The cost of firms’ debt financing and the global financial crisis

We provide an assessment of the determinants of the risk premium paid by non-financial corporations on long-term bonds. By looking at 5500 issues over the period 2005–2012, we find that in recent years the sovereign debt market turbulence has been a major driver of corporate risk. Compared with the three-year period 2005–2007 before the global financial crisis, in the years 2010–2012 Italian, Spanish and Portuguese firms paid on average between 70 and 120 basis points of additional premium due to the negative spillovers from the sovereign debt crisis, while German firms received a discount of 40 basis points.     

The microstructure of fear,the Fama–French factors and the global financial crisis of 2007 and 2008

We analyze minute by minute equity price data from 1 August 2005 to 31 October 2008 to study the relationship between the three sources of systematic risk in Fama and French's (1993) model and the market's expectation of total risk as represented by the VIX (the “fear factor”). Our findings confirm the predicted relationship between the equity risk-premium and risk (Merton, 1980). We find that the size-premium is driven by investors who are flying-to-quality (Abel, 1988; Barsky, 1989). We also find that investors became increasingly sensitive to changes in the VIX during the global financial crisis.     

An accounting revolution? The financialisation of standard setting

This paper analyses the political-economic content of the recent ‘revolutionary’ shift in financial accounting rules for listed companies, specifically the rise of IFRS and fair value. It connects this shift to the socio-economic changes that are currently being discussed in the literature on financialisation, e.g. the rise of shareholder value and the proprietary view of the firm. Two ideal-typical accounting systems are constructed on the basis of normative accounting theory and extant standards – historical cost accounting (HCA) and fair value accounting (FVA). The ‘accounting revolution’ of the past 10–15 years can be understood as a qualitative shift from HCA to FVA. It is further argued that these ideal-typical systems are related to different circuits or forms of capital – productive and money capital respectively – and to the particular perspective that these afford on the, capitalist firm. Inasmuch as financialisation is related to the circuit of money capital one can make sense of the rise to prominence of FVA, which represents the dominance of a financial view of the firm in the field of financial accounting. Throughout this paper, however, the limits to financialisation are also highlighted and traced back to the ineradicable manifestation of the circuit of productive capital.     

International income risk-sharing and the global financial crisis of 2008–2009

We examine the impact of the global financial crisis on the degree of international income and consumption risk-sharing among industrial economies using returns on cross-border portfolio holdings (e.g., debt, equity, FDI). We split the returns from the net foreign holdings as receipts (inflows) and payments (outflows) to investigate which of the two sides exhibited the greater resilience for income risk-sharing during the recent crisis. First, we find that debt delivered better risk-sharing than equity, mainly reflecting the deficit deterioration in EMU countries during the post-crisis period. FDI, by contrast, did not correspond to noticeable risk diversification. Second, separating output shocks into positive and negative components reveals that debt holding receipts (equity liability payments) performed better under negative (positive) realizations of the shock variable. Third, the unwinding of capital flows resulted in a sharp fall in income dis-smoothing via the debt liability channel in the new EU countries.     

The global financial crisis—Market misconduct and regulation from a behavioral view

This paper explores the problem of the global financial crisis of 2008–9, using a behavioral perspective to examine in some detail the issue of governance failures. These failures are evident in the inadequate oversight/regulation provided by US financial market regulators, as well as the inability of financial market participants to adequately judge and assign risk measures to key financial instruments. In total, five elements of behavioral finance are shown to characterize the crisis. The paper shows how specific adjustments in government policy (dealing with market structural imperfections) and company governance (dealing mainly with risk management) can respond to the key elements of the crisis. It also points out that future financial crises cannot be avoided, so that mitigation is the only remedy to deal with such phenomena.     

The impact of the global financial crisis on the cross-currency linkage of LIBOR–OIS spreads

This article examines the impact of global financial crisis on cross-currency linkage of the LIBOR–OIS spread, a financial stress measure in interbank markets. The impulse response analysis is conducted in a multivariate setting, adopting the bias-corrected bootstrap as a means of statistical inference. The overall evidence suggests that the crisis has substantially changed the nature of the cross-currency interactions in liquidity stress. Also global money markets have failed to contain stress in US dollar funding and the role of the Japanese yen as a liquidity source appears to be significant, while these two currencies drive the cross-currency system of liquidity stress.     

On the convergence of management accounting and financial accounting – the role of information technology in accounting change

In this article we theorize and conceptualize the recent convergence of management accounting (MA) and financial accounting (FA) with the advancements in information technology (IT), and explicate not only how this convergence is manifested in the technical and technological domain, but also how it is reflected in their convergence at the behavioral and organizational level.Drawing on the analytical model by Hemmer and Labro (2008), in which the forward-looking perspective of FA leads to forward-looking MA, we build a conceptual framing to analyze this convergence. According to this framing, information technology (IT) serves as a facilitator, catalyst, motivator, or even an enabler for the convergence of MA and FA. We further argue that convergence is a much broader phenomenon than claimed by Hemmer and Labro. It firstly covers the technical and technological domain, including the intentional integration of information systems and software, as well as the intentional combination of methods or standards, extending thereafter to the behavioral and organizational domain with the (un)intentional alignment regarding both functions and processes as well as the (un)intentional convergence regarding both work and roles. The applicability of this conceptual framing is illustrated with a set of examples.We present illustrations of the manifestations and outcomes of convergence in both the technical and technological domain (related to accounting standards, discretionary reporting, performance measurement, transfer pricing, competitor, customer and contractor analysis, due diligence in M&As), and the behavioral and organizational manifestation domain (related to accounting processes, work and the role of accountants, incentive systems, accounting and control in multinational companies, the control of business networks, the board of directors and venture capitalists). Based on our observations, we conclude that the forward-looking FA elements are often intertwined with MA, and vice versa, and that convergence in the technical and technological domain appears to precede convergence in the behavioral and organizational domain. In most of our observations, IT plays an important or even crucial role in this convergence process. In the light of these convergence observations, we open several avenues for further research.     

How resilient and countercyclical were emerging economies during the global financial crisis?

By studying the cross-country incidence of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, we document a structural break in the way emerging economies responded to the global shock. Contrary to popular perceptions, emerging economies suffered growth collapses (relative to the pre-crisis levels) comparable to those experienced by developed economies, even when they continued growing. Afterwards, most economies returned to their pre-crisis growth rates. Although emerging economies were not able to avoid the collapse originated in the U.S. and then transmitted across countries, they were more resilient during the global crisis than during past crises. Namely, they resumed their higher growth rates earlier and converged more quickly to their pre-crisis growth trend. Moreover, breaking with the past, emerging economies did not fall more than developed economies during the global crisis and were able to conduct countercyclical policies, thus becoming more similar to developed economies.     

Auditors’ going concern reporting accuracy during and after the global financial crisis

Motivated by concerns that one of the reasons for the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) is poor quality auditing, this study examines the accuracy of going concern modifications for a sample of United States (U.S.) companies in the pre-GFC (2005–2006), GFC (2007–2008), and post-GFC (2009–2010) periods. The results show that the type I misclassification is lower during the GFC but not different in the post-GFC period compared with the pre-GFC period. The type II misclassification is not significantly different in the GFC and post-GFC periods compared with the pre-GFC period. Additionally, the results suggest that non-Big 4 auditors, compared with Big 4 auditors, have become more conservative on clients’ going concern problems in the post-GFC period, which reduces their type II misclassification.     

Has the global financial crisis produced a New World Order?

Described by Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, as the worst financial crisis in global history, the economic impact of the global financial crisis would have been much worse had it not been for Asia (excluding Japan). In broad terms, the crisis has accelerated the secular emergence of Asia, whereas the US recovery is weak by historical standards and problems in Europe continue. What accounts for this two-tier pattern of world growth? Does this juxtaposition signal a permanent re-ordering of world business - in other words, a New World Order?     

Americanism and financial accounting theory – Part 2: The ‘modern business enterprise’, America's transition to capitalism,and the genesis of management accounting

The paper uses accounting evidence to explore when and how capitalism came to America. It continues the search for capitalists in American history begun in ‘Americanism and financial accounting theory. Part 1: Was America Born Capitalist?’ Part 1 concluded that America was not ‘born capitalist’ in Marx's sense, and that the capitalist mentality had not appeared in farming even by the late 19th century, on southern slave plantations by the Civil War, or in manufacturing enterprises by the 1830s. This paper (Part 2) challenges Alfred Chandler's thesis that the ‘modern business enterprise’ brought ‘a new type of capitalism’ from around the mid-19th century. It re-examines accounting evidence from the Boston textile mills, the railroads, and the iron and steel industry. It concludes that the Boston Associates who historians often see as ‘proto-capitalists’, the ‘managerial capitalists’ Chandler sees on the railroads, and the ‘entrepreneurial capitalists’ he sees in the iron and steel industry and elsewhere, remained semi-capitalists because their capitals and workers were not ‘free’. The paper re-examines the ‘costing renaissance’, the introduction and spread of product costing, standard costing, ROI and flexible budgets, and the evidence in Chandler's and Johnson and Kaplan's studies of the DuPont Powder Company and General Motors. This suggests that capitalism only appeared in America by around 1900, after more than two decades of intense conflict between ‘capital and labour’, and became established by the 1920s. This is the critical turning point in American business history, not the appearance of ‘managerial capitalism’, the paper argues. It concludes that America did not catch up with British capitalism until the late 1920s because its ruling elite faced an ideological problem created by its exceptional transition from a society of simple commodity producers and semi-capitalists, particularly the threat of popular socialism. The final paper, Part 3: ‘Adam Smith, the rise and fall of socialism, and Irving Fisher's theory of accounting’, argues that Fisher made a seminal contribution to solving this problem, but his legacy is a pathological theory of financial accounting.     

Americanism and financial accounting theory – Part 3: Adam Smith,the rise and fall of socialism,and Irving Fisher's theory of accounting

A previous paper (Part 1) rejected the conventional wisdom that America was ‘born capitalist’ and the historians’ consensus that it had become capitalist by the early-19th century; another (Part 2) rejected Chandler's thesis that the ‘modern business enterprise’ brought a ‘new form of capitalism’ to America from the 1840s. The accounting evidence suggests that America began to make the transition to capitalism around 1900 in a period of intense conflict between ‘capital and labour’ generated by ‘big business’ from the 1880s, a process not completed until the 1920s. This paper (Part 3) examines the consequences for America's political ideology and financial accounting theory. America's exceptional transition, it argues, explains the history of its political ideology, and this history explains Irving Fisher's theory of accounting. Section A argues that America lagged behind Britain because it started from a society of simple commodity producers and semi-capitalists, which created an exceptional ideological problem for its ruling elite. Big business generated hostility from workers, farmers and small employers – expressed in labour movements, ‘populism’, socialism, and ‘progressivism’ – and created an ideological problem by contradicting the ‘independent producer’ ideology of workers and farmers, and the ‘individual liberalism’ of small manufacturers and merchants, both underwritten by Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. The paper argues that Smith's theory of price articulates as semi-capitalist accounting, which explains his popularity in America until the appearance of big business in the 1880s. Socialism and progressivism became political forces in America from 1900 to around 1920. Progressivism produced ‘corporate liberalism’, the ideological counter to socialism that corporations could be made ‘socially responsible’ by government regulation and ‘publicity’ to ensure they earned only ‘fair’ returns, but this left two problems. First, socialists argued that no profit was ‘fair’, and second, fear of the ‘labour danger’ made American financial reports secretive and conservative. Section B argues that Irving Fisher responded to these problems with a theory of accounting, which he developed as a refutation of Marx and the American brand of socialism advocated by Eugene Debs, the threateningly successful presidential candidate of the Socialist Party of America. An important but neglected reason for socialism's abrupt collapse around 1920, it argues, was that the socialists lost the intellectual argument with the middle classes, and that Fisher's theory played an important role in this defeat. Fisher was a vigorous self-publicist, strongly influenced the teaching of economics and accounting in the universities and, the paper argues, changed the language of American accounting. Fisher claimed that accounting practice supported his theory of ‘capital’ and ‘income’, but the paper shows he did not understand double-entry bookkeeping or the accountants’ ‘cost theory of value’, and therefore divorced accounting from the reality of business transactions. As his theory underlies the FASB's framework, the paper concludes that Fisher's legacy to the world is a pathological theory of financial accounting.     

Baltic stock markets and the financial crisis of 2008–2009

This study presents new evidence on stock market integration by investigating the linkages between developed European stock markets and emerging stock markets. We focus on three countries in the Baltic region, namely Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with particular attention to the recent financial crisis of 2008–2009. The study is motivated by traditional stock market studies of integration, which show that developed stock markets are highly integrated, while emerging markets may be segmented. How integrated these emerging stock markets are in a crisis period with respect to the EUROSTOXX50 stock index is an empirical question investigated in this study. While the results of this study demonstrate that the Baltic stock markets were apparently segmented before the crisis, they were highly integrated during the crisis. The results of the variance decomposition analysis show that a large proportion of the forecast variance of the Baltic stock markets can be explained by the EUROSTOXX50 during the crisis. The results from the quantile regressions demonstrate that during the crisis the returns of the lowest quantile were most sensitive to the EUROSTOXX50 stock index. All these results imply less diversification benefits during crises when investors would need them the most.     

Baltic stock markets and the financial crisis of 2008–2009

This study presents new evidence on stock market integration by investigating the linkages between developed European stock markets and emerging stock markets. We focus on three countries in the Baltic region, namely Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with particular attention to the recent financial crisis of 2008–2009. The study is motivated by traditional stock market studies of integration, which show that developed stock markets are highly integrated, while emerging markets may be segmented. How integrated these emerging stock markets are in a crisis period with respect to the EUROSTOXX50 stock index is an empirical question investigated in this study. While the results of this study demonstrate that the Baltic stock markets were apparently segmented before the crisis, they were highly integrated during the crisis. The results of the variance decomposition analysis show that a large proportion of the forecast variance of the Baltic stock markets can be explained by the EUROSTOXX50 during the crisis. The results from the quantile regressions demonstrate that during the crisis the returns of the lowest quantile were most sensitive to the EUROSTOXX50 stock index. All these results imply less diversification benefits during crises when investors would need them the most.     

The role of accounting in bank regulation on the eve of japan’s financial crisis: a failure of the new capital adequacy regulation

In contrast to previous examinations of the role of accounting in financial crises, this paper explores the way in which accounting has been woven into a new system of banking regulations. Although the regulatory reform of the mid-1980s was intended to maintain the soundness of banking businesses, it failed to prevent banks from excessive asset expansion in the latter half of the 1980s in Japan. One of the major causes of this regulatory failure is found in the way that the regulatory capital is defined for the new capital adequacy regulation. The latent revaluation reserves are partially counted as capital. Japanese domestic regulatory reform took place in the wider context of the international standardization of capital adequacy regulations (BIS standards). Japanese regulators utilized taken-for-granted practices of accounting to creatively comply with the BIS standards.     

The 2007–2009 financial crisis and bank opaqueness

Doubts about the accuracy with which outside investors can assess a banking firm’s value motivate many government interventions in the banking market. Although the available empirical evidence is somewhat mixed, the recent financial crisis has reinforced a common assessment that banks are unusually opaque. This paper examines bank equity’s trading characteristics during “normal” periods and two “crisis” periods between 1993 and 2009. We find only limited (mixed) evidence that banks are unusually opaque during normal periods. However, consistent with theory, crises raise the adverse selection costs of trading bank shares relative to those of nonbank control firms. A bank’s balance sheet composition significantly affects its equity opacity, but we cannot detect specific balance sheet categories that have robust effects.     

Market reactions to policy deliberations on fair value accounting and impairment rules during the financial crisis of 2008–2009

Fair value accounting (FVA) has been blamed for amplifying the financial crisis of 2008–2009. We investigate investor and creditor reactions to policymaker deliberations, recommendations and decisions about FVA and impairment rules in the banking industry. If FVA was a key contributor to the financial crisis as some industry pundits and academic research suggest, we first should observe positive stock market reactions to proposals that relax FVA rules and negative reactions when policymakers support FVA. Second, we investigate cross-sectional stock price reactions to bank-specific factors that potentially contributed to pro-cyclical contagion. Third, we examine whether banks that have fewer alternative sources of information about fair values experience relatively negative reactions to potential relaxation of FVA and impairment rules. Finally, we investigate credit market reactions to these policy deliberations, recommendations and decisions by examining changes in credit default swap spreads for a subset of banks in our sample.     

Global financial crisis, extreme interdependences, and contagion effects: The role of economic structure?

The paper examines the extent of the current global crisis and the contagion effects it induces by conducting an empirical investigation of the extreme financial interdependences of some selected emerging markets with the US. Several copula functions that provide the necessary flexibility to capture the dynamic patterns of fat tail as well as linear and nonlinear interdependences are used to model the degree of cross-market linkages. Using daily return data from Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC) and the US, our empirical results show strong evidence of time-varying dependence between each of the BRIC markets and the US markets, but the dependency is stronger for commodity-price dependent markets than for finished-product export-oriented markets. We also observe high levels of dependence persistence for all market pairs during both bullish and bearish markets.     

Does stable ownership create value? Evidence from the global financial crisis

We investigate the value of stable ownership for a sample of European firms using the global financial crisis as an exogenous shock and pre-and post-crisis years as benchmark periods. Consistent with the argument that stable ownership allows managers to focus on the creation of long-term value, we find that stable ownership resulted in higher stock returns and a higher market-to-book ratio during the crisis. This positive effect of stable ownership was not reversed after the crisis. Stable institutional blockholdings were more valuable in countries with weaker investor protection. However, the positive effect does not apply to firms in which a family is the largest blockholder. Finally, we also find that ownership stability was associated with a higher level of investments, illustrating that stable ownership affects real corporate decisions.

     

Policy uncertainty and bank’s funding costs: The effects of the financial crisis,Covid-19 pandemic,and market discipline

This paper examines the impacts of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on bank funding costs using the 2001–2021 data of US banks. We document consistent evidence of a negative relationship between EPU and bank funding costs, implying lower bank funding costs during a time of high EPU, consistent with the hypothesis that economic agents tend to reallocate their assets into safer investments, such as bank deposits during high uncertainty. Large banks are likely to benefit most during high EPU when experiencing lower costs of funds compared with other banks, suggesting the “too-big-to-fail” perception of depositors. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that depositors require safer banks to pay lower rates, indicating the existence of market discipline. The cost-decreasing effects of policy uncertainty are less pronounced during the global financial crisis than the Covid-19 crisis.