The impact of social identity on trust in China: experimental evidence from cross-group comparisons

Social identity tends to bias decision making in favour of in-group members with whom one shares a common social membership. This article investigates the trust behaviour of mainland Chinese when interacting with nonmainlanders in a two-party decision-making situation. Our experimental results reveal that, relative to their Hong Kong brethren who tend to be insensitive to their potential partner’s background of origin, the decisions of mainland Chinese are significantly impacted by sharing a common background. This suggests mistrust may limit the effectiveness of China’s policy of promoting international cooperation.     

On the effects of group identity in strategic environments

We examine differences in behavior between subjects interacting with a member of either the same or different identity group in both a centipede game and a series of stag hunt games. We find evidence that subjects interacting with outgroup members are more likely to behave as though best-responding to uniform randomization of the partner. We conclude that group identity not only affects player׳s social preferences, as identified in earlier research, but also affects the decision making process, independent of changes in the utility function.     

Rotating group representatives and group members’ requests in repeated public goods game

ABSTRACT

This study investigated the effect of group representatives on contribution behaviour in response to group members’ requests in repeated public goods games. Data came from 135 students in 15 groups enrolled in the experiment, grouped in the following treatments: no group representatives (NR, NRG) and group representatives (R1, R2). We also tested initial requests wherein the group members’ initial requests (i.e. NRG, R2) mediated the positive relationship between individual-level contribution preferences and group contributions. We used a fixed-effects GLS regression and IV regression to analyse the effect of group representatives and group members’ requests. The results indicated the following: (a) rotating group representative/group members’ requests was related to group contributions at the session (within-members) and group (between-group) levels; (b) the reactions to members’ requests positively predicted group contributions; (c) subjects in the no group representatives treatment formed their requests by relying more on previous group contributions than subjects in the group representatives treatment, who relied more on the previous group members’ requests; and (d) the initial requests explained long-term contribution levels, which resulted in variations in group contributions observed between the NRG and R2 treatments. Our findings highlight the role of rotating group representatives in stimulating cooperation among members, while group members’ requests impel individuals to make contribution decisions at the group level.     

Inequity aversion and trustees' reciprocity in the trust game

The introduction of inequity concerns into the Trust Game gives rise to complementary concepts of conditional trustworthiness and unconditional untrustworthiness. When the inequity concern is not accounted for, unconditional untrustworthiness is overestimated. The high proportion of trustees adopting the equal division behavioural norm suggests that an unequal distribution of show-up fees may deter trustors from placing trust, and may eventually reduce the incentive to cooperate for both players. It also follows that increases in income inequality can explain declines in self-reported trust in high-income countries.     

Exploring group decision making in a power-to-take experiment

Most studies that compare individual and group behavior neglect the in-group decision making process. This paper explores the decision making process within groups in a strategic setting: a two player power-to-take experiment. Discussions preceding group decisions are video taped and analyzed. We find the following: (1) no impact of the group setting as such on individual behavior; (2) heterogeneity of individual types; (3) perceptions of fairness are hardly discussed and are prone to the self-serving bias; (4) groups ignore the decision rule of other groups and typically view them as if they were single agents. (5) We also show that to explain group outcomes two factors have to be taken into account that are often neglected: the distribution of individual types over groups and the decision rules that groups use to arrive at their decision. JEL Classification A12 · C72 · C91 · C92     

Whatever you say, your reputation precedes you: Observation and cheap talk in the trust game

Behavior in trust games has been linked to general notions of trust and trustworthiness, important components of social capital. In the equilibrium of a trust game, the investor does not invest, foreseeing that the allocator would keep all of the returns. We use a human-subjects experiment to test the effects of changes to the game designed to increase cooperation and efficiency. We add a pre-play stage in which the investor receives a cheap-talk message from the allocator, observes the allocator's previous decision, or both. None of these changes alter the game's theoretical predictions. We find that allowing observation results in substantially higher cooperation and efficiency, but cheap talk has little effect.     

Links between trust in the ECB and its interest rate policy

We analyse determinants of trust in the European Central Bank (ECB). Our main finding is that when households have pessimistic expectations, aggressive cuts in interest rates have an adverse effect on their trust in central bank. This result is in accordance with the ‘lack-of-confidence shock’ hypothesis developed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) and in contrast with the ‘fundamental shock’ hypothesis which implies positive effects of aggressive cuts for trust in the ECB. The result is robust to various changes in the modelling approach.     

Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments

We test for behavioral differences between groups and individuals in gift-exchange experiments. Related studies in economics establish group behavior as often closer to the standard game-theoretic equilibrium under the assumptions of rationality and selfishness. We show that this result may depend crucially on the decision making procedure within groups and the nature of the task. A novel experimental decision making protocol opens the black box of group decision making and allows tracking important features of the group interaction process. We are also able to show that acting in a group may shift initial individual choices.

Gender differences in trust and reciprocity: evidence from a large-scale experiment with heterogeneous subjects

This article examines gender differences in an experimental trust game. Recent studies have shown that men trust more and that women are more reciprocal in laboratory experiments. Participants in these studies, however, are typically university students who may not be representative of the entire population. In this study, we use data from a large-scale experiment with heterogeneous subjects who are representative of the German population. We find that men exhibit not only more trusting behaviour, but also more reciprocating behaviour than women. Moreover, our results are indicative of age-dependent gender differences. For men, we find an inverse U-shaped relationship between age, on the one hand, and both trust and reciprocity, on the other; however, we do not find age effects for women.     

Social Preferences in the Lab: A Comparison of Students and a Representative Population

We report from a lab experiment conducted with a sample of participants that is nationally representative for the adult population in Norway and two student samples (economics students and non‐economics students). The participants make choices both in a dictator game (a non‐strategic environment) and in a generalized trust game (a strategic environment). We find that the representative sample differs fundamentally from the student samples, both in the relative importance assigned to different moral motives (efficiency, equity, and reciprocity) and in the level of selfish behavior. It is also interesting to note that the gender effects observed in the student samples do not correspond to the gender effects observed in representative sample. Finally, whereas economics students behave less pro‐socially than non‐economics students, the two student groups are similar in the relative importance they assign to different moral motives.     

The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses

We randomly draw a game from a distribution on the set of two-player games with a given size. We compute the distribution and the expectation of the number of pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game conditional on the game having nondecreasing best-response functions. The conditional expected number of pure-strategy Nash equilibria becomes much larger than the unconditional expected number as the size of the game grows.     

Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game

We study the voluntary provision of a discrete public good via the contribution game. Players independently and simultaneously make nonrefundable contributions to fund a discrete public good, which is provided if and only if contributions cover the cost of production. We characterize nonconstant continuous symmetric equilibria, giving sufficient conditions for their existence. We show the common normalization by which players’ values are distributed over [0, 1] is not without loss of generality: if the distribution over this interval has continuous density f with f(0) >  0, then no (nonconstant) continuous symmetric equilibrium exists. We study in detail the case in which players’ private values are uniformly distributed, showing that, generically, when one continuous equilibrium exists, a continuum of continuous equilibria exists. For any given cost of the good, multiple continuous equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked. Nevertheless, not all continuous equilibria are interim incentive efficient. The set of interim incentive efficient equilibria is exactly determined. The authors thank Manfred Dix, George Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, and an anonymous referee for their comments.     

Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies: Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India

Electric irrigation contributes to food security in rural India, but deteriorating electrical infrastructures threaten the functioning of farmers’ pump sets. This problem could be solved through investments in energy‐efficient technologies. However, network externalities create a coordination problem for farmers. We develop a framed field experiment to study the effects of group size, leading by example, and payoff structures on the ability to coordinate technology adoption investments. The experiment is based on a game that combines features of a step‐level public goods game and a critical mass game. Our findings show that smaller groups more frequently coordinate on payoff‐superior equilibria and that higher payoffs lead to more investments. Contrary to previous studies, leading by example reduces investments but has no effect on efficiency. Building on this analysis, we discuss possible bottom‐up solutions to the energy crisis in rural India.     

Equilibria in a dynamic global game: the role of cohort effects

Summary. We introduce strategic waiting in a global game setting with irreversible investment. Players can wait in order to make a better informed decision. We allow for cohort effects, which arise endogenously in technology adoption problems with positive contemporaneous network effects. Formally, cohort effects lead to intra-period network effects being greater than inter-period network effects. Depending on the nature of the cohort effects, our game may or may not satisfy dynamic increasing differences. If it does, our model has a unique rationalizable outcome. Otherwise, multiple equilibria may exist as players want to invest at the same point in time others do.Received: 13 July 2004, Revised: 20 May 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D82, D83.We thank George-Marios Angeletos, Helmut Bester, Andreas Blume, Estelle Cantillon, Frank Heinemann, Christian Hellwig, Larry Karp, Tobias Kretschmer, In Ho Lee, Robin Mason and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. We also thank seminar participants at the EEA-meeting in Stockholm 2003, ESRC Workshop in Warwick 2004, Free University Berlin, IAE (Barcelona), Keele, MIT, Southampton, University of Pittsburgh, and at a CEPR-conference in Brussels 2002 for comments, and the European Union for providing financial support through the TMR network on network industries (Contract number FMRX-CT98-0203). This paper was completed while the first author visited the Department of Economics at MIT, whose hospitality he gratefully acknowledges.     

Competition vs. collaboration in the generation and adoption of a sequence of new technologies: a game theory approach

The study provides a game theoretic exploration of firms’ decisions on whether to compete or collaborate in the generation and adoption of a sequence of new technologies. Different from models proposed by previous studies, which concentrates on process innovation and a two-strategy set (innovation or do nothing), the present game theory model emphasises product innovation and a three-strategy set (innovation, collaboration, or do nothing). The study makes three contributions. The proposed game theory model extends current understanding of the impacts of collaboration possibilities and collaboration cost in a dynamic game theory. Further, the model clarifies the impact of transaction costs on the outcome. Finally, the study finds that the relationship between collaboration costs is not univariate, but depends on the market type and various market characteristics, such as technology gap, technology level, the product substitution index, transaction costs, and the discount rate of price sensitiveness.     

Corruption governance and its dynamic stability based on a three-party evolutionary game with the government,the public,and public officials

The current state of corruption in China is still worrisome. Corruption among public officials depends not only on their subjective will, but also on the success rate of government investigations and public whistleblowing. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this study constructs an evolutionary game model with the government, the people, and public officials and solves the dynamic model. The authors also provide a numerical simulation of the proposed model to confirm theoretical predictions. The results reveal that when the government’s success rate reaches a certain threshold, public officials will trend to a strategy of no bribery, and at this threshold, raising the cost of bribing public officials can quickly prevent them from corruption. At the equilibrium, the public will trend toward a strategy of no whistleblowing. The findings of this study are of great significance to the current anti-corruption debate in China.     

Asymmetric information in a competitive market game: Reexamining the implications of rational expectations

Summary. We examine price formation in a simple static model with asymmetric information, an infinite number of risk neutral traders and no noise traders. Here we re-examine four results associated with rational expectations models relating to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium prices, the advantage of becoming informed, the costly acquisition of information, and the impossibility of having equilibrium prices with higher volatility than the underlying fundamentals. Received: August 27, 1997; revised version: February 11, 1998     

Two Sides of the Same Coin: Re-examining Nepotism and Discrimination in a Segmented Society

Abstract

We report the results from a series of trust games designed to distinguish racial discrimination from racial nepotism, played with a sample of high school students in Cape Town, South Africa. In contrast to the original work in this regard by Fershtman et al. (2005 Fershtman, C., Gneezy, U. and Verboven, F. 2005. “Discrimination and Nepotism: the efficiency of the anonymity rule,”. Journal of Legal Studies, 34: 371–396. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), we find considerably greater heterogeneity in the way that proposers respond to the revealed racial identity of their partner, with nepotism being a dominant behavior. However, while some proposers exhibit a nepotistic bias in their offers that favors in-group members on average, others exhibit a nepotistic strategy that favors out-group members. A consequence of this nepotism is that both efficiency and equity are reduced on average.     

The Law and Bioeconomics of Ethnic Cooperation and Conflict in Plural Societies of Southeast Asia: a Theory of Chinese Merchant Success

Overseas Chinese dominate merchant roles in the economies of Southeast Asia. Chinese merchant success has generated envy and hatred by indigenous populations, resulting in episodes of racial violence toward the Chinese. In order to understand the economic basis of inter-ethnic conflict and violence, it is necessary to understand the economic basis of success of Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia. The paper presents an economic theory of Chinese middleman success. Central to the theory is the idea that the Confucian code of ethics which emphasize the importance of mutual aid/reciprocity among kinsmen, fellow-villagers and those speaking the same dialect, enabled the Chinese to cooperate among members of their own dialect group to form a club-like ethnically homogeneous middleman group (EHMG) for the provision of infrastructure, essential for middleman entrepreneurship. Chinese merchants embedded in the EHMG were able to economize on transaction costs, and this gave them a differential advantage to out-compete other ethnic groups to appropriate merchant roles. The EHMG functions also as a 'cultural transmission unit' transmitting Confucian ethics to future generations of Chinese middlemen, hence maintaining Chinese merchant roles over time. The paper draws on some key concepts in the New Institutional Economics literature as well as modern evolutionary biology.     

The effect of pharmacogenetic profiling with a clinical decision support tool on healthcare resource utilization and estimated costs in the elderly exposed to polypharmacy

Objective:

To compare healthcare resource utilization (HRU) and clinical decision-making for elderly patients based on cytochrome P450 (CYP) pharmacogenetic testing and the use of a comprehensive medication management clinical decision support tool (CDST), to a cohort of similar non-tested patients.

Methods:

An observational study compared a prospective cohort of patients ≥65 years subjected to pharmacogenetic testing to a propensity score (PS) matched historical cohort of untested patients in a claims database. Patients had a prescribed medication or dose change of at least one of 61 oral drugs or combinations of ≥3 drugs at enrollment. Four-month HRU outcomes examined included hospitalizations, emergency department (ED) and outpatient visits and provider acceptance of test recommendations. Costs were estimated using national data sources.

Results:

There were 205 tested patients PS matched to 820 untested patients. Hospitalization rate was 9.8% in the tested group vs 16.1% in the untested group (RR?=?0.61, 95% CI?=?0.39–0.95, p?=?0.027), ED visit rate was 4.4% in the tested group vs 15.4% in the untested group (RR?=?0.29, 95% CI?=?0.15–0.55, p?=?0.0002) and outpatient visit rate was 71.7% in the tested group vs 36.5% in the untested group (RR?=?1.97, 95% CI?=?1.74–2.23, p?<?0.0001). The rate of overall HRU was 72.2% in the tested group vs 49.0% in the untested group (RR?=?1.47, 95% CI?=?1.32–1.64, p?<?0.0001). Potential cost savings were estimated at $218 (mean) in the tested group. The provider majority (95%) considered the test helpful and 46% followed CDST provided recommendations.

Conclusion:

Patients CYP DNA tested and treated according to the personalized prescribing system had a significant decrease in hospitalizations and emergency department visits, resulting in potential cost savings. Providers had a high satisfaction rate with the clinical utility of the system and followed recommendations when appropriate.