The Dynamics of Dealer Markets Under Competition

The behavior of competing dealers in securities markets is analyzed. Securities are characterized by stochastic returns and stochastic transactions. Reservation bid and ask prices of dealers are derived under alternative assumptions about the degree to which transactions are correlated across stocks at a given time and over time in a given stock. The conditions for interdealer trading are specified, and the equilibrium distribution of dealer inventories and the equilibrium market spread are derived. Implications for the structure of securities markets are examined.     

Crossing Networks and Dealer Markets: Competition and Performance

This paper studies the interaction between dealer markets and a relatively new form of exchange, passive crossing networks, where buyers and sellers trade directly with one another. We find that the crossing network is characterized by both positive ('liquidity') and negative ('crowding') externalities, and we analyze the effects of its introduction on the dealer market. Traders who use the dealer market as a 'market of last resort' can induce dealers to widen their spread and can lead to more efficient subsequent prices, but traders who only use the crossing network can provide a counterbalancing effect by reducing adverse selection and inventory holding costs.     

Exit,Survival, and Competitive Equilibrium in Dealer Markets

In this study we analyze dealer exit, survival, and competitive equilibrium in the NASDAQ Stock Market using data from a unique period that entails major changes in regulatory and competitive environments. We decompose the forces that affect dealer survival into market factors and dealer attributes. Market factors encompass those variables that affect the demand for and profitability of dealer services as a whole. Variation in survival probability across dealers results mainly from their competitive advantages in business strategies, information, quote aggressiveness, access to order flow, and economies of scale. On the whole, our results suggest that dealer markets exhibit a Darwinian survival of the fittest.     

Risk Mutualization and Competition in Insurance Markets

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of mutual firms on competition in the insurance market. We distinguish two actors in this market: mutual firms, which belong to their pooled members, and traditional companies, which belong to their shareholders. Our approach differs from the literature by one crucial assumption: the expected utility of the consumers depends on the size of their insurance firm, which generates network externalities in this market. Thus, the choice of a contract results in a trade-off between the premium level and the probability of that premium being ex-post adjusted. The optimal contract offered by a mutual firm involves a systematic ex-post adjustment (negative or positive), while the contracts a company offers imply a fixed premium that is possibly negatively adjusted at the end of the contractual period. In an oligopoly game, we show that three types of configurations are possible at equilibrium: either one mutual firm or insurance company is active, or a mixed structure emerges in which two or more companies share the market with or without a mutual firm.     

Transparency and Liquidity: A Comparison of Auction and Dealer Markets with Informed Trading

Trading systems differ in their degree of transparency, here defined as the extent to which market makers can observe the size and direction of the current order flow. We investigate whether greater transparency enhances market liquidity by reducing the opportunities for taking advantage of uninformed participants. We compare the price formation process in several stylized trading systems with different degrees of transparency: various types of auction markets and a stylized dealer market. We find that greater transparency generates lower trading costs for uninformed traders on average, although not necessarily for every size of trade.     

Competition and Strategic Information Acquisition in Credit Markets

We investigate the interaction between banks’ use of informationacquisition as a strategic tool and their role in promotingthe efficiency of credit markets when a bank’s abilityto gather information varies with its distance to the borrower.We show that banks acquire proprietary information both to softenlending competition and to extend their market share. As competitionincreases, investments in information acquisition fall, leadingto lower interest rates but also to less efficient lending decisions.Consistent with the recent wave of bank acquisitions, we alsofind that merging for informational reasons with a competitoris an optimal response to industry consolidation.     

The Market Quality of Dealer versus Hybrid Markets: The Case of Moderately Liquid Securities

Abstract:  Over the last decade, electronic limit-order trading systems have been sweeping securities exchanges around the world. This paper studies a transitional case, namely, the commencement of trading of a group of moderately liquid stocks on SETS of the London Stock Exchange. The evidence reveals that the liquidity of those stocks dropped substantially after the introduction of the limit order book and the removal of the market makers' obligations. This transition provides an example that a hybrid market with a limit order book and voluntary dealers may not perform as well as a dealership market with obligatory market makers.     

欧盟证券市场的一体化与竞争

欧盟各主要证券交易所之间竞争加剧的同时，合作与联合的趋势正在加强。在今后一段时期内，很可能会形成以巴黎为中心和以伦敦——法兰克福为中心的两大欧盟交易所阵营之间竞争，同时在各阵营内部又是紧密合作或高度一体化的格局。     

Dealer Networks

Dealers in the over‐the‐counter municipal bond market form trading networks with other dealers to mitigate search frictions. Regulatory data show that this network has a core‐periphery structure with 10 to 30 hubs and over 2,000 peripheral broker‐dealers in which bonds flow from periphery to core and partially back. Central dealers charge investors up to double the round‐trip markups compared to peripheral dealers. In turn, central dealers provide immediacy by matching buyers with sellers more directly and prearranging fewer trades, especially during stress times. Investors thus face a trade‐off between execution cost and speed, consistent with network models of decentralized trade.     

Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources

This article examines the role of corporate headquarters in allocating scarce resources to competing projects in an internal capital market. Unlike a bank, headquarters has control rights that enable it to engage in “winner-picking”—the practice of actively shifting funds from one project to another. By doing a good job in the winner-picking dimension, headquarters can create value even when it cannot help at all to relax overall firm-wide credit constraints. The model implies that internal capital markets may sometimes function more efficiently when headquarters oversees a small and focused set of projects.     

Competition, Market Structure, and Bid-Ask Spreads in Stock Option Markets

This paper examines the effects of competition and market structure on equity option bid-ask spreads from 1986 to 1997. Options listed on multiple exchanges have narrower spreads than those listed on a single exchange, but the difference diminishes as option volume increases. Option spreads become wider when a competing exchange delists the option. Options traded under a "Designated Primary Marketmaker" (DPM) have narrower quoted spreads than those traded in a traditional open outcry crowd. Effective spreads are found to be slightly narrower under the DPM than in the crowd, but only since 1992, and only on low-volume options.     

欧盟《金融工具市场指令》对交易场所之间竞争的影响

《金融工具市场指令》（MiFID）作为欧盟《金融服务行动计划》的一部分,旨在欧盟区域内建立起统一的金融服务市场,并给欧盟的金融市场注入更多的竞争因素。MiFID规定了规范市场（交易所）、多边交易设施以及系统化内部撮合商三种交易场所,取消了“集中规则”,并且规定了“最佳执行”的义务。MiFID对交易场所间的竞争产生如下影响：多边交易设施的建立,加剧与传统交易所的竞争;新的交易场所的规定,加速证券交易所的合并进程;“最佳执行”的规定,让新的交易场所喜忧参半。     

Dealer financial conditions and lender-of-last-resort facilities

We examine the financial conditions of dealers that participated in two of the Federal Reserve's lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) facilities—the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)—that provided liquidity against a range of assets during 2008–2009. Dealers with lower equity returns and greater leverage prior to borrowing from the facilities were more likely to participate in the programs, borrow more, and, in the case of the TSLF, at higher bidding rates. Dealers with less liquid collateral on their balance sheets before the facilities were introduced also tended to borrow more. The results suggest that both financial performance and balance sheet liquidity play a role in LOLR utilization.     

Dealer behavior and trading systems in foreign exchange markets

We study dealer behavior in the foreign exchange spot market using detailed observations on all the transactions of four interbank dealers. There is strong support for an information effect in incoming trades. The direction of trade is most important, but we also find that the information effect increases with trade size in direct bilateral trades. All four dealers control their inventory intensively. Inventory control is not, however, manifested through a dealer's own prices in contrast to findings by Lyons (J. Financial Econ. 39(1995) 321). Furthermore, we document differences in trading styles, especially how they actually control their inventories.     

Intra‐Dealer Integration

This paper examines the quotation behaviour of dealers who made markets in the same stocks on both NASDAQ and either EASDAQ or the LSE. Whereas previous studies examine international integration at the market level, we examine integration at the dealer level. In other words, do dealers within the same market‐making firm use information from their arm on the opposite side of the Atlantic in forming their own quotes? We find that while there is some evidence of integration at the market level, integration is hard to detect at the dealer level. The results are largely unaffected by differences in fungibility between our two samples.     

Dealer Markets Under Stress: The Performance of NASDAQ Market Makers During the November 15, 1991, Market Break

The liquidity of the NASDAQ market was seriously undermined during the crash on October 19, 1987, when bid-ask spreads widened dramatically and dealers reputedly withdrew from market making. This paper studies the liquidity of 36 NASDAQ issues on November 15, 1991, when average prices fell over 4%, representing the first major correction in the post-crash era. We find that bid-ask spreads, the percentage of dealers posting inside quotes, and trading volume remained virtually unaffected. Effective spreads were also largely unaffected, except for trades in excess of 1,000 shares among issues whose market makers avoided odd-eighth quotes. Our evidence implies that, unlike October 1987, the liquidity of the NASDAQ market did not deteriorate appreciably during this episode of unusual market stress.     

Dealer balance sheets and bond liquidity provision

Do regulations decrease dealer ability to intermediate trades? Using a unique dataset of dealer-bond-level transactions, we link changes in liquidity of individual U.S. corporate bonds to dealers' transaction activity and balance sheet constraints. We show that, prior to the financial crisis, bonds traded by more levered institutions and institutions with investment bank like characteristics were more liquid but this relationship reverses after the financial crisis. In addition, institutions that face more regulations after the crisis both reduce their overall volume of trade and have less ability to intermediate customer trades.