Tax policy in a matching model with training

This paper develops a model of search on the labour market withtraining. We explore how the combination of an average job taxand a marginal wage tax can be used to alleviate inefficienciesin job matching and, at the same time, raise a positive revenuewith minimal distortions in search and training. We find that(i) a wage tax is less distortionary to raise revenue than isa job tax if training is not distorted initially; (ii) thisconclusion may reverse in the presence of training distortions;(iii) marginal wage taxes are less distortionary in economieswhere bargaining parties can commit to the wage profile.     

On Tax Over-Shifting in Wage Bargaining Models

It has frequently been noted in the wage bargaining literature that increasing average labour taxes may in fact be over-shifted in the pre-tax wage that is negotiated between unions and firms, raising workers post-tax wages. In this paper, we study the precise conditions for such tax over-shifting to occur under both Nash and Right-To-Manage bargaining structures, and considering both competitive and imperfectly competitive output market conditions. In the case of competitive output markets, we derive and interpret the conditions for over-shifting to occur and show that they hold for an entire class of commonly used production functions. Moreover, under monopolistically competitive output markets we show that tax over-shifting will occur when the firm has sufficient market power. The conditions on the production function, that were necessary and sufficient for tax over-shifting to occur under perfect competition, are shown to be no longer necessary. These findings hold for all bargaining structures considered.

Books and publications received

ABSTRACT

Economic theory predicts that regional wages will converge as transport and communication technologies bring labour markets together. An exploration of this transition from labour market segmentation to unification requires long-term evidence of nominal wages and cost of living by region. This paper presents new evidence of wages for male manufacturing workers and cost-of-living indices across 24 Swedish counties between 1860 and 2009. Our findings indicate that the Swedish regional wage differentials were a great deal larger in the 1860s than in the 2000s. Most of the compression took place between the 1860s and World War I, as well as in the 1930s and during World War II. Differences in expenditures on housing impact on our assessment of convergence in the post-World War II decades: the nominal measure declines, while the real one stays constant. Our concluding discussion engages with the assumption that before World War I, regional wage convergence was associated with labour mobility, spurred by improved communication and transportation technologies as well as by the implementation of modern employment contracts. In the 1930s and 1940s, in contrast, regional wage convergence can be traced to high unionisation and centralised collective bargaining in the labour market, two distinguishing features of the Swedish Model.     

WAGES THROUGH BOOMS AND RECESSIONS: A CASE STUDY OF ZIMBABWE

This paper examines developments in the wage system in Zimbabwe. The analysis focuses on the wage formation process and wage differentials. The paper observes that real wages have been flexible and have fallen sharply. Wage inflexibility is thus ruled out as a cause of unemployment. The collapse of wages has given rise to non‐standard labour market practices as workers try to cushion themselves against rapid wage declines. Wages also exhibit wide gender, racial and occupational differentials. The paper also argues that a wage policy in Zimbabwe must be pillared on decentralised, coordinated and synchronised collective bargaining.     

UNION-OLIGOPOLY SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING: TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES

This paper considers the efficacy and the desirability of homegovernment tariff and subsidy policies when labour market structureand asymmetries in the firms' size matter. In a Cournot-Nashduopolistic sector, a unionized home-firm competes against anon-unionized foreign firm. The home firm-union choose wagesand employment in a two-stage Nash bargaining game. The secondstage corresponds to the Cournot-Nash game with the foreignfirm. Firms may play in strategic substitutes or complements.As the home bargainers recognize that market shares are determinedby relative marginal costs, they may use the wage stage strategically.Home government policy choices critically depend upon the bargainingstructure and general equilibrium spillovers.     

Non-standard Employment in Sweden

In Sweden, as in many other countries, marginal groups tend to be overrepresented in non-standard employment. A decomposition of the employment rate of full-time workers on permanent contracts reveals that non-standard employment contributes to a substantially weaker labour market attachment for females and the foreign born than suggested by conventional employment figures alone. Our econometric analysis shows that the negative wage premia associated with fixed-term employment are considerably smaller in Sweden, both for natives and foreign born, than those that have been found for other countries. This may be due to a highly compressed wage structure and extensive coverage of collective bargaining in Sweden. On the whole, the type of fixed-term contract seems not to matter for the estimated wage premia.     

The gender earnings gap: effects of institutions and firms--a comparative study of French and Australian private firms

This paper uses two employer-employee linked data sets to investigatethe interactive role of labour market institutions and firmwage policies on the gender earnings gap. Extending the Juhnet al. (1991) decomposition methodology, a new decompositionmethodology is proposed to investigate the role of firm wagepolicies on the gender earnings gap. Two countries with differentwage bargaining systems, Australia and France, are used to conducta comparative study. It is found that firm wage policies inAustralia play a much larger role in narrowing the gender earningsgaps than in France. This is mainly due to the fact that Australiahas a more decentralised wage bargaining system and that suchsystem is operated under an environment where there is a strongunion presence.     

Segmented labour markets without policy-induced labour market distortions

This paper argues that labour market segmentation does not require labour market distortions. Segmentation appears when innovations are introduced in an initially imbalanced environment: because the capital market is imperfect. Only large firms can adopt the modern techniques. Small firms have to force their workers to reduce their labour incomes in order to compete with the modernized firms. The latter do not reduce wages because their interest is to minimize total labour costs rather than the wage bill alone: with labour a quasi-fixed cost. The difference in behaviour tends to be significant.     

Contribution Ceilings and the Incidence of Payroll Taxes

Social security contributions (SSCs) are typically formally split between employers and employees as payroll taxes, levied on earnings at a constant tax rate that applies only up to a ceiling, above which the marginal tax rate falls to a reduced rate, often 0. Such contribution ceilings create a concave kink point in the budget set of workers and hence should generate a dip in the distribution of earnings around the ceiling through labour supply responses (the reverse of bunching expected at convex kink points) but such a dip is not observed empirically. This paper sets out a new approach to infer the incidence of SSCs that exploits the absence of this dip and the fact that (mechanically) the distributions of labour cost (earnings inclusive of all payroll taxes), gross earnings (net of employer payroll taxes) and net earnings (net of both employer and employee payroll taxes) cannot all be smooth around a kink. The other papers in this special issue apply the method to data for Germany, France, the Netherlands and the UK and all find that distribution of gross earnings is smooth around kinks (implying that the distributions of labour costs and net-of-tax earnings are not) even though the concept of gross earnings is irrelevant in the standard static model of labour supply and demand that dominates the public economics literature. This suggests that other features of the labour market, such as wage bargaining based on the gross earnings concept, are relevant for determining the incidence of SSCs.     

Modelling a poisson process: Strike frequency in Great Britain

Conclusions There are several noteworthy aspects of the work presented here. It is noted that previous parametric models of the bargaining process may be solved for the time-to-settlement of a wage dispute. It is then argued that such a specification is a model of time-to-failure of the bargaining process, or, considering frequencies of strikes in a fixed interval, a Poisson process. This is a very intuitive conclusion that reinforces the inappropriateness of OLS models of strike frequency.¹⁰ An estimation method based on regression planes is used to estimate the model parameters of bivariate Poisson models of strike frequency in coal mining, construction, and manufacturing. The empirical results confirm the author's prior expectations about the determinants of strike frequency. [See for example Buck, 1982; Pencavel, 1970; and Sapsford, 1975.] More specifically, as the labor market gets tighter, as measured by industry and overall unemployment rates, the expected number of strikes increases. Increasing profits relative to the wage bill causes strikes to decline in construction and manufacturing and increase in coal mining. Increases in the rate of change of overall real wages causes the expected number of strikes to decline in coal mining and increase in construction and manufacturing. The rate of change of industry real wages has a negative impact in construction, positive in mining, and mixed in coal mining.     

Sticky Swedes and flexible Finns: manufacturing labour markets in Finland and Sweden during the Great Depression

ABSTRACT

Nominal wage stickiness is a popular explanation for the greatness of the Great Depression. According to the sticky-wage explanation, the slow adjustment of nominal wages raised real wages above the market-clearing level, causing a reduction of output and labour, thus increasing unemployment. Explanations for nominal wage stickiness are usually sought within the labour-market institutions and their changes after the First World War. This paper examines the role of labour-market institutions by comparing manufacturing labour markets in Finland and Sweden. These two countries had quite similar economic structures, trade patterns, and exchange rate policies, but different systems of industrial relations. Results indicate that stronger trade unions and collective bargaining made nominal wages stickier in Sweden, while in Finland, where collective agreements did not exist, unions were weaker, and wage adjustment was more flexible. As a result, real product wages rose in Sweden but fell in Finland. This created in Sweden stronger pressure for reducing labour input than in Finland. Our results show on one hand that labour market institutions clearly influenced the course of the Great Depression, but on the other hand that they alone do not explain the different economic outcomes during the depression and the recovery.     

WAGE DETERMINATION UNDER NON-LINEAR TAXES: ESTIMATION AND AN APPLICATION TO PANEL DATA

This paper studies wage determination under piecewise lineartaxes in a unionised labour market. The purposes of the paperare to model how piecewise linear taxation affects the choiceset of the union, and to take this information into accountin the estimation. The empirical application is based on paneldata. Piecewise linear taxes necessitates formal assumptionsabout the sources of randomness, and we find that both unobservedheterogeneity and measurement errors in the wage rate are importantto consider in the estimation. We also find that taxes are likelyto have a non-negligible impact on the (pre-tax) wage rate.     

Trade Union and Global Economic Growth

Abstract

This paper develops a simple framework for examining the role of unions in a global economy. It builds on the model of different institutions by comparing America with a flexible wage and Europe with a rigid wage (the existence of union), where the two areas are integrated via perfect capital mobility. We find the necessary condition that the degree of wage orientation of the union is larger than the firm's bargaining power and determines the positive direction on global economic growth. In addition, the effect of union's bargaining power on global economic growth is ambiguous. If the sum of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour and the output elasticity of labour is smaller than one, or the firms are characterized by a Leontief production function (Harrod–Domar growth model) or an extremely low substituting elasticity (much empirical literature is supported), the union's bargaining power will lead to an increase in the growth of the global economy. In the general Cobb–Douglas production function (Solow–Swan neoclassical growth model), the union's bargaining power will result in a decline in the growth of the global economy.     

The Wage Gap between Men and Women in Botswana's Formal Labour Market

This study looks at the wage gap between men and women in Botswana'sformal sector labour market. The wage gap is decomposed usingOaxaca's decomposition methodology. This method breaks downearnings differences into two parts: one part is due to differencesin characteristics between men and women, while the other partis due to differences in rewards to those characteristics inthe labour market. The latter has often been interpreted asa measure of the extent of the discrimination against women.The results of the decomposition exercise shows that there isrelatively less discrimination in the public sector, while inthe private sector discrimination against women is a major factorexplaining the differences in their earnings.     

Cyclical and structural influences on Irish unemployment

In the course of the 1990s the Irish unemployment rate movedfrom near the top to close to the bottom of the EU league table.This paper identifies the cyclical and structural factors thathave contributed to the transformation of the Irish labour market.A steady gain in competitiveness facilitated rapid growth inoutput and employment. The links between Irish and British unemploymentrates have weakened as rapid economic growth has reduced Irishunemployment to historically low levels. The role of structuralchanges, including the relative generosity of the social welfaresystem and the wage bargaining process, are discussed.     

Multiple wage-bargaining systems in the single European currency area

Little attention in the EMU literature has been paid to theinteraction between central bank monetary rules and systemsof collective wage bargaining. Analytically and empirically,coordinated wage-bargaining systems respond with real wage restraintto non-accommodating monetary policy. Since wage determinationis dominated by collective bargaining in all the EMU memberstates and wage coordination within the member states has grownsince 1980, this is a topic of potential importance. In particular,the replacement of the Bundesbank, directly targeting Germaninflation, by a European Central Bank (ECB) targeting Europeaninflation will remove a major institutional support of wagerestraint in Germany. The consequences of this for EMU are workedout under two scenarios, that inflation expectations will begenerated by ECB monetary policy and that they will reflectGerman inflation outcomes. Possible institutional developmentsare discussed including government union bargains. The Bundesbankalso played a major role in maintaining fiscal rectitude: forunderlying structural reasons, therefore, it is possible thatGermany will move to a period of fiscal activism with wage restraintand low inflation purchased through social contract negotiations.     

Contrasting paradigms: segmentation and competitiveness in the formation of the chinese labour market

An urban labour market is in the process of being formed in China. The objective of this paper is to analyse the stage that it has reached. A 1999 household survey is used to investigate whether the labour market has three tiers comprised of recently retrenched and re-employed urban workers, non-retrenched urban workers, and rural–urban migrants. It tests whether wage levels and structures differ across these categories of worker. Panel data are used to model the evolution of the wage structure and, specifically, the impact of retrenchment and re-employment. The results indicate that non-retrenched urban workers enjoy a wage premium, although migrants receive similar returns to education. Re-employed workers receive no return to education and appear to have lost out on the wage rises enjoyed by the non-retrenched. There is evidence to suggest that the urban labour market is segmented into these categories, which differ in their openness to market competition. The urban labour market has a long way to go before it is fully competitive.     

Unemployment in LDCs: Worker heterogeneity, screening, and quantity constraints

Unemployment in many less developed countries is characterized by a significant urban-rural wage differential coexisting with high urban unemployment. This may be consistent with optimization when there is imperfect information about a worker's ability, and abilities are heterogeneous. Firms know only the average quality of workers in the labour pool. High urban wages induce immigration of workers from rural areas, improving the average quality of the urban labour pool which has been depleted of high ability workers by previous screening. Hence, both sides of the market way find high non-market-clearing wages optimal. Quantity constraints from imperfect capital markets may strengthen this effect.     

Singapore's Collective Bargaining in a Game of Wage and Exchange Rate Policies

In Singapore's system of tripartite collective bargaining, does the wage-policy maker consistently react optimally to the best move made by the exchange rate-policy maker (Nash-rule) or only to the state of economy (non-Nash rule)? This paper finds that the Nash-rule equilibrium is unstable and thus the non-Nash rule becomes more meaningful. Under the non-Nash rule, the simulated wage growth exhibits a counter-cyclical pattern and increases with the union of workers' bargaining power. The government's role appears to strike a balance between the interests of the employers' and the employees. Consistent with actual observations, the simulated exchange-rate appreciation has acted as a complement to wage growth from 1987 to 1995.

     

Inflation,wage bargaining,wage policy and production structure: Theory and empirical results for the Netherlands

Summary Starting from traditional neo-classical results, a theory is developed in which, in addition to prices, labour productivity and unemployment, the degree of unionization, the profit rate and the shifting-on of direct taxes and social security contributions influence nominal contract wages. A separate theoretical framework is constructed for wage drift.It is furthermore shown how the wage theory presented is related to Friedman-Phelps specifications. After a discussion of wage policy and its potential influence on wages, wage equations are estimated for the key bargaining sector as well as for wage followers. After their characteristics have been dealt with, as well as the effects of wage policy and the role of wage drift, the relationship between key bargaining, inflation and employment is analysed, showing that the model presented is able to explain stagflation.My thanks are due to Mr. H. von Eye for his help in carrying out the calculations and to Mr. A. de Reyger for providing me with the sectoral unionization rates and his general research assistance. Mr. A. J. van Geel kindly prepared the graphs.