Culture,institutions, and long-run performance

If institutions are essential for long-run performance, why don't developing countries adopt institutions in developed countries to become rich? In this dynamic model, culture affects a ruler's institutional choice, while culture itself evolves endogenously. Multiple stable steady states are possible, and even similar initial conditions can lead to dramatically different steady states. The state of Qin's unification of China in 221 bc is used to illustrate the model. In one steady state, consistent with what happened in the state of Qin, individuals value material incentives. Qin did not strictly practice the patriarchal clan system advocated by Confucianism. Qin adopted Legalist institutions under which government officials were chosen by merit, and Qin culture was further shaped by Legalism. In another steady state, consistent with what happened in states other than Qin, individuals value loyalty and family values. Those states chose not to adopt Legalist institutions comprehensively, fearing that inconsistencies between culture and institutions could lead to internal rebellions even though institutional reforms would increase their military power. Other cases of how the interdependence between culture and institutions affects performance are also discussed.     

ON THE “PRO‐POORNESS” OF GROWTH IN A MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONTEXT

This paper represents a first attempt to bring together the issues of multidimensional poverty and growth “pro‐poorness” assessments. More specifically, we suggest the use of sequential dominance procedures to test the “pro‐poorness” of observed growth spells when poverty is measured on the basis of income and another discrete well‐being attribute. Sequential procedures are also used to obtain graphical tools that are consistent with the spirit of Ravallion and Chen's growth incidence curve and Son's poverty growth curve. Contrary to traditional unidimensional tests, our method makes it possible to take into account the importance of deprivation correlations at the individual level and thus may reverse results observed with the traditional tools used to check the “pro‐poorness” of growth. An illustration of our approach is given using Turkish data for the period 2003–05.     

HISTORY‐DEPENDENT PATHS AND TRADE GAINS IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY WITH A PUBLIC INTERMEDIATE GOOD*

This study reexamines McMillan's (International Economic Review 19 (1978), 665–78) analysis of a dynamic small open economy with a public intermediate good. Concerning the trade patterns of the open economy, we find results that were overlooked in McMillan's analysis. Among others, if labor endowment is of intermediate size, there are two saddle‐point steady states, and the initial stock of the public good determines the long‐run trade pattern. We also add a gains‐from‐trade analysis to McMillan's model and demonstrate that if the economy has a comparative advantage in a good with productivity less sensitive to the public intermediate good, the economy may lose from trade at the steady state.     

A NOTE ON “A ONE‐SECTOR NEOCLASSICAL GROWTH MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS RETIREMENT”: EXISTENCE OF MULTIPLE STEADY STATES*

This note extends Matsuyama's 0–1 endogenous retirement choice model to the framework with continuous endogenous retirement choice to study the consumption‐saving decision and capital accumulation in an overlapping generation model. The conditions for the existence of multiple steady states have been derived. In contrast to the 0 or 1 labour choice, the partial retirement may be a stable steady state under the continuous endogenous retirement choice in the second period. And this implies that partial retirement may be a stable optimal choice. Also, we find that the retirement choice depends on the initial capital stock when there are multiple steady states.     

Steady state properties of multi‐state economic models

A simple method to derive optimal steady states of multi‐state dynamic economic systems with minimal assumptions on the underlying processes is developed. This is accomplished by an n‐dimensional function defined over the n‐dimensional state space in terms of the model's primitives. The location and stability properties of optimal steady state candidates are characterized by the roots and derivatives of this function. A resource management example illustrates the simplicity and applicability of the method.     

Human capital investment,credentialing, and wage differentials

This study considers how individuals determine at what ratio they will invest in two different types of education. The first type contributes to the development of labor skills, while the other does not. We refer to the former as human capital investment and the latter as unproductive investment, which improves test scores but has no beneficial effect on students' human capital. We formulate an overlapping‐generations economy in which the rich and poor households invest in both types of education. We find that the ratio of human capital investment to unproductive investment is lower in the economy with medium size of the wage differentials. In a dynamic analysis, we identify two patterns of stable steady states for the dynamics of the wage differentials, namely, no‐inequality and high‐inequality steady states. Further, we show that a rapid increase in the level of skill‐biased technology may cause a switch from a steady state with no‐inequality to one with high inequality. This causes at least a temporary increase in the ratio of unproductive investment during the transition to the new steady state.     

On optimal redistributive capital taxation

This paper addresses conflicting results regarding the optimal taxation of capital income. Judd proves that in a steady state, there should be no taxation of capital income. Lansing studies a logarithmic example of one of Judd's models and finds that the optimal steady‐state tax on capital income is not always zero—it is positive in some specifications and negative in some others. There appears to be a contradiction. However, I show that Lansing derives his result by relaxing the convergence hypotheses of Judd's theorem. With less restrictive hypotheses, a wider range of primitives (parameter values, initial condition, etc.) satisfy the hypotheses and because each specification of primitives generates its own optimal time path(s) for the model's variables, it follows that a wider range of time paths with a wider range of steady‐state properties is possible. This raises a question. What happens if the convergence hypotheses are weakened further so that they are satisfied by a wider yet range of primitives? I find that at any interior steady state for the model's optimal tax equilibrium, either the capital tax is zero or else the elasticity of marginal utility is unitary which is satisfied identically in Lansing's log example. In effect, Lansing's example illustrates the only way in which an interior steady state can violate the zero tax result.     

Two‐level CES Production Technology in the Solow and Diamond Growth Models*

The two‐level CES aggregate production function—that nests a CES into another CES function—has recently been used extensively in theoretical and empirical applications of macroeconomics. We examine the theoretical properties of this production technology and establish existence and stability conditions of steady states under the Solow and Diamond growth models. It is shown that in the Solow model the sufficient condition for a steady state is fulfilled for a wide range of substitution parameter values. This is in sharp contrast with the two‐factor Solow model, where only an elasticity of substitution equal to one is sufficient to guarantee the existence of a steady state. In the Diamond model, multiple equilibria can occur when the aggregate elasticity of substitution is lower than the capital share. Moreover, it is shown that for high initial levels of capital and factor substitutability, the effect of a further increase in a substitution parameter on the steady state depends on capital–skill complementarity.     

Pro‐social leadership under authoritarianism

Authoritarianism is regarded as being unaccountable for people's needs, but few studies have documented how authoritarian countries balance their policy goals. China is known to use a promotion system to incentivize local leaders to develop the economy, while neglecting social spending. This paper documents that more leaders having a liberal arts background have been promoted as top provincial leaders. After carefully ruling out other channels, we provide evidence that the shift of top provincial leaders’ college educational backgrounds from science/technology to liberal arts/social science has increased fiscal expenditure shares on science, education, culture and public health and cut economic construction expenditures accordingly. The finding is mainly driven by the post‐1994 period, when local leaders had stronger incentives for economic growth. This indicates that Chinese top authorities are promoting more pro‐social local leaders when providing pro‐growth incentives in general.     

SOCIAL COMPARISON AND SUBJECTIVE WELL‐BEING: DOES THE HEALTH OF OTHERS MATTER?

The importance of social comparison in shaping individual utility has been widely documented by subjective well‐being literature. So far, income and unemployment have been the main dimensions considered in social comparison. This paper aims to investigate whether subjective well‐being is influenced by inter‐personal comparison with respect to health. Thus, we study the effects of the health of others and relative health hypotheses on two measures of subjective well‐being: happiness and subjective health. Using data from the Italian Health Conditions survey, we show that a high incidence of chronic conditions and disability among reference groups negatively affects both happiness and subjective health. Such effects are stronger among people in the same condition. These results, robust to different econometric specifications and estimation techniques, suggest the presence of some sympathy in individual preferences with respect to health and reveal that other people's health status serves as a benchmark to assess one's own health condition.     

Globalisation,Hegemony and Passive Revolution

Across the social sciences the last decade has witnessed a proliferating interest in the relationship between the state and globalisation. By the early 1990s a range of writers working within what we label a structuralist approach asserted that globalisation is, if not challenging the viability of the sovereign state, then at least forcing it to adapt its policies to conform to the new global reality‐being 'hollowed out', as the phrase had it. The pendulum then swung the other way when an 'agent-centric' backlash emerged, insisting that states have what we call agential power, such that they can mitigate and even shape global structures. In this article we build upon an emergent third way, or 'structurationist' perspective, between these two antinomies, in which we synthesise structuralist and agent-centric theory. We begin in Part I by taking stock of the central issues in the state/globalisation debate and examine the various structuralistand agent-centric approaches, while Part II sketches the theoreticaloutlines of a structurationis t approach and conceptualises what we call the spatial promiscuity of the state. In Part III we apply this approach to the case of Singapore. We choose Singapore only because it provides an excellent litmus test for critically appraising the various positions on globalisation, including our own, not least because Singapore is a small state that has perhaps the most globalised economy in the world.     

Testing Gibrat's legacy: A Bayesian approach to study the growth of firms

Gibrat's law is a referent model of corporate growth dynamics. This paper employs Bayesian panel data methods to test Gibrat's law and its implications. Using a Pharmaceutical Industry Database (1987–1998), we find evidence against Gibrat's law on average, within or across industries. Estimated steady states differ across firms, and firm sizes and growth rates do not converge within the same industry to a common limiting distribution. There is only weak evidence of mean reversion: initial larger firms do not grow relatively slower than smaller firms. Differences in growth rates and in steady state size are persistent and firm-specific, rather than size-specific.     

Do socially motivated self‐help groups perform better? Exploring determinants of micro‐credit groups’ performance in Eastern India

Group‐based micro‐credit initiatives, as part of the broader social and solidarity‐based finance initiatives, have gained prominence over the past decade, especially in developing economies like India. Lending to the poor, especially women, through micro‐credit groups, are significantly associated with the utilization of commons. Apart from their financial operations, self‐help groups promote social empowerment activities and collective action following a dual bottom‐line approach. However, the causal role of the group's motivation towards pursuing social objectives has not been explored in the past. The present study, therefore, investigates the interlinkages between the group's intrinsic motivation and efficiency using an innovative two‐stage double bootstrapped DEA‐based methodology. Results from the study affirm that apart from traditional factors like maturity, accessibility and group management, the motivation of the group is a crucial determinant of social efficiency. Additionally, the group's loan‐to‐savings ratio and receipt of cash payments significantly affect its long‐term financial sustainability. Micro‐credit groups cannot contribute sustainably as a viable alternative to traditional means of access to credit if it merely offers innovative forms of financing and consumption. They need to be socially aligned to serve the community better and contribute to the group's overall performance and galvanize community‐based resource management.     

Implementing Steady State Efficiency in Overlapping Generations Economies with Environmental Externalities

We consider in this paper overlapping generations economies with pollution resulting from both consumption and production. The competitive equilibrium steady state is compared to the optimal steady state from the social planner's viewpoint. We show that the dynamical inefficiency of a competitive equilibrium steady state with capital–labor ratio exceeding the golden rule ratio still holds. Moreover, the range of dynamically efficient steady state capital ratios increases with the effectiveness of the environment maintenance technology, and decreases for more polluting production technologies. We characterize some tax and transfer policies that decentralize as a competitive equilibrium outcome the transition to the social planner's steady state.     

Is income converging in China?

This study adopts a flexible Fourier unit‐root test proposed by Enders and Lee (2012) to revisit the tendency towards convergence in real per capita income among provinces after economic reform in China. When a data‐generating process is non‐linear, a Fourier series not only allows for the possibility of an unknown number of structural breaks with unknown forms but also allows for the use of a low‐frequency component to capture multiple changes. Contrary to what the linear statistics suggest, our results from a flexible unit‐root test indicate that China's eastern and western regions are converging to their own specific steady states.     

Neighbors' Income,Public Goods,and Well‐Being

How does neighbors' income affect individual well‐being? Our analysis is based on rich U.S. local data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, which contains information on where respondents live and their self‐reported well‐being. We find that the effect of neighbors' income on individuals' self‐reported well‐being varies with the size of the neighborhood included. In smaller areas such as ZIP codes, we find a positive relationship between median income and individuals' life satisfaction, whereas it is the opposite at the county, MSA, and state levels. We provide evidence that local public goods and local area characteristics such as unemployment, criminality, and poverty rates drive the association between satisfaction and neighbors' income at the ZIP code level. The neighbors' income effects are mainly concentrated among poorer individuals and are as large as one quarter of the effect of own income on self‐reported well‐being.     

MODELLING SOCIAL ENTERPRISES

The majority of research concentrates exclusively on the objectives of governments, profit entities or non‐profit organizations, while a significant number of organizations are hybrids. One form of these hybrids is the social enterprise. This paper theoretically describes social enterprises taking into consideration their main aims. Based on the ‘earned income’ school of thought, the principal‐agent theory and considering the nature of social enterprises’ activities we propose the objective functions of their owners (principals) and managers (agents). The maximization problem of the social enterprise is defined as the weighted average of the utilities of two groups of stakeholders who have an influence on the degree of the realization of the social mission and business orientations. We point out the direction which social enterprises should follow in order to obtain the highest value of their objective functions. The desired state for social enterprises should be one in which they reinvest all surpluses in the process of their mission realization and their profit is slightly higher than the required level by the principal's contract.     

Median‐voter Equilibria in the Neoclassical Growth Model under Aggregation*

We study a dynamic version of Meltzer and Richard's median‐voter model where agents differ in wealth. Taxes are proportional to income and are redistributed as equal lump‐sum transfers. Voting occurs every period and each consumer votes for the tax that maximizes his welfare. We characterize time‐consistent Markov‐perfect equilibria twofold. First, restricting utility classes, we show that the economy's aggregate state is mean and median wealth. Second, we derive the median‐voter's first‐order condition interpreting it as a tradeoff between distortions and net wealth transfers. Our method for solving the steady state relies on a polynomial expansion around the steady state.     

It's a Sin—Contraceptive Use,Religious Beliefs,and Long‐run Economic Development

This study presents a novel theory on the interaction of social norms, fertility, education, and their joint impact on long‐run economic development. The theory takes into account that sexual intercourse is utility enhancing and that the use of modern contraceptives potentially conflicts with prevailing social norms (religious beliefs). The theory motivates the existence of two steady states. At the traditional steady state, the economy stagnates, fertility is high, education is minimal, and the population sustains a norm according to which modern contraceptives are not used. At the modern steady state, the population has abandoned traditional beliefs, modern contraceptives are used, fertility is low and education and economic growth are high. Social dynamics explain why both equilibria are separated by a saddlepoint‐equilibrium (a separatrix), i.e. why it is so hard to transit from the traditional regime to the modern regime.     

Winning or losing in investor‐to‐state dispute resolution: The role of arbitrator bias and experience

When an investor sues a state for alleged breaches of its obligations under an investment treaty or a trade agreement with investment provisions, all that should matter for who wins the case are the merits of the claim itself. Alas, investor‐to‐state dispute settlement (ISDS) does not take place in a vacuum. Such cases are decided by a tribunal typically consisting of three arbitrators, one each nominated by the two parties while the president is mutually agreed upon. We demonstrate that the kind of involvement of these arbitrators in previous ISDS cases matters for the case under dispute. Specifically, we show that what we label the presidents' pro‐investor appointment bias—the number of times they have previously been nominated by an investor minus the number of times they have represented respondent states—raises the likelihood that an investor wins an ISDS case. The same holds for the pro‐investor appointment bias of state‐appointed arbitrators. Given the president's crucial role, the main implication of our findings is that presidents should be drawn from among those who have not systematically represented more one side than the other in previous cases.