decisions, as well as facilitating the socialisation of participant thinking and the construction of collective futures.     

Changing lifestyles and consumption patterns in developing countries: A scenario analysis for China and India

China and India are the world's largest developing economies and also two of the most populous countries. China, which now has more than 1.3 billion people, is expected to grow to more than 1.4 billion by 2050, and India with a population of 1 billion will overtake China to be the most populous country with about 1.6 billion population. These two countries are home to 37% of the world's population today. In addition, China and India have achieved notable success in their economic development characterised by a high rate of gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the last two decades. Together the two countries account already for almost a fifth of world GDP.The most direct and significant result of economic growth in India and China is the amazing improvement in quality of life (or at least spending power) for an increasing share of the population. The populations of both the countries have experienced a transition from ‘poverty’ to ‘adequate food and clothing’; today growing parts of the population are getting closer to ‘well to do lifestyles’. These segments of the society are not satisfied any more with enough food and clothes, but are also eager to obtain a quality life of high nutrient food, comfortable living, health care and other quality services.The theme of this paper is to analyse how the major drivers contributed to the environmental consequences in the past, and to take a forward look at the environmental impacts of these driving forces in China and India. The paper identifies population, affluence and technology to be the major driving forces in environmental pollution for these two countries then applies the simple equation of Impact=Population×Affluence×Technology, or I=PAT to evaluate the effects of changes in these drivers on CO₂ emissions.     

Stress testing credit risk: The Great Depression scenario

By employing Moody’s corporate default and rating transition data spanning the last 90 years we explore how much capital banks should hold against their corporate loan portfolios to withstand historical stress scenarios. Specifically, we will focus on the worst case scenario over the observation period, the Great Depression. We find that migration risk and the length of the investment horizon are critical factors when determining bank capital needs in a crisis. We show that capital may need to rise more than three times when the horizon is increased from 1 year, as required by current and future regulation, to 3 years. Increases are still important but of a lower magnitude when migration risk is introduced in the analysis. Further, we find that the new bank capital requirements under the so-called Basel 3 agreement would enable banks to absorb Great Depression-style losses. But, such losses would dent regulatory capital considerably and far beyond the capital buffers that have been proposed to ensure that banks survive crisis periods without government support.     

Public/private health care: The British scenario

The issue of public versus private health care is too often treated as an ideological issue, with each side unwilling to discuss common problems of cost containment and quality control which have to be faced, no matter what the financial framework. Thus, cost containment will worry the administrators of insurance funds just as much, if not more, than health service administrators. Health care is not, in the economist's sense, a perfect market; it cannot and does not remain unregulated. So what is at issue is whether regulation is carried out by government, by insurance companies, or by the professions, and what the balance between them shall be.

These and other lessons are drawn from a series of studies describing the workings of insurance systems in a number of countries, in Europe, as well as the United States, Canada and Australia. The findings of the book ‐ The Public/Private Mix for Health, edited by Gordon McLachlan and Alan Maynard, and published this autumn by the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust ‐ are too rich to be summarised here. What follows is an extract from the final chapter containing the editors’ own reflections on the material they have brought together.