Product market competition, open shop union and wage

We show that if the product market is not very much concentrated, open shop union, where the union density is less than one, may not be a justification for a positive relationship between product market competition and unionized wage, irrespective of the union density, bargaining power of the union and the union??s preference for wage and employment.     

Unionized oligopoly,labor-management cooperation,and international competitiveness

In a model of a duopolistic product market with a unionized labor force, this paper explores the interaction between firms' duopolistic behavior and union-firm bargaining. In a two-union/two-firm setting, we show that adopting efficient bargaining can improve a firm's competitiveness as well as efficiency, and it arises in equilibrium; while in a one-union/two-firm set-up, we find that an industry union prefers wage bargaining. However, when foreign competition in the product market intensifies, even the industry union prefers efficient bargaining. As an application, the analysis may explain differences in international competitiveness and the recent trend toward labor-management cooperation in the labor market.     

Enterprise Bargaining,Union Structure and Wages*

Models of simultaneous bargaining games are used to analyze the wage outcomes associated with various systems of industrial relations, including bargaining by craft, enterprise, industry or the whole economy. Union structure is a key determinant with highest wage pressure occurring when unions are organized along craft lines at industry level Abandonment of centralized bargaining and the splintering of both union and employer organizations into craft and industry units may well lead both to higher aggregate wage pressure and to greater wage inequality.     

Union–firm bargaining: Order of play and efficiency

This paper shows that a modified alternating offers Rubinstein model can provide a Pareto superior outcome in the context of the right-to-manage union–firm bargaining. Two examples of bargaining protocols that yield a superior outcome are provided. In the first example, the parties engage in a game in which the order of play is determined as part of the bargaining. We show that the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the firm always moves first in the wage bargaining game. The equilibrium wage is, therefore, unique. In the second example, we examine a two-part-tariff alternating offers bargaining protocol, where the parties bargain over the wage and transfer payments. We show that this bargaining protocol has a Pareto efficient, unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Thus, although the parties do not bargain over the level of employment, the outcome under this protocol is, nevertheless, socially optimal.     

Understanding wage determination in a multi-level bargaining system: a panel data analysis

This article presents an estimation of the elasticity of actual wages to industry-level collective bargaining thereby quantifying empirically the role of industry-level bargaining on wage determination. For this purpose, we use a unique employer–employee panel dataset covering the entire Belgian employment population over 9 years (1998–2006). Like several other European countries, e.g. Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands, Belgium has a relatively centralised wage bargaining system, with the industry level playing the most important role. Regression results confirm that wage increases collectively decided at the industry level are, on average, fully passed on to individual wages. In addition to industry-level bargaining, we are interested in the supplementary wage increases granted at the firm level, referred to as wage drift or wage cushion in the literature. Our estimates show that wage drift is affected by company size, by the economic performance of the industry and to a much lesser extent by labour market tensions as measured by the local unemployment rate. Interestingly, our results show that industry-level bargaining also takes most of these features into account.     

Prices,Productivity and Wage Bargaining in Open Economies*

According to the standard union bargaining model, unemployment benefits should have big effects on wages, but product‐market prices and productivity should play no role in the wage bargain. We formulate an alternative strategic bargaining model, where labour and product‐market conditions together determine wages. A wage equation is derived and estimated on aggregate data for four Nordic countries. Wages are found to depend not only on unemployment and the replacement ratio, but also on productivity, international prices and exchange rates. There is evidence of considerable nominal wage rigidity. Exchange rate changes have large and persistent effects on competitiveness.     

A DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL UNDER BILATERAL MONOPOLY*

The paper points out a crucial difference between the conventional disequilibrium macro model and partial equilibrium models of wage bargaining, In the former the real wage is constrained to be less than or equal to the marginal product, whereas in the latter the real wage is frequently constrained to be greater than or equal to the marginal product. The paper builds a disequilibrium model under bilateral monopoly, paying explicit attention to the labour market. The well-known union model of McDonald and Solow forms the basis of the labour market analysis. Just as the three regions of Keynesian Unemployment, Classical Unemployment and Repressed Inflation are configured in the conventional case, an equivalent exercise is undertaken but with the addition of a collectively negotiated wage. The particular wage agreement used is the Nash bargain. The framework is then used to account for the unusual events that occurred in the UK labour market 1979–81, particularly the unprecedented rise in unemployment with no diminution of the inflation rate. It suggests that there was a shift in bargaining advantage in favour of employers, which resulted in an increased share of profits in national income. This regime change exacerbated the unfavourable circumstances for labour, which existed at that time.     

On-the-job search and strategic bargaining

This paper studies wage bargaining in a simple economy in which both employed and unemployed workers search for better jobs. The axiomatic Nash bargaining solution and standard strategic bargaining solutions are inapplicable because the set of feasible payoffs is nonconvex. I instead develop a strategic model of wage bargaining between a single worker and firm that is applicable to such an environment. I show that if workers and firms are homogeneous, there are market equilibria with a continuous wage distribution in which identical firms bargain to different wages, each of which is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game. If firms are heterogeneous, I characterize market equilibria in which more productive firms pay higher wages. I compare the quantitative predictions of this model with Burdett and Mortensen's [1998. Wage differentials, employer size and unemployment. International Economic Review 39, 257-273.] wage posting model and argue that the bargaining model is theoretically more appealing along important dimensions.     

UNION–FIRM BARGAINING AGENDA REVISITED: WHEN UNIONS HAVE DISTINCT PREFERENCES

In this paper we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between firms and unions by considering a more general union's utility function with distinct preferences and sequential negotiations. First, we compare exogenously given labour market institutions; i.e., right‐to‐manage (RTM) and sequential efficient bargaining (SEB). We show that the conventional wisdom, which states that firms always prefer RTM, no longer holds. In fact, when unions are adequately wage aggressive and have strong enough bargaining power, firms may prefer SEB negotiations; however, firms switch their preference to RTM when unions are very strong. Moreover, we show that a conflict of interest between the parties may emerge when unions are sufficiently employment oriented as well as sufficiently wage aggressive and not too strong or too weak in bargaining. Second, we analyse the endogenous choice of the bargaining agenda. We show that a rich plethora of equilibria may occur and new situations of conflict/agreement of interests between the bargaining parties arise in particular when unions are sufficiently wage‐aggressive.     

Does union membership reduce gender earnings differentials? Evidence from employer–employee matched data in China

This paper examines whether union membership reduces gender earnings differentials in the Chinese labour market using an employer–employee matched data set. We have three main findings. First, union membership helps reduce the gender differentials in hourly wage and monthly allowance, but not in monthly basic wage and yearly bonus. Second, ensuring that female workers receive overtime pay is one way by which union membership helps reduce the gender earnings differentials. Third, controlling for firm fixed effects reduces the effect of union membership on the gender gap in hourly wage and monthly allowance, which means that the unobserved firm characteristics might impact the effect of union membership on gender earnings differentials.     

Employer size–wage effects: evidence from matched employer–employee survey data in the UK

This paper employs a random sample of matched employer–employee data from the UK to test seven possible explanations for the positive relationship between employer size and pay. Individual wage equations show a large employer size–wage premium. We then control for a range of establishment-level variables, based on seven hypotheses typically advanced to explain this premium. Each establishment-level factor reduces the wage premium, but a sizeable premium nonetheless remains. In adjudicating on these hypotheses, we find a strong association between the internal labour market and the employer size–wage premium. This finding supports the theory that the employer size–wage effect may be due to the higher costs of turnover or monitoring in larger firms. However, we find contrasting effects for public versus private sector establishments.     

The Rise and Fall of Centralized Wage Bargaining

During the three decades spanning the early 1950s to the early 1980s, the wage‐setting process in most Northern European countries was dominated by centralized bargaining (i.e., peak‐level labor and employer associations set wages nationwide). In the early 1980s, centralized wage bargaining began to collapse. In this paper, we assess a novel explanation for both the initial establishment of a centralized wage‐setting process, and its subsequent collapse. According to our theory, centralized wage bargaining was set up as a response to the spillovers created by the unemployment benefit program. Its collapse was the result of the increase in the productivity gap across workers, brought about by equipment‐specific technological progress and equipment–skill complementarity.     

Trade unions vs. statistical discrimination: Theory and application to post-apartheid South Africa

A simple model of statistical discrimination is analyzed, which captures some stylized facts of the South African labor market. It shows that this type of discrimination disappears when the wage rates are determined by efficient bargaining between a representative firm and a union, with endogenous membership. This may explain why the wage gap between Black and White workers in post-apartheid South Africa is smaller among unionized workers than among non-unionized ones.     

International Trade and Collective Bargaining Outcomes: Evidence from German Employer–Employee Data

In theoretical trade models with variable mark‐ups and collective wage bargaining, exposure to international markets might reduce the exporter wage premium. We test this prediction using linked German employer–employee data covering the years 1996–2007. To separate the rent‐sharing mechanism from assortative matching, we exploit individual worker information to construct profitability measures that are free of skill composition. Our results show that rent‐sharing is less pronounced in more export‐intensive firms or in more open industries. The exporter wage premium is highest for low‐productivity firms. In line with theory, these findings are unique to the subsample of plants covered by collective bargaining.     

Profit sharing as entry deterrence mechanism

In a right-to-manage framework, this paper analyzes the optimal choice of the pay scheme (profit sharing vs. fixed wage) in a unionized duopoly with potential market entry and decentralized bargaining. The paper shows that, depending on the institutional features, both pay systems can arise as equilibria in Nash strategies. Under duopoly with committed bargaining, the fixed wage is the Nash equilibrium; with flexible bargaining, an agreement between the incumbent firm and its union about profit sharing arises as Nash equilibrium, if the union is not too strong. A monopoly with threat of entry reinforces the selection of profit sharing as a deterrent mechanism.     

Severance payments in equilibrium unemployment

Under the insider wage model of Mortensen and Pissarides [Mortensen, D.T., Pissarides, C.A., 1994. Job creation and job destruction in the theory of unemployment. Review of Economic Studies 61, 397–415], this paper shows that (1) severance pay negatively affects market tightness (vacancy to unemployment ratio) and (2) the amount of severance pay is limited thereby insuring the employer a rational bargaining outcome.     

LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY IN A PANEL OF OECD COUNTRIES

In this paper we analyze empirically how labor market institutions influence business cycle volatility in a sample of 20 OECD countries. Our results suggest that countries characterized by high union density tend to experience more volatile movements in output, whereas the degree of coordination of the wage bargaining system and the strictness of employment protection legislation appear to be only of limited importance. We also find some evidence suggesting that highly coordinated wage bargaining systems have a dampening impact on inflation volatility.     

AN ULTIMATUM WAGE BARGAINING EXPERIMENT ON TRADE UNION EFFICIENCY

We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non‐binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers’ posted offers and toughening the bargaining position of employees, without reducing overall market efficiency.     

A Note on Franchising and Wage Bargaining

A franchising contract relocates distributable rent between franchisor and franchisee. With decentralized wage bargaining relocation modifies the position of the union in the wage bargaining. If the rent is relocated to the franchisor completely, then even a strong union is not able to raise wage above reservation level in the franchisee's firm. If franchisor and franchisee negotiate on rent division, there is an incentive to increase the franchise fee at the expense of the union. Therefore the overall rent assigned to labor depends on the differences of labor intensity in the franchisor's and franchisee's firms. Firm owners may be able to transfer distributable rents from a firm with a strong union to one with a weak union. Furthermore, a franchising contract shows a first mover advantage. A franchising contract is placed before wage bargaining, benefiting the franchisor.     

Insiders and outsiders in labour market models

The monopoly union model and the wage bargaining model are analysed in light of the distinction between insiders and outsiders. It is shown that a possible outcome of the wage bargaining is the wage level where all insiders keep their job, but no outsiders are taken on. In this situation, small variations in the bargaining situation of the union will not affect the wage and employment outcome. Furthermore, it may even be the case that the union does not wish a higher wage, because this would lead to lay-offs among the insiders. Thus, the monopoly union model and the bargaining model may yield the same wage and employment levels.This paper is part of the research project Wage Formation and Unemployment at SAF Center for Applied Research at the Department of Economics, University of Oslo. Comments from Michael Hoel, Andrew Oswald, Åsa Rosén, Asbjørn Rødseth and an anonymous referee on earlier drafts are gratefully acknowledged.