Analysts' Incentives and Street Earnings

We examine whether analysts' incentives are associated with street earnings. Because prior research argues that analysts' incentives to promote stocks increase in the extent to which the stock exhibits glamour characteristics, we predict that analysts are more likely to make income-increasing adjustments in determining street earnings for glamour stocks than for value stocks. We find that analysts are more likely to exclude expense items from street earnings for glamour stocks than for value stocks and that excluded expense items help predict future earnings for glamour stocks but not for value stocks. Overall, our results suggest that analysts' self-interest influences street earnings and this self-interest leads to street earnings that are less useful in predicting future earnings for glamour stocks.     

Risk,Mispricing, and Value Investing

We evaluate the stock return performance of a modified version of the book-to-market strategy and its implications for market efficiency. If the previously documented superior stock return of the book-to-market strategy represents mispricing, its performance should be improved by excluding fairly valued firms with extreme book-to-market ratios. To attain this, we classify stocks as value or glamour on book-to-market ratios and accounting accruals jointly. This joint classification is likely to exclude stocks with extreme book-to-market ratios due to mismeasured accounting book values reflecting limitations underlying the accounting system. Using both 12-month buy-and-hold returns and earnings announcement returns, our results show that this joint classification generates substantially higher portfolio returns in the post-portfolio-formation year than the book-to-market classification alone with no evidence of increased risk. In addition, this superior stock return performance is more pronounced among firms held primarily by small (unsophisticated) investors and followed less closely by market participants (stock price <$10). Finally, and most importantly, financial analysts are overly optimistic (pessimistic) about earnings of glamour (value) stock, and for a subset of firms identified as overvalued by our strategy, the earnings announcement raw return, as well as abnormal return, is negative. These last results are particularly important because it is hard to envision a model consistent with rational investors holding risky stocks with predictable negative raw returns for a long period of time rather than holding fT-bills and with financial analysts systematically overestimating the earnings of these stocks while underestimating earnings of stocks that outperform the stock market.     

A Test of the Errors–in–Expectations Explanation of the Value/Glamour Stock Returns Performance: Evidence from Analysts' Forecasts

Several empirical studies show that investment strategies that favor the purchase of stocks with low prices relative to conventional measures of value yield higher returns. Some of these studies imply that investors are too optimistic about (glamour) stocks that have had good performance in the recent past and too pessimistic about (value) stocks that have performed poorly. We examine whether investors systematically overestimate (underestimate) the future earnings performance of glamour (value) stocks over the 1976 to 1997 period. Our results fail to support the extrapolation hypothesis that posits that the superior performance of value stocks is because investors make systematic errors in predicting future growth in earnings of out–of–favor stocks.     

Earnings Surprises,Growth Expectations,and Stock Returns or Don't Let an Earnings Torpedo Sink Your Portfolio

We provide new evidence that the inferior returns to growth stocks relative to value stocks are the result of expectational errors about future earnings performance. Our evidence demonstrates that growth stocks exhibit an asymmetric response to earnings surprises. We show that while growth stocks are at least as likely to announce negative earnings surprises as positive earnings surprises, they exhibit an asymmetrically large negative price response to negative earnings surprises. After controlling for this asymmetric price response, we find no remaining evidence of a return differential between growth and value stocks. We conclude that the inferior return to growth stocks is attributable to overoptimistic expectational errors that are corrected through subsequent negative earnings surprises.     

Value versus growth stocks in Singapore

This study examines value and growth stocks in Singapore. Specifically, we examine the value premium up to 5 years after the value and growth portfolio formation. We also examine if growth (value) stocks really indicate higher (lower) company profits in the later years, whether analysts’ forecasts are overly optimistic/pessimistic, and if earnings and earnings growth exhibit mean reversion. Our findings are, first, there is a value premium for Singapore stocks, but the premium is concentrated in the first 2 years after the portfolio formation. Second, value (growth) stocks do indicate low (high) earnings growth rates and low (high) return on equity (ROE) in the following years. Third, earnings growth is significantly overestimated for growth stocks but it is not underestimated for value stocks, indicating a one-way over-reaction. Finally, there is some evidence of mean reversion for excess ROE but not for excess earnings growth rates.     

Analyzing the Analysts: When Do Recommendations Add Value?

We show that analysts from sell-side firms generally recommend "glamour" (i.e., positive momentum, high growth, high volume, and relatively expensive) stocks. Naïve adherence to these recommendations can be costly, because the level of the consensus recommendation adds value only among stocks with favorable quantitative characteristics (i.e., value stocks and positive momentum stocks). In fact, among stocks with unfavorable quantitative characteristics, higher consensus recommendations are associated with worse subsequent returns. In contrast, we find that the quarterly change in consensus recommendations is a robust return predictor that appears to contain information orthogonal to a large range of other predictive variables.     

GLAMOUR VERSUS VALUE: TRADING BEHAVIOR OF INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS

We design a new metric to measure the net buying and selling by institutions and individual investors and find that from 1980 to 2004 institutional investors were net buyers of growth stocks and net sellers of value stocks, implying that individual investors were net buyers of value stocks and net sellers of glamour stocks. The institutional preference for glamour and value stocks seems to be related to sell‐side analysts' recommendations and recent favorable stock price performances, especially during the post‐1994 period. Finally, the institutional buying of growth stocks and sale of value stocks was not based on superior information.     

Cashflow risk,systematic earnings revisions,and the cross-section of stock returns

The returns of stocks are partially driven by changes in their expected cashflow. Using revisions in analyst earnings forecasts, we construct an analyst earnings beta that measures the covariance between the cashflow innovations of an asset and those of the market. A higher analyst earnings beta implies greater sensitivity to marketwide revisions in expected cashflow, and therefore higher systematic risk. Our analyst earnings beta captures exposure to macroeconomic fluctuations and has a positive risk premium that provides a partial explanation for the value premium, size premium, and long-term return reversals. From 1984 to 2005, 55.1% of the return variation across book-to-market, size, and long-term return reversal portfolios is captured by their analyst earnings betas.     

Glamour Acquirers, Method of Payment and Post‐acquisition Performance: The UK Evidence

We study the effect of different acquirer types, defined by financial status and their payment methods, on their short and long‐term performance, in terms of abnormal returns using a variety of benchmark models. For a sample of 519 UK acquirers during 1983–95, we examine the abnormal return performance of acquirers based on their pre‐bid financial status as either glamour or value acquirers using both the price to earnings (PE) ratio and market to book value ratio (MTBV). Value acquirers outperform glamour acquirers in the three‐year post‐acquisition period. One interpretation is that glamour firms have overvalued equity and tend to exploit their status and use it more often than cash to finance their acquisitions. As we move from glamour to value acquirers, there is a greater use of cash. Our results are broadly consistent with those for the US reported by Rau and Vermaelen (1998). However, in contrast to their study, we find stronger support for the method of payment hypothesis than for extrapolation hypothesis. Cash acquirers generate higher returns than equity acquirers, irrespective of their glamour/ value status. Our conclusions, based on four benchmark models for abnormal returns, suggest that stock markets in both the US and the UK may share a similar proclivity for over‐extrapolation of past performance, at least in the bid period. They also tend to reassess acquirer performance in the post‐acquisition period and correct this overextrapolation. These results have implications for the behavioural aspects of capital markets in both countries.     

Returns to buying earnings and book value: accounting for growth and risk

Historical cost accounting deals with uncertainty by deferring the recognition of earnings until the uncertainty has largely been resolved. Such accounting affects both earnings and book value and produces expected earnings growth deemed to be at risk. This paper shows that the earnings-to-price and book-to-price ratios that are the product of this accounting forecast both earnings growth and the risk to that growth. The paper also shows that the market pricing of earnings and book values in these ratios aligns with the risk imbedded in the accounting: the returns to buying stocks on the basis of their earnings yield and book-to-price are explained as a rational pricing of the risk of expected earnings growth not being realized. Accordingly, the paper provides a rationalization of the well-documented book-to-price effect in stock returns: book-to-price indicates the risk in buying earnings growth. However, growth identified by a high book-to-price as yielding a higher return in this paper is quite different from “growth” typically attributed to a low book-to-price as yielding a lower return. Accordingly, the notion of “growth” versus “value” requires modification.     

Overreaction to stock market news and misevaluation of stock prices by unsophisticated investors: Evidence from the option market

This paper examines investors' option activity on value and growth stocks before earnings announcements. The main finding is that unsophisticated investors enter option positions that load up on growth stocks relative to value stocks in the days leading up to earnings announcements. This occurs despite the fact that at earnings announcements value stocks outperform growth stocks by a wide margin. The paper's results provide evidence that unsophisticated option market investors (1) overreact to past news on underlying stocks and (2) mistakenly believe that mispriced stocks will move even further away from fundamentals at impending scheduled news releases.     

Inflation Illusion and Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift

This paper examines the cross‐sectional implications of the inflation illusion hypothesis for the post‐earnings‐announcement drift. The inflation illusion hypothesis suggests that stock market investors fail to incorporate inflation in forecasting future earnings growth rates, and this causes firms whose earnings growths are positively (negatively) related to inflation to be undervalued (overvalued). We argue and show that the sensitivity of earnings growth to inflation varies monotonically across stocks sorted on standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) and, consistent with the inflation illusion hypothesis, show that lagged inflation predicts future earnings growth, abnormal returns, and earnings announcement returns of SUE‐sorted stocks. Interestingly, controlling for the return predictive ability of inflation weakens the ability of lagged SUE to predict future returns of SUE‐sorted stocks.     

Retail Investor Sentiment and Return Comovements

Using a database of more than 1.85 million retail investor transactions over 1991–1996, we show that these trades are systematically correlated—that is, individuals buy (or sell) stocks in concert. Moreover, consistent with noise trader models, we find that systematic retail trading explains return comovements for stocks with high retail concentration (i.e., small‐cap, value, lower institutional ownership, and lower‐priced stocks), especially if these stocks are also costly to arbitrage. Macroeconomic news and analyst earnings forecast revisions do not explain these results. Collectively, our findings support a role for investor sentiment in the formation of returns.     

Glamour and Value Strategies on the Tokyo Stock Exchange

This paper evaluates the performance of glamour and value strategies and tests the extrapolation model for the Japanese equity market. In general, value stocks outperform glamour stocks by between 6 and 12 percent per annum for the five years after portfolio formation. Evidence from past, future and expected growth provides strong support for the story developed in Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). It is difficult to attribute the value premia to the difference, if any, in risk factors. In addition, the book-to-market premium is much closer to an arbitrage opportunity than the size premium.     

Limited attention and the earnings announcement returns of past stock market winners

We document that stocks with the strongest prior 12-month returns experience a significant average market-adjusted return of 1.58% during the five trading days before their earnings announcements and a significant average market-adjusted return of −1.86% in the five trading days afterward. These returns remain significant even after accounting for transactions costs. We empirically test a limited attention explanation for these anomalous returns—that stocks with sharp run-ups tend to attract individual investors’ attention and investment dollars, particularly before their earnings announcements. Our analysis suggests that the trading decisions of individual investors are at least partly responsible for the return pattern that we observe.     

The Investment Performance of Common Stocks in Relation to Their Price–Earnings Ratios: An Update of the Basu Study

In this paper, the relationship between the investment performances of equity securities and their price–earnings ratios is examined using an approach similar to the one employed by Basu in a 1977 paper. From the tests, we conclude that, from 1979 through 1984, there were some moderate excess rates of return earned by selecting stocks based on their price–earnings ratios but that these excess rates were not obtained from investing in low price–earnings stocks.     

Extreme volumes and expected stock returns: Evidence from China's stock market

We examine the relation between extreme trading volumes and expected returns for individual stocks traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange over the July 1994–December 2000 interval. Contrasted with the evidence obtained from the US data [J. Finance 56 (2001) 877], our results show that stocks experiencing extremely high (low) volumes are associated with low (high) subsequent returns. Moreover, this extreme volume–return relation significantly co-varies with security characteristics like past stock performance, firm size, and book-to-market values. In particular, stocks with extreme volumes are related to poorer performance if they are past winners, large firms, and glamour stocks than if they are past losers, small firms, and value stocks, respectively. These results are robust to both daily and weekly samples as well as stock exchange sub-samples. Although the liquidity premium hypothesis of Amihud and Mendelson [J. Financ. Econ. 17 (1986) 223] provides a partial explanation for the extreme volume–return relation, our results fit better the behavioral hypothesis of Baker and Stein [J. Financ. Mark. 7 (2004) 271].     

Momentum Strategies

We examine whether the predictability of future returns from past returns is due to the market's underreaction to information, in particular to past earnings news. Past return and past earnings surprise each predict large drifts in future returns after controlling for the other. Market risk, size, and book–to–market effects do not explain the drifts. There is little evidence of subsequent reversals in the returns of stocks with high price and earnings momentum. Security analysts' earnings forecasts also respond sluggishly to past news, especially in the case of stocks with the worst past performance. The results suggest a market that responds only gradually to new information.     

Risk‐Adjusted Long‐Term Contrarian Profits: Evidence from Non‐S&P 500 High‐Volume Stocks

Can trading volume help unravel the long‐term overreaction puzzle? With portfolios of non‐S&P 500 NYSE stocks, we show that (1) both the high‐ and low‐volume (abnormal volume) contrarian portfolios earn a much higher market‐adjusted excess return than the normal‐volume contrarian portfolio, (2) however, when leverage‐induced risk is factored in, excess returns from contrarian portfolios with normal‐ and low‐volume stocks are insignificant, (3) only excess returns from high‐volume contrarian stocks are significant and cannot be explained by the time‐varying risk and return framework, and (4) such high‐volume, risk‐adjusted excess returns arise mainly from winner (glamour) stocks.     

Market Responses to Buy Recommendations Issued by Personal Finance Magazines: Effects of Information, Price-Pressure, and Company Characteristics

This paper analyzes explicit buy recommendations for stockspublished by German Personal Finance Magazines from 1995 to2003. These recommendations earn significant abnormal returnsof 2.58% within the five days around the publication day. Boththe price-pressure hypothesis and the information hypothesiscan be confirmed by our data. The price-pressure effect is mostevident for small stocks and glamour stocks. However, whereasthe initial price reaction to small stocks is additionally drivenby permanent information value, this does not hold true forglamour stocks. In contrast, value stocks are associated withhigh cumulative abnormal returns that are solely driven by informationvalue.