The Great Recession and charitable giving

We examine the impact of the Great Recession on charitable giving. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we estimate a variety of specifications and find sharp declines in overall donative behaviour that is not accounted for by shocks to income or wealth. These results suggest that overall attitudes towards giving changed over this time period.     

Testing for altruism and social pressure in charitable giving

Every year, 90% of Americans give money to charities. Is such generosity necessarily welfare enhancing for the giver? We present a theoretical framework that distinguishes two types of motivation: individuals like to give, for example, due to altruism or warm glow, and individuals would rather not give but dislike saying no, for example, due to social pressure. We design a door-to-door fund-raiser in which some households are informed about the exact time of solicitation with a flyer on their doorknobs. Thus, they can seek or avoid the fund-raiser. We find that the flyer reduces the share of households opening the door by 9% to 25% and, if the flyer allows checking a Do Not Disturb box, reduces giving by 28% to 42%. The latter decrease is concentrated among donations smaller than $10. These findings suggest that social pressure is an important determinant of door-to-door giving. Combining data from this and a complementary field experiment, we structurally estimate the model. The estimated social pressure cost of saying no to a solicitor is $3.80 for an in-state charity and $1.40 for an out-of-state charity. Our welfare calculations suggest that our door-to-door fund-raising campaigns on average lower the utility of the potential donors.     

Altruism and charitable giving in a fully replicated economy

In this paper, an economy is analyzed where one group of agents, the altruists, cares about the well-being of another group of agents, the recipients. It is asked how changes in the size of these groups affect the altruists' charitable giving in the Nash equilibrium. I show that a pure group size effect, i.e., a proportional expansion of both subgroups can lead to less free riding and to a lower degree of underprovision relative to the efficient level of charitable giving.     

Decomposing desert and tangibility effects in a charitable giving experiment

Several papers have documented that when subjects play with standard laboratory “endowments” they make less self-interested choices than when they use money they have either earned through a laboratory task or brought from outside the lab. In the context of a charitable giving experiment we decompose this into two common artifacts of the laboratory: the intangibility of money (or experimental currency units) promised on a computer screen relative to cash in hand, and the distinct treatment of random “windfall” gains relative to earned money. While both effects are found to be significant in non-parametric tests, the former effect, which has been neglected in previous studies, has a stronger impact on total donations, while the latter effect has a greater impact on the probability of donating. These results have clear implications for experimental design, and also suggest that the availability of more abstract payment methods may increase other-regarding behavior in the field.     

Willingness‐to‐pay for parallel private health insurance: evidence from a laboratory experiment

Abstract Debate over the effects of public versus private health care finance persists in both academic and policy circles. This paper presents the results of a revealed preference laboratory experiment that tests how characteristics of the public health system affect a subject's willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) for parallel private health insurance. Consistent with the theoretical predictions of Cuff et al. (2010), subjects’ average WTP is lower and the size of the private insurance sector smaller when the public system allocates health care based on need rather than randomly and when the probability of receiving health care from the public system is high.     

Temporary and permanent migrant selection: Theory and evidence of ability‐search cost dynamics

We integrate two workhorses of the labor literature, the Roy and search models, to illustrate the implications of migration duration—specifically, whether it is temporary or permanent—for patterns of selection. Consistent with our stylized model, we show that temporary migrants are intermediately selected on education, with weaker selection on cognitive ability. In contrast, permanent migration is associated with strong positive selection on both education and ability, as it involves finer employee–employer matching and offers greater returns to experience. Networks are also more valuable for permanent migration, where search costs are higher. Labor market frictions explain observed network–skill interactions.     

Race‐to‐the‐bottom Tariff Cutting

Unilateral tariff liberalization accounts for the lion's share of trade liberalization since the 1980s and has accompanied the most successful trade‐led development model of the past 50 years, “Factory Asia”. Understanding what drove this liberalization is therefore crucial to our grasp of the process of economic development. This paper provides empirical evidence for seven Asian emerging economies from 1988 to 2006 consistent with a tariff race to the bottom driven by a competition for foreign direct investment (FDI). The identification is two‐pronged. First, it is shown that tariffs on parts and components, intermediates and capital goods, crucial locational determinants for assembly firms, are correlated in competitive space, i.e. across countries at a similar level of development, but not across all countries. Second, it is shown that the tariff correlation in competitive space is significantly higher for inputs than consumer goods.     

The effect of religion on Muslims’ charitable contributions to members of a non‐Muslim majority

We investigate the effects of religion on charitable contributions of Muslims who are in a minority to non‐Muslims who are in a majority and to fellow Muslims. We find that religious thinking leads to significantly more charitable giving by 10%. The effect of religious thinking is dependent on the ethnic identity of the recipient. We find a significant effect on giving behavior toward relatively more privileged out‐group members (Han Chinese), but a small and generally insignificant effect toward in‐group members (fellow Muslims). With religious thinking, prosocial behavior toward out‐group members is significantly higher by 14%, which is mainly explained by the religiosity of Muslims. Our results have implications for our understanding of the influence of Islamic rules on Muslims’ attitudes and behavior toward non‐Muslims and for the design of fundraising mechanisms in Muslim communities.     

Winning or losing in investor‐to‐state dispute resolution: The role of arbitrator bias and experience

When an investor sues a state for alleged breaches of its obligations under an investment treaty or a trade agreement with investment provisions, all that should matter for who wins the case are the merits of the claim itself. Alas, investor‐to‐state dispute settlement (ISDS) does not take place in a vacuum. Such cases are decided by a tribunal typically consisting of three arbitrators, one each nominated by the two parties while the president is mutually agreed upon. We demonstrate that the kind of involvement of these arbitrators in previous ISDS cases matters for the case under dispute. Specifically, we show that what we label the presidents' pro‐investor appointment bias—the number of times they have previously been nominated by an investor minus the number of times they have represented respondent states—raises the likelihood that an investor wins an ISDS case. The same holds for the pro‐investor appointment bias of state‐appointed arbitrators. Given the president's crucial role, the main implication of our findings is that presidents should be drawn from among those who have not systematically represented more one side than the other in previous cases.     

Trust and foreign ownership: Evidence from intra‐European foreign direct investments

We use a novel firm‐level dataset to test whether trust affects the volume and the ownership structure FDI across Europe. Our methodology deals with the endogeneity of trust from the investor to the recipient country. We expect such a trust measure to affect investment decisions, and the associated knowledge capital, differently across types of foreign investors. In particular, this effect is expected to be stronger for industrial investors who possess transferable knowledge capital. The data confirm our predictions. Higher trust increases the number and volume of FDIs, but also the probability of co‐investing with a partner from the recipient country.     

Taking,giving, and impure altruism in dictator games

We show that, if giving is equivalent to not taking, impure altruism could account for List’s (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, 2007) finding that the payoff to recipients in a dictator game decreases when the dictator has the option to take. We examine behavior in dictator games with different taking options but equivalent final payoff possibilities. We find that recipients tend to earn more as the amount the dictator must take to achieve a given final payoff increases, a result consistent with the hypothesis that the cold prickle of taking is stronger than the warm glow of giving. We conclude that not taking is not equivalent to giving and agree with List (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, 2007) that the current social preference models fail to rationalize the observed data.     

Building and Interpreting Macro/Micro Estimates of Accrued‐to‐Date Pension Liabilities: French Reforms as a Case Study

Estimates of accrued‐to‐date pension liabilities (ADL) should become more widely accessible to statisticians and decision makers in the near future, in application of new SNA requirements. This raises two questions: how can such estimates be routinely produced, and what for? Microsimulation helps in answering the first question of the “how.” It allows ADL computations that take into account the complexity of pension rules. Concerning the “what for” question, it is known that ADL are not an indicator of global financial sustainability. Messages they convey are more interesting at the micro level, from a household perspective. This fosters the case for microsimulation which spontaneously generates consistent micro/macro results. We illustrate these points using the French situation as a case study. We emphasize one aspect of French reforms that may concern other countries as well: the move to price indexation and the connection it creates between sustainability and growth assumptions.     

信用、产权与我国信用制度的构建

交易是一对权利束的相向运动,当权利束的转移存在时间差的时候,这种交易就称为信用交易,而交易的权利束就是产权.产权与信用交易之间的逻辑联系是本文的研究核心,它们之间定量的关系是本文要探讨的主要内容.而以上问题具体到中国,就体现为中国的信用制度的构建与完善.     

How ‘Little’ Outsourcing Creates A Large Skill Premium: A Model of North‐to‐South Manufacturing Outsourcing

This paper develops a general equilibrium model that shows that a small volume of North–South ¹ trade (i.e. 2% of Northern GDP) could have caused the observed rise in the skill premium, thus resolving the ‘small trade volume paradox’ in the skill premium debate. We apply the concept of ‘trade in tasks’ of Grossman and Rossi‐Hansberg to analyze the nature of North‐to‐South manufacturing outsourcing. As a conceptual innovation, we carefully distinguish two different implicit assumptions of the Heckscher–Ohlin model: ‘factor immobility’ versus ‘task inseparability’. We show that outsourcing, as a form of trade in tasks, essentially attains ‘task separability’ while apparently retaining factor immobility, thus rendering the traditional Heckscher–Ohlin framework obsolete for analyzing current North–South trade. We argue that this change in the nature of trade calls for new thinking in economics and public policy‐making.     

Long‐Run PPP under the Presence of Near‐to‐Unit Roots: The Case of the British Pound–US Dollar Rate*

Empirical tests typically provide evidence that the British pound–US dollar exchange rate and the relative wholesale price index contain exact unit roots and exhibit cointegration. However, the cointegrating vector is significantly different from [1, ?1], thus raising doubts on the validity of the purchasing power parity (PPP) hypothesis. Following Elliott (1998 ), we show that if the exchange rate and relative price series contain near‐to‐unit roots in the context of a bivariate system, then any inference on the “cointegrating” vector and consequently on PPP, which is based on standard cointegration estimation methods, will be misleading. We then argue that the existing evidence against the PPP hypothesis in the British pound–US dollar market can be attributed to the finite sample bias of the standard cointegration estimators, arising from an endogenous and “nearly” nonstationary regressor. We also show that when robust procedures are employed the evidence favors the PPP hypothesis.     

Is Crowdfunding Different? Evidence on the Relation between Gender and Funding Success from a German Peer‐to‐Peer Lending Platform

According to the literature on traditional banking, lenders often discriminate against female borrowers. However, studies of Peer‐to‐Peer lending in the United States find that female borrowers have better chances of obtaining funds than do males. We provide evidence on the success of female borrowers at a large German peer‐to‐peer lending platform. Our results show that there is no effect of gender on the individual borrower's chance to receive funds on this platform, ceteris paribus. Several robustness checks confirm this finding. Hence, female discrimination seems to be eased by the ‘wisdom of the lending crowd’.