Birth,death and public good provision

We explore the effect of fixed versus dynamic group membership on public good provision. In a novel experimental design, we modify the traditional voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) by periodically replacing old members of a group with new members over time. Under this dynamic, overlapping generations matching protocol we find that average contributions experience significantly less decay over time relative to a traditional VCM environment with fixed group membership and a common termination date. These findings suggest that the traditional pattern of contribution and decay seen in many public goods experiments may not accurately reflect behavior in groups with changing membership, as is the case in many real-world environments.     

Estate taxes, consumption externalities, and altruism

We study how the introduction of consumption externalities affects the optimality of the dynamic equilibrium in an economy displaying dynastic altruism. When the bequest motive is inoperative consumption externalities affect the intertemporal margin between young and old consumption and thus modify the intertemporal path of aggregate consumption and capital. The optimal tax policy that solves this intertemporal suboptimality consists of a tax on capital income and a pay-as-you-go social security system. The latter solves the excess of capital accumulation due to the inoperativeness of the bequest motive and the former solves the suboptimal allocation of consumption due to consumption externalities. When the bequest motive is operative consumption externalities only cause an intratemporal misallocation of consumption but do not affect the optimality of the capital stock level. This suboptimal allocation of consumption implies in turn that the path of bequest deviates also from optimality. The optimal tax policy in this case consists of an estate tax and a capital income tax.     

TRIMs, environmental taxes, and foreign investment

Various second-best policy mixes of investment measures and environmental taxes for a polluted, small open economy with foreign capital and immovable trade restrictions are examined. The optimal policy mix depends on the types of trade restrictions. When tariffs are in place, strict policies of pollution taxes and export requirements are optimal for alleviating tariff-induced consumption and production distortions. When involuntary quotas are used in lieu of tariffs, however, the optimal policy mix is a zero export requirement and Pigouvian taxes on pollution. For the case of VERs, however, the optimal policy demands export requirements and a less stringent pollution tax.
TRIMs, impôts environnementaux et investissement étranger. Ce mémoire examine certains ensembles de politiques de second-ordre portant sur l'investissement et les impôts environnementaux dans une petite économie ouverte polluée où il y a capital étranger et restrictions au commerce international. Quand on a des droits de douane en place, des politiques de fiscalité environnementale et d'exportations requises sont optimales pour corriger les distorsions aux patterns de production et de consommation engendrées par les droits de douane. Cependant quand des contingentements involontaires sont en place plutôt que des droits de douane, le mélange optimal de politiques est de ne pas requérir d'exportation mais d'imposer des taxes à la Pigou sur la pollution. Pour ce qui est des restrictions volontaires à l'exportation, le mélange optimal de politiques réclame une taxe moins forte sur la pollution accompagnée par un certain niveau d'exportation requis.     

Unions, progressive taxes, and education subsidies

Progressive income taxes moderate distortionary wage demands by trade unions and thereby reduce unemployment, and at the same time underlie disincentives to acquire skills and decrease labour productivity. Governments can respond by combining progressive taxes with subsidies to investment in human capital. A system of generous education subsidies and steep progressive tax rates is more likely to emerge, the greater the market power of trade unions and the better the ability of governments to influence private education decisions. Empirical analysis for several OECD countries provides results consistent with these propositions. A policy mix of high education subsidies and relatively progressive income taxes is found in countries where union membership is significant.     

Growth, income taxes and consumption aspirations

In a Barro-type economy with exogenous consumption aspirations, raising income taxes favors growth even in the presence of lump-sum taxes. Such a policy is compatible with the behavior of private consumption, income taxes and growth rates observed in actual economies.     

Income,taxes and employer pension contributions

This paper empirically examines the effects of a change in foreign trade regime on productivity growth. Based on a Generalized Leontief factor demand function system, total factor productivity growth (TFPG) rates are calculated for the Turkish rubber industry during a substantial trade liberalization in the 1980s: TFPG was significantly higher following trade liberalization. Technological change was the major contributor to this growth. When a panel data estimation technique is used to explain technological change, the effects of trade liberalization become clearer: a one percentage point increase in the protection level led to more than a one percentage point (1.27) decline in the technological change rate.     

Debt policy, corporate taxes, and discount rates

This paper applies the standard risk-neutral valuation framework to tax shields generated by dynamic debt policies. We derive a partial differential equation (PDE) for the value of the debt tax shield. For a class of dynamic debt policies that depend on the asset's free cash flows, value, and past performance, we obtain closed-form solutions for the PDE. We also derive the tax-adjusted cost of capital for free cash flows and analyze the conditions under which the weighted average cost of capital is an appropriate discount rate. Finally, we derive closed-form solutions for equity betas, which differ from the formulas that have traditionally been used to lever and unlever equity betas.     

Excise taxes,over-shifting,cross-elasticity,and tax revenue

This article examines cross-elasticity effects in excise taxation for markets characterized by monopolistic competition and over-shifting. Extending the constant elasticity demand model to consider cross-elasticity leads to notably different results regarding tax revenue maximization. With nonzero but weak cross-elasticity effects relative to the price elasticity, we derive a higher optimal tax-price ratio compared to prior research. With strong cross-elasticity, revenue can continually be increased by raising the excise tax. Overall, the study offers government greater incentive to use excise taxes to obtain revenue.     

Income taxes, spending composition and long-run growth

The focus of this paper is threefold. First, it reexamines the impact on long-run growth of changes in flat-rate income taxes when a fraction of total government expenditures is used to provide public services that affect the productivity of privately held inputs. Second, for a given tax policy, this paper studies the impact of government expenditure composition on the rate of economic growth. Third, since demographics follow an overlapping generations structure and fiscal policy affects the economy's productivity, the paper features the role of productivity as a means of redistributing income across generations. The economy is analyzed numerically and policy experiments are carried out.     

Public investment criteria,insurance markets,and income taxes

The evaluation of small government investments is studied in a one-commodity, two-period world with risk and income taxation, assuming both complete and incomplete insurance markets. When marginal personal tax rates differ or markets are incomplete, there are at least two interpretations of the assumption that the distribution of income is optimal. The correct discount rate for riskless investment depends on which interpretation is chosen. The correct adjustment for risk generally does not. The use of nonmarket information - relating the returns from the proposed investment to those from ongoing activities - to compute this adjustment is explored.     

Land assembly with taxes,not takings

We use a novel tax mechanism – ‘rejected offer reassessment’ (ROR) – in laboratory experiments to discourage seller holdout and facilitate land assembly. Under this mechanism, if a landowner rejects a developer’s offer, his taxable property value is reassessed to be equal to the rejected offer, increasing his taxes. We find that, relative to a control treatment, ROR discourages the magnitude of seller holdout (but not its frequency) and increases the rate of successful land assembly by almost 60%. It also increases the gains from trade by 22.1% relative to the control treatment, but the difference is not statistically significant.     

Asymmetric information, signaling and environmental taxes in oligopoly

This paper examines the effects of signaling on environmental taxation in a two-period oligopoly model in which each firm privately knows whether its technology is clean or dirty, while third parties (the rival firms and the regulator) have only a subjective perception about this fact. Consequently, there are both horizontal and vertical asymmetric information, and each firm can strategically manipulate both, the competitor's and the regulator's priors. In this context, we find that each firm wishes to be perceived as a technologically clean firm in period 2 whenever the regulator's ecological conscience is sufficiently high. We also show that taxes under symmetric information are always positive, but under asymmetric information and signaling they may be negative (subsidies) and lower or greater than in the symmetric information case, depending on the ecological conscience of the regulator and the probability of firms being dirty. Finally, taxes are below environmental marginal damage, both under symmetric and asymmetric information, and signaling reinforces such under-taxation.     

Efficiency aspects of increasing inheritance taxes while decreasing income taxes

This article tries to shed some light on the economic efficiency aspects of a tax reform that would increase inheritance taxes while decreasing income taxes. An analysis of labour market decisions following the activation of such a reform is presented. An international comparison of inheritance tax collection shows that almost all industrial countries impose an inheritance tax. However, government revenue from inheritance and gift taxes in Europe is lower than 1% of GDP and is very low in the United States as well. Applying the proposed reform could increase work hours and delay retirement decisions.     

Environmental taxes and strategic delegation

This paper analyzes a managerial delegation model in which the government chooses an environmental tax to control environmental damage. By giving the managers of firms an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue, we show that firm owners have to pay a higher environmental tax and both environmental damage and social welfare increase compared to the profit-maximization case. Financial support from UPV (Subvención a grupos, 2001), UPV (HB-8238/2000) and MEC (BEC 2000-0301) is gratefully acknowledged. We would like to thank A. Saracho and two referees for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

FDI,taxes and agglomeration economies in the EU15

This article provides an empirical analysis of the impact of tax differentials and agglomeration economies on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The article departs from most previous work on FDI and tax competition in a number of ways. First, it incorporates several measures of agglomeration in order to investigate whether agglomeration economies mitigate the downward spiral in tax rates. As the strength of agglomeration economies may vary with the degree of integration, we use a panel of bilateral FDI flows for a highly integrated region including countries with similar economic structure – the EU15 – from 1986 to 2004. Second, the empirical analysis explicitly deals with the problem of selection bias by using the Heckman sample selection approach. Also, by focusing on the EU15, we are able to provide additional information on the determinants of FDI between similar, higher-income countries. The empirical analysis provides some evidence of corporate marginal effective tax rates having an impact on FDI. This result, however, is sensitive to the inclusion of agglomeration economies. In particular, we find both Marshall types of technological externalities and overall concentration of economic activity to have an influence on FDI flows and, moreover, mitigating the negative impact of taxes.     

Efficiency wages and income taxes

The paper was written during a visit at the Ludwig-Maximilian-University of Munich in the summer of 1988. The hospitality of this institution, as well as the financial support from a Ruhrgas Scholarship under the West German Norwegian Scholarship Scheme, is gratefully acknowledged. Participants at various seminars have given useful comments and criticism. I am also grateful to two anonymous referees for their comments to an earlier version of the paper.