Public infrastructure for production and international trade in a small open economy: a dynamic analysis

This paper develops a dynamic trade model with a stock of public infrastructure, which has a property of “unpaid factor of production”. We show that a country with a smaller (larger) labor endowment tends to become an exporter of a good whose productivity is more (less) sensitive to the stock of public infrastructure. We also show that after the opening of trade, the labor-scarce country becomes unambiguously better off but the labor-abundant country may become worse off. Overall, these results contrasts with those obtained in the case of public intermediate goods with a “creation of atmosphere” property.     

The effect of technology choice on specialization and welfare in a two‐country model

This study presents a simple two‐country model in which firms in the manufacturing sector can choose a technology level (high or low). We show how trade costs and productivity levels affect technology choices by the firms in each country, where the fixed cost of adopting high technology differs between the two countries. This depends on the productivity level of the high technology. In particular, if the productivity of high technology is medium and trade costs are not too low, then a technology gap between countries arises. In this case, improving the productivity of the high technology country reduces the welfare level of consumers in the country in which low technology is adopted. To compensate for the welfare loss of the country from the technological improvement, trade costs should be reduced.     

Public infrastructure,non‐cooperative investments,and endogenous growth

Two countries strategically invest in productive infrastructure within a general equilibrium model with endogenous growth. These public investments generate externalities. Dynamic analysis reveals that: (1) under constant returns, the two countries’ growth rates differ during the transition but are identical on the balanced growth path, (2) a country with decreasing returns can experience sustained growth provided that the other country grows at a positive constant rate, (3) cooperation does not necessarily lead to higher growth for each country, and it can increase or decrease the gap between countries’ growth rates depending on the countries’ consumption preferences regarding domestic and foreign goods.     

Payment choice in international trade: Theory and evidence from cross‐country firm‐level data

When trading across borders, firms choose between different payment contracts. Theoretically, this should allow firms to trade‐off differences in financing costs and enforcement across countries. This paper provides evidence for this hypothesis employing firm‐level data from a large number of developing countries. As predicted, international transactions are more likely paid after delivery when financing costs in the source country are high and when contract enforcement is low. We extend the theory and also show empirically that the more complex an industry is, the more important is contract enforcement and the less important are financing costs for the contract choice.     

Specialization in a dynamic trade model: An overlapping generations case

Abstract

We explore a small open economy with overlapping generations to show that demographic structure is an important factor for the determination of a production pattern in the dynamic trade theory. In the representative agent model, Baxter (1992) shows that even if there are two commodities and two production factors, there is a Ricardian implication that opening up to trade leads to perfect specialization in a small open economy. In contrast, using the overlapping generations model, we find that the heterogeneity of the economic agents generally makes imperfect specialization occur. We also find that whether the stability condition holds or not is crucial for the determination of the long-run production pattern.     

A dynamic model of OPEC trade and production

A dynamic simulation model is presented of the world energy market, covering the period 1974–1995. It is used to assess and rank six possible price or output policies that OPEC may adopt with respect to oil exports, given a range of assumptions relating to such important variables as the rate of growth of domestic absorption of oil revenues within OPEC, the rate of capacity expansion for oil production, the responsiveness of investment in alternative sources of energy to changes in oil prices, and the rate of growth of world demand for energy. Furthermore, an illustrative analysis is given of possible conflict situations within OPEC, and their impact on the choice of price or output policy is discussed. The main conclusion drawn is that the supply response of alternative energy sources to OPEC oil will be the key to predicting whether oil prices will go up or down.     

A dynamic model of endogenous trade policy

Empirical evidence suggests that past levels of protection are significant determinants of current levels of protection. We investigate dynamic interactions among interest groups and resulting endogenous links between current and future trade policies. We explore these intertemporal links in a small open economy in which lobbying and tariff policies are the outcome of a dynamic game among factor owners. The model can generate cycles with prolonged periods of free trade and/or prolonged periods of restricted trade (i.e., persistent trade policies). An interesting aspect of the environment is the role of lobbying as a partial substitute for intertemporal trade. JEL Classification: F13, C73
Un modèle dynamique de politique commerciale endogène. Les résultats d'analyses empiriques montrent que les niveaux passés de protection sont des facteurs importants dans l'explication des niveaux de protection actuels. Ce mémoire analyse les interactions dynamiques entre groupes d'intérêt et les liens endogènes qui en résultent entre les politiques commerciales présentes et futures. On explore ces liens intertemporels dans une petite économie ouverte où lobbying et politiques tarifaires sont le résultat d'un jeu dynamique entre les propriétaires des facteurs de production. Le modèle peut engendrer des cycles où on observe des périodes prolongées de libre commerce et/ou des périodes prolongées de commerce restreint (i.e. des politiques commerciales persistantes). Il appert que le rôle du lobbying est un substitut partiel pour le commerce intertemporel.     

Destabilization effect of international trade in a perfect foresight dynamic general equilibrium model

In the present paper, we consider a two-country, two-good, two-factor general equilibrium model with CIES nonlinear preferences, asymmetric technologies across countries and decreasing returns to scale. It is shown that aggregate instability and endogenous fluctuations may occur due to international trade. In particular, we prove that the integration into a common market on which countries trade the produced good and the capital input may lead to period-two cycles even when the closed-economy equilibrium is saddle-point stable in both countries.     

Social collateral,dynamic incentives,and joint liability in a two‐step trust game: Lending to the unbankable

Asymmetric information and lack of collateral creates a suboptimal allocation of financial resources to those in most need. When uncollateralised borrowers approach financial institutions, the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection results in no lending. Conversely, group‐lending contracts—joint liability, dynamic lending, and social cost for defaulting—control for information asymmetries and create a co‐operative trust game between borrowers leading to an undominated optimal strategy to repay, and therefore, for the lender to Give. Group lending proves superior to typical individual borrowing and lending when no collateral is available. Social collateral and trust are fundamental pieces of the successful work of MicroFinance. Resulting contracts and correspondent payoffs are Pareto efficient.     

Investment in trade facilitating infrastructure: A political-economy analysis

This paper analyzes public investment in infrastructure that facilitates international trade. It considers a world consisting of small open economies that face transport costs for exporting or importing a particular good. Transport costs can be lowered by an improvement in transport infrastructure. National governments non-cooperatively decide about their respective country's investment level. Governments' preferences are assumed to be biased in favor of producers' interests with consequences for equilibrium investments: Exporting countries, whose producers benefit from a transport cost reduction, spend more for infrastructure than importing countries, whose producers are protected by transport costs from foreign competition. This outcome is inefficient, and governments have an incentive to cooperate internationally. The paper also incorporates bilateral trade with two goods that benefit from infrastructure improvements as well as trade that results from offshoring.     

Health and infrastructure in a model of endogenous growth

This paper studies the optimal allocation of government spending between infrastructure and health (which affects labor productivity as well as household utility) in an endogenous growth framework. A key feature of the model is that infrastructure affects not only the production of goods but also the supply of health services. The rate of time preference is also endogenously related to health outcomes. The first part considers the case where health enters as a flow in production and utility, whereas the second focuses on a “stock” approach. Growth- and welfare-maximizing rules for income taxation and the allocation of public spending are derived.     

Foreign direct investment and international trade in a continuum Ricardian trade model

We develop a continuum Ricardian trade model to capture both North–South trade and technology transfer via foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational enterprises (MNEs). We show that there is a unique range of products produced in the South by MNEs. In the case of an infinitely elastic supply of expatriates, if the ability of Southern workers in absorbing Northern technology increases, then (a) the range of MNE production increases, (b) Northern workers's welfare and Southern workers' welfare change in opposite directions, and (c) the world aggregate welfare increases under certain conditions. We explore issues such as North–South wage gaps, FDI policies and the product cycle. We also derive results under a general supply of expatriates.     

Factor‐biased public infrastructure and wage inequality

This paper analyzes how factor‐biased public infrastructure affects the skilled–unskilled wage inequality. In the basic model with a full employment economy, we find that when the weighted dependence of skilled labor and capital in the urban skilled sector on public infrastructure is large enough relatively to that of unskilled labor and capital in the urban unskilled sector, the wage inequality will be expanded. We also discuss labor‐biased and capital‐biased public infrastructure in our framework, and find that the relative dependences of relevant labor or capital on public infrastructure are important determinants of wage inequality. In the extended models, we analyze separately the issue of wage inequality in the economy with unemployment and the totally open capital market, and find the results of the basic model almost still hold.     

Skill distribution and income disparity in a North‐South trade model

Abstract. What are the impacts of free trade agreement on the welfare of different types of workers in a developed country? What is the impact of free trade on a developed country's income disparity? What is the effect of free trade on the skill distribution of a developed country? The objective of this paper is to address the above questions in a two‐sector general‐equilibrium North‐South trade model in which both countries produce one final good and one high‐tech intermediate input. The final good is produced with the use of a high‐tech intermediate input and unskilled workers. Horizontally differentiated skilled workers produce the high‐tech intermediate input. Each country is populated by a continuum of unskilled workers with differential potential ability. Workers in the North and South can acquire skills by investment in training or education. Thus, skill distribution in the North and South is determined endogenously in the model through a self‐selection process. I characterize two different types of equilibria: a closed‐economy equilibrium without trade and a free trade equilibrium. Then, I investigate the impact of free trade, in the presence of training costs, on the skill distribution within each country, income disparity, and social welfare. JEL classification: D63, F10, J31     

Quotas and equilibrium relative prices in the trade restricting country

This paper is concerned with the effects of international trade restriction through quotas. It is shown that a casual relationship exists between the fraction of licences distributed domestically, the terms of trade, and the domestic relative price of the importable.     

Monetary policy and efficiency in over‐the‐counter financial trade

We develop a monetary model that incorporates over‐the‐counter (OTC) asset trade. After agents have made their money holding decisions, they receive an idiosyncratic shock that affects their valuation for consumption and, hence, for the unique liquid asset, namely money. Subsequently, agents can choose whether they want to enter the OTC market in order to sell assets and thus boost their liquidity or to buy assets and thus provide liquidity to other agents. In our model, inflation affects not only the money holding decisions of agents, as is standard in monetary theory, but also the entry decision of these agents in the financial market. We use our framework to study the effect of inflation on welfare, asset prices and OTC trade volume. In contrast to most monetary models, which predict a negative relationship between inflation and welfare, we find that inflation can be welfare improving within a certain range, because it mitigates a search externality that agents impose on one another when they make their OTC market entry decision. Also, an increase in the holding cost of money will lead to a decrease in asset prices, a regularity that is well documented in the data and often considered anomalous.     

Identifying terms of trade shocks in a developing country using a sign restrictions approach

Using annual data for Botswana from 1960 to 2012, we examine the responses of macroeconomic variables to four generalized positive terms of trade shocks – global demand, globalizing, sector-specific and global supply. A sign-restricted structural vector autoregression model with a penalty function is estimated to identify the four possible shocks. While positive global demand and globalization shocks are both expansionary, they have opposite effects on inflation. A positive commodity market specific shock dampens real GDP growth and is inflationary, suggesting a possible Dutch disease response. A negative global supply shock suppresses both output growth and inflation. All but the last shock leads to a significant declining interest rate. Monetary policy contraction is recommended for the first shock and expansion for the others.     

Pecking order and core‐periphery in international trade

This paper analyzes the impact of market size and trade costs on bilateral trade flows. A multi‐country trade model with firm‐level heterogeneity in productivities and countries’ market potential provides a simple micro foundation for the link between these variables. In the model, market size and trade costs jointly determine a country‐specific pecking order of exporters serving their destination countries. In a counterfactual setting where bilateral trade costs are homogeneous across country pairs, market size predicts a common ranking of exporters among destination countries. This leads to a unique core‐periphery structure of the world trade network. With heterogeneous trade costs, we illustrate the impact of market size and trade costs on bilateral trade flows and its margins in a simple gravity‐like setting. Using an instrumental variables approach, we find that both market size and trade costs (measured through the network position of countries) have a significant impact on bilateral exports: countries in the core bilaterally trade more with other countries in the core than with peripheral countries, conditional on typical observables.     

Demand complementarities and cross‐country price differences

Empirical studies document that markups vary across destinations. This paper proposes a novel mechanism to explain variation in markups: consumers’ utility from final goods and services depends on their consumption of complementary goods and services. In countries with more complementary goods and services, consumer demand is less elastic, enabling monopolistically competitive firms to charge higher prices. The paper provides empirical evidence documenting a dependence of prices on demand complementarities.