产业组织模块化及其应用

本文概述了模块化的产生及其基本界定,在交易费用框架下对产业组织的模块化机理进行了分析。研究发现信息化改变了产品生产活动的监督与度量成本,从而使得经济组织结构向着节省交易费用的方向变迁,即组织模块化。本文基于模块化在产业组织中的构造规律,通过对我国电信业的实证研究,对产业组织的模块化及其政策制定提出了建议。     

The transaction costs perspective on international supply chain management; evidence from case studies in the manufacturing industry in the Netherlands

Transaction costs are barriers for internationalisation processes. This paper investigates the practical relevance of transaction costs economics (TCE) for international supply chain management (SCM) in this era of globalisation, which is characterised by splitting up the supply chain in more and more parts. The analysis is based on data from in-depth interviews with seven manufacturing companies in the Netherlands which are actually engaged in this modern way of organising production. It is shown that the balance between transaction costs and sheer production costs (transformation costs) plays a prominent role in the strategic decisions on how and where to organise production. Especially intangible (or ‘soft’) transaction costs are important in this respect. The analysis provides insight in practical experience in the manufacturing industry in the Netherlands with transaction costs and shows how transaction costs affect decisions on transaction management, personnel policy and internationalisation of R&D. This study is to our knowledge the first to confront the theory of TCE with practice of manufacturing firms in their internationalisation decisions using in-depth interviews instead of survey data.     

Strategic Research Partnerships: A Managerial Perspective

Private sector incentives to participate in research partnerships can be grouped roughly into two categories: cost-economizing incentives and strategic incentives. This paper summarizes the argument in two streams of thought that are often identified with these two sides: the transaction-cost/incomplete contracts approach and the strategic management approach. The paper recounts business motives to engage in research partnerships in each and points out that differentiating between more traditional economic perspectives (transaction costs, incomplete contracts) and strategic management/organizational theory perspectives (strategic networks, resource-dependent view, dynamic capabilities, knowledge-based view, organizational learning, options approach) may not be as sharp as one might suppose at first. The complementary nature of these perspectives should be encouraging for theoreticians looking for a more integrated model of collaboration.     

Strategic Research Partnerships: A Managerial Perspective

Private sector incentives to participate in research partnerships can be grouped roughly into two categories: cost-economizing incentives and strategic incentives. This paper summarizes the argument in two streams of thought that are often identified with these two sides: the transaction-cost/incomplete contracts approach and the strategic management approach. The paper recounts business motives to engage in research partnerships in each and points out that differentiating between more traditional economic perspectives (transaction costs, incomplete contracts) and strategic management/organizational theory perspectives (strategic networks, resource-dependent view, dynamic capabilities, knowledge-based view, organizational learning, options approach) may not be as sharp as one might suppose at first. The complementary nature of these perspectives should be encouraging for theoreticians looking for a more integrated model of collaboration.     

The demand for cars and gasoline: A simultaneous approach

This paper develops and estimates a simple model of the demand and supply of cars and gasoline in Israel, focusing on an individual maximizing his life-time utility function under various constraints. Particular emphasis is placed on the transaction cost in a car purchase, and the fact that cars can be characterized by size and age factors which, in turn, affect running costs and maintenance costs. The empirical results show that a change in the price of gasoline (and/or the price of new cars) changes the structure of the stock of cars with respect to engine size.     

交易费用计量研究述评

交易费用的计量是交易费用经济学从理论研究走向实证研究的关键。根据交易费用的不同定义,可以将交易费用分为宏观层面上的交易费用和微观层面上的交易费用,同时将微观层面上的交易费用分为市场型、管理型和政策型交易费用。在此基础上,对有关交易费用计量的文献进行了梳理分析。分析表明,尽管近年来在交易费用的计量方面已取得不少成就,但总的来说,方法还是比较单一,尤其对非市场交易费用和政策型交易费用的计量仍然停留在经验层次,缺少对企业内部交易费用的直接计量。     

Alliance or alone? how to build interorganizational information systems

This article shows that the builders of interorganizational information systems (IOSs) struggle most with the problem of whether to build them alone or in an alliance mode. It is suggested that the situation should be studied in the light of the transaction costs involved in the application ofthe IOS. The nature of the application to be handled through the IOS should be the main detemrlnant of IOS design. According to the study, as derived from the transaction cost approach, applications with low transaction

costs are suitable for alliance networks whereas those with high transaction costs should be constructed from an organization's own resources. A market-hierarchy/decision-maker model for determining the righi way to participate in IOSs is introduced. There is a visible trend leading to a proportionally greater use of markets. Information technology lowers transaction costs, and more and more products and services become suitable for marketing through IOSs. A case example is dmwn from the Finnish Insurance Industry, where direct writing is the dominant governance structure. The transaction costs in motor vehicle insurance are studied.     

The Innovation impact model: a tool t0 study the impact of technological change

This article shows that the builders of interorganizational information systems (IOSs) struggle most with the problem of whether to build them alone or in an alliance mode. It is suggested that the situation should be studied in the light of the transaction costs involved in the application ofthe IOS. The nature of the application to be handled through the IOS should be the main detemrlnant of IOS design. According to the study, as derived from the transaction cost approach, applications with low transaction

costs are suitable for alliance networks whereas those with high transaction costs should be constructed from an organization's own resources. A market-hierarchy/decision-maker model for determining the righi way to participate in IOSs is introduced. There is a visible trend leading to a proportionally greater use of markets. Information technology lowers transaction costs, and more and more products and services become suitable for marketing through IOSs. A case example is dmwn from the Finnish Insurance Industry, where direct writing is the dominant governance structure. The transaction costs in motor vehicle insurance are studied.     

金融抑制与黑龙江省中小企业融资难题的破解思路

金融抑制是发展中国家的一个共同特征之一,也是形成黑龙江省中小企业融资困境的根本原因之一.政府管制的低利率造成巨大的融资缺口,商业银行只能通过信贷配给的方式安排有限的借贷资金;金融市场的分割形成金融体系的二元性,将中小企业排斥在正规金融体系之外,加大了其融资成本.深入分析金融抑制与中小企业融资困境的关系,才能找到破解中小企业融资难题的思路.重点是合理安排利率水平,加强利率市场化管理,并发展多层次的金融体系结构,进而为中小企业提供多渠道的融资途径.     

Entrepreneurship,search costs,and ecological rationality in an agent-based economy

Since Coase’s paper on the firm, transaction costs have occupied much attention as a field of economic inquiry. Yet, with few exceptions, neoclassical theory has failed to integrate transaction costs into its core. The dominant mode of theorizing depends upon Brouwer fixed points which cannot integrate transaction costs in more than a superficial manner. Agent-based modeling presents an opportunity for researchers to investigate the nature of transaction costs and integrate them into the core of economic theory. To the extent that transaction costs reduce economic efficiency, they provide opportunities for entrepreneurs to earn a profit by reducing these costs. We employ an extension of Epstein and Axtell’s (1996) Sugarscape to demonstrate this point one type of transaction costs: search costs. When agents do not face the cost of finding a trading partner, the system quickly reaches a steady state with tightly constrained prices regardless of agent production strategies. When search costs are present, entrepreneurs may use competing strategies for production and exchange that allow them to earn higher revenues than they would earn otherwise. These cost reducing innovations tend to promote concatenate coordination (Klein 2012). The agent’s production strategies represent technology in the form of mental models (Denzau and North 1994) that shape agent action with regard to the agent’s environment. The success of these are dependent on their ability to overcome search costs. The average profit, market rate of return, earned by each of these mental structures tends to equalize as a result of competition.     

“诺思第二悖论”及其新破解

在新制度经济学家看来,制度的一个重要作用是降低作为经济运行的"摩擦力"的交易费用。理论上,交易费用会随着一国制度的进步和完善而降低。但是,据瓦利斯和诺思测算,美国自1 870年到1 970年的1 00年间总量交易费用占GNP的比例不仅没有降低,反而越来越高了。这种理论(随着制度的进步交易费用应该越来越低)与实际(测量到总量交易费用越来越高)的矛盾被称之为"诺思第二悖论"。瓦利斯和诺思测量到的总量交易费用并非交易费用的全部,表面上测量到的总量交易费用上升了,但"理论上"的总量交易费用是下降的,即是说,随着制度的进步,不仅每笔交易的交易费用下降了,理论上的总量交易费用也是下降的,所谓"诺思第二悖论"是不存在的。     

The Economic Efficiency of Policy Reform and Partial Market Liberalization under Transaction Costs

The article presents an integrated analysis of the effects of domestic and trade policy reform on resource allocation and welfare under transaction costs. It develops a general multiagent, multicommodity model, where transaction costs are the costs of resources used in the exchange process. The influence of domestic and trade policy (including both price and quantity instruments) on distorted market equilibrium is analysed. Alternative concepts of distorted equilibrium are presented and investigated. They provide a basis for evaluating the effects of multilateral partial market liberalization on resource allocation and welfare under transaction costs. New conditions are derived under which multilateral policy reforms generate Pareto improvements.     

Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts

We scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature. This literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing—or of even foreseeing—the possible states of nature in advance. We argue, however, that such transaction costs need not interfere with optimal contracting ( i.e. transaction costs need not be relevant ), provided that agents can probabilistically forecast their possible future payoffs (even if other aspects of the state of the nature cannot be forecast). In other words, all that is required for optimality is that agents be able to perform dynamic programming, an assumption always invoked by the incomplete contract literature. The foregoing optimality result holds very generally provided that parties can commit themselves not to renegotiate. Moreover, we point out that renegotiation may be hard to reconcile with a framework that otherwise presumes perfect rationality. However, even if renegotiation is allowed, the result still remains valid provided that parties are risk averse.     

信息技术应用的成本节约:不同行业的比较

信息技术应用节约了企业的交易成本和协调成本,影响了企业边界的变动。基于交易成本理论的分析表明,对于在成熟行业和新兴行业经营的企业来说,其有关性质上的差异影响了信息技术应用带来的成本节约效果,从而使企业的边界发生了不同方向的变动。     

Offset Credits in the EU ETS: A Quantile Estimation of Firm-Level Transaction Costs

International carbon offset certificates were cheaper than European Union Allowances, although they were substitutes within the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). Thus, firms had a strong incentive to use offset certificates. However, a considerable number of firms did not exhaust their offset quota and, by doing so, seemingly forwent profits. While most literature on emissions trading evaluates the efficiency of regulation in a frictionless world, in practice firms incur costs when complying with regulation. In order to assess the relevance of trade-related fixed transaction costs, this study examines the use of international offset credits in the EU ETS. It establishes a model of firm decision under fixed (quantity-invariant) entry costs and estimates the size of such costs rationalizing firm behavior using semi-parametric binary quantile regressions. Comparing binary quantile results with probit estimates shows that high average transaction costs result from a strongly skewed underlying distribution. For most firms, the bulk of transaction costs stems from certificate trading in general, rather than additional participation in offset trading.     

Information technology, transaction costs and the decision to 'make or buy'

Information and communication technology (ICT) has a wide ranging impact on business. One of the effects is on the 'make or buy decision'. This is analysed from the perspective of transactzon cost economm (TCE). On the one hand ICT reduces transaction costs by reducing search costs, by facilitating monitoring and control of performance and by yielding a greater flexibility of production, which reduces the transaction specificity of assets. These efiects, favour the decision to 'buy'. On the other hand, ICT reduces economies of scale, in some areas of production, which makes outside production i n a specializedfirm less attractive. Also, ICT may be used to impose switching costs between suppliers and buyers, thereby miszng transaction costs. But such ploys appear to be feasible only temporarily, with a pressure from users and competitors towards standardization and open systems. Thus the effects of ICT are diverse, but on the whole it tends to favour the option to contract out.     

Transaction costs and informational cascades in financial markets

We study the effect of transaction costs (e.g., a trading fee or a transaction tax, like the Tobin tax) on the aggregation of private information in financial markets. We implement a financial market with sequential trading and transaction costs in the laboratory. According to theory, eventually all traders neglect their private information and abstain from trading (i.e., a no-trade informational cascade occurs). We find that, in the experiment, informational no-trade cascades occur when theory predicts they should (i.e., when the trade imbalance is sufficiently high). At the same time, the proportion of subjects irrationally trading against their private information is smaller than in a financial market without transaction costs. As a result, the overall efficiency of the market is not significantly affected by the presence of transaction costs.     

Factors that influence transaction costs in development offsets: Who bears what and why?

Environmental policy instruments generate transaction costs to public and private parties. There is a growing literature reporting on the size of transaction costs produced by environmental policy instruments. This paper extends that literature through an analysis of the factors that influence transaction costs in environmental policy and how this influence occurs. The theory based factors that influence transaction costs are categorised as: 1) transaction characteristics; 2) transactor characteristics; 3) nature of the institutional environment; and 4) nature of the institutional arrangements. We examined how these factors influenced transaction costs through the analysis of two Australian-based development offset schemes with different policy designs. We found evidence of all four theory-based categories of influence in the policy case studies. The degree of influence and how each factor influenced transaction costs varies across the two policies and between parties. Policy design as a component of the institutional environment had a particularly large bearing on transaction costs of offset buyers and the policy administrator. An important contribution to transaction cost theory assumes the institutional environment as given.     

Induced Institutional Innovation and Transaction Costs: The Case of the Australian National Native Title Tribunal

The theory of induced innovation says that technological innovations which economize on relatively scarce inputs will be invented and adopted. Hayami and Ruttan have hypothesized that this model also holds for institutional innovations. Coase and Williamson suggest that economic organization, such as vertical integration, is the result of transaction cost minimization. Coase discusses the transaction costs of negotiation versus other alternatives for solving externality problems. This paper brings these previously unconnected threads of the literature together and incorporates transaction costs in an induced institutional innovation model.

This conceptual model is brought to bear on the issue of institutional innovations over time in relation to the National Native Title Tribunal. In addition to the reductions in transaction costs from a negotiated settlement rather than litigation, there are other advantages of negotiation. These may include improved “quality” of settlements, improved relations between the negotiating parties, and more timely resolution.