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1.
JEREMY B. GRIFFIN 《Journal of Accounting Research》2014,52(5):1165-1193
Financial accounting standards increasingly require fair value measurements. I experimentally examine how uncertainty affects auditors’ adjustment decisions when evaluating fair values. I manipulate two types of uncertainty, input subjectivity and outcome imprecision, and one reporting choice, supplemental disclosure. I find that auditors are most likely to require adjustments when fair values contain both more input subjectivity and more outcome imprecision, but that this likelihood diminishes when clients supplement recognized fair values with additional disclosure. Thus, consistent with moral licensing, I find that auditors tolerate greater potential misstatement in the financial statements when clients provide disclosure, suggesting that the SEC's preference for supplemental disclosure may have the unintended consequence of affecting fair values recognized in the body of the financial statements. I also provide evidence that auditors determine adjustment size by comparing recorded fair value to the nearest bound, rather than the midpoint, of the auditors’ own range estimate, consistent with strict application of auditing standards. 相似文献
2.
MICHAEL MINNIS 《Journal of Accounting Research》2011,49(2):457-506
I examine how verification of financial statements influences debt pricing. I use a large proprietary database of privately held U.S. firms, an important business sector in which the information environment is opaque and financial statement audits are not mandated. I find that audited firms have a significantly lower cost of debt and that lenders place more weight on audited financial information in setting the interest rate. Further, I provide evidence of a mechanism for this increased financial statement usefulness: accruals from audited financial statements are better predictors of future cash flows. Collectively, I provide novel evidence that audited financial statements are more informative and that this significantly influences lenders’ decisions. 相似文献
3.
We investigate whether recognition on the face of the financial statements versus disclosure in the footnotes influences the amount that financial managers report for a contingent liability. Using an experiment with corporate controllers and chief financial officers, we find that financial managers in public companies expend more cognitive effort and exhibit less strategic bias under recognition than disclosure. This difference appears to be associated with capital market pressures experienced by public company managers as we find that both the cognitive effort and bias exhibited by private company managers are unaffected by placement. As a result, public company managers make higher liability estimates for recognized versus disclosed liabilities. Their liability estimates are similar to those of private company managers for recognition but lower than private company managers’ estimates for disclosure. Our results have implications for auditors and financial statement users in evaluating recognized versus disclosed information for public and private companies. 相似文献
4.
《Journal of Accounting and Public Policy》2022,41(6):107012
Disaster-affected clients demand significant additional effort from their audit office, and hence strain the audit office’s resources available to other non-disaster-affected clients. We consider audit offices with disaster-affected clients to be strained offices and find that, compared with clients audited by non-strained audit offices, non-disaster-affected clients audited by strained audit offices are more likely to have their financial statements restated. This result suggests the financial reporting quality of companies not directly exposed to disasters could also be negatively affected by the disasters, due to their auditors’ strained-resource issue. We further find such a negative effect is more pronounced when the degree of resource constraints is greater and when the audit office lacks client experience or industry expertise. We offer novel evidence of financial reporting consequences of natural disasters, focusing on the externality of disasters on companies not directly affected by disasters. The findings have important implications for regulators in making disaster-related policies, for auditors in managing their client portfolios, and for companies in making auditor choice decisions. 相似文献
5.
Private firms face differing financial disclosure and auditing regulations around the world. In the US and Canada, for example, private firms are generally neither required to disclose their financial results nor have their financial statements audited. By contrast, many firms with limited liability in most other countries are required to file at least some financial information publicly and are also required to have their financial statements audited. This paper discusses and analyzes the reasons for differential financial reporting regulation of private firms. We first discuss various definitions of a private firm. Next, we examine theoretical arguments for regulating the financial reporting of these firms, particularly related to public disclosure and auditing. We then provide new survey-based evidence of firms’ and standard setters’ views of regulation. We conclude by identifying future research opportunities. 相似文献
6.
Accounting standards now require management (as preparers of the financial statements) to assess and disclose going concern problems to stakeholders. However, important questions exist about managers’ ability and willingness to provide credible going concern assessments given their role as financial statement preparers and incentives to avoid self-reporting problems. The objective of this study is to investigate the effects of problem severity and recovery strategy on managers’ going concern disclosure judgments and decisions. We conduct an experiment with 84 experienced managers involved with financial reporting and find they are most likely to recommend going concern disclosure when financial distress is high and the recovery plan focuses on debt and equity. The results also suggest that managers have higher “substantial doubt” thresholds than auditors, and their perceptions regarding the fairness of the going concern standard also influence their decisions about disclosures of going concern issues. 相似文献
7.
Ray Ball Sudarshan Jayaraman Lakshmanan Shivakumar 《Journal of Accounting and Economics》2012,53(1-2):136-166
We examine the “confirmation” hypothesis that audited financial reporting and disclosure of managers' private information are complements, because independent verification of outcomes disciplines and hence enhances disclosure credibility. Committing to higher audit fees (a measure of financial statement verification) is associated with management forecasts that are more frequent, specific, timely, accurate and informative to investors. Because private information disclosure and audited financial reporting are complements, their economic roles cannot be evaluated separately. Our evidence cautions against drawing inferences exclusively from market reactions around “announcement periods” because audited financial reporting indirectly affects information released at other times and through other channels. 相似文献
8.
We examine whether the public availability of product market incumbents' financial disclosures leads to greater capital structure mimicking of incumbents by entrants. Exploiting a change in disclosure enforcement for German private firms in the mid-2000s, we find entrant-incumbent mimicking rises substantially in concentrated markets once incumbents' financial statements are publicly available. Additional tests exploring potential mechanisms are more consistent with interfirm learning underlying the effect than alternative channels. Our findings shed light on the effects of competitor financial statement disclosure on private firms’ initial financing decisions and highlight how capital structure dependencies among peer firms arise. 相似文献
9.
《Journal of Accounting and Public Policy》2020,39(6):106735
This paper investigates the potential role of enforcement action in shaping firms’ decisions to opt out of highly regulated stock market regimes. Our analyses are set in the German environment, where firms may choose to “downlist” from an EU-regulated to an exchange-regulated stock market, thereby circumvent mandatory preparation of IFRS financial statements and enforcement oversight. We find that downlisting firms are more likely to have been censured by enforcement bodies for erroneous accounting, compared to a sample of control firms, and that this association is more pronounced for severe or controversial errors. This finding is consistent with enforcement actions creating costs for firms and managers. Event study analyses show that market price reactions to firms’ downlisting announcements are negative in about one out of two cases. This suggests that in quite a few cases, managers, by downlisting, may be protecting private benefits rather than the interests of equity holders. Additional analyses reveals that about half of our sample firms continued to prepare IFRS financial statements on a voluntary basis after the downlisting. Taken together, our results contribute to the literature on the economic consequences of the EU’s IAS and enforcement regulation by suggesting that some firms adopt avoidance strategies to opt out of enforcement supervision. 相似文献
10.
ZAHN BOZANIC JEFFREY L. HOOPES JACOB R. THORNOCK BRADEN M. WILLIAMS 《Journal of Accounting Research》2017,55(1):79-114
We study how public and private disclosure requirements interact to influence both tax regulator enforcement and firm disclosure. To capture IRS enforcement activities, we introduce a novel data set of IRS acquisition of firms’ public financial disclosures, which we label IRS attention. We examine the implementation of two new disclosure requirements that potentially alter IRS attention: FIN 48, which increased public tax disclosure requirements, and Schedule UTP, which increased private tax disclosure. We find that IRS attention increased following FIN 48 but subsequently decreased following Schedule UTP, consistent with public and private disclosure interacting to influence tax enforcement. We next examine how private tax disclosure requirements under Schedule UTP affected firms’ public disclosure responses. We find that, following Schedule UTP, firms significantly increased the quantity and altered the content of their tax‐related disclosures, consistent with lower tax‐related proprietary costs of disclosure. Our results suggest that changes in SEC disclosure requirements altered the IRS's behavior with regard to public information acquisition, and, relatedly, changes in IRS private disclosure requirements appear to change firms’ public disclosure behavior. 相似文献
11.
《Journal of Accounting and Public Policy》2023,42(4):107118
I examine whether company-implemented disclosure committees help to improve non-GAAP reporting quality. I find that firms with disclosure committees provide higher quality non-GAAP performance metrics and that the exclusions used to calculate their non-GAAP numbers are less persistent for future operating income and operating cash flows. Moreover, I find that firms with disclosure committees are less likely to receive SEC comment letters about non-GAAP disclosure. For firms that receive comment letters about non-GAAP reporting, disclosure committees can help to improve non-GAAP reporting quality. Comparing the influence of audit committees and disclosure committees, I find that audit committee financial experts have stronger monitoring effects than those on disclosure committees. Meanwhile, legal experts on disclosure committees provide similar monitoring compared to audit committees’ financial experts. Finally, the interaction between audit committee financial experts and disclosure committee legal experts produces the strongest effect on non-GAAP reporting quality. In sum, my analyses suggest that disclosure committees can provide important monitoring of non-GAAP reporting. 相似文献
12.
Hojun Seo 《Journal of Accounting and Economics》2021,71(1):101364
This study examines peer effects in corporate disclosure decisions. Peer effects suggest that the average behavior of a group influences the behavior of individual group members. Consistent with peer effects, I find that disclosures made by industry peers induce firm disclosure. Peer effects in disclosure are more pronounced when a firm's strategic uncertainty is higher, indicating that peer firm disclosure reduces the external uncertainty arising from the firm's interaction with its industry peers and thus increases the precision of managerial private information. I also find that peer effects are stronger when a firm's dependence on external financing is greater, suggesting that peer firm disclosure increases the costs on firm visibility and reputation in capital markets. Overall, these findings suggest that peer firm disclosure shapes a firm's information environment. 相似文献
13.
Bank Disclosure and Market Assessment of Financial Fragility: Evidence from Turkish Banks’ Equity Prices 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
María Fabiana Penas Günseli Tümer-Alkan 《Journal of Financial Services Research》2010,37(2-3):159-178
In this paper we explore whether Turkish banks with worsening indicators of financial fragility were subject to market monitoring during the years leading to the 2000/2001 crisis, and how the quality and timeliness of the disclosure affect market reaction. We find that shareholders reacted negatively to indicators of financial fragility such as increases in maturity mismatches, currency mismatches, and non-performing loans, showing shareholders’ concerns about the impact of financial fragility indicators on future profits. We also find that audited statements that show larger reporting lags, are not informative, pointing to the need of improving their timeliness. Finally, our study suggests that the finding that securities prices react to financial fragility indicators should not be taken as sufficient evidence of banks’ safety and soundness. 相似文献
14.
Disclosure Regulation in the Commercial Banking Industry: Lessons from the National Banking Era
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JOÃO GRANJA 《Journal of Accounting Research》2018,56(1):173-216
I exploit variation in the adoption of disclosure and supervisory regulation across U.S. states to examine their impact on the development and stability of commercial banks. The empirical results suggest that the adoption of state‐level requirements to report financial statements in local newspapers is associated with greater stability and development of commercial banks. I also examine which political constituencies influence the adoption of disclosure and supervisory regulation. I find that powerful landowners and small private banks are associated with late adoption of these regulations. These findings suggest that incumbent groups oppose disclosure rules because the passage of such rules threatens their private interests. 相似文献
15.
《The British Accounting Review》2023,55(2):101084
We examine whether U.S. state-level third-party auditor liability (TPAL) regimes affect firms' financial restatement decisions. Using a sample of 34,409 firm-year observations from 2003 to 2018, we find that state-level TPAL is significantly negatively related to the likelihood of firm-level financial restatements. We also observe that the negative relationship between TPAL and financial restatements persists for a subsample of firms with income-increasing financial restatements and the ‘restatement of torts standard’ (one of the more expansive subgroups of TPAL). Using a difference-in-differences regression design, we find that an increase in state-level TPAL regimes strengthens the negative relationship between TPAL and the incidence of restatements. Our main finding remains robust across several sensitivity tests. Finally, we find that the negative relationship between TPAL and restatements is more pronounced when firms are subject to greater litigation risk and when firms are audited by non-specialist auditors. Overall, we show that TPAL has important implications for client firms' financial restatements. 相似文献
16.
This paper uses the quarterly conference call as a disclosure metric to examine whether firms with less informative financial statements are more likely to respond by providing additional voluntary disclosure. After controlling for other characteristics of a firm's information environment, I find a significant inverse relation between measures of the informativeness of a firm's financial statements and the likelihood that the firm will use a quarterly conference call. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis in Verrecchia (1990) that the probability of disclosure of management's private information is negatively related to the precision of prior public information on firm value. 相似文献
17.
PRAVEEN KUMAR NISAN LANGBERG K. SIVARAMAKRISHNAN 《Journal of Accounting Research》2012,50(4):1041-1076
We examine the valuation and capital allocation roles of voluntary disclosure when managers have private information regarding the firm’s investment opportunities, but an efficient market for corporate control influences their investment decisions. For managers with long‐term stakes in the firm, the equilibrium disclosure region is two‐tailed: only extreme good news and extreme bad news is disclosed in equilibrium. Moreover, the market’s stock price and investment responses to bad news disclosures are stronger than the responses to good news disclosures, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. We also find that myopic managers are more likely to withhold bad news in good economic times when markets can independently assess expected investment returns. 相似文献
18.
《Accounting in Europe》2013,10(3):347-373
AbstractI investigate the effect of family ownership on firms’ disclosure practices in their annual reports. In specific, I study Swedish publicly listed firms, which are typically characterized by controlling owners that have a strong influence in the corporate governance decisions of the firm, including corporate disclosures. To measure disclosure, I construct a comprehensive disclosure index covering information on (1) corporate governance, (2) strategic and financial targets and (3) notes to the financial statements. The results reveal that overall, family firms provide less disclosure in annual reports than non-family firms do. The finding is consistent with the premise that through their management positions, family owners can directly monitor managers and avoid costly public disclosures. Overall, the results suggest that ownership structure of firms is important to consider in understanding firms’ disclosure incentives, particularly in settings where controlling owners play a significant role in the governance of the firm. 相似文献
19.
This study uses a comprehensive panel of tax returns to examine the financial reporting choices of medium-to-large private U.S. firms, a setting that controls over $9 trillion in capital, vastly outnumbers public U.S. firms across all industries, yet has no financial reporting mandates. We find that nearly two-thirds of these firms do not produce audited GAAP financial statements. Guided by an agency theory framework, we find that size, ownership dispersion, external debt, and trade credit are positively associated with the choice to produce audited GAAP financial statements, while asset tangibility, age, and internal debt are generally negatively related to this choice. Our findings reveal that (1) equity capital and trade credit exhibit significant explanatory power, suggesting that the primary focus in the literature on debt is too narrow; (2) firm youth, growth, and R&D are positively associated with audited GAAP reporting, reflecting important monitoring roles of financial reporting; and (3) many firms violate standard explanations for financial reporting choices and substantial unexplained heterogeneity in financial reporting remains. We conclude by identifying opportunities for future research. 相似文献
20.
We provide new evidence on the disclosure in earnings announcements of financial statement line items prepared under Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). First, we investigate the circumstances that might provide disincentives generally
for GAAP line item disclosures. We find that managers who regularly intervene in the earnings reporting process limit disclosures
at the aggregate level and in each of the financial statements so as to more effectively guide investor attention to summary
financial information. Specifically, this disclosure behavior obtains when managers habitually cater to market expectations,
engage in income smoothing, or use discretionary accruals to improve earnings informativeness. Second, we predict and find
that the specific GAAP line items that firms choose to disclose are determined by the differential informational demands of
their economic environment, consistent with incentives to facilitate investor valuation. However, these valuation-related
disclosure incentives are muted when managers habitually intervene in the earnings reporting process. 相似文献