The effects of mergers in markets for differentiated products

Several authors have studied conditions in which price-increasing forces associated with mergers in ahomogenous oligopoly might be offset by price-decreasing forces associated with rationalization of production. Analogously, in the case of mergers between producers ofdifferentiated products, economies of scope are a possible price-decreasing force. The interrelationship of demands can be another one. Edgeworth showed the possible strength of this latter force in demonstrating that the imposition of taxes on substitute products can cause the prices of all of them to fall. That paradoxical result is directly relevant since effects of mergers are shown to be equivalent to those of properly chosen taxes. Nevertheless, it is shown that the Edgeworth phenomenon does not carry over to mergers i.e., demand forces on their own are not sufficient for mergers to lead to reductions in all prices — although some price reductions are possible. The paper also develops conditions for all prices to rise after a merger. General conjectural variation models in both price and quantity are considered. Finally, it is shown that mergers cannot increase welfare in linear models with Bertrand or Cournot competition. The implications of the results for merger policy are briefly discussed.     

The effect of mergers on variety in grocery retailing

We study a merger between two Dutch supermarket chains to assess its effect on the depth as well as composition of assortment. We adopt a difference-in-differences strategy that exploits local variation in pre-merger competitive conditions and thus in the merger outcomes. To define our control group, we account for selection on observables through a matching procedure. We observe that, after the merger, the assortment of the merging parties converges in markets where they are not directly competing one with the other. Instead, the merging parties reposition their assortment to avoid cannibalization in the areas where they directly competed before the merger. While the target’s stores reduce the depth of their assortment when in direct competition with the acquirer’s, the latter increase their assortment. This suggests that variety is a strategic variable in retail chains’ response to changes in local competition.     

纽伦堡国际玩具展成功要诀——专访德国Spielwarenmesse eG总裁Ernst Kick先生

2011年2月8日,在全球最大玩具展会——纽伦堡国际玩具展即将闭幕之际,《玩具世界》杂志社社长兼总编辑王文璧先生,在展会现场办公室专访了该展主办方——德国Spielwarenmessee G总裁Ernst Kick先生,下面将Ernst Kick总裁先生的精彩对话以飨读者：     

The use of stock market returns in antitrust analysis of mergers

One of the most promising recent innovations in merger analysis has been the attempt to predict the effects of horizontal mergers by examining the share prices of the rivals to the merging firms. In this paper we describe the standard procedure, discuss some of the major criticisms of that procedure, and propose a modification, apply it to a sample of recent mergers, contrast the results with those from the standard procedure, and discuss the appropriate uses and remaining limitations of the model for antitrust analysis.The views expressed in this paper reflect those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of their employer. We wish to thank the referees and Mary Streitwieser for helpful comments, and Becky Carr for excellent typing services.     

The 1984 justice department guidelines toward horizontal mergers

This paper examines the treatment of economic efficiency in the 1984 revision of the Department of Justice's antitrust Merger Guidelines. An overview of the evolution of the guidelines toward horizontal mergers is presented emphasizing three key areas where changes have occurred. A model is developed following O. Williamson framework is extended to link changes in market concentration (as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) that result from a horizontal merger to changes in market power (as measured by price-cost margins). Finally, the cost reductions (economies) required to offset increases in market power are developed in a simulation model. The paper concludes with an application of the model to the LTV-Republic Steel merger.     

Vertical mergers in procurement markets

This paper uses computational methods that reveal ambiguous strategic effects of vertical mergers in a duopoly setting featuring incomplete information about sellers' costs, and differences in sellers' productive capabilities. First, vertical mergers can be jointly unprofitable. Second, the buyer's preferred merger partner is almost always the seller with lower expected costs, and is typically the larger seller. Third, vertical mergers always reduce the unintegrated seller's profits, sometimes dramatically. Finally, vertical mergers can increase total welfare. Some of the results contrast qualitatively with unambiguous findings from models with symmetric sellers, which suggests that caution should be used in drawing general inferences from those models.     

警惕国际并购陷阱

进入21世纪,国内企业明显加快了国际化步伐.尤其是近几年,随着数家国内有影响的大企业,通过并购进军海外市场,尽管他们更多集中在电子行业,但是这些国际化举措在纺织行业也引起企业关注.今年配额取消后,国际纺织贸易环境变得越发严峻,更多纺织企业开始思考如何真正走国际化道路?如何实现产品附加值增加?如何规避贸易壁垒等问题.     

Hold-up of anti-competitive mergers

We construct a model of endogenous mergers and study some issues of whether and how to control mergers, taking into account firms equilibrium response to policy. Anti-competitive mergers benefit competitors more than the merging firms. We show how such free-riding reduces firms incentives to merge (holdup). Firms delay merger proposals, hoping other firms will merge instead. The final result, however, is an overly concentrated market. Merger control may thus preserve competitive markets. In the presence of holdup, even reasonable policies such as requiring divestiture or using cost-benefit analysis, may be worse than not controlling mergers at all.     

Horizontal mergers and delegation

This paper shows that the profitability of merger in oligopoly is significantly enhanced if firms delegate the output decision to an agent and then motivate the latter using strategic rent shifting contracts. Two consequences of increased profitability are that the minimum market share that the merging parties require in order to merge profitably without efficiency gains, as well as the maximum market share that the merging parties can possess in order to guarantee that a profitable merger is welfare enhancing, are reduced. A third result is that delegation cannot reduce the set of endogenous mergers.     

Simulating media platform mergers

The empirical analysis of media platforms economics has often neglected the multi-homing behaviour of advertisers. Assuming away the cross-substitutability and/or complementarity between the advertising slots of different platforms could damage the quality and the robustness of counterfactual analysis. To evaluate the consequence of such an abstraction, we compare the simulation results of hypothetical platform mergers when the demand on the advertising side is derived from a Translog cost model which allows for multi-homing, and when it is approximated by using a simple log-linear inverse demand model that ignores the differentiation among media platforms’ advertising slots. Ignoring the existence of substitutes or complements on the advertising side would result in overpredicting the losses of the viewers’ surplus and in underpredicting the gains in platforms’ revenues.     

Modeling the effects of mergers in procurement

In procurement settings, mergers among suppliers reduce buyers' choice sets and can harm buyers by eliminating their preferred supplier or reducing their negotiating leverage. I develop a stochastic economic model that predicts the effects of mergers based on information that commonly is available to antitrust authorities. I derive general expressions for the ex ante expected changes in price, buyer utility, and supplier profit. Each becomes tractable under certain distributional assumptions. The model predicts that average prices will increase by more than 40% due to the recently litigated acquisition of Power Reviews by Bazaarvoice, in the absence of an effective remedy.     

The effect of horizontal mergers,when firms compete in prices and investments

Motivated by a number of high-profile antitrust cases, we study mergers when firms offer differentiated products and compete in prices and investments. Since the net effect of the merger is a priori ambiguous, we use aggregative game theory to sign it: we find that absent efficiency gains, the merger always reduces total investments and consumer surplus. We also prove that there exist classes of models for which the results obtained with cost-reducing investments are equivalent to those with quality-enhancing investments.     

Is speed of integration really a success factor of mergers and acquisitions? An analysis of the role of internal and external relatedness

Previous research on mergers and acquisitions has neglected the issue of speed of postmerger integration by and large. This paper argues that there are benefits and detriments associated with speed of integration. Thus, in some situations speed may be highly beneficial whereas in others it may be harmful to the success of a merger or acquisition. It is argued that the benefits and detriments of speed of integration depend on the magnitude of internal and external relatedness between the merging firms prior to the merger or acquisition. Results from a survey of 232 horizontal mergers and acquisitions show that speed is most beneficial when external relatedness is low and at the same time internal relatedness is high. In contrast, speed is highly detrimental in the case of low internal and high external relatedness. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The drivers of success in new-product development

Why are some new products so successful and some companies outstanding performers in new-product development? The article identifies success factors from numerous research studies into NPD (new-product development) performance in industry. Three categories of success drivers have been defined. First, success drivers, that explain the success of individual new-product projects, are more tactical: They capture the characteristics of new product projects, such as certain executional best practices (building in voice-of-customer; doing the front-end homework; and adopting a global orientation for the project), and well as the nature of the product itself (a compelling value proposition, for example). A second category is drivers of success at the business level: They include organizational and strategic factors, such as the business's innovation strategy and how the firm makes its R&D investment decisions; how it organizes for NPD; climate and culture; and leadership The third category of success divers identified is the systems and methods the firm has in place for managing NPD, for example gating systems, Agile development approaches, and ideation methods. The details of each of these 20 success drivers, along with their managerial implications, are outlined in the article.     

Threshold tests for the control of mergers: The Australian experience

Merger policy in Australia has been formulated for a small open economy. Tight merger control has been avoided in order not to impede rationalisation and improved international competitiveness. From 1977 to early 1993 a merger or acquisition was only prohibited if it would lead to a firm gaining a dominant position in a substantial market. As a result, few mergers were stopped and some which would probably have substantially lessened competition were allowed to proceed without detailed investigation. Since January 1993 a threshold test of substantial lessening of competition has applied — a reversion to the test included in the original 1974 Trade Practices Act. This is likely to mean that more proposed mergers will come under scrutiny and the trade-offs between efficiency gains and anti-competitive detriments will need to be evaluated in a greater number of individual cases. New draft merger guidelines released in November 1992 generally reflect contemporary thinking in industrial economics.     

Horizontal mergers and collusive behavior

In the Industrial Organization literature, it is generally felt that mergers hurt consumers; not only because of the increased industrial concentration they effect, but also because collusion becomes more likely. In this paper we show that, at least in one important case, this intuition is misguided. If a tacitly collusive agreement enforced by trigger strategies is not initially sustainable, mergers will tend to reduce the chance that it becomes sustainable in the future. This is so because the threat point implicit in the agreement becomes more favorable for outsiders.     

The impact of FDI through mergers and acquisitions on innovation in target firms

This paper analyzes the effects of cross-border mergers and acquisitions on innovation activities in target firms. The empirical analysis is based on survey and ownership data for a large sample of small- and medium-sized German firms. After controlling for endogeneity and selection bias, we find that foreign acquisitions have a large negative impact on the propensity to perform innovation activities and a negative impact on average R&D expenditures in innovative firms. Furthermore, innovation output, measured as product and process innovations, and the share of sales from product innovations, is not significantly affected by a foreign acquisition for a given amount of innovation efforts. Hence, the estimation results do not provide any evidence of significant technology transfer through foreign acquisitions in form of a higher innovation success.     

半导体公司成功的秘密

成为市场领袖总是一件不错的事情,如今成为半导体工业的市场领袖则更是一个特大喜讯.