Will Sub-Prime be a Twin Crisis for the United States?

We identify incentives generated by the Bretton Woods II system that may have contributed to the sub-prime liquidity crisis now working its way through the international monetary system. We then evaluate the persistent conjecture that the liquidity crisis is or will become a balance of payments crisis for the United States. Given that it happens, the additional costs associated with a sudden stop of net capital flows to the United States could be quite substantial. But we observe that emerging market governments have continued to acquire US assets even as yields have fallen, and the incentives for continuing to do so remain strong. Moreover, the Bretton Woods II system, which has clearly been the most resilient of the forces driving current markets, continues to generate low real interest rates in industrial countries and growth in emerging markets that will help limit the damage from the liquidity crisis.     

The purchasing power parity of Southeast Asian currencies: A time-varying coefficient approach

The economies of Southeast Asia have undergone several structural changes, including the Asian currency crisis, during the post-Bretton Woods era. We use a time-varying coefficient cointegration model to test for purchasing power parity (PPP) of Southeast Asian currencies and to track changes in purchasing power relationships over time. The main empirical findings are as follows. First, the stability of the relationship between exchange rates and price differentials is strongly rejected. Second, a major structural change occurs at the outbreak of the Asian currency crisis in 1997. Third, when the cointegration vector is allowed to vary with time, we find evidence of a cointegration relationship for four countries in terms of the US dollar and for four countries in terms of the Japanese yen. Therefore, it seems unlikely that Southeast Asian currencies form a “yen bloc.”     

Exchange rate volatility and the role of regional currency linkages: the ASEAN case

As the economies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have moved towards closer economic ties and trade integration in recent years, the establishment of exchange rate stability is becoming an important regional policy concern, particularly in the wake of the Asian currency crisis of 1997. This paper examines the exchange rate volatility of the currencies of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand between 1974 and 1999. Using variance decomposition (VDC) methods and impulse response functions, which are VAR-related estimation techniques, the study also investigates the regional currency linkages which may have played a role in transmitting exchange rate fluctuations. The results indicate that, in spite of the adoption of the crawling peg exchange regime following the breakup of the Bretton Woods system, all of the five ASEAN currencies experienced volatility, with the Indonesian rupiah posting the highest volatility level. The switch to de facto pegging against the US dollar in the mid-1980s helped to stabilize all ASEAN currencies with the exception of the Malaysian ringgit. Each of the five currencies became more susceptible to instabilities in other ASEAN currencies in the post-1985 period. Consistent with the experience of the Asian currency crisis, the Thai baht was the main channel through which regional currency fluctuations were transmitted.     

The Great Escape: The Multinational Trade Deficit in Historical Perspective

During the Bretton Woods era, the debate surrounding U.S. export sales versus U.S. multinational production focused primarily on the maintenance of pegged exchange rates and labor’s concern over the export of jobs. The collapse of Bretton Woods gave at least the hope that a decline in the dollar would expand exports and limit imports. Yet, the forty-year secular decline in the dollar has been one with a secular expansion of U.S. trade deficits. The older concerns of U.S. multinational sales competing with U.S. exports retain a current relevance. They help explain the unending nature of U.S. trade deficits.     

Price convergence in US cities: a cointegration approach with two structural breaks

This article investigates how the price indices of major cities of the US respond to the shock from a city and from monetary policy. We find that the crisis of Bretton Woods system in 1968 and the oil crisis in 1974 should be incorporated as structural breaks in monetary policy variables and price indices. Using cointegration technique with structural break in our aggregated data, we find that the average half-life is 1.75 years, which is closer to what some of others found in disaggregated data, and that the interest rate is an effective tool for controlling cities’ price in short run.     

Choice of Exchange Rate Regime: Currency Board (Hong Kong) or Monitoring Band (Singapore)?

Following the East Asian crisis, a number of observers have advocated that small and open economies in Asia adopt an irrevocably fixed regime. Such a hard peg, it is argued, signals greater commitment to rule out arbitrary exchange rate adjustments as well as the authorities’ willingness to subordinate domestic policy objectives such as output and employment growth to the maintenance of the pegged exchange rate. But is this a reasonable position to adopt? In order to answer this question, we consider and contrast the experiences of Hong Kong and Singapore. While both of these economies share a number of broad similarities, the former operates a US dollar–linked currency board arrangement and the latter maintains an adjustable peg in the form of a monitoring band arrangement with the central parity based on an undisclosed trade–weighted currency basket.     

BRETTON WOODS II STILL DEFINES THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM

Abstract.  In this paper we argue that net capital inflows to the USA did not cause the financial crisis that now engulfs the world economy. A crisis caused by such flows has been widely predicted but that crisis has not occurred. Indeed, the international monetary system still operates in the way described by the Bretton Woods II framework and is likely to continue to do so. Failure to properly identify the causes of the current crisis risks a rise in protectionism that could intensify and prolong the decline in economic activity around the world.     

Export growth slowdown and currency crisis: the Malaysian experience

A slowdown in export growth occurred in all East Asian economies that were affected by the Asian currency crisis. Misaligned exchange rates have been widely cited as a cause of the slowdown. In the Malaysian context at least a vulnerability to the downturn in the electronic cycle could also be a major factor leading to poor export performance. Using the US/yen dollar rate as a proxy for exchange rate misalignment and US total new orders for electronics as a proxy for global electronics demand, cointegration analysis was used to establish the likely causes of a slowdown in Malaysia's export performance. Empirical results suggest that a unique long-run relationship exists between all three variables. The policy implications of these results including exchange rate monitoring and export diversification are discussed in the conclusion.     

THE DOLLAR'S INTERNATIONAL ROLE

The dollar was the dominant international currency following World War II. However, as the international economy has changed in dramatic ways, the dollar's international role also has changed. Although the dollar's role has declined, it remains an important international currency. Furthermore, the world does not appear to be moving toward a tripolar monetary system. The dollar and the deutsche mark, not the yen, are the most important international currencies. The dollar's role has declined due to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, the decline in the relative importance of the United States, and deregulation of the world financial market.     

FEAR OF FLOATING IN EAST ASIA?

Abstract.  We examine the de facto exchange rate arrangements in eight East Asian countries during the post-Asian crisis period. The empirical results suggest that three countries adopted a hard peg or a peg with capital account restrictions, whereas five countries moved toward a more flexible exchange rate arrangement in the post-crisis period. Three of these five countries (Korea, Indonesia and Thailand) achieved a level of exchange rate flexibility close to the level accomplished in a free floater such as Australia. These results suggest that 'fear of floating' in East Asia is not prevalent in the post-crisis period, supporting the bipolar view of the optimal exchange rate regime.     

The East Asian Dollar Standard, Fear of Floating, and Original Sin

Before the crisis of 1997/98, the East Asian economies—except for Japan but including China—pegged their currencies to the US dollar. To avoid further turmoil, the IMF argues that these currencies should float more freely. However, the authors’ econometric estimations show that the dollar's predominant weight in East Asian currency baskets has returned to its pre‐crisis levels. By 2002, the day‐to‐day volatility of each country's exchange rate against the dollar had again become negligible. Most governments were rapidly accumulating a “war chest” of official dollar reserves, which portends that this exchange rate stabilization will come to extend over months or quarters. From the doctrine of “original sin” applied to emerging‐market economies, the authors argue that this fear of floating is entirely rational from the perspective of each individual country. And their joint pegging to the dollar benefits the East Asian dollar bloc as a whole, although Japan remains an important outlier.     

THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES ON REAL EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY: EVIDENCE BASED ON A NEW DATASET

Do alternative exchange rate regimes affect short‐term real exchange rate volatility differently? The existing empirical evidence is quite mixed with slightly more papers supporting that they do. We show that such lack of consensus is mainly due to current literature limitations regarding the measurement of real exchange rates (RERs), the identification of exchange rate regimes (ERRs), and the control for the incidence of real and nominal shocks. To address these limitations, we construct a novel monthly dataset for 63 countries over the period 1946–2007, which includes market‐determined multilateral RER and a proxy for terms of trade. We find that ERRs indeed affect short‐term real exchange rate volatility differently. While the evidence is generally consistent with Mussa's sticky prices argument, we find that for nonadvanced countries in post‐Bretton Woods there exists a “U‐shape nominal flexibility puzzle of RER.” We also find evidence of a “short‐run RER volatility puzzle.” Having controlled for the incidence of real and nominal shocks, nonadvanced countries' RER volatility remains between 25% and 150% greater than that of the advanced economies. Moreover, the key literature finding that short‐term RER volatility is higher in Bretton Woods (BW) than in post‐Bretton Woods (PBW) for industrialized countries vanishes when using market‐determined multilateral RER instead of official bilateral RER. (JEL F31, F33, F41)     

A Tribute to Hyman P. Minsky

In this article, we examine financial crises after the Bretton Woods period using a new virulence index. After summarizing financial crises after Bretton Woods, we analyze aspects of four separate crises in a virulence index. The index includes measures of contagion, as well as impacts on economic, financial and social indicators. We find that financial crises have increased in virulence over time.     

东亚美元本位、浮动恐惧和原罪

概要亚洲金融危机以前 ,包括中国在内的东亚国家———除了日本———都把本国的货币与美元挂钩。为了避免进一步的混乱 ,国际货币基金组织曾建议这些国家的汇率应该进一步自由浮动。可是 ,我们的分析表明 ,到目前为止 ,美元在东亚国家的货币篮子里依然占据绝对比重 ,也就是说 ,东亚国家的汇率制度基本上又回到了危机以前。到 2 0 0 2年 ,每一个东亚国家货币对美元的每日波幅已经非常微小 ,以至于可以忽略不计。同时 ,大多数东亚国家迅速积累了作为“战争基金”的官方外汇储备 ,这预示着汇率稳定将从每日延续到每月和每个季度。从“原罪”(…     

TOWARD A REGIONAL EXCHANGE RATE REGIME IN EAST ASIA

Abstract.  Deepening market-driven economic integration in East Asia makes intraregional exchange rate across the region increasingly desirable and necessary. The paper suggests that East Asia's emerging economies begin to choose a currency basket as a monetary policy anchor to enable all East Asian currencies to collectively appreciate vis-à-vis the US dollar, while maintaining intraregional rate stability, in the event of surges of capital inflows or a rapid unwinding of global payments imbalances. Following this initial step, East Asia may agree on more rigid intraregional exchange rate stabilization schemes through, for example, an Asian Snake or an Asian Exchange Rate Mechanism.     

Is the crisis problem growing more severe?

The crisis problem is one of the dominant macroeconomic features of our age. Its prominence suggests questions like the following: Are crises growing more frequent? Are they becoming more disruptive? Are economies taking longer to recover? These are fundamentally historical questions, which can be answered only by comparing the present with the past. To this end, this paper develops and analyses a data base spanning 120 years of financial history. We find that crisis frequency since 1973 has been double that of the Bretton Woods and classical gold standard periods and is rivalled only by the crisis-ridden 1920s and 1930s. History thus confirms that there is something different and disturbing about our age. However, there is little evidence that crises have grown longer or output losses have become larger. Crises may have grown more frequent, in other words, but they have not obviously grown more severe. Our explanation for the growing frequency and chronic costs of crises focuses on the combination of capital mobility and the financial safety net, including the implicit insurance against exchange risk provided by an ex ante credible policy of pegging the exchange rate, which encourages banks and corporations to accumulate excessive foreign currency exposures. We also provide policy recommendations for restoring stability and growth.
— Michael Bordo, Barry Eichengreen, Daniela Klingebiel and Maria Soledad Martinez-Peria     

Testing the relative purchasing power parity hypothesis: the case of Korea

This study examines the relative purchasing power parity (PPP) hypothesis using the data from the Korean won–US dollar and the Korean won–Japanese yen foreign exchange markets. We extract proxies for inflation from stock market returns of Korea, the United States and Japan based on the method used by Chowdhry, Roll and Xia in 2005. We explicitly test the relative PPP hypothesis in light of the short-run price volatility using monthly, bimonthly and quarterly data from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2012. Our findings suggest that the empirical test results from the entire sample period do not support the relative PPP hypothesis. However, the results from the sample period excluding the Asian Financial Crisis period show that the relative PPP hypothesis holds for the Korean won–US dollar market with a moderate magnitude of inflation impact, but not for the Korean won–Japanese yen market. Abrupt changes in exchange rates during the crisis period may have affected the relationship between inflation and exchange rates. This result also suggests that factors other than inflation might have affected the Korean won–Japanese yen exchange rate.     

中国均衡实际有效汇率:一个总量一般均衡分析

亚洲金融危机时期中国实行事实上的盯住美元制度 ,同时亚洲各国的汇率水平进行了重新调整。本文探讨在亚洲金融危机以前及危机期间中国实际有效汇率的“均衡”水平。假定一系列不同的贸易差额 ,我们运用扩展了的Devarajan Lewis Robinson三商品一般均衡模型估计均衡实际有效汇率的不同时间路径。模型的关键要素是要有进口品和出口品价格指数的时间序列资料。鉴于这些价格指数从其他渠道无法获得 ,作者利用贸易数字构造了这些指数。研究发现在亚洲金融危机之前的 4年内中国的实际有效汇率低于均衡汇率 ,这部分地缘于外汇储备的快速累积。与事实相反 ,如果假设在此期间 ,每年不超过 1 0 %的出口收入转化为外汇储备 ,则中国的实际有效汇率将会比现在高 5%到 1 2 %     

Global dynamics,capabilities and the crisis

The financial crisis started in 2007–8, initially in the US, but its consequences have been felt throughout the global economy. However, its effects were far from uniform. While parts of Asia and Africa continued to grow fast, Europe experienced a large set back. This paper emphasizes three important factors: differences across countries in technological development; differences in capacities to exploit the opportunities offered by technology; and differences in the ability to compete in international market. A formal model, based on this approach, is developed and applied to data for 100 countries in the period 1997–2012. Empirical indicators reflecting the various factors are developed, a dataset constructed and econometric estimates of the model performed. The results are used to explore the factors behind the slowdown in economic growth, with a particular emphasis on the continuing stagnation in Europe. A major factor turns out to be the increased financialization of the economy. The negative effect of the growth of finance prior to the crisis is especially pronounced for the countries that suffered most during the crisis.