Japanese Housing Tenure Choice and Welfare Implications after the Revision of the Tenant Protection Law

A new mode of housing tenure in Japan, rental housing with fixed rental terms, was introduced in March 2000 with the revision of the Japanese Tenant Protection Law. This paper examines the implications of this new system by analyzing the determinants of the choices by households among the three types of housing tenure in Japan: owned housing, general rental housing, and rental housing with fixed rental terms, and calculates the estimated compensating variation. Our micro-data is based on the three waves of Japanese household longitudinal data (Keio Household Panel Survey, KHPS) covering all of Japan. The difference between general rental housing and rental housing with fixed rental terms is reflected in the length of the contract term and the level of rent. We carefully eliminate potential sample selection bias introduced to the conditional logit housing tenure choice model through the estimation of the hedonic price regression of each housing tenure alternative. We find that households with a smaller number of family members, those who moved from outside the local housing market, those headed by an unmarried household head, and those with plans to own a house in the near future tend to select rental housing with fixed rental terms. The estimated mean compensating variation by introducing rental housing with fixed rental terms for all households selecting that tenure is 1,205 JPY per month or 1.96% of their monthly rent. Moreover, younger and/or lower income households derived the greatest benefit from the revised law in the form of lower rents.

The experience with rent control in Israel: From rental housing to condominiums

During the past decades, home ownership has replaced privately owned rental housing as the dominant form of tenure in Israel. An important factor in this transition has been rent control. This paper examines the development of the rent control system, surveys the other major housing policies, and considers the main effects of rent control on the housing market.The Israeli rent control system is characterized by far reaching security of tenure; rent ceilings that are a fraction of the free-market rent; legalized key money shared between owner and tenant; and decontrol after a tenant dies or the landlord repurchases the unit. Consequently, the construction of privately owned rental housing has ceased. The controlled sector is disappearing, and the remaining stock is badly undermaintained and deteriorating.     

Residential Asking Rents and Time on the Market

Landlords offering a house in the rental market face a difficult strategic pricing decision. The revenue maximizing decision for the landlord involves a tradeoff between the rental rate and time on the market. Because the turnover of renters is higher than owners, and because the landlord must bear some carrying costs on a vacant house, pricing the rent too high may decrease revenue due to a higher vacancy period and pricing it too low may reduce the revenue when occupied. While there is substantial research on the relationship between listed prices and time on the market for freehold interests, this is the first study to provide empirical evidence on the relationship between asking rent, contract rent and time on the market for single family residential rental (leasehold) property interests. We present two models; a rental price model and a duration model for time-on-the market. Using data from the Dallas–Fort Worth area we find that landlords who set a lower asking rent relative to predicted rent can expect a shorter marketing period for their properties. The results also indicate that overpricing the asking rent and then lowering it at a later date leads to a longer marketing time (after the reset) and often a lower rent. These finding are reasonably robust for low-, mid-, and higher-valued rental properties.

Residential Search and Mobility in a Housing Market Equilibrium Model

In this paper, we propose an equilibrium model for the housing market which provides an explanation for observed housing consumption of households over their lifetimes. The moving behavior of households is described as a stochastic dynamic process in which households moving decisions depend on information which is obtained over time. Households move when the offer exceeds an endogenously determined threshold. On the basis of the households moving behavior, the steady-state distribution of households over the housing stock is obtained. On the supply side of the market, landlords are looking for households to occupy their vacant dwellings. Their strategy is to set rents in a mixed strategy in order to profit from imperfect information. After formulating search behavior of households as well as the behavior of landlords, the market equilibrium is derived. We explore the sensitivity of the equilibrium to changes in the structural parameters.     

中国住房市场波动的影响因素研究——基于租金收益率的方差分解

基于资产定价的视角,本文通过将标准的动态戈登增长模型和传统的住房使用成本模型相结合,建立了一个关于住房市场租金收益率的动态住房使用成本模型。该模型将租金收益率分解为购房的预期资金成本、预期购房相对于租房的风险溢价和预期未来租金增长率三个部分的现值之和。进一步,本文将该模型应用于京沪广深四大城市的季度数据,并使用方差分解方法来考察国内住房市场动态波动的影响因素及其相对重要性。本文结果表明,资金成本变动在四大城市的住房市场波动中为最重要的影响因素,而租金在住房市场波动中虽然存在着一定的影响作用,但并不如资金成本显著。此外,本文还发现,不能直接观测得到的购房相对于租房的风险溢价也是影响国内住房市场的一个不可忽视的重要因素。值得注意的是,近年四大城市居民租房面临的风险相对于购房正日益上升。     

Economic and political aspects of negotiated rents in the Swedish housing market

The aim of this paper is to describe the rent control system in Sweden, evaluate the effects on consumption and production in the housing market, and provide a public choice explanation of the present rent control system.The first section of this paper contains introductory remarks and an overview of the rental market in Sweden. The Swedish rent control system and its prerequisites are described in section 2. Attention is given to two important prerequisites: the existence of a large municipal housing sector and a strong tenants' movement. As a result, a rent system has been developed with all rents set by negotiations. The rent structure is determined by a fairness principle, which has some resemblance to market adapted rents. The rent level will be determined by a non-profit condition in municipal housing companies.In section 3 the effects of the existing rent control system are discussed with the municipality of Stockholm as a test case. Effects on rent level and rent structure are evaluated, and the relation between rent policy in municipal housing companies and resulting rents in private housing is analyzed. Gains and losses to tenants and landlords are evaluated as well as effects on construction and maintenance.In section 4 a political perspective is discussed. The aim is to explain why the system is not implemented in the market adapted way it was intended. Finally, the future of the rent system is discussed.     

Neighborhood Center Image and Rents

The impact of neighborhood-center image on rental rates is empirically modeled and tested. The neighborhood-center anchor does not substantially affect in-line, nonanchor rental rates and is more a proxy for a neighborhood center's trade-area economic base than an actual determinant of neighborhood-center rental rates. Image-related facilities specific variables do affect rental rates. Concurrently, relative center size does impact rental rates, providing marginal support for the use of gravity models at the property subtype level. More modeling of retail rents and sales activity is warranted.     

Is the Compensation Model for Real Estate Brokers Obsolete?

This study examines the traditional compensation model for real estate brokers under which both the listing and buyer brokers are paid by the seller based on a percentage of the property sales price. We argue that this model has not evolved to reflect contemporary legal agency relationships and technology-driven information availability. It therefore creates substantial transactional inefficiencies for buyers and sellers at both the matching and bargaining stages of a transaction. While there is evidence that market forces are pushing for a change in the status quo, there is also evidence that the brokerage industry is resisting this change by pursuing anti-competitive policies and laws. We explore the economics of the current and alternative compensation structures and suggest policy implications regarding anti-competitive behavior in the brokerage industry.

Pricing Upward-Only Adjusting Leases

This paper presents a stochastic pricing model of a unique, path-dependent lease instrument common in the United Kingdom and numerous commonwealth countries, the upward-only adjusting lease. In this lease, the rental rate is fixed at lease commencement but will be reset to the market rate at predetermined intervals (usually every five years) if it exceeds the contract rent. We derive a closed form expression for the market rent of a lease with upward-only adjustments. Results indicate what the initial coupon rate on a 10-year lease with one reset should be relative to that on a symmetric up-and-downward adjusting variable rate lease under various economic conditions (level of real interest rates and expected drift and volatility of the underlying rental service flow). We also consider the calculation of effective rents when free rent periods are given.     

The Limited-Service Brokerage Decision: Theory and Evidence

This study examines the home seller’s brokerage services decision, comparing full-service brokerage and limited-service arrangements. A model is developed which considers seller motivation and availability of effort, along with the cost of brokerage services, broker productivity and market dynamics as factors of influence in this decision. Limited-service arrangements are found to have a significant impact on price and marketing time. The popularity of limited-service arrangements is strongly influenced by the total dollar cost of brokerage services, which, in turn, is determined by housing market conditions.     

Why Do the Swiss Rent?

At less than 34%, Switzerland has the lowest home ownership rate in Western Europe. This may seem odd given the economic strength of the country. We use household survey data for five Swiss cantons to explore some possible reasons for this. We estimate a tenure choice equation that allows us to analyze the impacts of a number of key variables on the ownership rate. We pay particular attention to the relative cost of owning and renting, which is a function of house prices, rents, and the user cost of owning. The latter is a function of income tax policy and expected house price inflation, among other things. We also measure mortgage underwriting criteria and consider rent control and other policies affecting rental housing. By simulating a number of hypothetical changes to taxation and other policies, underwriting criteria, and price levels, we assess the importance of these variables in explaining the ownership rate. We conclude that high house prices—relative to household incomes and wealth—and the tax on imputed rent are the most important causes of Switzerland’s low ownership rate.     

Ethnicity, Endogeneity, and Housing Tenure Choice

Home ownership rates for New Zealanders of European descent aged twenty five to fifty four are 16 percentage points higher than for Maori in the same age group. This article explores the relative attainment of home ownership of the two ethnic groups by estimating a series of tenure choice models and decomposing the difference in rates into endowment and residual effects. Particular attention is given to the endogeneity of current income and wealth relative to the tenure choice decision and to the methods for decomposing group mean differences. The article also applies more appropriate methods for estimating incomes and wealth than have been used in most previous studies of tenure choice. The study concludes that only a small proportion of differences in home ownership rates is explained by household endowments. It is shown that controlling for the endogeneity of income and wealth has a substantial impact on the tenure choice and decomposition results.     

Asset allocation and investment horizon

Quarterly recommendations by national brokerage firms since the third quarter of 1989 provide an opportunity to compare different approaches to asset allocation. To follow a brokerage firm's recommendation every quarter is to practice tactical asset allocation. Both the length of the investor's decision horizon and brokerage commissions that are incurred when portfolio changes are made impact investment performance, and both contribute to the risk experienced by investors. Buy-and-hold and strategic asset allocation would have served investors better than tactical asset allocation during the first half of the 1990s.     

CEO decision horizon and firm performance: An empirical investigation

We investigate the effect of top managers' myopia on firms' market valuation. We devise a measure of expected CEO tenure as a proxy for the length of CEO decision horizon. After accounting for the endogenous nature of CEO horizon, our empirical tests show that shorter CEO horizon is associated with more agency costs, lower firm valuation and higher levels of information risk. The results are consistent with the notion that a short CEO decision horizon is indicative of preference for investments that offer relatively faster paybacks at the expense of long-term value creation.     

The Value of the Rent Control Option

In this paper, we combine direct arbitrage arguments and an option-pricing approach to develop a method of pricing the option for rent control. For a lump-sum payment of key money, a tenant acquires the right to rent a real estate unit for an exogenously determined controlled rent, as opposed to paying the free-market rent. The tenant may continue exercising this right as long as he or she lives. Alternatively, the tenant may sell the right to occupy the controlled rent unit and receive a fraction of the key money paid by the subsequent tenant. We value the equilibrium key money, in a representative agents partial equilibrium, while endogenously determining the expected tenure duration in a controlled rent unit. We propose a procedure for valuing rent control options different from the representative agents. Our analysis shows that under real-world levels of conditional life expectancy, the level of the fraction of the key money retained by a departing tenant has an insignificant effect on the expected tenure duration in a controlled rent unit and on the level of key money.     

Vacancies and Rent Dispersion in a Stochastic Search Model with Generalized Tenant Demand

I model imperfect information, derive a downward sloping market demand curve, and explain vacancies in a partial equilibrium model of a rental housing market. Tenants can be completely described by an exogenous demand curve, perhaps arising from differences in income, preferred location, or tastes, and view vacant units based on a stochastic arrival of rental information. Free entry of these landlords induces excess rental housing capacity (equilibrium vacancies). I determine the equilibrium distribution of rents for vacant units, show that this rent distribution may be discontinuous, and explore the equilibrium vacancy rate to changes in exogenous parameters. The resulting characterization of equilibrium distributions of rents may be amenable to econometric modeling exploring the relationship between market rents and vacancies.     

Small Banks, Small Business, and Relationships: An Empirical Study of Lending to Small Farms

We examine small banks lending to small farms. We find that relationships, as measured by the length of tenure of farm operators, are positively related to bank lending. We also find that de novo banks have a positive tendency to lend to small farms. When existing relationships between borrowers and incumbent lenders are stronger, de novo banks have greater difficulties in lending to small farms. We further find that, even within the category of small banks, lending to small farms (as a percentage of a banks assets) tends to decrease as the bank increases in size.     

Agency and ownership of housing

In this model, landlords cannot enforce leases conditional on their tenants' efforts to care for their residences, but can exploit economies of scale in maintenance. Also, multifamily properties that have been converted from rental apartments to condominiums or cooperatives cannot be reconverted. In this case, tenants optimally expend less effort on care than homeowners, while landlords partly offset this reduced care with extra maintenance. As a result, single-family houses and residences in small multifamily dwellings are optimally owned by their occupants, while residences in large dwellings are optimally rented to tenants. These results are roughly consistent with the available data.     

An economic assessment of rent controls: The Ontario experience

Rent controls have existed in Ontario since 1975. Although controls have undergone numerous changes, the basic approach has remained a modified cost-pass-through system with provision for the elimination of financial loss and for a return of new capital expenditures, and, prior to 1986, an exemption for new construction. This paper analyzes the economic consequences of the first twelve years of controls. The major effects have been to reduce rents on pre-1976 units but to increase rents on newly constructed post-1975 units, to reduce new construction, to accelerate deterioration and conversion of the existing rental stock, to generate a severe rental housing shortage, to create an environment for key money, to inefficiently and inequitably redistribute income, and to significantly exacerbate government budgetary deficits by reducing tax revenues and inducing increased government housing expenditures.     

An economic analysis of lead paint laws

In this paper we develop a theoretical framework for determining whether laws designed to reduce lead paint risk are consistent with efficiency. We do this in the context of both owner-occupied and rental housing, and under different informational scenarios depending on who has knowledge about the risk. Our results suggest that efficient lead paint laws would impose on property owners and landlords a duty to notify buyers and tenants about known risks but would not impose on them a duty to inspect for or abate the risk. Our review of the existing law shows that common law standards are largely consistent with efficiency, but statutory law is not.