Public Versus Private Provision of Public Goods

It is well known that public goods are underprovided in a static setting with voluntary contributions. Public provision—in a median voter framework with proportional taxation—generally exceeds private provision. This paper compares private and public provision of public goods in a dynamic setting. In a dynamic setting, voluntary donations can result in efficient provision. Also, majority‐rule solutions exist even when taxes are not proportional to income. At low discount factors, public provision tends to exceed private provision. As patience increases, however, private provision may exceed public provision. This occurs because many outcomes with a low level of public good provision—and potentially large targeted transfer payments to particular individuals—become sustainable under public provision. Under private provision, however, large targeted transfers are unsustainable. To finance the public good, private provision tends to result in benefit taxation, and public provision tends to result in progressive taxation.     

Labour hoarding,employment and unemployment in British manufacturing industry

The impact of the provision of public infrastructure on private economic activity is examined. Using a flexible functional form of a cost function with public infrastructure as an additional external input the paper estimates the shadow-price of public infrastructure services for the manufacturing, trade and transport and the construction industries. The results indicate significant cost savings that result from the provision of public infrastructure services. In addition, the paper investigates both empirically as well as theoretically, the question whether the neglect of the provision of public capital within the growth accounting framework provides an explanation for the generally observed productivity slowdown.     

Efficiency,access, and the mixed delivery of health care services

Universal health systems often rely on both pubic provision and contracting arrangements with private hospitals. This paper studies the optimal mix of public and private provision of health care services. We propose a model in which the regulator acts as athird-party payer, and aims to ensure universal access to treatment at minimal cost. Patients need one unit of medical services and differ in the severity of illness. A private and a public hospital are available. Under incomplete contracts, ownership affects the regulatory constraints and the power of managerial incentives. Only the private manager internalizes profits, and has incentives to reject costly patients and to exert effort in cost reduction. Contracting with the private hospital is optimal when managerial effort is relatively effective in reducing costs. By using the public hospital as a last resort provider, the regulator can ensure access, provide incentives to the private manager, and internalize part of the resulting cost savings. Imposing a no-dumping constraint on the private hospital reduces the power of incentives and is not always optimal.     

Woodsy the optimal owl: Environmental campaigns, norms, and implications for public goods policy

Norms regarding private provision of a public good (e.g. cutting down on energy use, not littering) can affect the marginal gains from contributing to a public good and therefore people's decisions about contributing to the public good. A model is proposed in which norms of private contributions to a public good can be influenced by public policy, and these norms affect people's self-image, which derives from a comparison of one's own contribution with the norm contribution. In this context, we examine the conditions under which private contributions to a public good are efficient, and the conditions under which policy affecting these norms improves social welfare. We find that (1) a benevolent social planner who fails to account for private provision norms will underprovide the public good, and (2) public policy that attempts to raise the norm contribution of private provision can increase social welfare if the effect of raising the norm does not have an extreme negative effect - either extremely small or extremely large - on peoples' self-image.     

MODELS OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE PROVISION OF GOODS

Beside the traditional public–private dichotomy for the provision of public services, an increasing attention has been devoted to the use of public–private partnerships (PPPs). This paper compares relative inefficiencies of public provision, traditional private provision and PPPs as found in real cases, in the literature and through original theoretical models.     

PRIVATIZATION OF WATER: EVALUATING ITS PERFORMANCE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

Private‐sector provision of water has been promoted in developing countries since 1990 in order to expand water service coverage to low‐income households. Decades later, the consequences of privatizing water utilities are still disputed. Some scholars have found that areas with privatized water services see positive development effects, while others contend that the private‐sector supply of a social good will always lead to its under‐provision. However, does more privatization of water provision in developing countries actually bring about more access to water? This paper hypothesizes that more private participation in water provision will not ensure more access to water at the national level. The relationship is tested using data on weighted percentages of private ownership of water utilities, and access to improved water sources from 1990 to 2015 across 62 countries. Multivariate OLS results indicate a positive relationship but with no statistical significance. 2SLS results, on the other hand, indicate a positive, small and statistically significant effect of water privatization on water access. Nonetheless, the causal mechanism behind these results must be further explored, given that the measured effect could be capturing the result of an increase in investment that is associated with private ownership of water utilities.     

Factor Endowments and the Private Provision of Public Goods

The paper examines the consequences of increasing the size of the community in the standard model of the private provision of public goods when costs are variable. In contrast to an economy with fixed costs, the provision of the public good can fall with a larger community, and an increased provision of the public good is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for individual utility to rise. The paper also contributes to the literature on immiserizing growth in that it shows that capital accumulation can possibly result in lower utility for all individuals.     

An analysis of public adaptation to climate change using agricultural water schemes in South America

This paper provides an analysis of public adaptation to climate change using agricultural water schemes in South American farms. Unlike other studies of adaptation, this paper examines the differences between private irrigation and public irrigation schemes based on around 1400 farm surveys collected across seven countries in South America which recorded detailed water schemes. We analyze the choice of water schemes in the first stage and the land values for each scheme in the second stage. We find that public irrigations do not increase in response to a warmer climate, but private irrigations do. On the other hand, we find that public irrigation schemes are provided primarily as a response to water scarcity. Moreover, we find that private irrigations are taken gradually while public irrigations are provided as a lump sum, resulting in either too much or too little provision. Therefore, public adaptations to climate change will likely involve two inefficiencies. No provision of irrigation in a hotter climate may result from a lack of knowledge. Overprovision of irrigation in dry zones may result from a lump-sum provision of a public good.     

Child care voucher and labour market behaviour: experimental evidence from Finland

This article provides experimental estimates of the impact of a voucher for private care on labour force participation and use of private and public child care within the Nordic system of universal provision of public care. In a market that was providing high-quality, low-cost public child care, a voucher is nevertheless found to have a significant, positive effect for the use of private child care with zero effects on either use of public care or labour force participation. The use of private increased by five percentage points in the whole country and by five to seven percentage points in areas that suffer from excess demand for child care as a result of the introduction of the private child care voucher.     

Innovation in Nonprofit Organizations

Innovation as the driving force behind the economic growth of high-income countries has almost exclusively been researched for the private enterprise sector. Nonproft organizations as a growing sector also have to be assessed for their contribution. They are first grouped by their different outputs (proximity to public versus private good provision). Next, for each output group fields of activities are identified, which exhibit differences in management regimes and incentive structure. This leads to hypotheses (and some empirical evidence) on innovative behavior and on barriers to innovation. The result: Their potential for contributing is far from being fully used.     

Saving the public from the private? Incentives and outcomes in dual practice

We consider a monopoly physician offering free public treatment and, if allowed, a private treatment for which patients have to pay out of pocket. While patients differ in the propensity to benefit from private treatment it always yields better health outcomes than public treatment but is also more costly in terms of money and time. We study the physician's supply of private care and allocation of time costs across public and private patients and contrast these with the first‐best allocation. To increase the willingness‐to‐pay for private treatment the physician shifts time costs to public patients. While this turns out to be socially optimal, the resulting positive network effect leads to an over‐provision of private care if time costs are sufficiently high. A second‐best allocation arises when the health authority sets public reimbursement but has no control over private provision. Depending on the welfare weight the health authority attaches to physician profits, a ban of dual practice may improve on the second‐best allocation. Notably, a ban benefits not only public patients but also private patients with a moderate propensity to benefit from private care.     

Basic Needs, Property Rights and Degradation Of Commons

A major problem in many developing countries is the degradation of commons. This degradation has occurred on account of the lack of fulfilment of the basic needs of the poor, free riding and ill–defined property rights. As these goods are essential for the survival of these people, they have to access these items from commons. This results in regular raids to common land for resources and also to private houses (for example, in New Delhi) which are not guarded for water. A variant of the agricultural household model is used to analyse the above problem. Several propositions are established and it is demonstrated that degradation can occur at both a low and high price of basic needs. This result has important policy implications as it demonstrates that land or common degradation cannot be solved by just using the price system. Properly defined property rights and provision of basic goods in kind may resolve the problem of degradation of commons.     

Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods

Public provision of a private goods is justified on efficiency grounds in a model with no redistributive preferences. A government’s involvement in the provision of a private good generates information about preferences that facilitates more efficient revenue extraction for the provision of public goods. Public provision of the private good improves economic efficiency under a condition that is always fulfilled under independence and satisfied for an open set of joint distributions. The efficiency gains require that consumers cannot arbitrage the publicly provided private good, so our analysis applies to private goods where it is easy to keep track of the ultimate user, such as schooling and health care, but not to easily tradable consumer goods.     

Collective Choice and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods*

Some public goods are provided entirely with private contributions, others with a mixture of public and private funding, and still others are entirely publicly funded. In order to study this variation, a model of dual provision is developed that endogenizes public and private funding. Households vote over an income tax that finances public supply of the good and on whether to permit private contributions. While permitting private contributions may lead to a reduction in total provision, a majority always favors permitting private contributions. Results are developed for small and large economies, and the relevance of nonexcludability and noncongestion are investigated.     

Depreciation and intergenerational altruism in the private provision of public goods

The static model of the private provision of public goods is refuted by empirical and experimental evidence which shows that contributions are above the levels predicted by the theory. The model is reconsidered here in an intertemporal framework that allows the formation of a stock of public good over time and admits intergenerational altruism into preferences. Both of these factors affect the level of private provision. An intertemporal version of the Samuelson rule is derived and it is shown that, for some parameter values, the provision level determined by this is matched by private provision. For other parameter values, it is shown how a system of taxation can achieve the optimum.     

Keynesian Multipliers, Direct Crowding Out, and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods

This paper studies Keynesian multipliers in a macroeconomic model with monopolistic competition. We allow public and private consumption goods to be perfect substitutes in private utility. This enables us to study the effect of direct crowding out on the size of national income, profit and employment multipliers for a given rise in real public spending. A positive real national income multiplier is obtained if consumers value public consumption less than private consumption. In addition, we determine the effective marginal cost of public funds and the optimal provision of public goods, both in the short run and in the long run.     

Heterogeneity,impatience, and dynamic private provision of a discrete public good

We analyze dynamic private provision of a discrete public good by heterogeneous agents, who differ in terms of their levels of impatience, in a differential game framework. In contrast to the strategic complementarity result for homogeneous individuals, we show that an asymmetric completion Markov perfect equilibrium exists, where the individual contributions and the strategic behaviors depend crucially on an impatience differential: the difference in rates of time preference across groups of individuals. When this differential is insignificant, contributions of both types of individuals are strategic complements. On the other hand, when this impatience differential exceeds a threshold, the contributions of impatient individuals become strategic substitutes, whereas the contributions of patient individuals remain strategic complements. We show that group size has an interesting role to play in the strategic behavior: increasing the number of patient individuals aggravates the incentives to free‐ride by the impatient agents. We also derive a condition under which all the socially beneficial projects get completed in the equilibrium.     

公共品供给机制:作用边界变迁及影响因素

公共品供给机制是从供给主体和运行机理的角度抽象出的公共品供给模式,包括政府供给、市场供给和自愿供给.某一公共品的供给方式不是一成不变的,其供给机制的作用边界处于变迁之中,主要表现为政府供给与私人供给的相互转化.在公共品供给机制的变迁中,公共品的性质特征、技术进步、政府职能理念、公平效率准则、政府政策倾向、需求状况以及私人资本规模都产生了一定的影响作用.     

Let There Be Light: Social Enterprise,Solar Power,and Sustainable Development

Energy poverty is a major problem in the developing world, with nearly 1.3 billion people lacking household electricity. Strikingly, the electrification rate is not only low, but is falling in many countries as population growth outpaces efforts to give more people access to electricity. Seizing the opportunities presented by rapid changes in technology and the availability of renewable energy at continually falling costs, social enterprises have begun to light the darkness and fill in the gap between the public and private provision of electricity. We review the extent of energy poverty and explain why neither the public, nor the private sector has successfully addressed this problem. We also discuss institutional factors that have created an environment conducive to the spread of solar power. To illustrate the social enterprise response, we explain the sector’s three most common approaches to solar electrification. Since the potential benefits of any social innovation revolve around its scalability, we discuss various paths to scale before outlining A.T. Kearney’s “Social Enterprise Accelerator” model as a template for scaling up individual social businesses. To enable greater consistency with an institutional economic framework, we suggest an adaptation of the model. We conclude by highlighting potential benefits and challenges facing solar electrification, including the limits of social enterprise as a stand-alone solution to utility provision.