The Economic Efficiency of Policy Reform and Partial Market Liberalization under Transaction Costs

The article presents an integrated analysis of the effects of domestic and trade policy reform on resource allocation and welfare under transaction costs. It develops a general multiagent, multicommodity model, where transaction costs are the costs of resources used in the exchange process. The influence of domestic and trade policy (including both price and quantity instruments) on distorted market equilibrium is analysed. Alternative concepts of distorted equilibrium are presented and investigated. They provide a basis for evaluating the effects of multilateral partial market liberalization on resource allocation and welfare under transaction costs. New conditions are derived under which multilateral policy reforms generate Pareto improvements.     

Market access and technology adoption in the presence of FDI

This paper theoretically investigates whether improved access to the domestic market speeds up new technology adoption by foreign firms. Foreign firms choose between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI) to serve the domestic market. If two firms compete in the domestic market, multilateral liberalization of FDI or the realization of multilateral free trade may deter or delay technology adoption, while they always promote and accelerate technology adoption if only a single firm serves the domestic market. Technology adoption can be quickest and consumer welfare greatest when the fixed cost of FDI and the trade costs are neither very high nor very low. Preferential liberalization of FDI promotes the technology adoption of the targeted firm but may not benefit consumers because it discourages technology adoption of the non-targeted firm.     

Environmental Policy, Intra-Industry Trade and Transfrontier Pollution

The paper discusses effects of domestic environmental policy on foreignemissions and on transboundary pollution. We use a Dixit-Stiglitz typemodel of monopolistic competition with an endogenous number of firms.Production generates environmental externalities which spill over to theother country. It is shown that environmental policy has an impact onmarket structure at home and abroad. These market structure effectsinduce changes in emissions abroad. In contrast to what has been derivedin earlier contributions, it turns out to be possible that tighterenvironmental standards at home lead to less emissions abroad. The paperderives these results and provides the economic intuition behind them.Finally, conditions for optimal environmental policies are derived.     

基于外部性理论下汽车消费探析

2009年1月，在国家汽车产业扶植政策的刺激下，国内汽车消费量激增。面对这种情形，汽车消费所引起的外部性问题成了不容回避的话题。其中汽车消费对环境的影响更多是一种负的外部性，而且由于环境资源这类公共产品并不具备排他性，市场并不能使它们达到最佳的优化配置，从而降低整个社会福利水平。因此，政府应该从技术措施、道德措施、法律措施三方面入手，规范汽车生产、流通和消费市场行为，内化其所引致的负外部性。     

Productivity and Firms’ Sales Destination: Chinese Characteristics

In the trade literature, it is often assumed that there is little or no trade cost within a country's borders, but large trade costs across a country's borders. Thus, productive firms self‐select into exporters and the less productive firms can only serve domestic consumers. This paper presents a similar but different case in China, whose domestic markets are segmented by provincial borders mainly owing to the various (hidden) protective measures favoring local firms. These discriminative measures are de facto trade barriers. It applies the heterogeneous trade theory to examine the effects of firms’ productivity on their sales choices in both the international and domestic markets, in the presence of intra‐national and international trade costs. We find that productive firms not only self‐select into exporters, but also into sales in other provincial markets. This pattern is sensitive to firms’ locations and ownerships. For foreign direct investment (FDI)‐controlled firms, increases in productivity are associated with a higher probability of selling into other provincial markets, rather than into international ones. Productivity increases for firms operating in the inland area exhibit different patterns than those in the Eastern area.     

Environmental Protection for Sale: Strategic Green Industrial Policy and Climate Finance

Industrial policy has long been criticized as subject to protectionist interests; accordingly, subsidies to domestic producers face disciplines under World Trade Organization agreements, without exceptions for environmental purposes. Now green industrial policy is gaining popularity as governments search for low-carbon solutions that also provide jobs at home. The strategic trade literature has largely ignored the issue of market failures related to green goods. I consider the market for a new environmental good (like low-carbon technology) whose downstream consumption provides external benefits (like reduced emissions). Governments may have some preference for supporting domestic production, such as by interest-group lobbying, introducing a political distortion in their objective function. I examine the national incentives and global rationales for offering production (upstream) and deployment (downstream) subsidies in producer countries, allowing that some of the downstream market may lie in nonregulating third-party countries. Restraints on upstream subsidies erode global welfare when environmental externalities are large enough relative to political distortions. Climate finance is an effective alternative if political distortions are large and governments do not undervalue carbon costs. Numerical simulations of the case of renewable energy indicate that a modest social cost of carbon can imply benefits from allowing upstream subsidies.     

Recent developments in China's labor market: Labor shortage,rising wages and their implications

China's abundant supply of cheap labor has played an important role in its remarkable economic and social development. Recently, however, China has experienced a labor shortage and rising wages, implying that the country's long‐lasting competitive advantage based on its “unlimited” labor supply and low costs is vanishing. We find that structural demographic changes, regional economic growth disparities and the household registration system may have caused the labor shortage. Furthermore, China's continued low wages, relatively low labor share of gross national income, declining proportion of household consumption to GDP , and productivity improvements as well as increasing unit labor costs can be used to explain the recent wage increases. The dramatic development of its labor market signals that China is entering a new stage of economic development. The country's prior successful model of economic development needs to be adjusted to adapt to the new situation in its labor market to achieve sustainable economic development.     

Market collusion and the politics of protection

This paper investigates the relationship between trade and competition policy within a model where market collusion and protectionist lobbying are themselves related. Collusion and lobbying are modeled as joint products of the same collective effort of firms. In equilibrium, firms cannot achieve greater cooperation in one dimension without reducing it in the other. A trade agreement that limits the effectiveness of lobbying may cause firms to increase market collusion, thereby increasing the domestic price. Thus, international trade agreements may run counter to the goals of competition policy. On the other side, a more restrictive competition policy is shown to either reduce the domestic price or reduce import protection. Thus, competition policy tends to promote trade policy goals. The reason is that restrictive competition policy undermines collusion at the source—it decreases the per-firm benefit to collusion relative to the gains from deviating—reducing firm cooperation in both dimensions.     

The political economy of post-crisis international standards for resolving financial institutions

The development of post-crisis international standards for resolving financial institutions highlights an intriguing puzzle: the European Union (EU), which is often considered as a ‘great financial power’, had a marginal influence in the standard-setting process, which was led by the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). Why? This paper brings together and further develops the concepts of cross-border externalities derived from the hierarchical network structure of the international financial system and domestic regulatory capacity. The US and the UK had the incentives (externalities) to promote and the domestic capacity to shape international standards. By contrast, the EU was mainly exposed to regional (intra-EU) cross-border externalities and lacked regulatory capacity on the matter. Paradoxically, international standards contributed to developing EU resolution capacity by facilitating an agreement on EU (and later on, euro area) rules.     

Admission standards,student effort,and the creation of skilled jobs

We consider the implications of expanding enrollment through lower standards in a model with human capital externalities and a market failure. Workers and firms make uncoordinated investment choices prior to random matching. Investment choices depend on the expected productivity of the counterpart in production. The setting generates a potential human capital externality as a more skilled labor force induces more skilled job openings. Exploiting the externality is complicated by a market failure which may cause some workers to earn a degree but not put forth the effort required to become highly skilled. We show that beyond a threshold, increased enrollment through low standards can be poor policy. Policies which increase returns to agents and firms in best matches can improve outcomes.     

THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC INPUTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

A small open economy model is developed that incorporates direct and indirect effects on multinational location decisions associated with public input provision. It is shown that when agglomeration externalities are present in local intermediate goods markets, public input provision can affect multinational firms directly by lowering the fixed costs of production and indirectly by decreasing the costs of intermediate inputs, but growth is contingent on achieving a critical mass of investment. It is further shown that the effectiveness of a policy of public input provision over a policy of subsidy incentives is critically dependent on key market parameters in the host country . ( JEL F2, H4, O1)     

总部集聚与工厂选址

总部经济的地理特征就是总部集聚。本文建立了一个全新的空间经济学模型,深入阐释总部与工厂分离的机制。模型分企业总部集聚和企业总部在南北地区均匀分布的两种情形,细致地探讨了跨地区运输成本、企业总部和工厂之间的交流成本以及地区间税收政策差异这三个因素相互影响、共同作用于工厂选址的机理。在其他条件不变的情况下,运输成本的降低将导致企业倾向于在总部集聚地区设立工厂;而无论运输成本高低,只要交流成本和外围地区劳动力工资上涨,更多的企业趋向于在总部集聚地区设厂;只有当外围地区的劳动工资降低或税率降低,更多的企业才趋向于在外围地区设厂。本文也再次验证了税收竞争的南部有利性与整体"竞次"(race to bottom)局面:一个地区的税收优惠政策不仅会对当地的企业产生影响,更会对总部集聚地区的其他企业利润产生负面影响。     

Second-best trade policies in Cournot oligopoly

In this paper we study the optimal import policy in an oligopolistic market with a given number of quantity-setting firms. In the absence of fixed costs, we show that if the policy instrument is an import quota, the optimal policy is either free trade or autarky, while if the instrument is a tariff the optimal policy is neither free trade nor autarky. In the case of fixed costs, we show that contrary to the traditional protectionist argument, a restrictive import policy might increase domestic welfare by increasing domestic consumers' surplus, instead of increasing domestic profits.     

Technology, agglomeration, and regional competition for investment

Abstract.  Competition for firms by region has a long-standing history, and the academic literature has debated whether such competition is efficient. We develop a model that explores technology development by firms facing regional competition for their investment and examine the endogenous determination of region policy, firm technology, and agglomeration externalities. We find a new source of inefficiency – regional competition leads firms to inefficiently distort their development and selection of production technology to improve their standing in the regional competition for their investment. We show that these inefficient firm decisions on technology and location can also weaken agglomeration externalities.     

Environmental protection without loss of international competitiveness

We develop a two‐country Cournot oligopoly model with product differentiation across countries and production‐generated pollution. The abatement of pollution by the firms in response to emission taxes is endogenous, and the number of firms can be fixed or there may be free entry and exit of firms in both countries. We propose particular unilateral and multilateral piecemeal policy reforms of emission taxes and production subsidies such that domestic industries will not suffer any loss of international competitiveness (defined in terms of either market share or profits), emission levels will be lower, and welfare could be higher in both countries.     

Spatial effects of foreign direct investment in US states

Abstract This paper estimates the aggregate productivity effects of Marshallian externalities generated by foreign direct investment (FDI) in US states, controlling for Marshallian externalities and other spatial spillovers generated by domestic firms. A regional production function framework models externalities and other spatial spillovers explicitly as determinants of total factor productivity. We employ a system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator to account for the potential endogeneity of FDI and the presence of spatial lags. Using data for US states from 1977–2003, the results indicate that FDI generates positive externalities, while externalities from domestic firms are negative.     

Brotherhood of competition: Foreign Direct Investment and domestic mergers

We examine the effects of mergers on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and on shaping national policies regarding FDI. In this work we develop a partial equilibrium model of an oligopolistic industry in which a number of domestic and foreign firms compete in the market for a homogeneous good in a host country. It is assumed that the number of foreign firms is endogenous and can be affected by the government policy in the host country. The government sets the policy (subsidies) to maximise social welfare. We allow domestic mergers. Our main results suggest that when the host country government imposes discriminatory lump-sum subsidy in favor of foreign firms, a merger of domestic firms will increase the number of FDI if the subsidy level is exogenous. With an endogenous level of subsidy, a merger of domestic firms will decrease (increase) the welfare if the domestic firms are more (less) efficient.     

THE NUMBER OF FIRMS AND THE POLITICS OF STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY

Incorporating home firms' lobbying in a country into a third market model of oligopoly, this paper studies how such lobbying affects the government's strategic export policy scheme. We pay special attention to the home firms' lobby formation and its effect on domestic welfare. The home firms can organize a lobby more easily when the number of their rival foreign firms is larger than that of them, and/or when the government is overly concerned with political contribution relative to domestic welfare. The strategic export policy under lobbying cannot improve the domestic welfare, which depends on the number of firms, the government's concern about political donation and the level of socially wasted lobbying costs.     

The Effects of Trade Liberalization between Heterogeneous Countries on Endogenous Mergers

This paper examines the effects of trade liberalization on merger behavior. We endogenize merger choice among owners in an oligopolistic industry in asymmetric countries to analyze the consequences of trade cost reductions on competitiveness and welfare. In this context, the non‐cooperative game supports asymmetric market structures. We also find that trade liberalization is not necessarily pro‐competitive in countries with the competitive advantage, even if trade costs are completely abolished. Moreover, the tariff‐jumping explanation of international mergers does not necessarily apply. The welfare analysis shows that merger behavior can significantly alter any gains from liberalization. Countries should consider enforcing competition in regional agreements. Specifically, to avoid a reduction in domestic welfare following trade‐liberalizing reductions in trade costs, a high‐cost country's optimal policy may be to ban international mergers.     

Quality heterogeneity and global economic growth

This paper develops a fully endogenous, variety-expansion growth model with firm-specific quality heterogeneity, limit pricing, and an endogenous distribution of markups. Firms with high-quality products engage in exporting, firms with intermediate-quality products serve the domestic market, and inefficient firms with low-quality products exit the market. Trade liberalization, measured by a reduction in trade costs or a decline in foreign market entry costs, generates a reallocation of resources from low-quality to high-quality products and exit of inefficient firms. However, it has ambiguous effects on the average global quality level, long-run growth, and welfare. An increase in the rate of population growth or in the intensity of trade-related knowledge spillovers accelerates economic growth. The laissez-faire equilibrium is inefficient, and this leaves room for welfare-improving government intervention.