STRATEGIC LOBBYING BY POTENTIAL INDUSTRY ENTRANTS*

A firm which lobbies government for a change in policy, say an import tariff, can increase its profits in two ways. First, the policy can increase the profits of all firms in the industry. This effect therefore involves a free-rider problem. Second, a firm's lobbying expenditures may signal other firms about its costs and interests. For example, a firm with low marginal costs may profit much from an import ban. Other firms which see that this firm expects to profit much from the ban may decide not to enter the industry. This may further increase the low-cost firm's profits.     

Information transmission during the trial: The role of punitive damages and legal costs

This paper studies an incomplete information model in which a preventable accident occurred. The judge determining punitive damages observes the firm's (defendant) investment decisions, but is uninformed about the firm's experience adopting safety measures. Our model allows firms to file an appeal if the judge's verdict is incorrect, which the judge may accept or reject. We identify under which conditions a separating equilibrium exists where the firm's investment decisions signal its type to the judge, who responds with a correct verdict, thus avoiding future appeals. Our paper also finds conditions under which a pooling equilibrium exists whereby the firm's investment in precaution conceals its type from the judge, who can respond with an incorrect verdict thus giving rise to appeals. Furthermore, we show that the separating equilibrium is more likely to arise if the percentage of revenue that defendants are required to pay in punitive damages decreases, if the punitive‐to‐compensatory ratio increases, and if the legal cost of filing an appeal increases.     

Performance measurement in multi-task agencies

This paper analyzes a multi-task agency relationship with a risk-neutral and financially constraint agent. The agent’s performance evaluation is incongruent, i.e. it does not reflect his contribution to firm value, and thus motivates an inefficient effort allocation across tasks. This paper investigates the improvement of the agent’s performance evaluation by contrasting two alternatives for the principal: (i) to invest in assets which can be utilized to generate additional measures about the agent’s performance; and (ii), to delegate this task to a supervisor. This paper demonstrates that delegation is superior whenever the costless available performance evaluation is sufficiently incongruent.     

Sequential contracting with multiple principals

This paper considers dynamic games in which multiple principals contract sequentially and non-cooperatively with the same agent. We first show that when contracting is private, i.e. when downstream principals do not observe the mechanisms offered upstream and the decisions taken in these mechanisms, all PBE outcomes can be characterized through pure-strategy profiles in which the principals offer menus of contracts and delegate to the agent the choice of the contractual terms. We then show that, in most cases of interest for applications, the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes is further facilitated by the fact that the principals can be restricted to offer incentive-compatible extended direct mechanisms in which the agent reports the endogenous payoff-relevant decisions contracted upstream in addition to his exogenous private information. Finally we show how the aforementioned results must be adjusted to accommodate alternative assumptions about the observability of upstream histories and/or the timing of contracting examined in the literature.     

Asymmetric Taxation under Incremental and Sequential Investment

This paper discusses the effects of an asymmetric tax scheme on incremental and sequential investment strategies. The tax base is equal to the firm's return, net of an imputation rate. When the firm's return is less than this rate, however, no tax refunds are allowed. This scheme is neutral under both income and capital uncertainty.     

Impact of coopetition in the alliance portfolio and coopetition experience on firm innovation

This paper examines two interrelated questions: to what extent does coopetition in a firm's alliance portfolio impact the firm's innovation performance? And to what extent does a firm's coopetition experience influence the relationship between coopetition in the alliance portfolio and innovation performance? Conceptually, we advance the concepts of balanced coopetition in a firm's alliance portfolio and coopetition experience and suggest that both balanced coopetition and coopetition experience contribute to firm's innovation outcomes. Results based on a longitudinal data of firms from the semiconductor industry show that moderate to high levels of balanced-strong coopetition in a firm's alliance portfolio positively impact the firm's coopetition-based innovation performance. Further, coopetition experience contributes to innovation performance and positively moderates the relationship between balanced-strong coopetition and innovation performance.     

Efficient moral hazard

This paper presents an infinite-horizon, discounted dynamic programming model of the endogenous opportunity costs of an agent’s effort that is allocated among an endogenous number of principals. An agent allocates effort between evaluating new principals and attending to current principals. Since each principal’s return is not maximized by the agent’s optimal allocation, moral hazard occurs in equilibrium. However, since the agent maximizes the total expected value of all undertaken projects, the agent’s allocation of effort is efficient. If the agent chooses a single principal, then moral hazard does not occur and the allocation is efficient. These results are contrary to the inefficient moral hazard results in bilateral principal-agent (P-A) and common agency (C-A) models.     

Interactions of the firm's real and financial decisions

This paper provides an integrated approach to the theory of the firm. Under technological uncertainty, corporate taxes, risky debt and risk neutrality it is shown that the firm's investment production and financing decisions are made simultaneously. It is demonstrated that the relationship between optimal capital (or labour) and debt is not strictly negative as in Dotan and Ravid (1982) nor strictly positive as in Hite (1977). The direction of this relationship depends on the characteristics of debt and the characteristics of the firm's production function. Given the simultaneity of the real and financial decisions, it is shown that an interior optimum exists for the firm's value as a function of debt.     

Firm Performance in the Face of Fear: How CEO Moods Affect Firm Performance

The authors use facial emotion recognition software to quantify CEO mood. Anger or disgust motivates a CEO to work harder to improve his or her situation; thus firm profitability improves in the subsequent quarter. Happy CEOs are less likely to work on hard or unpleasant tasks; thus profitability decreases in the subsequent quarter. In the short term, fear explains the firm's announcement period market performance. However, fear is transient and performance improvement is short term.     

Fairness and Incentives in a Multi‐task Principal–Agent Model

This paper reports on a two‐task principal–agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece‐rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece‐rate contracts. Many principals reward high effort on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high effort on both tasks. In contrast, almost all agents with a piece‐rate contract focus on the first task and disregard the second. Principals understand this and predominantly offer bonus contracts. This behavior contradicts the self‐interest theory but is consistent with theories of fairness.     

Civilisations and Their Discontents: Political Geography and Geopolitics in the Huntington Thesis

This article considers the place of political geography and geopolitics in Samuel Huntington's celebrated work Clash of Civilizations. It is argued that Huntington's engagement with geography is fundamentally ambivalent. On the one hand, he frames his entire analysis as a form of what he calls political geography, and he invokes geographical factors in various ways throughout the entire text. At the same time, however, he explicitly discounts the significance of space or territory in the civilisational framework that he depicts. An analysis of Huntington's inconsistency in this regard contributes to a broader critique of his overall premises, logic, and conclusions. Beyond this, it provides insight into the uncertain position of geography more broadly in contemporary discourses of international relations and international security. Ultimately, I suggest that the ambivalences in the Clash of Civilizations are indicative of certain ‘fault lines’ — to borrow from Huntington's own lexicon — that have been characteristic for the American security imagination across much of the twentieth century.     

Choosing Between Internal and Non-internal R&D Activities: Some Technological and Economic Factors

This paper evaluates some of the technological and economic factors that underlie the choice between in-house R&D, R&D alliances and outsourcing. We recount the reasons for the growth in non-internal activities, and explain why these are not as prevalent for R&D as other value-adding activities, and highlight that outsourcing is most often undertaken where multiple, substitutable sources are available. We then develop two frameworks. First, a static framework is developed, which evaluates the choice of mode based on a firm's distribution of competencies, and their strategic importance. Second, a dynamic framework is developed that demonstrates how the static framework differs depending on whether the firm is engaged in pre-paradigmatic, paradigmatic or post-paradigmatic sectors. We also consider the effect of new technologies being introduced to a firm's portfolio of competencies     

MECHANISM AND IMPACTS OF EMBEZZLEMENT IN A DUOPOLISTIC MARKET*

We consider the case in which a corruptible manager contemplates to embezzle his/her firm's revenues by overstating the production costs in a duopolistic market. In order to embezzle more, the manager chooses to increase the firm's output. This partially corrects the market failures associated with the oligopoly distortion. Nevertheless, pervasive and large‐scale embezzlement is detrimental and should be addressed, although moderate embezzlement might be socially good. We also consider how the length of tenure affects the manager's behaviours: extending the tenure cannot eradicate embezzlement, and an insufficient rise of the reward rate may only defer embezzlement.     

Reciprocity and matching frictions

The ability of search and matching models to replicate stylized facts—such as volatilities and correlations—has been a center of attraction over the last couple of years. This paper introduces the Akerlof (Q J Econ 97:543–569, 1982) fair wage approach into an endogenous separation search and matching model. Within a RBC general equilibrium context, we show that the efficiency wage model outperforms its benchmark Nash bargaining pendant. In particular, the model generates the empirically observed volatilities in response to a productivity shock and replicates a strong Beveridge curve. Furthermore, we derive the Solow condition in a search environment and discuss the interactions of search and efficiency wage frictions. We show that search frictions create a wedge between the optimal wage/effort solution in the search and the competitive equilibrium. The efficiency wage consideration adds an additional margin to the firm's decision problem. As effort varies over the cycle, it changes the firm's optimal response to exogenous disturbances and amplifies the response to shocks.     

Chief technology officer roles and performance

This paper assesses the impact of Chief Technology Officers (CTO) on firm performance using upper-echelon theory, human capital theory and social capital theory. The upper-echelon theory is used to investigate how CTO roles are realised within a company regardless of the individual who carries them out, i.e. through a formal CTO position or not. Human and social capital theories are employed to assess how certain features of CTO influences his/her effect on company performance. Thus, this explorative study investigates two questions: (1) do CTO roles affect a firm's performance?, and (2) which features of the senior manager in charge of technology influence performance? To answer these questions the study first develops a conceptual model and subsequently tests the model based on a survey of 49 firms in electronics and machinery industries in Turkey. Two findings emerge: (1) the fulfilment of CTO roles increases a firm's profitability and (2) the existence of a distinct managerial technology position further improves profitability. Moreover, the study clearly shows the role of social capital theory in explaining how the company performance is likely to increase when the CTO/CTO-proxy manager is placed on a higher rung on the organisational ladder.     

Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives

In this paper we are analyzing a mixed quantity-setting duopoly consisting of a socially concerned firm and a profit-maximizing firm. The socially concerned firm considers one group of stakeholders in its objective function and maximizes its profit plus a share of consumer surplus. Both firms have the option to hire a manager who determines the production quantity on behalf of the firm's owner. We find that in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game both firms hire a manager and delegate the production choice. If the unit production costs of the firms are similar, then the socially concerned firm has a higher market share and even higher profit. Interestingly, we observe that the relationship between the share of consumer surplus taken into account by the socially concerned firm and its profit is non-monotonic. As the share increases, the socially concerned firm's profit first increases and then decreases. The conclusion is that it pays off to take stakeholder interests into account, but not too much.     

Identification of firms’ beliefs in structural models of market competition

Firms make decisions under uncertainty and differ in their ability to collect and process information. As a result, in changing environments, firms have heterogeneous beliefs on the behaviour of other firms. This heterogeneity in beliefs can have important implications on market outcomes, efficiency and welfare. This paper studies the identification of firms’ beliefs using their observed actions—a revealed preference and beliefs approach. I consider a general structural model of market competition where firms have incomplete information and their beliefs and profits are nonparametric functions of decisions and state variables. Beliefs may be out of equilibrium. The framework applies both to continuous and discrete choice games and includes as particular cases models of competition in prices or quantities, auction models, entry games and dynamic games of investment decisions. I focus on identification results that exploit an exclusion restriction that naturally appears in models of competition: an observable variable that affects a firm's cost (or revenue) but does not have a direct effect on other firms’ profits. I present identification results under three scenarios—common in empirical industrial organization—on the data available to the researcher.     

On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas under a Revenue Constraint

This paper sets out a duopolistic model to examine the price and welfare equivalence of tariffs and quotas, given the quota rent is equal to the tariff revenue. It shows that the domestic welfare ranking of the two trade policies crucially depends on the relative costs of the domestic and foreign firms; when the domestic firm's relative costs are lower than those of the foreign firm, a quota regime generally leads to a higher welfare level than that of an equivalent tariff regime. This finding contrasts sharply with the conclusions of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1977 ), where it was found that a tariff regime always generates higher domestic welfare.     

Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria

We analyze an abstract model of trading where N principals submit quantity-payment schedules that describe the contracts they offer to an agent, and the agent then chooses how much to trade with every principal. This represents a special class of common agency games with complete information. We study all the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of these games, not only truthful ones, providing a complete characterization of equilibrium payoffs. In particular, we show that the equilibrium that is Pareto-dominant for the principals is not truthful when there are more than two of them. We also provide a partial characterization of equilibrium strategies.     

From the Encyclopédie to the Tableau économique : Quesnay on freedom of grain trade and economic growth

This paper investigates the evolution of Quesnay's economic thought between his Encyclopédie articles and the first edition of the Tableau économique. The rediscovery of a forgotten piece Quesnay included in an agricultural treatise — the Essai sur l'amélioration des terres — leads us to reconsider the origins of the first edition of the Tableau. This forgotten piece of writing is the missing link between Quesnay's first economic writings and the Tableau. It improves on the theory of grain trade liberalization Quesnay presented in his first writings on two levels. First, it reconstructs of his previous argument in order to give it a more coherent shape. Second, this text complements the Encyclopédie articles by a growth mechanism. Through a reconstruction of Quesnay's growth mechanism, we show that his argument is a significant analytical step toward the first edition of the Tableau.