Management of operating cash flows before and after the scandals in the early 2000s: An examination of meeting or beating analyst cash flow forecasts*

We examine whether the stock market premium assigned to meeting or beating analyst estimates of cash flows from operations (hereafter, “CFO”) has changed after the publicized accounting scandals in the early 2000 s (“post-scandals period”). We also examine whether firms’ CFO management behavior associated with meeting or beating analyst CFO forecasts has changed after the scandals. We find that the market reward for firms that meet or just beat analyst CFO forecasts (“small beaters”) has increased in the post-scandals period, especially when the accuracy of CFO forecasts is relatively high. We also find that the extent of CFO management engaged in by small beaters has increased after the accounting scandals and that these firms appear to resort to the timing of CFO. Further, we find evidence that the “underpricing” of CFO is weaker in the post-scandals period that exhibits a greater extent of CFO management than before, suggesting that the reduction in the underpricing of CFO in the post-scandals period is at least partially due to CFO management. Overall, our findings suggest that firms responded to the rising importance of cash flow information after a series of accounting scandals by inflating reported CFO to a larger extent than they did before.     

Leading the herd: evidence from mutual funds’ buy and sell decisions

This article investigates whether a mutual fund’s performance is related to its herding behavior. Using the methodology of Sias (Rev Finance Stud 17:165–206, 2004), we develop a measure to capture the magnitude that a fund’s buy (sell) decisions are leading other funds’ buys (sells), and find that a fund’s performance is positively (negatively) related to its “buy leading” (“sell leading”). We interpret these findings as evidence that “buy leaders” (“sell leaders”)’ performance benefits (suffers) from the positive (negative) price effect associated with buy (sell) herds. Additionally, we find a positive relationship between fund performance and valuation-motivated “buy leading”, while we find weak evidence on the relationship between performance and valuation-motivated “sell leading”. We interpret these results as evidence that leading funds’ outperformance is due, in part, to their ability to value stocks.     

Monitoring and Controlling Bank Risk: Does Risky Debt Help?

We examine whether mandating banks to issue subordinated debt would enhance market monitoring and control risk taking. To evaluate whether subordinated debt enhances risk monitoring, we extract the credit‐spread curve for each banking firm in our sample and examine whether changes in credit spreads reflect changes in bank risk variables, after controlling for changes in market and liquidity variables. We do not find strong and consistent evidence that they do. To evaluate whether subordinated debt controls risk taking, we examine whether the first issue of subordinated debt changes the risk‐taking behavior of a bank. We find that it does not.     

Too Big to Be Efficient? The Impact of Implicit Subsidies on Estimates of Scale Economies for Banks

We examine whether “too‐big‐to‐fail” (TBTF) factors affect estimates of scale economies for large banks. From a standard model of bank production that does not control for any TBTF factors, we find evidence of scale economies for our sample of large banks. We then control for TBTF factors by using a measure of the “implicit subsidy” that emerges from a reduction in TBTF banks’ funding costs due to investor expectations of government support. We do this in two ways: first, we estimate scale economies from an augmented model of bank production that employs a proxy for the counterfactual price of debt that banks would face in the absence of any TBTF funding cost advantage; second, we estimate scale economies from a model of bank production that is estimated only for a sample of banks considered unlikely to be TBTF. After controlling for TBTF factors using either method, we no longer find evidence of scale economies for our sample of large banks. These results suggest that estimated scale economies for large banks are affected by TBTF factors.     

How do nonprofits respond to negative wealth shocks? The impact of the 2008 stock market collapse on hospitals

The theory of cost shifting posits that nonprofit firms “share the pain” of negative financial shocks with their stakeholders, for example, by raising prices. We examine how nonprofit hospitals responded to the sharp reductions in their assets caused by the 2008 stock market collapse. The average hospital did not raise prices, but hospitals with substantial market power did cost shift in this way. We find no evidence that hospitals reduced treatment costs. Hospitals eliminated but left unchanged their offerings of profitable services. Taken together, our results provide mixed evidence on whether nonprofits behave differently from for‐profits.     

Earnings management and stock price crashes post U.S. cross-delistings

We examine whether cross-delisted firms from the major U.S. stock exchanges experience an increase in crash risk associated with earnings management. Consistent with our prediction, we find that earnings management has a greater positive impact on stock price crash risk post cross-delisting when compared to a control group of firms that remain cross-listed. More importantly, we find that this effect is more pronounced for cross-delisted firms from countries with weaker investor protection, poorer quality of their information environment and less conservative accounting practices. Our findings are robust to the potential endogenous nature of the cross-delisting decision, alternative measures of stock price crash risk and information asymmetry. We interpret our results as evidence of a “reverse bonding effect” following cross-delistings from U.S. stock exchanges.     

Special Repo Rates

This article provides the causes and symptoms of special repo rates in a competitive market for repurchase agreements. A repo rate is, in effect, an interest rate on loans collateralized by a specific instrument. A “special” is a repo rate significantly below prevailing market riskless interest rates. This article shows that specials can occur when those owning the collateral are inhibited, whether from legal or institutional requirements or from frictional costs, from supplying collateral into repurchase agreements. Specialness increases the equilibrium price for the underlying instrument by the present value of savings in borrowing costs associated with the repo specials.     

Toward a National Market System for U.S. Exchange–listed Equity Options

In its response to the 1975 Congressional mandate to implement a national market system for financial securities, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initially exempted the option market. Recent dramatic changes in the structure of the option market prompted the SEC to revisit this issue. We examine a sample of actively traded, multiply listed equity options to ask whether this market's characteristics appear consistent with the goals of producing economically efficient transactions and facilitating “best execution.” We find marked changes between June 2000, when quotes are often ignored, and January 2002, when the market more closely resembles a national market.     

Government finances and bank bailouts: Evidence from European stock markets

Using a sample of European banks and a series of events affecting governments' finances, we conduct an event study to examine whether there is a relationship between governments' fiscal difficulties and banks' stock returns. We find a significant reaction of banks' stocks to news concerning governments' finances. Banks' stock returns fall in response to a deterioration of governments' financial situation. We find little difference in the reaction between large and small banks. The evidence points towards all banks being equally likely to be bailed out. Our data are consistent with a policy during the Eurozone sovereign-debt crisis in which “no bank is too small to save”.     

COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND MUTUAL FUND INVESTORS

We present evidence from questionnaire responses of mutual fund investors about recollections of past fund performance. We find that investor memories exhibit a positive bias, consistent with current psychological models. We find that the degree of bias is conditional upon previous investor choice, a phenomenon related to the well-known theory of cognitive dissonance. Psychological and economic frictions in the mutual fund industry are examined via a cross-sectional study of equity mutual funds. We find an unusually high frequency of poorly performing funds, consistent with investor “inertia.” We also examine the differential responses of investment dollars to past performance, controlling for survivorship. These show that the effect is confined to the top quartile. We find little evidence that the response to poor performance is unusual.     

Were internal capital markets affected by the ‘perfect’ pension storm?

We examine capital expenditures in multi-segment firms before and after the “perfect storm” that affected pension plans between 2000 and 2002, when bond yields and stock prices both fell precipitously. Our sample of firms went from having overfunded to underfunded pension plans as a result of the storm. We examine the segment-level relation between investment, Tobin's q, and cash flow both before and after the event. We find mixed evidence on the change in the relation between investment and q, which may be a result of measurement error in q. We find stronger evidence for the conclusion that after the pension storm, firms with underfunded pension plans directed more investment towards segments that produce higher cash flow.     

What Drives Sell‐Side Analyst Compensation at High‐Status Investment Banks?

We use proprietary data from a major investment bank to investigate factors associated with analysts’ annual compensation. We find compensation to be positively related to “All‐Star” recognition, investment‐banking contributions, the size of analysts’ portfolios, and whether an analyst is identified as a top stock picker by the Wall Street Journal. We find no evidence that compensation is related to earnings forecast accuracy. But consistent with prior studies, we find analyst turnover to be related to forecast accuracy, suggesting that analyst forecasting incentives are primarily termination based. Additional analyses indicate that “All‐Star” recognition proxies for buy‐side client votes on analyst research quality used to allocate commissions across banks and analysts. Taken as a whole, our evidence is consistent with analyst compensation being designed to reward actions that increase brokerage and investment‐banking revenues. To assess the generality of our findings, we test the same relations using compensation data from a second high‐status bank and obtain similar results.     

Do managers listen to the market?

There are competing theories as to whether managers learn from stock prices. Dye and Sridhar (2002), for example, argue that capital markets can be better informed than the firm itself, while Roll [Roll, R., 1986, “The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers,” Journal of Business 59, 97–216.] argues managers may ignore market signals due to hubris. In this paper, we examine whether managers listen to the market in making major corporate investments, and whether agency costs and corporate governance mechanisms help explain managers' propensity to listen. We find that, on average, managers listen to the market: they are more likely to cancel investments when the market reacts unfavorably to the related announcement. Further, we find mixed evidence consistent with the notion that managers' propensity to listen is related to agency costs. We find that firms tend to listen to the market more when more of their shares are held by large blockholders, and when their CEOs have higher pay-performance sensitivities.     

Responses by Australian auditors to the global financial crisis

We examine the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on auditor behaviour in Australia. Using a sample of listed companies, we examine whether the GFC impacted the propensity of auditors to issue going concern modifications and increased audit effort as reflected in audit fees and audit reporting lag. Controlling for client characteristics, we find an increase in the propensity to issue going concern opinions during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007 and that Big N auditors responded to the GFC earlier than non‐Big N auditors. In relation to audit effort, we find evidence of increased audit fees during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007. There is, however, no evidence of increased audit reporting lags during the GFC.     

A Search-Based Theory of the On-the-Run Phenomenon

We propose a model in which assets with identical cash flows can trade at different prices. Infinitely lived agents can establish long positions in a search spot market, or short positions by first borrowing an asset in a search repo market. We show that short-sellers can endogenously concentrate in one asset because of search externalities and the constraint that they must deliver the asset they borrowed. That asset enjoys greater liquidity, a higher lending fee ("specialness"), and trades at a premium consistent with no-arbitrage. We derive closed-form solutions for small frictions, and provide a calibration generating realistic on-the-run premia.     

The realized forward term premium in the repo market

Repurchase agreements for general-collateral government debt measure the short-term cost of riskless borrowing, thus avoiding issues relating to specialness of Treasury offerings or irregular term-to-maturity in the Treasury bill market. The spread between reverse and repo rates has previously been ignored by researchers who find that the pure expectation hypothesis either holds at this extremely short end of the term structure or that observed deviations from the expectations hypothesis are not economically significant. This paper shows that the time-varying realized forward premium at the short-end of the yield curve is consistently positive when accounting for the spread between repurchase and reverse repurchase agreement rates.     

Information Intermediary or De Facto Standard Setter? Field Evidence on the Indirect and Direct Influence of Proxy Advisors

We examine whether proxy advisory firms (PAs) serve primarily an information intermediary role by providing research and voting recommendations to shareholders, or directly influence executive compensation by exerting pressure on firms to adopt preferred pay practices. Through a field study, we find that PAs are perceived as both information intermediaries and agenda setters and that these roles provide leverage to enable PAs to exercise significant influence over executive pay practices. Boards feel, and sometimes yield to, pressure to conform to PA “best” practices despite their own preferred compensation philosophies, even in the absence of overt PA scrutiny or negative shareholder votes. We also find that PAs are susceptible to conflicts of interest and generally use a “one‐size‐fits‐all” approach to voting recommendations. Overall, however, PAs are viewed as improving compensation practices by increasing transparency and accountability and fostering dialogue between firms and their shareholders.     

“原罪”嫌疑、制度环境与民营企业慈善捐赠

2018年11月1日,习近平同志在民营企业座谈会上的讲话指出,要落实按照罪刑法定、疑罪从无的原则,切实保护民营企业家的人身和财产安全,这是因为"原罪"嫌疑是中国民营企业发展史上无法回避的一个重要问题,长期使得企业家面临企业合法性地位能否获得政府与社会公众认可的担忧,产生了诸多的微观经济后果。本文以2004-2016年间中国A股民营上市公司作为研究样本,根据企业初始产权获取过程中是否涉及公有产权到私有产权的转变作为对民营企业"原罪"嫌疑的度量,实证检验了"原罪"嫌疑是否以及如何影响民营企业的慈善捐赠行为。结果发现,由于"原罪"嫌疑所引致的民营企业合法性得不到正式认可与保护的威胁,背负"原罪"嫌疑的民营企业有动机通过慈善捐赠来讨好政府和社会公众以便降低这种威胁,而且这一正向影响关系随着企业所在省市的制度环境的完善而减弱。进一步本文还发现,"原罪"嫌疑对民营企业慈善捐赠水平的正向影响关系在不存在政治联系的企业以及实际控制人登上富豪榜后表现得更为明显。     

It is a Sweetheart of a Deal: Political Connections and Corporate‐Federal Contracting

We examine whether political connections measured by political contributions influence the choice of terms included in government contracts awarded to firms. We construct an index of four “sweetheart” contract terms and find that firms making larger political contributions more frequently have these favorable terms included in their contracts. We also find that political contributions have explanatory power for contract design after controlling for lobbying, negotiation power, and the employment of former government employees. These results are robust to alternative model specifications, different estimation techniques, various variable measurements, and adjustments for possible endogeneity.     

Identifying M&A targets and the information content of VC/PEs

The information gap in the M&A market hinders acquirers from effectively identifying high-quality targets. We examine whether VC/PEs convey information content in the M&A market and whether acquirers can use such information to identify high-quality targets. We show that VC/PEs have significant information content and can signal high-quality target companies via “certification”. When acquirers lack acquisition experience and targets are located in inferior information environments, VC/PE “certification” is more significant. The better reputation a VC/PE has, the more information it conveys. Syndicate VC/PEs convey stronger information than independent VC/PEs. We also find that acquirers do not pay higher premiums for high-quality targets. Overall, our results suggest that VC/PEs have value relevance in the M&A market, confirming their “certification” role. We present means for acquirers to select high-quality targets and investors to build efficient portfolios.