自组织视角下基于环保优势的企业环境战略研究

文章从自组织理论视角,探索国际优秀环保企业如何将环保("绿色")因素融入公司战略,激励创新,创造价值并构建企业竞争优势。研究认为,目前企业环境管理行为已进入自组织阶段。具备环保优势的中外企业大都在品牌价值、自然资源、客户依赖、人才竞争、监管压力、环保信誉等方面有着类似的共同点;文章从构建环保竞争优势出发,基于产业角度和资源角度考虑,分别提出了反应战略、适应战略、防御战略、超前战略的企业环境战略;并给出了不同类型企业的环境战略选择。     

欧盟产业重大科技专项的组织实施

本文介绍了欧盟通过公私合作(PPP)方式,在战略性产业领域组织实施重大科技专项的政策背景,阐述了具有代表性的联合技术计划(JTI)和契约型公私合作专项(Contractual PPP)的遴选机制、治理体系和最新发展,并提出了其对中国组织实施产业重大科技项目的若干借鉴意义。     

美国信息高速公路计划的思路及进展

美国国家信息基础设施计划(俗称“信息高速公路”计划,以下简称为NII)出台已一年有余。一年来,国内各界对NII的介绍与讨论似乎都只专注于它的技术问题。而在美国人看来,技术只是NII的一个侧面,而且远非主要的侧面。本文试图介     

基于组织协同的战略实施整合模型

文章从组织协同的角度对当前流行的主要战略实施理论和模型进行了综合分析,提出战略实施的内核可以整合为战略系统、运营系统、人员系统等3大核心要素系统;同时战略实施还需要适应企业的内部生态背景和组织环境,包括4个主要因素:战略领导力、企业文化、变革管理、公司政治。成功的战略实施应该是其内核的内在一致性与组织适应性的高效统合。由此建立的战略实施整合模型对企业提高战略执行力和战略实施效果具有重要的现实指导作用。     

吉林围绕结构调整实施技术创新能力提升计划

为促进产业结构调整,吉林省将着力实施创新能力提升计划,这项计划简称为"1511"计划,即推动100种重大新产品规模化生产、推进50项重点产业技术研发、提升100户重点企业技术创新能力、推动10个产业公共技术研发中心建设.     

政府信息化的社会责任和主要问题

政府信息化起源于美国克林顿政府在1993年实施的“国家信息基础设施”(NII)计划,并很快为其他国家所认同,英国政府于1994年开始电子政府的建设,日本政府也于1994年提出了构建高速国家网络的“维也纳”计划。我国政府于1993年底确立了“实施信息化工程、以信息化带动产业发展”的国家信息化指导方针,先后启动了金卡、金桥、金关等一系列信息化重大工程,并于1999年底正式成立国家信息化领导小组。     

2004年夏季产业组织与战略管理国际研讨会简述

2004年夏季产业组织与战略管理国际研讨会于2004年6月14-15日在北京大学光华管理学院召开。 这次研讨会由北京大学光华管理学院武常岐教授、南加州大学谭国富教授以及新加坡国立大学方博亮教授组织。由北京大学光华管理学院战略管理系主办。来自美国、加拿大和中国大陆、中国香港、中国台湾等地的20余位产业组织和战略管理领域的学者就产业组织理论、实证和应用以及中国转型经济下的企业和政府行为等若干前沿问题进行了深入研讨。     

产业网络环境下企业跨组织知识整合的内在机理

全球环境的动荡变化要求产业网络的各个组成部分不断整合互动以形成协同效应.产业网络环境下企业的跨组织知识整合对于促进企业创新及获得竞争优势至关重要.本文在对产业网络与"知识"资源的关系以及"知识整合"内涵分析的基础上,提出了产业网络环境下企业跨组织知识整合的实现机制,并认为,产业网络环境下企业应高度重视跨组织知识整合问题,通过集成内外知识整合功能,营造知识整合环境与组织氛围,提高知识整合能力,建立并完善知识整合机制以获得持续发展.     

基于产业组织视角的资本结构研究综述

从学科交叉研究的角度,对基于产业组织理论的资本结构研究成果进行回顾,归纳了从产业特征、竞争战略、产品生命周期三个方面的最新研究成果和文献。得出结论,资本结构决策是企业基于产业特征、公司战略、产品市场竞争环境以及资本市场等诸因素所进行的综合选择。     

加大技术创新力度 促进高新技术产业化

近几年来,省委、省政府加大实施"科教兴鄂"战略的力度,并确定把推进技术创新,加速高新技术产业化作为实施"科教兴鄂"战略的突破口来抓,在增加投入、制定政策、优化环境等方面采取了一些重大举措,为我省技术创新,高新技术产业发展创造了良好的发展环境.     

Decentralized planning in a market economy? On the nature of Coase’s research program

By drawing attention to the planning islands of firm organizations in a market economy, Coase makes us believe that besides the price mechanism, there is another means of coordination, namely deliberate coordination. With the firm as an exemplary case of deliberate coordination was introduced into landscape of economics, Coase initiated a new research program which is to inquire into how efficiency is (and could be) achieved via various kinds of institutional arrangements, from the price mechanism, to firms, to government regulations. This paper acknowledges the positive role Coase has played in drawing economists’ attention to the generally neglected field of organizational research. It criticizes, however, his research program for viewing the economy, or society, from the perspective of some concrete decision-making entity.     

Theories of the firm, competitive advantage and government policy

To improve the effectiveness of government policy, it is necessay to develop a good picture of what a firms in a knowledge-intensive economy is and does. In this paper, we have drawn on the recent surge of books and articles on the resource- and knowledge-based theories of the firm and their implications for competitive advantage. We would like to contribute to that discussion summarizing that debate and exploring the implications for government policy. In new theories of the firm, emphasis is placed on the crucial importance of knowledge, a production factor which is not easily imitated. Exampb of government policy which are based on these new inskhts are the recognition of the importance of demanding clients, the emphasis on the unique potential of the local business environment and the stimulation of transfer of knowledge between firms and networks instead of subsidizing project for knowledge development in isolated firms. A more realistic view of business behaviour will improve the effectiveness of policy, thereby generally improving the competitive position of firms.     

On the Sale of Production Rights and Firm Organization

It is argued that the owner of production rights may not be indifferent across organizational structures of producers. In particular, the owner may prefer to grant some or all of the rights to labor-managed firms. The reason is that such firms adopt a less competitive strategy and so generate more industry rent, which the owner can capture as fee payments. A mixed duopoly may be particularly attractive. The conflict between revenue-raising and the pursuit of efficiency as objectives of government privatization programs is highlighted, and the relevance to East European reform discussed.     

What Happened to the Japanese Model?

Japan's steep postwar growth was nested in a political economy built around producer‐oriented policies: by fostering the growth of large firms using the tools of industrial policy, the government could jumpstart development. Many large firms, and their employees, benefited indirectly from this growth program, and very small firms and industries not included in the growth model were compensated through preferential policies or subsidies. Japan's social contract evolved around this system, having as its centerpiece lifetime employment. The government spent more resources on supporting exporting industries and compensating domestic ones than on building a forward‐looking welfare system. Japan's decade‐long economic downturn marks a structural transition towards a postindustrial society. While excelling in producing tangibles, Japan has fallen behind in fostering modern industries, including services; the country also lacks a welfare system to handle increasing structural unemployment that this transition brings about. Without a commitment towards a welfare system and a welfare society, and a reorientation of the social contract towards citizens, Japan is unlikely to transition successfully.     

An evolutionary game theory approach to the dynamics of the labour market: A formal and informal perspective

A stylized fact of the labour market in developing countries is that it is highly segmented in informality. One of the main factors that induce workers and firms into informality is an excessive regulatory system that makes formal economy little attractive. This study aims to analyze the dynamics of workers and firms’ entrance and withdrawal of the formal and informal economy, assessing the impact of taxes by using an evolutionary game theory approach in which economic agents decide for one these markets according to the expected pay-off. Moreover, the optimal relation between regulatory and enforcement action by the government is evaluated.     

西部大开发税收优惠政策实施效果评估

本文通过对西部开发税收优惠政策与地区经济增长、企业生产经营行为以及地方财政收入关系的评估分析,认为西部开发税收优惠政策对经济增长具有明显促进作用,对企业资产利润率提高也具有显著正效应.但从2002年到2004年西部开发税收政策对西部经济增长促进效应不断降低.最主要的原因是政策涉及的垄断企业多,市场化企业少;能源开发、环境污染严重企业享受多,实现地方可持续发展企业享受少;优惠税额主要促进了中央大型能源开采垄断企业,大多数有利于西部地区经济可持续发展的支柱产业得不到有效支持.所以提出:西部开发税收优惠政策在覆盖面上应做有增有减,并做出延长政策时效等调整.     

University-firm-government interactions in a knowledge-importing economy: implications based on the creation of the solar photovoltaic industry in Taiwan

ABSTRACT

University-firm-government interactions on industry dynamics have been widely discussed, accentuating the role of the government and universities. However, a case study of the solar photovoltaic industry in Taiwan reveals that pioneering firms play a leading role in the creation of an industry in a knowledge-importing economy, whereas government and universities stimulate further growth of the industry. This industry dynamic among university-firm-government enriches triple helix studies and is important for firms intending to initiate an industry and policy-makers in the field of science and technology in knowledge-importing economies.     

低碳经济视角下的长三角地区发展策略研究

目前长三角地区的高碳发展模式受到越来越多的制约,在此背景下,发展低碳经济是长三角地区实现可持续发展的必然选择。本文从长三角地区发展低碳经济的机遇与挑战出发,选择碳税作为该地区发展低碳经济的切入点,应用博弈论方法,研究政府、企业、个体之间的矛盾,对三者在征收碳税情形下的策略进行分析,求解了非对称信息下各参与主体的纳什均衡,在此基础上提出了贯彻碳税政策的建议。本文的研究有助于从微观角度理解低碳经济下政府、企业、个体的行为,对于政府如何发展低碳经济具有借鉴意义。     

The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs, and Macroeconomic Growth

This articleanalyzes the links between the internal organization of the firmand macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth modelin which firms face agency costs due to the existence of asymmetriesof information and the formation of vertical collusions insidethose firms. To respond to the threat of collusion, optimal collusion-proofincentive contracts depend on the efficiency of collusive sidecontracting within organizations. Collusion affects thereforethe firms' profitability, the incentives to innovate, and, finally,the stationary equilibrium growth rate of the economy. On theother hand, when the growth rate is small, the prospects of long-termrelationships within firms increase the agents' incentives toinvest in a better collusive technology. We then discuss thetwo-way relationships between the structure of internal transactioncosts, organizational technologies, and macroeconomic growth.     

Government interventions and the size of the informal economy. The case of Iran (1971–2007)

Literature on the informal economy can mainly be divided into two different contrasting theories. According to the dual labor market theory (DLM), which considers the informal economy as a spare sector providing jobs for formally unemployed resources, unpleasant economic situations force people to act informally. Legalists, on the other hand, blame government interventions such as minimum wages or price control policies for pushing rent-seeking firms toward the shadows. This study using an Error-correction Multi-Indicators Multi-Causes (EMIMIC) model, a systematic method consisting of structural and measurement equations, shows that these two theories are complementary rather than substitutes for one another. While long-term trends are explained by legalists, DLM theory is also suitable for explaining short term changes. Iran’s economy in the period 1971–2007, which was characterized by government interventions, is chosen for this purpose. These interventions are measured by Principal Component Analysis. Finally, an index of the size of Iran’s informal economy is also reported.