Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves

We develop a model of vertical merger waves and use it to study the optimal merger policy. As a merger wave can result in partial foreclosure, it can be optimal to ban a vertical merger that eliminates the last unintegrated upstream firm. Such a merger is more likely to worsen market performance when the number of downstream firms is large relative to the number of upstream firms, and when upstream contracts are non‐discriminatory, linear and public. On the other hand, the optimal merger policy can be non‐monotonic in the strength of synergies or in the degree of downstream product differentiation.     

Contracts as a barrier to entry: Impact of Buyer’s asymmetric information and bargaining power

An incumbent seller contracts with a buyer under the threat of entry. The contract stipulates a price and a penalty for breach if the buyer later switches to the entrant. Sellers are heterogenous in terms of the gross surplus they provide to the buyer. The buyer is privately informed on her valuation for the incumbent’s service. Asymmetric information makes the incumbent favor entry as it helps screening buyers. When the entrant has some bargaining power vis-à-vis the buyer and keeps a share of the gains from entry, the incumbent instead wants to reduce entry. The compounding effect of these two forces may lead to either excessive entry or foreclosure, and possibly to a fixed rebate for exclusivity which is afforded to all buyers.     

Access pricing: A comparison between full deregulation and two alternative instruments of access price regulation,cost-based and retail-minus

In this paper, two instruments of access price regulation, cost-based and retail-minus, are compared with the full deregulation hypothesis. For this purpose, a model that considers an upstream monopolist firm that sells a vital input to an independent firm and to a subsidiary firm in the downstream market is developed. The main conclusion of the paper is that retail-minus regulation avoids foreclosure and leads to better results than cost-based regulation in terms of investment level and consumer surplus. Moreover, retail-minus regulation allows a higher consumer surplus than deregulation of access price as long as the regulator carefully defines the retail-minus instrument.     

Buyer power and exclusion in vertically related markets

Suppliers and consumer organizations have become increasingly concerned by the build-up of buyer power of retailers in many markets. A major concern is that strong retailers will abuse their power to exclude products and rival retailers from the market to be able to increase prices to consumers. As a consequence, remedies to limit buyer power are discussed and implemented in many countries. In this paper we compare the incentives for exclusion, and the effect on consumers prices, under both buyer and seller power. We study a model with a dominant upstream manufacturer and a competitive fringe of producers offering their products to two differentiated downstream retailers. We compare the equilibrium outcome of this model when i) the dominant supplier holds all the bargaining power, and (ii) the retailers have all the bargaining power. We show that full or partial exclusion of either the competitive product or downstream retailers occurs when inter and intrabrand competition are strong. This is true both under seller and buyer power. However, in contrast to the received literature, we find that buyer power weakly enhances welfare compared to seller power because buyer power will lead to both more product variety (less exclusion) and lower retail prices.     

Bilateral Bargaining with Externalities

This paper provides an analysis of a non‐cooperative pairwise bargaining game between agents in a network. We establish that there exists an equilibrium that generates a coalitional bargaining division of the reduced surplus that arises as a result of externalities between agents. That is, we provide a non‐cooperative justification for a cooperative division of a non‐cooperative surplus. The resulting division is related to the Myerson‐Shapley value with properties that are particularly useful and tractable in applications. We demonstrate this by examining buyer‐seller networks and vertical foreclosure.     

Anti-competitive effects of resale-below-cost laws

We show that resale-below-cost laws enable producers to impose industrywide price-floors to retailers. This mechanism suppresses downstream competition but also dampens upstream competition, leading to higher prices. Price-floor may be more profitable for producers than resale price maintenance contracts and, while resale price maintenance may have ambiguous effect on welfare, price-floors always harm welfare. Retailers' buyer power appears as a key element for a price-floor to work out.     

VERTICAL MERGERS,FORECLOSURE AND RAISING RIVALS' COSTS – EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE*

The hypothesis that vertically integrated firms have an incentive to foreclose the input market because foreclosure raises its downstream rivals' costs is the subject of much controversy in the theoretical industrial organization literature. A powerful argument against this hypothesis is that, absent commitment, such foreclosure cannot occur in Nash equilibrium. The laboratory data reported in this paper provide experimental evidence in favor of the hypothesis. Markets with a vertically integrated firm are significantly less competitive than those where firms are separate. While the experimental results violate the standard equilibrium notion, they are consistent with the quantal‐response generalization of Nash equilibrium.     

Structuring and contracting in competing supply chains

This paper considers two competing supply chains, each with multiple upstream suppliers producing complementary products and selling to a single buyer (e.g., assembler or retailer), who then sells the finished assembled product to a market that involves both demand uncertainty and competition. Our main research questions focus on what supply chain structure (integration vs. decentralization) and which contracting strategy a business should choose. We find that supply chains that decentralize perform better under strong market competition (i.e., high degree of product substitution between supply chains). However, when a large number of suppliers exist, supply chains that integrate perform better. When decentralized structures are used for both supply chains, a consignment with revenue sharing contract generally outperforms a wholesale price contract from the downstream retailer's point of view. Interestingly, for a supplier, a wholesale price contract, which pushes all demand risks to the downstream retailer, might not be preferred. For the entire supply chain, one contract strategy can outperform another depending on the degree of competition, the cost share of the buyer, and the number of suppliers.     

Buyer power with atomistic upstream entry: Can downstream consolidation increase production and welfare?

This paper investigates the effects of buyer power on entry into an atomistic upstream market and economic welfare. Under reasonable market conditions, we show that industries with a few buyers induce more upstream entry than industries with a larger number of firms. In particular, monopsony can be more conducive to entry and lead to higher social welfare than more fragmented industry structures. This seeming paradox arises because a single buyer better internalizes the positive effects of entry on later-periods’ supply conditions than a collection of firms. This result is relevant in a number of market settings, including markets for specialized labor and processing markets for agricultural products.     

Upstream Competition between Vertically Integrated Firms

We propose a model of two‐tier competition between vertically integrated firms and unintegrated downstream firms. We show that, even when integrated firms compete in prices to offer a homogeneous input, the Bertrand logic may collapse, and the input may be priced above marginal cost in equilibrium. These partial foreclosure equilibria are more likely to exist when downstream competition is fierce or when unintegrated downstream competitors are relatively inefficient. We discuss the impact of several regulatory tools on the competitiveness of the wholesale market.     

Upstream merger in a successive oligopoly: Who pays the price?

This study applies a successive oligopoly model, with an unobservable non-linear tariff between upstream and downstream firms, to analyze the possible anti-competitive effects of an upstream merger in the Norwegian food sector (specifically, the market for eggs). The theoretical predictions are that an upstream merger may lead to higher average prices paid by downstream firms and at the same time no changes in the prices paid by consumers. Consistent with the theoretical predictions it is found that the merger had no effect on consumer prices, but led to higher average prices paid by the downstream firms to the merged firm.     

Robust exclusion and market division through loyalty discounts

We show that loyalty discounts create an externality among buyers because each buyer who signs a loyalty discount contract softens competition and raises prices for all buyers. This externality can enable an incumbent to use loyalty discounts to effectively divide the market with its rival and raise prices. If loyalty discounts also include a buyer commitment to buy from the incumbent, then loyalty discounts can also deter entry under conditions in which ordinary exclusive dealing cannot. With or without buyer commitment, loyalty discounts will increase profits while reducing consumer welfare and total welfare as long as enough buyers exist and the entrant does not have too large a cost advantage. These propositions are true even if the entrant is more efficient and the loyalty discounts are above cost and cover less than half the market. We also prove that these propositions hold without assuming economies of scale, downstream competition, buyer switching costs, financial constraints, limits on rival expandability, or any intra-product bundle of contestable and incontestable demand.     

The Impact of Interstate Foreclosure Cost Differences and the Value of Mortgages on Default Rates

Previous research on mortgage default has focused on the costs, benefits, and characteristics of the mortgagor. In such studies default rates have been taken as a measure of mortgage risk. In this paper we present a model where the position of the lender affects the default-foreclosure process. Important to the lender's decision to foreclose rather than renegotiate an existing loan are the value of mortgage and the legal costs associated with foreclosure.
The empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that both the value of the mortgage and legal foreclosure costs affect the foreclosure rate. In those states where legal foreclosure costs are high rates are significantly less than where costs are low. This suggests that previous models which include only the costs and benefits of default to the borrower are incomplete and that foreclosure rates can not be taken as a strict measure of mortgage risk. That is, low foreclosure rates may indicate that losses occur in other forms of loan negotiation rather than in expensive legal costs.     

Legal unbundling can be a golden mean between vertical integration and ownership separation

We study an industry in which an upstream monopolist supplies an essential input at a regulated price to several downstream firms. Legal unbundling means in our model that a downstream firm owns the upstream firm, but this upstream firm is legally independent and maximizes its own upstream profits. We allow for non-tariff discrimination by the upstream firm and show that under quite general conditions legal unbundling never yields lower quantities in the downstream market than ownership separation and integration. Therefore, typically, consumer surplus will be largest under legal unbundling. Outcomes under legal unbundling are still advantageous when we allow for discriminatory capacity investments, investments into marginal cost reduction and investments into network reliability. If access prices are unregulated, however, legal unbundling may be quite undesirable.     

A bargaining perspective on strategic outsourcing and supply competition

This article considers the outsourcing choice of a downstream firm with its own upstream production resources or assets. The novelty of the approach is to consider the outsourced function as involving resources consistent with the resource‐based view of the firm. From a bargaining perspective, we characterize a downstream firm's decision whether to outsource to an independent or to an established upstream firm. In so doing, the downstream firm faces a trade‐off between lower input costs afforded by independent competition, and higher resource value associated with those who can consolidate upstream capabilities. We show that this trade‐off is resolved in favor of outsourcing to an established firm. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Vertical integration and product differentiation

We study a new channel of downstream rent extraction through vertical integration: competition for integration. Innovative downstream firms create value and profit opportunities through product differentiation, which however affects an upstream monopolist’s incentive to vertically integrate. By playing the downstream firms against each other for integration, the upstream firm can extract even more than the additional profits generated by the downstream firms’ differentiation activities. To preempt rent extraction, the downstream firms may then reduce differentiation, which reduces social welfare. We show that this social cost of vertical integration is more likely to arise in innovative and competitive industries, and that the competition for integration channel of downstream rent extraction is robust to upstream competition.     

The Cost of Foreclosure Delay

We measure the cost of foreclosure delay by estimating time‐related foreclosure costs using a large national sample of residential mortgages before, during, and after the recent U.S. housing crisis. The large volume of foreclosures, coupled with an unprecedented series of government interventions in mortgage servicing practices, significantly extended foreclosure timelines during and after the crisis.  Costs were especially pronounced in judicial review states, which saw average foreclosure costs go up 15 percentage points, 24 percentage points in the highest cost state.  Cost increases of this magnitude are likely to have consequences for servicing practices and mortgage credit availability.     

Foreclosure Discount: Definition and Dynamic Patterns

The lack of a consistent definition of foreclosure discount gives rise to discount rates that vary from nonexistent to sizeable across locations and time. We define the foreclosure discount as the discount of the real estate owned (REO) sale price relative to a normal‐sale estimated market value. With a dataset of 1.34 million REO sale transactions, across 16 CBSAs between 2000 and 2012, we find three noteworthy empirical findings. First, a high REO sale concentration in a market increases the foreclosure discount. Second, foreclosure discount is negatively related to recent house‐price appreciation. Third, the often reported high foreclosure discount for lower value properties is likely due to property condition.     

Cascading contingent protection and vertical market structure

Cascading contingent protection may occur when protection of an upstream industry transfers injury to the downstream industry and increases the likelihood that this industry asks and receives protection. This paper examines cascading protection within a sequential petitioning model where the upstream industry acts as leader. The analysis identifies market structure and the vertical linkage between the upstream and the downstream industry as important determinants of the occurrence of cascading protection. It is shown that the circumstances which make cascading protection more likely to occur also make it more likely that this protection has serious negative welfare consequences.     

A note on vertical market foreclosure

The judicial fear of vertical market foreclosure has been criticized severely in the academic literature. The focus of this criticism isnot that foreclosure is impossible; rather, it is that foreclosure is not a profitable business strategy. In this note, we show that this criticism is not valid under conditions of partial ownership. If effective vertical control can be achieved with partial ownership, vertical market foreclosure can be used to increase the partial owner's profits. We use theduPont (GM) litigation as a vehicle to explore this point.