How Does the Minimum Wage Affect Firm Investments in Fixed and Human Capital? Evidence from China

This paper empirically analyzes the impact of Chinese minimum wage regulations on the firm decision to invest in physical and human capital. We exploit the geographical and inter‐temporal variations of county‐level minimum wages in a panel data set of all state‐owned and all above‐scale non‐state‐owned Chinese firms covering the introduction of the new Chinese minimum wage regulations in 2004. In our basic regressions including all Chinese firms, we find significant negative effects of the minimum wage on human capital investment rates and no overall effects on fixed capital investment rates. When grouping firms by their ownership structure, we find that these results hold for most firms. Foreign‐owned firms are an exception to some extent, because the likelihood that they invest in human capital has not decreased in response to the policy.     

中国行业收入不平等问题的解析

进入新世纪以来,中国行业收入不平等有持续扩大的趋势。基于回归方程的Shap-ley分解结果表明,人力资本、所有制、资本投资、技术等因素对行业收入差距有显著影响,其中人力资本对行业收入差距的贡献约为45%,所有制的贡献在20%以上。因此在治理措施上,实施教育均等化,提高教育回报率,开放垄断行业的劳动力市场,推行劳资谈判制度可以有效缓解行业收入差距持续扩大的问题。     

Institutional quality and skilled–unskilled wage inequality

This paper establishes two-sector general equilibrium models in the presence of unproductive activities to investigate how an improvement of the institutional quality influences the skilled–unskilled wage inequality. We find that an improvement of the institutional quality will affect the interest rate, and then the interest rate combining with the capital intensity will generate an impact on the skilled–unskilled wage inequality. Specifically, both the interest rate and comparisons of the capital–labor relative distributive shares between two sectors play an important role in determining the skilled–unskilled wage gap in an economy featured with unproductive activities. The above results are robust even when we extend the basic theoretical model in several different ways.     

Real Minimum Wage and Growth Theory: Simulations and Some Policy Results

Abstract

A Solow type two‐sector growth model is used to examine several issues related to growth and unemployment in a minimum wage economy. By simulating the model, we demonstrate that given the same percentage increase in wage rate, an economy with a higher capital–labor ratio is more likely to decay. More importantly, a tariff policy reduces the unemployment periods by 92% provided that the current capital–labor ratio is one‐sixth of that of the steady state capital–labor ratio. We assume that the first best policy of uniform wage subsidy is not politically feasible.     

Human capital investment with competitive labor search

We study human capital accumulation in the presence of labor search frictions. Given that unemployed workers can default on their education loans, skilled individuals with a larger debt burden prefer riskier but better paid careers than is socially desirable. A higher level of employment risk in turn depresses the skill premium and the incentives to invest in education. The equilibrium allocation is characterized by too low employment, underinvestment by the poor, and too little investment in skill-intensive technologies. A public education system funded by graduate taxes can restore efficiency, and it would also reduce wage inequality.     

Income Distribution, Redistributive Politics, and Economic Growth

This article studies the political economy of inequality and growth by combining the political economy approach with an imperfect capital market assumption. In the present model, there emerges a class of individuals whose members do not invest privately beyond the state-financed schooling, due to their initial wealth constraint. We show that inequality affects private investment not only through the political effect, which relates inequality to private investment negatively, but also through what we call the threshold effect, which associates inequality to private investment positively. In general, private investment and inequality do not show a monotone negative relationship.     

Rural–urban human capital disparity and skilled–unskilled wage inequality in China

This paper builds three‐sector general equilibrium models to investigate how a shrink of rural–urban human capital disparity generates an impact on skilled–unskilled wage inequality in China. In the basic model where the urban skilled sector and the urban unskilled sector have no upstream and downstream linkage, we find that the wage inequality will be narrowed down if the urban skilled sector is more capital intensive than the urban unskilled sector. To capture the characteristic of China's state capitalism, we build an extended model where the urban skilled sector acts as an upstream industry for the urban unskilled sector, and find that the wage inequality will be reduced if the substitution elasticity of unskilled labor and intermediate product in the urban unskilled sector is large enough. When we consider the factual characteristics of the Chinese economy, our models predict that a shrink of rural–urban human capital disparity will be helpful to reduce the skilled–unskilled wage inequality in China.     

Human capital accumulation, fertility and economic development

We examine the development paths of an economy by incorporating the trade-off between the quality and quantity of children and the substitutability between the educational effect within the family and the education paid for by the parent. There is a threshold wage rate, above which individuals begin to invest in the human capital of their children, while reducing the number of children. At this point, the economy shifts from an exogenous growth phase to an endogenous growth phase. It is also shown that the aggregate saving rate is positively correlated with the youth dependency ratio in the development process.     

Matching, Heterogeneity, and the Evolution of Income Distribution

This paper analyzes a model in which firms and workershave to engage in costly search to find a production partner,and endogenizes the skill, job, and wage distributions in thiscontext. The presence of search frictions implies that thereare two redistributive forces in the labor market. The firstis mismatch relative to the Walrasian economy; skilled workerstend to work with lower physical to human capital ratios, andthis compresses the earnings differentials. The second is theopportunity cost effect; because the opportunity cost of acceptingan unskilled worker, which is to forgo the opportunity to employa skilled worker, is high, unskilled wages are pushed down. Theinteraction between these two forces leads to a non-ergodic equilibriumprocess for wage and income inequality. Further, the presenceof mismatch reduces the rate of return to physical capital andthus depresses growth. A key prediction of the analysis is thatincreasing wage inequality is more likely to arise in economieswith less frictional labor markets, which is in line with thediverse cross-country patterns observed over the past two decades.Finally, the paper predicts that, as is largely the case withU.S. data, between group and within group wage inequality shouldmove in the same direction.     

Investments into education—Doing as the parents did

Empirical evidence suggests that parents with higher levels of education generally attach a higher importance to the education of their children. This implies an intergenerational chain transmitting the attitude towards the formation of human capital from one generation to the next. We incorporate this intergenerational chain into an OLG-model with endogenous human capital formation. In absence of any state intervention such an economy might be characterized by multiple steady states with low or high human capital levels. There are also steady states where the population is permanently divided into different groups with differing human capital and welfare levels. Compulsory schooling is needed to overcome steady states with low human capital and welfare levels. Tax financed education subsidies can lead to further pareto-improvements.     

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MEETS ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY: GLOBALIZATION, INEQUALITY, AND INNOVATION STRATEGIES

I perform a Schumpeterian analysis of a world economy in which heterogenous individuals and firms endogenously respond to stronger global competition by undertaking more education and by spending more in research and development (R&D). A more globalized economy is predicted to exacerbate wage inequality, but to spur human capital accumulation within each country. However, despite its positive level effects on consumption and output, globalization can reduce each country's per-capita output growth rate. R&D specialization allows each country to positively invest in manufacturing, variety proliferation R&D, and product quality upgrading R&D. The existence of such an R&D specialization – jointly with domestic size – allows us to explain some different economic performance about inequality and R&D effort of developed regions, such as the US and the EU countries.     

Distributional Effects of Public Education in an Economy with Public Pensions*

We study how the allocation of government expenditures between two major outlays—education and pay‐as‐you‐go social security—affects human capital distribution in an economy with heterogeneous agents. We consider an overlapping generations economy where the government maintains both programs, and allocates tax revenues to finance them. In our model, human capital is one of the factors of production. It is itself produced as a combined result of public inputs and private inputs. Parents' decisions to invest time and material resources in education of their children are motivated by altruism, heterogeneous in its strength across the population, which leads to heterogeneity of incomes. We investigate the effect of an increase in public funding for education on the human capital distribution. We show that in this framework, contrary to some earlier results, increased spending on public education may lead to higher inequality. Our results depend crucially on the interaction of education funding with the social security budget and on the elasticity of substitution in the learning technology.     

Factor‐biased public infrastructure and wage inequality

This paper analyzes how factor‐biased public infrastructure affects the skilled–unskilled wage inequality. In the basic model with a full employment economy, we find that when the weighted dependence of skilled labor and capital in the urban skilled sector on public infrastructure is large enough relatively to that of unskilled labor and capital in the urban unskilled sector, the wage inequality will be expanded. We also discuss labor‐biased and capital‐biased public infrastructure in our framework, and find that the relative dependences of relevant labor or capital on public infrastructure are important determinants of wage inequality. In the extended models, we analyze separately the issue of wage inequality in the economy with unemployment and the totally open capital market, and find the results of the basic model almost still hold.     

Externalities,Productivity and Sustained Growth

This paper shows that the existence of endogenous growth, in the closed‐form solution, in a single sector economy with a convex technology in an overlapping generations (OLG) framework, which attempts to fill the current gap in endogenous growth theory. It finds there is an unbounded growth when trade, in the form of knowledge spillover, affects labor productivity through the formation of human capital with self‐education that is not an independent sector but builds the human capital here. This conclusion holds even though there is the “limited income” expressed as the “non‐increasing wage/investment ratio” for each generation. Moreover, it shows the convergence of growth rates for each country, which is unique and constant, while the growth rate per capita negatively relates with each country's population growth rate. Also, there is no “poverty trap” with the introduction of externalities that is different from existing literature.     

Trade, technology, and unemployment: the role of endogenous skill formation

Abstract .  This paper analyses trade in an asymmetric  2 × 2 × 2  world, where the two countries ('Europe' and 'America') differ in their preferences towards wage inequality. Fair wage considerations compress wage differentials in both countries. European workers are more averse to wage inequality, and Europe is characterized by lower wage differentials and higher unemployment. Allowing for endogenous skill formation, the effects of a globalization shock, global technological change, and a change in the educational capital stock on skill premia and employment levels are derived. In contrast to a model with exogenous factor supplies, international wage and unemployment differentials are affected by global shocks.     

Human capital and income distribution dynamics

The paper assumes a continuum of two period-lived agents; agents are identical except for inherited income. Young agents allocate their inheritance between consumption and investment in human capital under uncertainty. In the second period they receive a wage proportional to the accumulated human capital and invest in offspring. Two main results arise: a low earning per unit of human capital leads economy to converge to a stationary income distribution whatever the initial distribution and vice versa, for a sufficiently high wage, endogenous growth operates and the distributive dynamics depends on initial conditions. In this case different redistributive policies are analysed.     

Endogenous Persistent Occupations and Inequality

The paper argues that human capital is the leading force determining inequality persistence. We show that, in a context of a perfect capital market where agents inherit human capital and wealth, it is the inherited human capital level that determines agents' occupational choice and investment. The critical assumption is that the entrepreneurial activity is of increasing returns to scale. This creates a higher profile of revenue for entrepreneurs. Although every agent can choose to become an entrepreneur, and although there is no barrier of entry in entrepreneurship, only those who receive a relatively higher human capital will do so. Agents whose inherited human capital is lower than the human capital threshold, endogenously determined, are better off becoming workers. Even in the context of a perfect capital market, which allows less endowed agents to borrow and invest in education, it turns out that the agents who inherit a low level of human capital bear a greater utility cost in their education investment. So they are better off investing less in education, lending their savings, and working as workers. As a result, agents' occupational choice depends on the intergenerational transmission of human capital. In the long run, the population is polarized into the rich entrepreneurs and the poor workers, magnifying inequality persistence in human capital level and revenue.     

Low level equilibrium trap,unemployment, efficiency of education system,child labour and human capital formation

This paper builds an overlapping generations household economy model to examine the impact of adult unemployment on the human capital formation of a child and on child labour, as viewed through the lens of the adult’s expectations of future employability. The model indicates that the higher the adult unemployment rate in the skilled sector, the lesser is the time allocated by an unskilled adult towards schooling of her child. We also find that an increase in the unskilled adult’s wage may or may not decrease child labour in the presence of unemployment. The model predicts that an increase in child wage increases schooling and human capital growth rate only if the adults in the unskilled sector earn less than subsistence consumption expenditure. As the responsiveness of skilled wage to human capital increases, schooling and human capital growth rates increase. The model dynamics bring out the importance of education efficiency and parental human capital in human capital formation of the child. In the case of an inefficient education system, generations will be trapped into low level equilibrium. Only in the presence of an efficient education system, steady growth of human capital is possible. Suitable policies that may be framed to escape the child labour trap are discussed as well.     

Efficiency of Screening and Labor Income Inequality

We analyze the importance of information about individual skills for understanding human capital accumulation and income inequality. The paper uses the framework of an overlapping generations economy with endogenous investment in human capital. Agents in each generation differ by random individual ability, or talent, which affects the screening process. The human capital of an agent depends on both his talent and his investment in education. The investment decision is based on a public signal (test outcome), which screens all agents for their talents. We analyze how a better information system, which allows more efficient screening, affects investment in education and, hence, income inequality in equilibrium. As a main result, we find that, typically, less inequality in the distribution of actual incomes can only be achieved at the expense of more inequality in the distribution of income opportunities.     

National labor markets, international factor mobility and macroeconomic instability

We consider a standard two-country environment, where one of the two countries has a rigid labor market, and analyze how global economic integration affects the economies with respect to expectations-driven cycles and steady state welfare. We show that by allowing free capital mobility, equilibrium indeterminacy is exported from the rigid wage country to the world economy. If further liberalization is permitted, by allowing free movements of labor, the scope for indeterminacy is reduced and open labor markets may produce a stabilizing effect on the global macro-economy. Whether this also implies higher welfare in the long run depends on differentials in average firm size across countries, which determines the direction of migration flows.