Internal Audit Quality and Financial Reporting Quality: The Joint Importance of Independence and Competence

In light of the growing importance of internal audit functions (IAF) and the limited archival evidence on internal audit quality, we examine an interactive model of IAF quality (comprised of competence and independence) to better understand the determinants of IAF effectiveness as a financial reporting monitor. Our tests support the hypothesis that the joint presence of competence and independence is a necessary antecedent to effective IAF financial reporting monitoring. In sum, our results show that, the answer to “what is the effect of internal audit competence (independence) on financial reporting quality?” is “it depends on the independence (competence) of the internal auditor.” Our study extends the understanding of IAF quality determinants in the realm of financial reporting as it relates to ongoing discussions by researchers, standard setters, regulators, and practitioners.     

Disentangling Managers’ and Analysts’ Non‐GAAP Reporting

Researchers frequently proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures using performance metrics available through analyst forecast data providers (FDPs), such as I/B/E/S. The extent to which FDP‐provided earnings are a valid proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP reporting, however, has been debated extensively. We explore this important question by creating the first large‐sample data set of managers’ non‐GAAP earnings disclosures, which we directly compare to I/B/E/S data. Although we find a substantial overlap between the two data sets, we also find that they differ in systematic ways because I/B/E/S (1) excludes managers’ lower quality non‐GAAP numbers and (2) sometimes provides higher quality non‐GAAP measures that managers do not explicitly disclose. Our results indicate that using I/B/E/S to identify managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures significantly underestimates the aggressiveness of their reporting choices. We encourage researchers interested in managers’ non‐GAAP reporting to use our newly available data set of manager‐disclosed non‐GAAP metrics because it more accurately captures managers’ reporting choices.     

Do Audit Clients Successfully Engage in Opinion Shopping? Partner‐Level Evidence

This study investigates whether companies engage in audit opinion shopping activities by exerting influence over an audit firm's decision to switch the engagement partner (“partner‐level opinion shopping”) in the Chinese setting, where the identities of engagement partners are publicly disclosed. Adopting the empirical framework developed by Lennox [2000], we show evidence that companies successfully engage in partner‐level opinion shopping. Further, partner‐level opinion shopping is more likely to be successful if a company is economically important to an audit firm, and it is less likely to be successful if the audit firm is formed as a partnership rather than a corporation. We also find that companies successfully engaging in partner‐level opinion shopping exhibit significantly lower earnings quality. Finally, we directly compare audit records between incoming and outgoing partners and find that, for companies that successfully improve audit opinions after partner switching, incoming partners have a significantly higher propensity to issue clean opinions than their outgoing counterparts.     

Market uncertainty and disclosure of internal control deficiencies under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act

This study examines cross-sectional differences in stock market reactions to the disclosure of internal control deficiencies under Section 302 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. We hypothesize that the market punishment for internal control problems will be less severe for internal control disclosure that helps reduce market uncertainty around the disclosure. We also predict that such a relation is dependent on the types of disclosure and the market’s prior knowledge of the credibility of firms’ financial reporting. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that when firms disclose their internal control deficiencies, their abnormal stock returns are negatively associated with changes in market uncertainty (e.g., changes in the standard deviations of daily stock returns) around the disclosure. We also find that the impact of the uncertainty reduction is greater for voluntary disclosures of non-material weakness, especially those made in the context of previous suspicious events. The negative impact of changes in market uncertainty on the abnormal stock returns remains intact even after controlling for possible simultaneity. An analysis using financial analysts’ earnings forecasts dispersion as an alternative proxy for uncertainty confirms the results.     

The effect of board composition on the informativeness and quality of annual earnings: Empirical evidence from Greece

This study examines how the informational quality of annual accounting earnings, varies according to the size and composition of the board of directors of publicly listed firms within the Greek capital market. Data analysis over a period of five years (2000-2004) revealed that the informativeness of annual accounting earnings is positively related to the fraction of outside directors serving on the board, but it is not related to board size. Additionally, firms with a higher proportion of outside board members proved to be more conservative when reporting bad news but on the contrary they do not display greater timeliness on the recognition of good news. Finally, firms with a higher proportion of outside directors report earnings of higher quality compared to firms with a low proportion of outside directors. Our results are robust to several sensitivity tests controlling for endogeneity, firm's fixed effects and alternative models for the estimation of discretionary accruals.     

Auditor Mindsets and Audits of Complex Estimates

Auditors experience significant problems auditing complex accounting estimates, and this increasingly puts financial reporting quality at risk. Based on analyses of the specific errors that auditors commit, we propose that auditors need to be able to think more broadly and incorporate information from a variety of sources in order to improve audit quality for these important accounts. We experimentally demonstrate that a deliberative mindset intervention improves auditors’ ability to identify unreasonable estimates by improving their ability to identify and incorporate into their analyses contradictory information from diverse parts of the audit and improving their ability to think critically about the evidence. We perform additional analyses to demonstrate that our intervention improves auditor performance by causing them to think differently rather than simply to work harder. We demonstrate that critical thinking can improve the identification of unreasonable estimates and, in doing so, we provide new directions for addressing audit quality issues.     

Analyst reputation and management earnings forecasts

Prior studies show that analysts with high reputation are influential in the market. This paper examines whether managers consider analyst reputation in shaping their voluntary disclosure strategy. Using Institutional Investor magazine’s All-American (AA) rankings as a proxy for analyst reputation, we find that the coverage of AA analysts is positively associated with the likelihood of quarterly management earnings forecasts (MEFs). We also find that AA analysts’ forecast optimism is more positively associated with the likelihood of MEFs than non-AA analysts’ forecast optimism when the firm is covered by AA analysts. Analyses based on AA analyst coverage changes and AA status changes confirm the relation between analyst reputation and MEFs. We further find that analyst reputation influences other MEF properties, such as forecast news, bias, and revisions, and that our results are robust to alternative measures of analyst reputation. Further analyses show that market reactions at quarterly earnings announcements are more positive (negative) when firms meet/beat (miss) AA analysts’ forecasts than when firms meet/beat (miss) non-AA analysts’ forecasts. Collectively, our findings suggest that managers strategically provide voluntary forecasts by taking into account the reputation of individual analysts following their firms.     

The impact of product market competition on earnings quality

The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of product market competition on earnings quality. Based on a sample from the US manufacturing sector for the period 1996–2005, we find consistent evidence showing a positive relation between product market competition and earnings quality. Additional tests also confirm a positive relation between product market competition and the precision of public and private information held by investors and analysts. We also provide evidence that firms competing in concentrated and heterogeneous industries are associated with a number of earnings attributes and information quality not shared by those competing in concentrated but homogeneous industries. These findings are consistent with the intuition that firms enjoying a monopolistic advantage tend to avoid the attention of their competitors and politicians by creating a more opaque information environment.     

Do Opinions on Financial Misstatement Firms Affect Analysts’ Reputation with Investors? Evidence from Reputational Spillovers

We examine whether opinions on firms subsequently revealed to have misstated earnings affect analysts’ reputation with investors. We find that positive opinions by bullish analysts hurt their reputation, leading investors to react less to their research on non‐misstatement firms after the misstatement revelation (i.e., negative spillovers). We also find that bearish analysts issuing more negative opinions gain reputation and experience positive spillovers. Finally, for analysts who dropped coverage of the misstatement firm before the misstatement revelation, we find no spillovers, which suggests that analysts experience limited reputational gains when they did not issue a public negative opinion.     

Information Content of Internal Control Weaknesses: The Evidence from Japan

This paper investigates how capital markets in a code-law country, Japan, react to the disclosure of internal control weaknesses (ICW). The Japanese government attempted to implement a more concise, efficient, and, thus, less strict internal control reporting system than Section 404 of the US-SOX. In fact, for the first two years, the disclosure rate of ICW has been much lower in Japan than in the U.S. While market reactions to the disclosure of ICW are not significantly different from zero in our event study analysis, they become significantly negative after controlling for other information released around the disclosure date, audit quality, and other firm attributes. Our results are consistent with the notion that the disclosure of ICW is informative to the market because it is less frequent and exceptional in Japan.     

Audit committees and earnings quality

This research investigates whether audit committees are associated with improved earnings quality for a sample of Australian listed companies prior to the introduction of mandatory audit committee requirements in 2003. Two measures of earnings quality are used based on models first developed by Jones (1991 ) and Dechow and Dichev (2002 ). Our results indicate that formation of an audit committee reduces intentional earnings management but not accrual estimation errors. We also find differences in the associations between audit committee accounting expertise and the two earnings quality measures. Other audit committee characteristics examined are not significantly related to either earnings quality measure.     

Management by the Numbers: A Formal Approach to Deriving Informational and Distributional Properties of “Unmanaged” Earnings

We explore the theoretical relation between earnings and market returns as well as the properties of earnings frequency distributions under the assumption that managers use unbiased accounting information to sequentially decide on real options their firms have and report generated earnings truthfully, with the market pricing the firm based on those reported earnings. We generate benchmarks against which empirically observed earnings‐returns relations and aggregate earnings distributions can be evaluated. This parsimonious model shows a coherent set of results: reported losses are less persistent than reported gains, decision making diminishes the S‐shaped market response to earnings and earnings relate to returns asymmetrically in the way documented by Basu [1997]. Furthermore, the implied frequency distribution of aggregate earnings is neither symmetric nor necessarily single‐peaked. Instead, it may exhibit a kink at zero and look similar to the plots reported by Burgstahler and Dichev [1997]. However, within our model, none of these phenomena are due to reporting noise, bias, or some undesirable strategic managerial behavior. They are the natural consequences of using past earnings as the basis for value increasing managerial decision making that in turn generates the future earnings on which future decisions will be based.     

Audit Firm Tenure,Non‐Audit Services,and Internal Assessments of Audit Quality

We use data from internal assessments of audit quality in a Big 4 firm to investigate the impact of audit firm tenure and auditor‐provided non‐audit services (NAS) on audit quality. We find that first‐year audits receive lower assessments of audit quality and that quality improves shortly thereafter and then declines as tenure becomes very long. Partitioning our sample between SEC registrants and private clients, we find that the decline in audit quality in the long tenure range is attributable to audits of private clients. For audits of SEC registrants, the probability of a high quality audit reaches its maximum with very long tenure. We also find that audit fees are discounted for first‐year audits but auditor effort is higher than in subsequent years. We find no association, on average, between total NAS fees and audit quality in the full sample but observe that total NAS fees are positively associated with quality for SEC registrants and negatively associated with quality for privately held clients. Our findings are important for regulatory policies related to audit firm tenure and auditor‐provided NAS.