The Interdependent Use of Earnings and Dividends in Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecasts*

Abstract. This paper examines how analysts combine earnings and dividend information when they predict future earnings. Because both earnings and dividends are noisy indications of future earnings, we posit that analysts use the two corroboratively, to confirm the information reflected in each, and that analysts will substitute away from earnings when it is noisy and toward dividends. Using regressions of analysts' earnings forecast revisions on unexpected earnings, unexpected dividends, and five variables that reflect whether the signs of unexpected earnings and dividends confirm or contradict each other, we find evidence of both corroboration and substitution. Analysts' earnings forecast revisions are significantly related to the five corroborative variables, and this relation has statistically significant explanatory power beyond that in the magnitudes of unexpected earnings and unexpected dividends. Consistent with expectations, we find that the evidence of corroboration varies across the noisiness of earnings information; there is more evidence of corroboration when earnings are more variable. We also find evidence consistent with analysts substituting away from earnings, toward dividend information for firms with noisy earnings information (high variance). Overall, the results imply that analysts use earnings and dividend information interdependently, with some interdependency determined by the noisiness of earnings announcements. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent comment les analystes combinent l'information relative aux bénéfices et aux dividendes pour prévoir les bénéfices futurs. Les bénéfices et les dividendes étant tous deux des indicateurs imparfaits des bénéfices futurs, les auteurs posent l'hypothèse que les analystes utilisent les deux, à titre corroboratif, pour confirmer l'information que livre chacun de ces indicateurs et qu'ils préféreront les dividendes aux bénéfices, si ces derniers se révèlent un indicateur imparfait. En procédant à la régression des révisions des prévisions de bénéfices des analystes sur les bénéfices imprévus, sur les dividendes imprévus et sur cinq variables indiquant si les pronostics de bénéfices et de dividendes imprévus se confirment ou s'infirment les uns les autres, les auteurs enregistrent des données qui vont à la fois dans le sens de la corroboration et de la substitution. Les révisions des prévisions de bénéfices des analystes présentent une relation significative avec les cinq variables de corroboration, relation qui affiche un pouvoir d'explication statistiquement significatif, au-delà de celui de l'ampleur des bénéfices imprévus et des dividendes imprévus. Conformément aux prévisions, les auteurs constatent que la preuve de corroboration varie selon le degré d'imperfection de l'information relative aux bénéfices; les preuves de corroboration sont plus fortes lorsque les bénéfices varient davantage. Les auteurs font également état de constatations conformes à l'hypothèse selon laquelle les ana lystes écartent l'information relative aux bénéfices pour y substituer l'information relative aux dividendes dans le cas d'entreprises dont l'information relative aux bénéfices est imparfaite (variance élevée). Dans l'ensemble, les résultats invitent à la conclusion que les analystes utilisent l'information relative aux bénéfices et aux dividendes de manière interdépendante, une partie de cette interdépendance étant déterminée par l'imperfection de l'information communiquée en ce qui a trait aux bénéfices.     

Horizon‐Dependent Underreaction in Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecasts*

This paper provides empirical evidence that underreaction in financial analysts' earnings forecasts increases with the forecast horizon, and offers a rational economic explanation for this result. The empirical portion of the paper evaluates analysts' responses to earnings‐surprise and other earnings‐related information. Our empirical evidence suggests that analysts' earnings forecasts underreact to both types of information, and the underreaction increases with the forecast horizon. The paper also develops a theoretical model that explains this horizon‐dependent analyst underreaction as a rational response to an asymmetric loss function. The model assumes that, for a given level of inaccuracy, analysts' reputations suffer more (less) when subsequent information causes a revision in investor expectations in the opposite (same) direction as the analyst's prior earnings‐forecast revision. Given this asymmetric loss function, underreaction increases with the risk of subsequent disconfirming information and with the disproportionate cost associated with revision reversal. Assuming that market frictions prevent prices from immediately unraveling these analyst underreac‐tion tactics, investors buying (selling) stock on the basis of analysts' positive (negative) earnings‐forecast revisions also benefit from analyst underreaction. Therefore, the asymmetric cost of forecast inaccuracy could arise from rational investor incentives consistent with a preference for analyst underreaction. Our incentives‐based explanation for underreaction provides an alternative to psychology‐based explanations and suggests avenues for further research.     

The Effect of Investment Banking Relationships on Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecasts and Investment Recommendations*

Abstract. This study shows that financial analysts of brokerage firms that provide investment banking services to a company (investment banker analysts) are optimistic, relative to other (noninvestment banker) analysts, in their earnings forecasts and investment recommendations. Returns earned by following the investment recommendations of investment banker analysts, however, are not significantly different from those of non-investment banker analysts. Given that information regarding the investment banking relationships of brokerage firms is publicly available, we find evidence that capital market participants rely relatively less on the investment banker analysts in forming their earnings expectations. Although we find a significant capital market reaction around the noninvestment banker analysts' research report dates and not around the investment banker analysts' research report dates, the difference between the two market reactions is not statistically significant. Finally, we find that investment banker analysts' earnings forecasts are, on average, as accurate as those of noninvestment banker analysts. Résumé. Les auteurs mettent en évidence le fait que les analystes financiers des maisons de courtage qui offrent des services de prise ferme aux entreprises (les analystes de courtiers preneurs ferme) sont optimistes dans leurs prévisions de bénéfices et leurs recommandations de placements, par comparaison aux autres analystes (c'est-à-dire aux analystes de courtiers qui ne sont pas preneurs ferme). Les rendements obtenus par les investisseurs qui observent les recommandations de placements des analystes de courtiers preneurs ferme ne sont cependant pas sensiblement différents de ceux qu'obtiennent les investisseurs qui se fient aux analystes des courtiers qui ne sont pas preneurs ferme. Compte tenu du fait que l'information relative aux relations qu'entretiennent les maisons de courtage en matière de prise ferme est du domaine public, les constatations des auteurs confirment que les participants au marché financier s'appuient relativement moins sur le verdict des analystes des courtiers preneurs ferme dans le calcul de leur espérance de gains. Bien que les auteurs observent une réaction marquée du marché financier à proximité des dates de publication des rapports de recherche des analystes des courtiers qui ne sont pas preneurs ferme, ce qui n'est pas le cas à proximité des dates de publication des rapports de recherche des analystes des courtiers preneurs ferme, la différence entre ces deux réactions n'est pas statistiquement significative. Enfin, les auteurs constatent que les prévisions de bénéfices des analystes des courtiers preneurs ferme sont, en moyenne, aussi exactes que celles des analystes des courtiers qui ne sont pas preneurs ferme.     

MD&A Quality as Measured by the SEC and Analysts' Earnings Forecasts*

This study examines the predictive value of Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) information. More specifically, this study tests the association between properties of analysts' earnings forecasts and MD&A quality, where MD&A quality is measured by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). We find that high MD&A ratings are associated with less error and less dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts after controlling for many other expected influences on analysts' forecasts. We also find that estimated regression coefficients are consistent with MD&A information having a substantial effect on earnings forecasts. Finally, we find our results are driven by forward-looking disclosures about capital expenditures and operations, and also by historical disclosures about capital expenditures. These findings are consistent with the suggestion by many constituencies (including the SEC) that the type of information found in high quality MD&A is particularly relevant for predicting earnings.     

Determinants of Managerial Earnings Guidance Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure and Bias in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts*

Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”), some management privately guided analyst earnings estimates, often through detailed reviews of analysts' earnings models. In this paper I use proprietary survey data from the National Investor Relations Institute to identify firms that reviewed analysts' earnings models prior to Reg FD and those that did not. Under the maintained assumption that firms conducting reviews guided analysts' earnings forecasts, I document firm characteristics associated with the decision to provide private earnings guidance. Then I document the characteristics of “guided” versus “unguided” analyst earnings forecasts. Findings demonstrate an association between several firm characteristics and guidance practices: managers are more likely to review analyst earnings models when the firm's stock is highly followed by analysts and largely held by institutions, when the firm's market‐to‐book ratio is high, and its earnings are important to valuation but hard to predict because its business is complex. A comparison of guided and unguided quarterly forecasts indicates that guided analyst estimates are more accurate, but also more frequently pessimistic. An examination of analysts' annual earnings forecasts over the fiscal year does not distinguish between guidance and no‐guidance firms; both experience a “walk‐down” in annual estimates. To distinguish between guidance and no‐guidance firms, one must examine quarterly earnings news: unguided analysts walk down their annual estimates when the majority of the quarterly earnings news is negative; guided analysts walk down their annual estimates even though the majority of the quarterly earnings news is positive.     

Evidence from Archival Data on the Relation Between Security Analysts' Forecast Errors and Prior Forecast Revisions*

Abstract. This paper examines the association between analysts' forecast errors at the earnings announcement date and the revisions to those forecasts during the preceding year. The study is an initial effort to use archival data from expert decision makers to test behavioral theories that have support in laboratory environments. Consistent with findings of conservatism in laboratory experiments, we find that analysts systematically underweight new information. This finding is most pronounced when the analysts are consistently revising their estimates downward throughout the year. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent le lien entre les erreurs prévisionnelles des analystes à la date de déclaration des bénéfices et les révisions dont ces prévisions ont fait l'objet au cours de l'exercice précédent. Il s'agit là d'une première tentative d'utilisation des données d'archives des experts en matière décisionnelle dans le but de tester les théories comportementales qui ont été démontrées en laboratoire. Conformément aux observations faites en laboratoire en ce qui a trait à la prudence, les auteurs constatent que les analystes accordent systématiquement trop peu de poids à l'information nouvelle/Cette constatation est très marquée lorsque les analystes révisent continuellement leurs estimations à la baisse au cours de l'année.     

Auditor Quality and the Accuracy of Management Earnings Forecasts*

In this study, we appeal to insights and results from Davidson and Neu 1993 and McConomy 1998 to motivate empirical analyses designed to gain a better understanding of the relationship between auditor quality and forecast accuracy. We extend and refine Davidson and Neu's analysis of this relationship by introducing additional controls for business risk and by considering data from two distinct time periods: one in which the audit firm's responsibility respecting the earnings forecast was to provide review‐level assurance, and one in which its responsibility was to provide audit‐level assurance. Our sample data consist of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) initial public offerings (IPOs). The earnings forecast we consider is the one‐year‐ahead management earnings forecast included in the IPO offering prospectus. The results suggest that after the additional controls for business risk are introduced, the relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality for the review‐level assurance period is no longer significant. The results also indicate that the shift in regimes alters the fundamental nature of the relationship. Using data from the audit‐level assurance regime, we find a negative and significant relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality (i.e., we find Big 6 auditors to be associated with smaller absolute forecast errors than non‐Big 6 auditors), and further, that the difference in the relationship between the two regimes is statistically significant.     

Last‐Chance Earnings Management: Using the Tax Expense to Meet Analysts' Forecasts*

We assert that the tax expense is a powerful context in which to study earnings management, because it is one of the last accounts closed prior to earnings announcements. Although many pre‐tax accruals must be posted in the year‐end general ledger, managers estimate and negotiate tax expense with their auditors immediately prior to earnings announcements. We hypothesize that changes from third‐ to fourth‐quarter effective tax rates (ETRs) are negatively related to whether and how much a firm's earnings absent tax expense management miss analysts' consensus forecast, a proxy for target earnings. We measure earnings absent tax expense management as actual pre‐tax earnings adjusted for the annual ETR reported at the third quarter. We provide robust evidence that firms lower their projected ETRs when they miss the consensus forecast, which is consistent with firms decreasing their tax expense if non‐tax sources of earnings management are insufficient to achieve targets. We also find that firms that exceed earnings targets increase their ETR, but this effect is less significant. By studying the tax expense in total, rather than narrow components of deferred tax expense, our results provide general evidence that reported taxes are used to manage earnings.     

个人、机构投资者情绪与证券分析师的乐观偏差——来自中国A股市场的证据

证券分析师的盈利预测存在着显著的乐观偏差,且这种乐观偏差会因投资者情绪的变化而忽高忽低。基于开户数量构建个人、机构投资者情绪指标,实证研究投资者情绪对证券分析师乐观偏差的影响。研究发现,个人、机构投资者情绪越乐观,证券分析师的乐观偏差越大;机构投资者情绪的波动比个人投资者更为剧烈,且对证券分析师的影响也大于个人投资者;在考虑了公司的截面特征后,结论依然稳健。研究有助于进一步理解新兴市场中证券分析师的盈利预测行为,并为投资者使用证券分析师的研究报告提供决策参考。     

The Relation between Analysts' Forecasts of Long‐Term Earnings Growth and Stock Price Performance Following Equity Offerings*

In this paper we evaluate the role of sell‐side analysts' long‐term earnings growth forecasts in the pricing of common equity offerings. We find that, in general, sell‐side analysts' long‐term growth forecasts are systematically overly optimistic around equity offerings and that analysts employed by the lead managers of the offerings make the most optimistic growth forecasts. In additional, we find a positive relation between the fees paid to the affiliated analysts' employers and the level of the affiliated analysts' growth forecasts. We also document that the post‐offering underperformance is most pronounced for firms with the highest growth forecasts made by affiliated analysts. Finally, we demonstrate that the post‐offering underperformance disappears once we control for the overoptimism in earnings growth expectations. Thus, the evidence presented in this paper is consistent with the “equity issue puzzle” arising from overly optimistic earnings growth expectations held at the time of the offerings.     

Improving Financial Reports by Revealing the Accuracy of Prior Estimates*

Several researchers (e.g., Lundholm 1999; Ryan 1997; Petroni, Ryan, and Wahlen 2000) have proposed a reporting mechanism to enhance the reliability of estimates and other forward‐looking information in financial reports. Their proposals require companies to report reconciliations of prior‐year estimates to actual realizations as supplemental information in their financial reports. Such disclosures would enable investors to distinguish between accurate and opportunistic reporting behavior, and, arguably, should create incentives for companies to estimate accurately in the first place. Our study provides evidence on these proposals. Specifically, we conduct two experiments within the context of an important intangible asset requiring estimation ‐ software development costs. Our results show that the proposed reporting mechanism is effective in communicating information about the accuracy of financial estimates. We find, however, that not all disclosures are equally useful. The most effective disclosures explicitly describe the implications of misestimation (if any) on both the balance sheet and on earnings, thereby reducing the computational complexity associated with less explicit disclosures. Furthermore, our results show that when the disclosures explicitly describe the implications of misestimation, investors reward accurate estimators but do not explicitly punish those who are inaccurate. We conclude that information about previous estimate accuracy is useful to investors and that regulators should consider the type of disclosure, because not all disclosures may be equally effective in creating management incentives for accurate estimation. Moreover, the competitive advantage conferred on firms that provide accurate estimates arguably should create incentives for all companies to estimate accurately in the future.     

Bias and Accuracy of Management Earnings Forecasts: An Evaluation of the Impact of Auditing*

This paper assesses how the bias and accuracy of managers' earnings forecasts in prospectuses were affected by a 1989 regulation that required the forecasts to be audited by public accountants. Theory suggests that auditors' association with the forecasts would reduce positive (optimistic) bias, by reducing moral hazard. Regulators expected that the audit requirement would also improve the accuracy of the forecasts. Both predictions were tested using management earnings forecasts disclosed in prospectuses of Canadian initial public offerings. The results show that audited forecasts contained significantly less positive bias than reviewed forecasts, but there was only a marginally significant improvement in accuracy.     

Analysts' Interpretation and Investors' Valuation of Tax Carryforwards*

We examine how financial analysts and equity investors incorporate information on deferred taxes from carryforwards into earnings forecasts and share prices. We focus on carryforwards because, in providing this information each period, management must use their private information about the firm's profitability prospects. Thus, accounting measurement of tax carryforwards is another way of providing a management earnings forecast. In analyzing the role of carryforwards in valuation, we distinguish between two conflicting effects. First, deferred taxes from carryforwards represent future tax savings; hence, they should be valued positively as assets. In contrast, the existence of tax carryforwards may signal a higher likelihood of future losses, which would have a negative effect on expected earnings and share prices. We find that analysts consider earnings of firms with carryforwards to be less persistent because of the increased likelihood of future losses. We also find that analysts tend to be less precise and more optimistic (biased) in forecasting earnings of firms with carryforwards. This higher optimism and lower precision are more pronounced just after firms adopt Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SPAS) 109 and are almost entirely corrected over time. An analysis of investors' valuation indicates a strong positive relation between deferred taxes from carryforwards and share prices, suggesting that these carryforwards are valued as assets. Also, earnings and book values of equity are valued less in firms that have carryforwards than in firms without carryforwards. Finally, the valuation allowance required under SFAS 109 assists equity investors in valuing a firm's earnings and net assets. The combined findings on analysts' interpretation and investors' valuation suggest that analysts fail to fully capture the implication of carryforwards on future earnings within their forecasting horizon.     

The Differential Role of R&D and SG&A for Earnings Management and Stock Price Manipulation*

This paper documents a differential role of R&D versus selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A) for real earnings management. The distinction of these two components is important because prior studies mostly examine their combined use, but firms could manipulate them differently given the differing valuation implications. Reduced SG&A is viewed positively by investors as evidence of cost reduction, while reduced R&D is viewed negatively by investors as such expenditures are critical signals of expected growth. I examine their use in the context of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) as well as firms receiving accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAERs). Although both groups face strong incentives to manage earnings upward by reducing expenses, I predict and find that firms will reduce SG&A but increase R&D. During the manipulation period, SEO and AAER firms exhibit lower discretionary SG&A and higher discretionary R&D, relative to control firms, and investors positively value low discretionary SG&A and high discretionary R&D. Overall, this study confirms the importance of distinguishing between R&D and SG&A in real earnings management contexts and suggests a complementary (substitutive) relation between cutting SG&A (R&D) and accruals management.     

Going-Concern Status,Earnings Persistence,and Informativeness of Earnings*

Abstract. Valuation theory recognizes that the relation between earnings innovations and changes in security valuation is increasing in the persistence of the earnings innovations. Analyses in this article reveal that the present value of revisions in expected future benefits is a function of the length of revision horizon, suggesting that earnings persistence is determined, in part, by an entity's going-concern status. These analyses predict an inverse relation between earnings informativeness and an entity's probability of termination. Drawing on a sample of quarterly earnings and returns data from more than 1,500 distinct firms for the period 1981–1990, a statistically significant inverse relation is documented between an entity's probability of termination and the informativeness of earnings—the latter measured as the coefficient from a regression of returns on earnings. Further empirical analyses reveal that this result is a pervasive economic phenomenon not attributable to extreme conditions or other prevailing explanations of earnings informativeness. This inference is robust to variations in research design, including measurement of earnings informativeness and of termination probability and alternative specifications of the relation between returns and earnings. Consequently, the evidence in this article is consistent with a fundamental role for an entity's going-concern status in determining the usefulness of earnings. Résumé. La théorie de l'évaluation reconnaît le fait que la relation entre les nouvelles informations relatives au bénéfice net et les changements dans l'évaluation des titres s'intensifie lorsque persistent lesdites informations. Les analyses réalisées par les auteurs révèlent que la valeur actualisée des rajustements dans les gains futurs espérés dépend de l'horizon du rajustement, ce qui donne à penser que la persistance du bénéfice net est en partie fonction de la continuité de l'exploitation de l'entreprise. Selon ces analyses, le potentiel informatif du bénéfice net devrait être en relation inverse avec la probabilité de fermeture de l'entité. En s'appuyant sur un échantillon de données trimestrielles relatives au bénéfice net et au rendement recueillies auprès de plus de 1500 entreprises distinctes pour la période 1981–1990, les auteurs observent une relation inverse statistiquement significative entre la probabilité de fermeture d'une entité et le potentiel informatif du bénéfice—ce dernier étant mesuré sous forme de coefficient, au moyen d'une régression des rendements sur les bénéfices. D'autres analyses empiriques révèlent que cette conclusion est un phénomène économique répandu qui n'est pas attribuable à des conditions extrêmes ou à d'autres explications prédominantes du potentiel informatif du bénéfice net. Cette inference résiste aux variations dans le plan de recherche, y compris la mesure du potentiel informatif du bénéfice net et de la probabilité de fermeture, et les autres caractéristiques possibles de la relation entre le rendement et le bénéfice. Les résultats obtenus confirment donc que la continuité de l'exploitation joue un rôle fondamental dans la détermination de l'utilité du bénéfice net.     

The Difference between Earnings and Operating Cash Flow as an Indicator of Financial Reporting Fraud*

This paper examines the relation between earnings and operating cash flow to derive and test an indicator of financial statement fraud. Accrual measurement concepts indicate that financial statement fraud should be associated with high levels of earnings relative to operating cash flow. We demonstrate that the excess of earnings over operating cash flow is extreme in most fraud cases in years immediately prior to the fraud discovery based on a sample of 56 fraud cases from 1978 to 1991. We compare the distribution of the earnings minus operating cash flow variable for fraud firms with that for a sample of 60,453 firm-years for firms listed on COMPUSTAT. We test a logistic regression model in which the discovery/nondiscovery of fraud is the dependent variable, and earnings minus operating cash flow is the explanatory variable. Other control variables are included in the model based on prior studies. Results are consistent with expectations derived from accrual measurement theory. We then examine the predictive ability of the model using our sample of fraud firms and a sample of nonfraud firms in the same four-digit SIC code industries. Observations for the fraud firms are for the fiscal year prior to the discovery of fraud. Observations for the nonfraud firms are for the same fiscal years as the fraud firms in the same industries. The predictive ability of the model, including the excess of earnings over operating cash flow, is substantially higher than the predictive ability of the model omitting this variable. We conclude that the earnings-operating cash flow relation provides important information for those interested in identifying financial statement fraud, especially when considered in conjunction with other factors associated with fraud risk.