MARKET POWER AND EFFICIENCY IN A SEARCH MODEL*

We build a theoretical model to study the welfare effects and policy implications of firms’ market power in a frictional labor market. The main characteristics of our environment are that wages play a role in allocating labor across firms and the number of agents is finite. The decentralized equilibrium is inefficient and the firms’ market power results in the misallocation of workers from the high to the low productivity firms. A minimum wage exacerbates the inefficiencies by forcing the low‐productivity firms to increase their wage. Moderate unemployment benefits can increase welfare by improving the workers’ outside option.     

Labor market structure and offshoring

We consider a two‐country, two‐sector model in which a firm’s offshoring decision depends on labor market rigidities that impose additional costs on the firm. Firms endogenously choose their organizational form considering their productivity level and organizational costs. The costs generated by labor market frictions play a key role in determining the benefits of each organizational structure, and thus helps determine the conditions under which a firm decides to offshore. There are three different types of equilibria depending on the relative levels of the domestic and foreign labor market costs and the price of the intermediate input. In all equilibria, a relative rise in the domestic labor market cost increases the share of firms that offshore, while decreasing domestic integration. Furthermore, an economy with offshoring has a higher welfare level and a lower unemployment rate than it would under autarky.     

Sectoral labor adjustment and monetary policy in a small open economy

This paper studies the welfare implications of sectoral labor adjustment cost in a two-sector small open economy model with sticky prices. We find that, when the economy faces external shocks, if monetary policy can stabilize the real economy, then sectoral labor market adjustment cost will lead to welfare loss. However, if monetary policy such as fixed exchange rates cannot stabilize real variables, then some degree of labor market friction will improve welfare instead and the gain will be significant. As a result, the welfare gap between flexible exchange rates and fixed exchange rates decreases with sectoral labor market friction. This is because the friction can offset some of the nominal rigidity and become a substitute for monetary policy to stabilize the real economy.     

On The Distributional Effects Of Reducing Capital Taxes*

This article asks whether household heterogeneity and market incompleteness have quantitatively important implications for the welfare effects of tax changes. We compare a representative‐agent economy to an economy in which households face idiosyncratic uninsurable income risk. The income process is consistent with empirical estimates and implies a realistic wealth distribution. We find that capital tax cuts imply large welfare gains in the representative‐agent economy. However, when households are heterogeneous, substantial redistribution during transition means that only a minority will support capital tax cuts, whereas most households can expect large welfare losses.     

Labor Informality: Choice or Sign of Segmentation? A Quantile Regression Approach at the Regional Level for Colombia

The labor market in developing countries is remarkably heterogeneous, with a small productive formal sector characterized by high wages and attractive employment conditions, and a large informal sector characterized by low productivity and volatile wages. The informal sector is particularly diverse. In this paper, we examine the heterogeneity of the informal sector at the regional level in Colombia. In general, our findings suggest that both voluntary and involuntary informal employment co‐exist by choice and as a consequence of labor market segmentation. We also find that there are striking differences in labor market characteristics across cities, particularly with respect to informal employment.     

The Impact of Social Segregation on the Labor Market Outcomes of Low-Skilled Workers*

We study the impact of network homophily on labor market outcomes in a search-and-matching model with two job search channels: the formal market and social contacts. There are two worker types: low-skilled and high-skilled workers. The homophily level determines whether the referral networks of the two types are mixed or segregated from each other. We show that there exists an intermediate homophily level that minimizes the unemployment rate and maximizes the wages of low-skilled workers. Complete integration does not maximize the welfare of low-skilled workers, unless it improves their productivity. We argue that our model can explain the empirical findings on the labor market effects of the Moving-to-Opportunity experiment and the integration of immigrants.     

Why Are Rich Countries More Politically Cohesive?*

We document empirically that rich countries are more politically cohesive than poorer countries. In order to explain this regularity, we provide a model where political cohesion is linked to the emergence of a fully functioning market economy. Without market exchange, the welfare of inherently selfish individuals will be mutually independent. Whoever has greater bargaining power will be willing to make decisions that enhance the productivity of their supporters at the expense of other groups in society. If the gains from specialization are sufficiently large, however, a market economy will emerge. From being essentially non‐cohesive under self‐sufficiency, the political decision‐making process becomes cohesive in the market economy, because the welfare of individuals will be mutually interdependent as a result of the exchange of goods.     

Globalization,welfare, and the attitudes toward higher education

In this paper we study how the attitudes toward higher education may affect labor market outcomes in the context of globalization. In particular, we show that different educational attitudes are responsible for differences in the wage differential among countries. Using a matching model with two types of workers and firms, we find that there is a trade-off between the wage differential and the workers’ welfare, namely, that an economy that is less willing to educate itself will display a lower wage differential but will lose in terms of welfare. Moreover, from a policy perspective, we show that the negative effects on welfare due to this disinclination to study can be offset by increased labor market flexibility. All things considered, policy makers ought to keep in mind that both a positive attitude toward higher education and labor market flexibility, can lead to improved overall performance in this increasingly globalized world.     

INTERNATIONAL WELFARE AND EMPLOYMENT LINKAGES ARISING FROM MINIMUM WAGES*

We formulate a two‐country model with monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms to reconsider labor market linkages in open economies. Labor market imperfections arise by virtue of country‐specific real minimum wages. Abstracting from selection of just the best firms into export status, standard effects on marginal and average firm productivity are reversed in our model, yet there are significant gains from trade arising from employment expansion. In addition, we show that with firm heterogeneity an increase in one country’s minimum wage triggers firm exit in both countries and thus harms workers at home and abroad.     

Market Size and the Survival of Foreign‐owned Firms*

We develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and foreign direct investment cost uncertainty and investigate the survival of foreign‐owned firms. The survival probabilities of foreign‐owned firms depend on firm‐level characteristics, such as productivity, and host country characteristics, such as market size. We show that a foreign‐owned firm will be less likely to be shut down when its parent firm's productivity is higher and its indigenous competitors are less productive. Although a larger market size will always reduce the survival probability of indigenous firms, it can lead to a higher survival probability for foreign‐owned firms if their parent firms are sufficiently productive.     

PRODUCTIVITY AND THE LABOR MARKET: COMOVEMENT OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE*

The productivity‐driven Mortensen–Pissarides model predicts that labor productivity is strongly correlated with labor market variables whereas these correlations were argued to be much weaker in the data, especially since the 1980s. We first document that the size of these discrepancies between the data and the model becomes substantially smaller if employment data from the Current Population Survey is used in measuring productivity instead of the commonly used employment data from the Current Employment Statistics. Second, we show that incorporating time to build and a stochastic value of home production helps reconcile the quantitative performance of the model with the data.     

Innovation,competition and firm size distribution on fragmented markets

This paper presents a simple model of firm and consumer behavior. We formulate a sub-market entry game, where boundedly rational firms decide on investing in R&D for inventing new products that will appeal to targeted groups of consumers. The success depends on the amount of resources available for the project as well as on the firm’s familiarity with market characteristics. Successful innovation feeds back into the firm size and (potentially into) market knowledge and increases the future R&D productivity. A new product decreases the market-shares of incumbents. However, this business stealing effect is asymmetric across incumbent population. We identify the section of parameter space where firms have an incentive to diversify horizontally. In this section, the model results in rich industrial dynamics. Firm size heterogeneity emerges endogenously in the model. Equilibrium firm size distributions are heavy tailed and skewed to the right. The heaviness of the tail depends on submarket specificity of firm’s market knowledge. This relationship is non-monotonic, emphasizing two different effects of innovation on industrial dynamics (positive feedback and asymmetric business stealing).     

Heterogeneity, Job Creation and Unemployment Volatility

In this paper, I explore the impact of match‐specific heterogeneity at the job creation margin on business cycle fluctuations. I show that this form of heterogeneity alone does not help to amplify labor market volatility, either under full or under asymmetric information. First, I show analytically that, under full information, heterogeneity has no first‐order effect on the response of unemployment and job creation to productivity, and actually tends to dampen the response of market tightness. Then, in a series of calibrations, I show that with both full and asymmetric information, the model delivers labor market volatilities close to the representative‐agent, full‐information benchmark.     

Public infrastructure and trade in a dynamic two‐country model

We develop a two‐country dynamic trade model with public infrastructure having an “unpaid‐factor”‐type positive externality on private sectors’ productivity. With welfare‐maximizing national governments making infrastructure investment, we show that a country with a smaller labor endowment, a lower depreciation rate of infrastructure, and/or a lower time preference rate will become an exporter of a good that is more dependent on infrastructure and will gain from trade, whereas its trading partner may lose from trade. We consider both the nonstrategic governments case and the case of strategic governments that recognize the effect on the terms of trade.     

Efficient taxation, wage bargaining and policy coordination

This paper is related to the literature on optimal nonlinear taxation under right-to-manage wage formation, and we assume that the fall-back profit facing firms during wage bargaining depends on the profit they can obtain if moving production abroad. The purpose is to study how policy coordination among countries can be used to increase the welfare level in comparison with an uncoordinated equilibrium. We consider coordinated policy reforms with respect to the marginal taxation of labor income, the unemployment benefit and the provision of a public good. The results show that policy coordination that leads to fewer hours of work per employee and/or a reduction of the unemployment benefit will increase welfare compared to the uncoordinated equilibrium.     

Subsidy competition and imperfect labor markets

This study presents a two‐country model of subsidy competition for manufacturing firms under labor market imperfections. Because subsidies affect the distribution of firms, subsidies influence unemployment rates and welfare in both countries. We show that when labor market frictions are high, subsidy competition is beneficial, although subsidies under subsidy competition are inefficiently high. In the coordinated equilibrium, the supranational authority provides a subsidy to firms that equal the expected total search costs, which increases the number of firms relative to laissez‐faire and improves welfare relative to laissez‐faire and subsidy competition. Finally, we find that a rise in a country's labor market frictions raises the equilibrium subsidy rate, affects unemployment rates, and lowers welfare.     

Tax Reform with Useful Public Expenditures

We examine the effects of tax reform in an endogenous growth with two types of useful public expenditures. The optimal fiscal policy shifts the tax base to private consumption and generally requires a change in the size of government. If a tax reform holds the size of government fixed to satisfy a revenue‐neutrality constraint, then the reform will be suboptimal; theory alone cannot tell us if welfare will be improved. For some model calibrations, we find that a revenue‐neutral consumption tax reform can result in large welfare gains. For other quite plausible calibrations, the exact same reform can result in tiny or even negative welfare gains as the revenue‐neutrality constraint becomes more severely binding. Overall, our results highlight the uncertainty surrounding the potential welfare benefits of fundamental tax reform.     

Alternative theories of wage dispersion

We analyze labor market models where the law of one price fails—i.e., models with equilibrium wage dispersion. We begin considering ex ante heterogeneous workers, but highlight a problem with this approach: If search is costly the market shuts down. We then assume homogeneous workers but ex post heterogeneous matches. This model is robust to search costs, and delivers equilibrium wage dispersion. However, we prove that the law of two prices holds: Equilibrium implies at most two wages. We explore other models, including one combining ex ante and ex post heterogeneity which is robust and delivers more realistic wage dispersion.     

Employment and Productivity Growth in Europe and North America: The Impact of Labor Market Institutions

In this paper, we examine long-run employment and productivity growth in the major economies of North America and Europe from 1960 to the early 1990s. We develop a model in which output growth is determined by the growth of aggregate demand, and the relative contributions of employment and productivity growth to the growth of output depend on country specific labor market institutions. We find that institutions that promote collective bargaining, employment security and social protection have roughly equal and opposite effects on employment growth (negative) and productivity growth (positive), giving rise to an inverse relationship between these variables. The welfare implications of this finding are that labor market deregulation could result in more work and greater inequality and insecurity for workers, without significantly increasing the rate of economic growth.     

UNDERSTANDING THE WORLD WOOL MARKET: TRADE,PRODUCTIVITY AND GROWERS’ INCOMES*

Applying recent estimates of total factor productivity (TFP) growth on Australian sheep farms, we analyse the long‐run effects of TFP growth on the world wool market using a detailed model of the world wool market that treats raw wool, wool textiles and wool garments as heterogeneous commodities. The model divides the world wool market into nine regions and eight major industrial sectors capturing the extreme nature of the multistage production system through which wool passes. We find that regional sheep producer's welfare responds by between ‐0.9 per cent and 0.7 per cent assuming conservative TFP growth over the period 1995/96–2003/04. Sensitivity analysis shows the welfare effects to be robust with respect to all model parameters, but sensitive to the size of the TFP growth and the degree of TFP spill‐over. Our realistic representation of the multistage nature of the wool production system shows that wool inputs steadily decline in importance in moving from early‐ to late‐stage processing. This production structure indicates that the productivity of sheep farmers has little effect on the prices of and demand for wool garments. In contrast, trade in wool inputs is very responsive to the productivity of sheep farmers.