The relationship between the costs and prices of a multi-product monopoly: The role of price-cap regulation

This paper examines the role of price-cap regulation in influencing the relationship between the costs and prices of a multi-product monopoly. Based on a simple model of mark-up pricing, a combination of analytical and numerical analysis is used to show how cost increases among the firm's products can cause a divergence of prices from the Ramsey structure if the cost increases are non-uniform or if the demand elasticities for the products are non-uniform. However, in the absence of additional cost changes, profit-maximising prices which are subject to a price-cap constraint converge to the Ramsey structure if the previous period's quantities are used as weights in the firm's price-cap constraint. Consequently, given this formulation of the firm's price-cap constraint, only in situations of recurring cost changes are prices likely to show on-going divergence from the Ramsey structure.This paper reports on research funded by the Australian Electricity Supply Industry Research Board. I am grateful to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on previous versions.     

Strategic pricing and entry deterrence under price-cap regulation

This paper shows that dynamic price-cap regulation allows the regulated firm to deter entry. Under dynamic price-cap regulation, the allowed prices in each period are an increasing function of the prices set in the previous period. By setting a low price before entry, the regulated firm can commit itself to charge a low price in the event of entry. If this price is sufficiently low with respect to the potential entrant's fixed cost, entry does not occur. Whether the regulated firm prefers to deter or accommodate entry depends on the level of the entry cost for the prospective entrant, on the tightness of the price-cap and on the degree of market power of the competing firms in case of entry.     

Setting the X Factor in Price-Cap Regulation Plans

Despite the popularity of price-cap regulation in practice, the economic literature provides limited guidance on how to determine the X factor, which is the rate at which inflation-adjusted output prices must fall under price-cap plans. We review the relevant basic principles, and then determine how to set the X factor: (1) when only a subset of the firm's products are subject to price-cap regulation, and when product-specific costs and productivity cannot be measured; (2) when changes in regulated prices affect the economy-wide inflation rate; and (3) in the presence of such structural changes as strengthened competitive forces.     

Price-cap regulation of congested airports

This paper investigates price-cap regulation of an airport where the airport facility (e.g. runway) is congested and airlines have market power. We show that when airport congestion is not a major problem, single-till price-cap regulation dominates dual-till price-cap regulation with respect to optimal welfare. Furthermore, we identify situations where dual-till regulation performs better than single-till regulation when there is significant airport congestion. For instance, when the airport can cover the airport costs associated with aeronautical services simply through an efficient aeronautical charge then dual-till regulation yields higher welfare.     

Asymmetric equilibria under price cap regulation

This study analyzes the effects of a price-cap regulation on market outcomes in Cournot and Stackelberg duopolies. Although two firms are ex-ante identical, there are asymmetric Cournot equilibria as well as the symmetric equilibrium under the price-cap regulation, when the price-cap level is binding. By contrast, the Stackelberg equilibrium is unique and equivalent to the most asymmetric Cournot equilibrium under a binding price-cap level. We present several comparative statics results with respect to the equilibrium outcomes. The main concern of this study is the welfare effect of a change in a price-cap level. We show that when asymmetric Cournot equilibria or the Stackelberg equilibrium are focused on, a reduction in a price-cap level may be socially harmful even if the price-cap level is more than the competitive price.     

Dominant Firm Pricing with Competitive Entry and Regulation: The Case of IntraLATA Toll

In this paper, we develop a generalized model of a dominant firm-competitive fringe industry in which products are differentiated, costs vary across suppliers, and the dominant firm is subject to alternative regulatory regimes. The model yields an equilibrium condition that can be tested empirically using data on Bell Operating Companies' pricing of intraLATA toll telephone service. Estimation of a reduced form price equation provides strong support for the theoretical model. Of particular interest, the results suggest that dominant firm (Bell Operating Company) toll prices are driven down by the presence of actual and potential fringe competitors (interexchange carriers) when entry is authorized by the state. Additionally, the results fail to provide evidence that the introduction of incentive regulation or price-cap regulation has reduced intraLATA toll prices.     

Pricing incentives under price-cap regulation

In many price-cap regulation plans, such as those of AT&T and British Telecom, a weighted average of the prices for multiple services (baskets) must not exceed a specified level. This analysis demonstrates that the weighting scheme most commonly employed is subject to intertemporal manipulation. This investigation provides specific demand conditions under which weight manipulation can arise, shows the manipulation to reduce social welfare, and proposes a simple alternative weighting scheme that is less prone to manipulation. The alternative weighting scheme can help in designing more effective price-cap plans, especially if new plans have longer terms than current ones.     

Price-cap regulation and market definition

One of the merits claimed for certain types of price-cap regulation is the possible long-run convergence of the prices of multi-product firms to Ramsey prices. Typically such regulated firms define commodities by such devices as dividing the day into discrete periods, customers into age-groups, distances into ranges, and so on. Allowing that such division is endogenous throws doubt on the ability of Laspeyre quantity-based price-caps to encourage an efficient market definition and hence to generate an efficient price structure.     

TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT IN WHOLESALE INTERNATIONAL ROAMING: TOWARDS A MORE EFFICIENT MARKET?*

Despite a general trend of lower charges for mobile calls, in Europe, prices for international roaming calls have remained at levels that are surprisingly high. The apparent reluctance of mobile network operators to lower roaming tariff is generating many antitrust concerns. This paper presents in a two‐country two‐firm framework the functioning of the current system governing wholesale international roaming agreements based on interoperator tariffs. The focus is on the role of traffic management; thanks to the emergence of traffic direction techniques, mobile network operators are allowed to select the roaming partner. We show that, unless these techniques do not allow for perfect control on traffic flows, traffic management does not improve the market's efficiency. In line with the regulatory mechanism recently adopted by the European Commission, we show that a simple price cap mechanism may restore partial efficiency in the wholesale market. We also show that although cross‐border cooperation at the wholesale level is Pareto efficient, it will not emerge as an equilibrium of a two‐sided matching game.     

Price Regulation for Independent Transmission Companies

This paper considers methods of price structure regulation of electricity transmission in the context of an independent transmission company (TRANSCO). The focus is on two-part tariffs where the variable part would reflect congestion charges (and ancillary services) while the fixed part would reflect capacity costs. The two-part tariffs form a price-cap index, and the firm could rebalance prices, as long as the index satisfies the price-cap constraint. The firm would then have incentives to trade off congestion against capacity expansion in such a way that it becomes profitable to expand, whenever the costs of congestion on average exceed the costs of expansion. However, with chained Laspeyres weights in the price-cap index expansion may be suboptimal. We therefore discuss ways to improve the expansion factor. Implementing the regulatory schemes considered suggests a hybrid approach combining a TRANSCO with an independent system operator (ISO).     

Allocative inefficiency properties of price-cap regulation

The paper deals with the argument that a price-cap regulated firm maximizing profits under the price-cap constraint will set prices that over time approach the Ramsey structure. My analysis explores the effects of price caps on the structure of prices. The results are in important aspects at variance with the claim of convergence to a Ramsey structure.     

Price-cap Regulation of Airports: Single-till Versus Dual-till

Abstact This paper takes up the debate whether price-cap regulation of airports should take the form of single-till or dual-till regulation. The contribution is to model single- and dual-till regulation, evaluate their welfare implications, and compare them to Ramsey charges. We show that single-till regulation dominates dual-till regulation at non-congested airports with regard to welfare maximization. However, none of them provides an airport with incentives to implement Ramsey charges. A Ramsey optimal price-cap regulation, which achieves this goal, is also presented. Thanks to Kay Mitusch, Pio Baake, and Sascha Lukac for very helpful comments.     

Price cap regulation: A case study of some pitfalls of implementation

There has been considerable discussion of price-cap regulation as an alternative to traditional rate-of-return regulation. This paper examines some of the practical pitfalls of price-cap regulation. First, a model of a terminating price cap is developed. Next, this model is used to propose some problems of implementation. These problems are evaluated in the context of a case study of the Tucson Electric Power Company, which faced a type of price cap for several years in the 1980s. Extensions of the specific case to more general lessons about price-cap regulation are considered.     

Price Dynamics in a Network of Decentralized Power Markets

In this paper, we model the dynamic behavior of prices in a network of interconnected, but decentralized, electric power markets—an architecture very different from the centralized exchanges and power pools currently being implemented by many state regulators. We estimate dynamic equations of unregulated, wholesale power prices at spot markets scattered over an eleven-state trading region. The results indicate that this decentralized system of power and transmission trading produces prices that are efficient and dynamically stable over this vast network. Price convergence in the power market is similar to what has been observed in the recently deregulated natural gas market.     

Regulation of network infrastructure investments: an experimental evaluation

This paper reports the results of an experiment evaluating three regulatory schemes for network infrastructure, in terms of their ability to generate efficient levels of capacity investment. We compare the performance of (1) price cap regulation, (2) a regulatory holiday for new capacity, and (3) price cap regulation with long term contracts combined with a secondary market. The setting is one in which network users can benefit from acting strategically, and are better informed than the network operator about demand growth. We find that the regulatory holiday creates an incentive to underinvest relative to optimal levels. Long term contracts also fail to improve on single price-cap regulation, and may reduce investment by providing noisier signals about future demand.     

RETAIL PRICE REGULATION AND THE OPTION TO DELAY

ABSTRACT ** :  This paper examines a two-period model of an investment decision in a network industry characterized by demand uncertainty, economies of scale and sunk costs. In the absence of regulation we identify the market conditions under which a monopolist decides to invest early as well as the underlying overall welfare output. In a regulated environment, we consider a monopolist who faces no downstream (final good) competition but is subject to retail price regulation. We identify the welfare-maximizing regulated prices when the unregulated market outcome is set as the benchmark. We show that if the regulator can commit to ex post regulation – that is, regulated prices that are contingent to future demand realization – then regulated prices that allow the firm to recover its total costs of production are welfare-maximizing. Thus, under ex post price regulation there is no need to compensate the regulated firm for the option to delay that it foregoes when investing today. We argue, however, that regulators cannot make this type of commitment and, therefore, price regulation is often ex ante – that is, regulated prices are not contingent to future demand. We show that the optimal ex ante regulation, and the extent to which regulated prices need to incorporate an option to delay, depend on the nature of demand uncertainty.     

Asymmetric evidence of gasoline price responses in France: A Markov-switching approach

It has been documented that retail gasoline prices respond more quickly to increases in wholesale prices than they do to decreases in wholesale prices. However, there is little empirical evidence that identifies the link between the pass-through of oil prices to gasoline in different volatility regimes. Using a Markov-switching model on weekly observations of fuel prices from 1990 to 2011, we find that fuel prices respond significantly faster to increases in crude oil prices than to decreases in crude oil prices. However, when volatility is low, the transmittal of a price change from crude oil to retail fuel is higher compared to periods of high volatility. These results provide important information on the behavior of retailers. The findings of this paper therefore provide clues for better understanding the recent dynamics of fuel prices and some policy implications.     

Effects of wholesaler concentration on retailers by format: evidence from Japanese brand-level price data

Using unique brand-level wholesale price data, this article examines how purchase prices of commodities for retailers are influenced by wholesale concentration. Compared with studies focusing on retail prices, little empirical work has measured the impact of wholesale concentration on wholesale prices. Economic theory suggests that the sensitivity of purchase price in response to degree of wholesale concentration is smaller for large retail formats than for small retail formats in the presence of intra-format retail competition. To test the validity of the theoretical implication, I measure the impact of the concentration on purchasing prices for retailers by format. Empirical findings support the hypothesis that the large retail format tends to draw advantageous purchase prices when wholesalers become increasingly oligopolistic.     

The Impact of the EU ETS on Prices,Profits and Emissions in the Power Sector: Simulation Results with the COMPETES EU20 Model

This paper analyses the impact of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) on electricity prices, in particular on wholesale power markets across the EU. To study this impact, this paper discusses the major results of a bottom-up modelling analysis of the implications of emissions trading for the performance of the wholesale power market in 20 European countries. The analyses show that a significant part of the costs of (freely allocated) CO₂ emission allowances is passed through to power prices, resulting in higher electricity prices for consumers and additional (‘windfall’) profits for power producers, even in cases of full auctioning. In addition, they show that the ETS-induced increases in power prices depend not only on the level of CO₂ prices but also on the structure of the power market, i.e., the incidence of market power, and the price responsiveness of power demand. Finally, the analyses show that the internalization and pass-through of carbon costs are crucial elements in a policy regime to reduce CO₂ emissions by both changing the mix of power generation technologies and lowering total electricity demand.