Market Delineation under the Merger Guidelines: Monopoly Cases and Alternative Approaches

Despite the well-known Cellophane fallacy, the Merger Guidelines' market-delineation paradigm, which examines the effects of price increases above the prevailing level, has substantial utility in many monopoly cases. For monopoly cases in which the Guidelines' approach is not appropriate due to the Cellophane fallacy, no modification of that approach appears to solve the problem is a useful way. More direct methods for assessing monopoly power are likely to be preferable to structural analysis in many monopoly and merger cases.     

Using the Hicks formula to evaluate an estimate of the elasticity of derived demand for toll-free numbers

Duffy-Deno & Parsons D-D & P (2012) estimated the coefficient for the price elasticity of demand for toll-free numbers (TFNs) at between −0.04 and −0.05. Here, the Hicks formula for derived demand is used to check the range of likely demand elasticity for TFNs given the special characteristics of this market. This approach suggests that the demand for TFNs is likely not more elastic than estimated by D-D & P. Therefore, the premise is sound for D-D & P's discussion of the public policy implications of highly inelastic demand for TFNs. The use of industry information for all four parameters of the Hicks formula to check a derived demand elasticity is the first of its kind in the published literature.     

Residual demand estimation for market delineation: Complications and limitations

To shed some light on market delineation in an antitrust context, many economists are turning to estimates of residual demand elasticities. Recent papers have drawn attention to the importance of demand curve in market delineation and explained how they can be estimated. This paper shows that there are many complications and limitations of the approach. The relationship between the residual demand elasticity and the scope of the relevant market is complicated and depends on behavioral assumptions. The residual demand elasticity that can be estimated is not the one on which market delineation turns. The estimation of residual demand elasticities can be very difficult because of the complex dynamics of consumer behavior. Finally, residual demand estimators are likely to have a high variance because of instrument problems and this is likely to lead to widely varying estimates depending on specification choices.     

农村劳动力转移与中国城市农民工市场的波动——兼论新《劳动法》对农民工市场的影响

中国城市具有二元劳动力市场结构,农民工市场属于第二劳动力市场。农民工市场的均衡模型表明,供需弹性的相对大小会影响农民工市场的自动调节,进而引起农民工市场的均衡与波动。以城市劳动力市场的构成以及城市农民工市场的波动情况为视角,中国农村劳动力向城市的转移可分为三个阶段。2003年以前城市农民工市场可以自动达到供求均衡,而2004年以后则交替出现＂民工荒＂和失业等劳动力市场的缺口,主要是由于农民工市场的供给和需求弹性的相对大小发生了变化。新《劳动法》增加了企业的用工成本,但尚无法确定其是否会改变供需弹性的相对大小,因而也无法确定是否引起了农民工市场的波动。短期内,政府可以通过影响供需弹性的相对大小来降低城市农民工市场的波动,长期而言,只有采取有力措施变城市二元劳动力市场为一元劳动力市场,才能从根本上解决我国农民工市场的波动问题。     

Measuring Market Power in the U.S. Aluminum Industry: A Residual Demand Approach

This paper applies a refined market power test to examine market power in the U.S. aluminum industry. The study conducts a two-step analysis in which the inverse residual demand facing the industry is first estimated to generate the associate elasticity to infer market power, and then the inverse partial residual demand facing the industry is estimated to produce the elasticity to measure the potential effect of inter-industry coordination. The results suggest that only the primary industry attains market power, and the market power can exert even without collusion between the primary and secondary industries.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California's Electricity Industry

Using historical cost data, we simulate the California electricity market after deregulation as a static Cournot market with a competitive fringe. Our model indicates that, under the pre-deregulation structure of generation ownership, there is potential for significant market power in high demand hours, particularly in the fall and early winter months when hydroelectric output is at its lowest level relative to demand. The results also show that two of the most important factors in determining the extent and severity of market power are the level of available hydroelectric production and the elasticity of demand.     

Market Power and Technology

It is well known that market power depends on the price elasticity of demand and the intensity of competition. It is also well known that technology can influence market power through its effect on market structure. However, there is limited research on the direct link between market power and technology. In this paper, we investigate this relationship. We find that the monopoly price can be constrained to be identical to marginal cost under certain technological conditions. We also show how market power depends directly upon technology, holding constant demand conditions, market structure, and the degree of competition.     

Third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly with endogenous input costs

This paper examines the output effect of third-degree price discrimination in symmetrically differentiated oligopoly. We find that when the sellers’ input costs are chosen endogenously by an upstream supplier with market power, as opposed to being fixed exogenously, long-standing qualitative conclusions about the effect of price discrimination on aggregate output can be reversed. In contrast to previous findings (e.g., by Holmes, 1989), more intense competition in the strong market than in the weak market can make it less likely that price discrimination raises aggregate output. For linear demand functions, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions under which the output effect changes sign when input costs are endogenized.     

OPERATING SYSTEM PRICES IN THE HOME PC MARKET*

Because the demand for OS is a derived demand revealed through the demand for PCs and because its elasticity is relatively small, the profit‐maximizing price of DOS/WIN that would result from a static equilibrium is much higher than the observed price. We investigate this assertion empirically by fitting a differentiated‐products model of the home PC market to panel data of all PC brands sold in the G7 countries over the period 1995–1999. The results confirm that the low value of the aggregate elasticity of demand for PCs is the result of differentiation and substitution among PCs.     

Third‐Degree Price Discrimination and Consumer Surplus

This paper considers the effects of monopoly third‐degree price discrimination on aggregate consumer surplus. Discrimination is likely to reduce surplus (relative to that obtained with a uniform price), but surplus can rise under reasonable conditions. If the ratio of the pass‐through coefficient to the price elasticity at the uniform price is higher in the market with the higher price elasticity then surplus is larger with discrimination (for a large set of demand functions). The relatively high pass‐through coefficient implies a large price reduction in this market. With logit demand functions surplus is higher with discrimination if pass‐through is above 0.5.     

Demand for coffee in Sweden: The role of prices, preferences and market power

There is a widespread belief that consumer coffee prices are high relative to bean prices and that lower consumer prices would lead to substantial increases in bean exports from Third-World countries. This issue is evaluated by analysing how retail prices, preferences and market power influence coffee demand in Sweden. A demand function is estimated for the period 1968–2002 and used, together with information on import prices of coffee beans, to simulate an oligopoly model. This approach gives estimates of the maximum average degree of market power and shows how coffee demand would react to reductions in marginal cost to its minimum level. The maximum level of market power is found to be low, but it generates large spreads between consumer and bean prices because the price elasticity has low absolute values. Moreover, the impact of a price decrease would be small because long-run coffee demand is dominated by changes in the population structure in combination with different preferences across age groups. Hence, a change to perfect competition would only have a negligible effect on bean imports.     

电力市场中的市场势力及其治理

电力市场中市场势力受供给和需求刚性、市场竞争政策和制度安排，以及输电堵塞等因素影响表现出特殊性。电力市场势力不仅受到主导企业市场份额的影响，还更多地受企业之间战略相互作用或博弈效应、市场需求弹性、竞争性边缘企业供给弹性、边缘企业的市场份额等因素的影响。这些因素与电力生产经营过程中的技术性结合在一起，使规制很难有效进行，在电力市场中产生了明显的市场势力结果。限制电力市场中市场势力的根本途径是设计特别的市场竞争政策和交易制度。     

The evolution of cyber-insurance industry and market: An institutional analysis

The cyber-insurance (CI) market is at a nascent stage. This paper investigates how the contexts provided by formal and informal institutions affect the development of the CI industry. It highlights the nature, origin, and implications of CI-related institutions and provides insights into the mechanisms and forces that can lead to institutional changes. It offers an explanation as to how different institutional pillars related to CI progressively evolve and reinforce one another. Such a mechanism is likely to influence a range of demand and supply side factors and create a system that can accelerate the growth of the CI industry and market. The paper also investigates how contradictions generated by CI, the formation of dense networks and changing power dynamics can trigger regulative normative and cognitive changes. Since the current analysis of the causes and consequences of institutions and institutional change is mainly concerned with more established economic sectors, this paper is expected to provide insights into institutions surrounding to this new and rapidly evolving industry.     

Analytical Screens for Electricity Mergers

Electricity mergers pose distinct challenges for competition policy. Electricity demand is highly inelastic in the short run, storage is limited, and transmission constraints limit the ability to substitute generation at other locations. As a result, a merger can affect prices in many different markets and even generators with small market shares may be able to exercise market power. The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s approach for screening horizontal mergers, based on the concentration thresholds in the Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, can fail to identify mergers that lessen competition, and mergers that fail the FERC screen may have no significant anticompetitive effect. We propose competitive residual demand (CRD) analysis, which examines the supply curves of the markets affected by a merger and considers the ability and incentive of firms to raise prices before and after a proposed merger. CRD analysis is a relatively easy way to address the incentives for generators to exercise market power and relies on data that are often available. Vertical (convergent) mergers between electricity and gas raise additional concerns, and we propose a methodology to screen vertical mergers.     

The Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Global Seaborne Hard Coal Market: Are there Implications for the Future?

The global financial crisis in 2008 sent commodity markets spinning which caused demand to erode, price levels to quickly plummet and project financing costs to rise. In this paper, the authors examine the impacts the economic slowdown has had on the global seaborne hard coal market looking at the impacts for both coking (metallurgical) and thermal (steam) coals including pricing, supply availability, demand and aggregated mine level production costs. The hard coal market experienced a significant slow down; the commodity has bounced back strongly in 2010 driven by strong Asian demand at growth rates above historic levels and strong projections for the future.     

A note on the excess entry theorem in spatial models with elastic demand

This paper revisits the excess entry theorem in spatial models according to Vickrey [Vickrey, W.S., 1964. Microstatics. Harcourt, Brace and World, New York] and Salop [Salop, S., 1979. Monopolistic competition with outside goods. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141–156] while relaxing the assumption of inelastic demand. Using a demand function with a constant demand elasticity, we show that the number of firms that enter a market decreases with the degree of demand elasticity. We find that the excess entry theorem does only hold when the demand elasticity is sufficiently small. Otherwise, there is insufficient entry. In the limiting case of unit elastic demand, the market is monopolized. We broaden our results with a more general transportation cost function.     

Microsoft's Pricing of Windows and the Economics of Derived Demand Monopoly

The economic experts in the Microsoft case debated whether Microsoft's pricing of Windows was consistent with Microsoft having a monopoly over personal computer (PC) operating systems. In this debate, PCs were treated as a single homogeneous commodity. This paper demonstrates that PC heterogeneity is likely to reduce substantially the monopoly price of Windows. The reason is that low-end PCs, which surely have the more elastic demand, are of disproportionate importance in determining the elasticity of derived demand for Windows.     

Manufacturer-supplier guanxi strategy: An examination of contingent environmental factors

While guanxi is a cultural norm in China, the development and maintenance of guanxi can also be viewed as a business relationship management strategy that is leveraged by organizations in response to environmental conditions. The current research proposes that participation in guanxi is not equal to actively pursuing guanxi as a business strategy. Rather, firms respond to external environmental factors through guanxi management. Drawing on contingency theory and based on the perspectives of a China-based manufacturer respondent sample, a conceptual model of environmental factors that influence manufacturer-supplier guanxi is proposed and tested. The results indicate that supply and demand market uncertainties and legal environment complexity significantly affect levels of manufacturer-supplier guanxi, and that guanxi influences the use of non-coercive power by manufacturers. Contrary to expectations, manufacturer dependence on a major supplier did not influence levels of guanxi. The study findings and their implications extend current knowledge of inter-organizational guanxi and its influence on business-to-business relationships.     

Examining models of collusion: The market for lysine

We compare the experience with collusion in the market for lysine with the predictions of theory. The lysine market provides an ideal setting following the confessions of cartel participants in antitrust investigations. Data availability allows demand and cost functions to be estimated and observed mark-ups compared with predictions. We find that several integral aspects of collusion in the lysine market are not adequately addressed in the literature: the dynamics associated with entry and investment; persistent asymmetries between firms; the cartel's bargaining problem; and the existence of cheating in equilibrium. These issues are likely to have much wider applicability beyond the lysine market.     

Competition in Turkish mobile telecommunications markets: Price elasticities and network substitution

This paper estimates demand elasticities for Turkish mobile telecommunications markets. In contrast to most other studies, firm-level data is used to estimate dynamic panel data models including instrumental variable techniques. Both short- and long-run elasticities are calculated, yielding a long-run price elasticity of −0.72 for the post-paid market and of −0.33 for the pre-paid market. The short-run price elasticity is estimated to be −0.36 for the post-paid market and −0.20 for the pre-paid market. In addition, there is evidence of fixed-to-mobile traffic substitution for consumers who use pre-paid cards.